Judgment 1. In this case the petitioner has obtained a rule from the High Court calling upon the opposite party to show cause why the order of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Patna, dated the 28th of January 1957, permitting the opposite party No. 1, Raj Kuer Ra-ghubansmani Prasad Narayan Singh, to withdraw the amount of Rs. 59,096 and odd in deposit in Trust Administration suit No. 12/16 of 1946/56 should not be set aside. 2. The suit related to a trust known as General Trust of the Tekari Raj Estate created in respect of the sixteen annas Tekari Raj properties by defendant No. 1 Rani Bhuneshwari Kuer, by means of an instrument of trust dated the 20th January 1941. Paragraph 34 of the instrument of trust provided that the President will bo the executive head of the Board of Trustees, but the name of the Rani Saheba shall be recorded in the Land Registration Department of the Collectorate of the various districts where the trust properties are situated and in other public records as trustee representing the entire body of the trustees and all proceedings of the Court shall be carried out in her name. Paragraph 4 of the instrument of trust dated the 20th January 1941, further provided that the trustees shall pay, out of the income of the trust properties, the money payable to the Government on account of land revenue or otherwise. Paragraph 19 of the instrument provided for the payment of debts mentioned in Schedule D of the instrument which included, amongst others, the payment of dues under the Income-tax Act and the Agricultural Income-tax Act. Paragraph 23 said that, after making payments detailed in the preceding paragraphs, the surplus of the net rents and profits of the trust estate shall be divided amongst the beneficiaries in certain proportions. The present suit was brought by the plaintiff, opposite party No. 1, alleging that there had been a breach of trust on the part of the trustees and praying that a scheme should be framed by the Court for proper administration of the estate and an investigation should be made regarding the accounts of the trust estate. The present suit was brought by the plaintiff, opposite party No. 1, alleging that there had been a breach of trust on the part of the trustees and praying that a scheme should be framed by the Court for proper administration of the estate and an investigation should be made regarding the accounts of the trust estate. A written statement was filed on behalf of the Rani Saneba, defendant No. 1, on the 25th May 1946, and one of the points taken in defence was that the plaintiff had forfeited his right to act as a trustee. It is also material to state that on the 29th January 1948, there was a compromise entered into between the parties which was recorded by the Court. The terms of the compromise are as follows :- - "1. The Rani Saheba and the Board of Trustees will deposit in current account in the Imperial Bank within a fortnight from today the entire money of the plaintiffs share up to date which is alleged by the defendants to have been forfeited. This amount will be deposited by the Rani Saheba and the Board of Trustees in presence of the Nazir in the name of the District Judge. The receipt will be deposited in Court. 2. The plaintiff can make a proposal at any time he likes and as many proposals as necessary as to the manner in which the money deposited under para. 1 above should be invested. The Rani Saheba will have the right to object to the proposals. If any propcsal is agreed upon by both parties, the money will be invested accordingly. If the Rani Saheba objects to any proposal regarding investment, the District Judge will decide whether the proposal is reasonable or not. If it is decided that the proposal is reasonable, the money will be invested according to the proposal. Otherwise the proposal win be turned down. 3. The Rani Saheba and the Board of Trustees will go on depositing in the same account such money as may accrue to the plaintiffs share in future. The receipts will always be filed in Court. The terms regarding proposal as to investment of those moneys will be the same as above. 4. If the decision in the suit is that the plaintiff has forfeited his share, the money deposited under the terms mentioned above will be paid to the Rani Saheba. The receipts will always be filed in Court. The terms regarding proposal as to investment of those moneys will be the same as above. 4. If the decision in the suit is that the plaintiff has forfeited his share, the money deposited under the terms mentioned above will be paid to the Rani Saheba. If the decision is that the plaintiff has not forfeited his share they will be paid to him." 3. In pursuance of this compromise order, a sum of Rs. 59.096-13-3 was deposited by the Board of Trustees in the name of the District Judge, Patna. in the current account of the State Bank of India. 4. There was further compromise between the parties, and on the 15th June 1955, the defendant No. 1, the Rani Saheba, applied for amendment of the written statement by deleting the clause relating to forfeiture. This amendment was allowed by the Court on the 31st May 1956. Thereafter a joint petition was filed on the 5th June 1956, which Was signed bv the plaintiff and the Rani Saheba, praying that the plaintiff should be permitted to withdraw the entire amount of Rs. 59,096-13-3, which was in deposit. 5. In the meantime the Income-tax Department and the Commercial Taxes Department laid claim to the amount in question, and on the 9th January 1956, the Certificate Officer, Gaya, made a prohibitory order under Rule 20 of Schedule II of the Bihar and Onssa Public Demands Recovery Act with regard to the said deposit. It was objected on behalf of the plaintiff that the prohibitory order was illegal, and, after hearing the parties in the matter, the Additional Subordinate Judge of Patna took the view that the amount in deposit was not liable to be attached in certificate proceedings and that the plaintiff should be permitted to withdraw the amount held in deposit 6. In support of this application, the learned Advocate-General submitted in the first place that the assessment proceedings were taken against the Board of Trustees and the assessment order was also in their name and the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that Rani Bhubneshwari Kuer was assessed in her personal capacity. The orders of assessment of Agricultural income-tax have not been produced before the Subordinate Judge nor have they been produced in this Court. But in the certificates (Exs. The orders of assessment of Agricultural income-tax have not been produced before the Subordinate Judge nor have they been produced in this Court. But in the certificates (Exs. A-1 and A-2) the certificate-debtor is shown as Sri Rani Bhubneshwari Kuer -- General Trust Tikari Raj, Ganga Mahal, Gaya, and in the certificate, Ex. A-3, the certificate-debtor has been shown as Sri Rani Bhubneshwari Kuer, Tikari Raj, Ganga Mahal. The procedure with regard to the assessment of tax on trust property is described in Sec.12 of Bihar Act XXXII of 1948, which states as follows :- - "12. Assessment of tax on land held for the benefit of several persons. -- (1) Save as provided in Sections 10, 13 and 15, if a person holds land on trust from which agricultural income is derived wholly for the benefit of another or partly for his own benefit and partly for the benefit of another agricultural income-tax shall be assessed on the total agricultural income derived from such land at the rate which would be applicable if such person had held the land as his personal property and exclusively for his own benefit, and the agricultural income-tax so payable shall be assessed on the person holding such land, and he shall be liable to pay the same." Under Sec.2 (m) of the Act " person means any individual, or association of individuals, owning or holding property for himself or for any other, or partly for his own benefit and partly for another, either as owner, trustee, receiver, common manager.....". Sec.2 (m) would, therefore, apply to a Board of Trustees which is an association of individuals within the meaning of that section. It is obvious, therefore, that the assessment in this case should have been made against the Board of Trustees and not against Rani Bhubneshwari Kuer as representing the Board of Trustees. In the present case it -is argued by the learned Advocate General that under the terms of the instrument of trust dated 20th of January, 1941, as subsequently amended, there was an agreement between the parties that hne name of the Rani Saheba shall be recorded in tne Land Registration Department of the Collectorates of tne various districts where the trust properties are situated and in other public record as trustee representing the entire body of the trustees, and all proceedings of Court shall be carried out in her name". On the basis of this clause it was argued by the learned Advocate General that the Rani saheba was competent to represent the Board of Trustees in the assessment proceedings. We are unable to accept this argument. In the first place, the instrument of trust does not say that the Rani Saheba would represent the Board of Trustees in revenue proceedings with regard to assessment. It is obvious that proceedings taken for assessment of Agricultural Income-tax before the Commissioner or before the Commercial Taxes Officer are not proceedings taken before a Court. Paragraph 34 of the instrument, therefore, has no application to this case. Secondly, the procedure for assessment has been prescribed by the various provisions of Bihar Act 32 of 1948, and the jurisdiction of the authority to assess tax depends upon the statutory provisions and not upon the terms of the deed of trust entered into between the Rani Saheba and the other parties to that instrument. To put it differently, the jurisdiction to assess Agricultural Income-tax depends upon the strict compliance of the provisions of Bihar Act 32 of 1948 and the requirements of the statutory provisions cannot be varied by any clause in the instrument of trust. For these reasons we hold that in the present case there is no valid order of assessment made against the Board of Trustees as required by Sec.12 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act (Bihar Act 32 of 1948). 7. We shall, however, assume in favour of the petitioner that there is a valid order of assessment against the Board of Trustees for income-tax for the year in question. Even on that assumption, the question would arise whether the authorities have jurisdiction to proceed against the money in deposit for realisation of the Agricultural Income-tax. It is necessary to reler again in this connection to Sec.12 (quoted above) of Bihar Act 32 of 1948, upon the language of which much of the argument of learned Counsel for both parties ranged in this case. The argument of the learned Government Advocate was that Sec.12 imposed a liability for payment of Agricultural Income-tax upon the trustees holding the trust properties who and who alone shall be liable to pay the same. The argument of the learned Government Advocate was that Sec.12 imposed a liability for payment of Agricultural Income-tax upon the trustees holding the trust properties who and who alone shall be liable to pay the same. It is true that Sec.12 (2) makes a provision that the trustees shall be entitled to deduct the amount of Agricultural Income-tax before paying to any beneficiary the amount of agricultural income to which such beneficiary is entitled, but the Act does not say that the beneficiaries are liable for payment of the Agricultural Income-tax. On the other hand, the liability for payment of the tax is thrown upon the trustees and upon the trustees alone. Tne learned Subordinate Judge has found in the present ease that tne amount in deposit, namely, Rs. 59,000 and odd has been paid out of tne trust income to the beneficiary, namely, the plaintiff Raj Kuer, and the amount was not a part of the trust fund on the date when the prohibitory order was passed. If that finding is correct, it would follow that the Certificate Officer had no jurisdiction to attach that amount. The Advocate General on behalf of the petitioner, however, attacked that finding on the ground that the trustees have no right to distribute the income of the trust to any of the beneficiaries unless amounts payable to the Government on account of land revenue or Agricultural income-tax have been satisfied, in this connection the Advocate General relied upon paragraph 4 of the instrument of trust dated 20th of January, 1941. It was argued by the Advocate General that there was a breach of the terms of the trust and the . money in deposit was wrongly distributed to the beneficiaries in breach of the terms of the trust and the authorities of the Commercial Taxes Department could therefore pursue the money in the hands of the beneficiaries. We do not accept this argument as correct. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether there was a breach of the terms of the trust deed. But, even assuming that there was a breach of paragraph 4 of the instrument of trust, it does not follow that the payment of the amount to the beneficiary is a nullity or it is a matter which could be ignored. But, even assuming that there was a breach of paragraph 4 of the instrument of trust, it does not follow that the payment of the amount to the beneficiary is a nullity or it is a matter which could be ignored. Nor does it follow that the title to the money in deposit continued in the trustees and that the title was not transferred to the beneficiary. As a result of the compromise between the parties, dated 29th of January, 1948, the amount in deposit was held in Court in the name and for the benefit of the plaintiff. It is manifest that the money has passed out of the title and control of the trustees and title to the money was transferred to the plaintiff, Raj Kuer. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the amount of tax charged upon agricultural income could be followed in the hands of the beneficiaries to whom that agricultural income was distributed. We think that this argument is fallacious because it is well settled that the Agricultural Income-tax is not made a charge upon the income and there is no provision in the statute whicn makes it a charge upon income. On the contrary, the correct proposition is that the tax is a tax imposed upon the person in relation to his income and that the tax is not a charge on the income. That view has been expressed by Beaumont C. J. and Kania J. with regard to the analogous provisions of the Income-tax Act in the case of In re, Patiala State Bank. AIR 1941 Bom 93 (A). We, therefore, reject the argument of learned Advocate General that there is some kind of charge imposed upon the trust income which it is possible for the petitioner to follow or trace in the hands of the beneficiaries. In this connection learned Government Advocate also pertinently referred to Sec.3 (1) and Sec.18 (1) of the Public Demands Recovery Act and argued that the certificate-debtor Rani Saheba had no disposing power over the deposit because of the terms of the compromise dated 29th of January, 1948. In this connection learned Government Advocate also pertinently referred to Sec.3 (1) and Sec.18 (1) of the Public Demands Recovery Act and argued that the certificate-debtor Rani Saheba had no disposing power over the deposit because of the terms of the compromise dated 29th of January, 1948. It was submitted and rightly submitted that the certificate authorities could proceed to execute the certificate only against the properties over which the certificate-debtor had disposing power within the meaning of Sec.18 (1) of Bihar and Orissa Act 4 of 1914, and in the present case the certificate-debtor had no such disposing power over the deposit in question. 8. For these reasons we hold that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge dated 28th of January, 1957, is right, and we are Satisfied that there is no error of jurisdiction and the learned Subordinate Judge has not acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. It follows that there is no merit in this application which must be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100/-.