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1957 DIGILAW 167 (ALL)

Dwarika Prasad v. Board of Revenue

1957-04-09

MOOTHAM, SRIVASTAVA

body1957
JUDGMENT Srivastava, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeks the quashing of an order of the Board of Revenue dated 17-12-1956. 2. The applicant Dwarika Prasad was the hereditary tenant of the two plots of land Nos. 351 and 442 of village Mahewa, tahsil Bhartnal district Etawah. On 7-5-1945, he filed a suit against Respondents 4 to 6 alleging that they had wrongfully taken possession of the plots. The suit was filed u/s 180 of U.P. Tenancy Act. It resulted in a compromise dated 19-2-1951 according to which it was, agreed between the parties that the applicant would get possession over half the area of the plots and remain its hereditary tenant, while the Respondents would retain the remaining half of the plots and be its hereditary tenants. In pursuance of this compromise, without the decree being executed, the Respondents 4 to 6 gave up possession over half the area of the plots to the applicant. After the date of vesting under the UPZA and LR Act, Respondents 4 to 6 filed an application u/s 232 of the Act claiming possession over that half of the plots which had been given to the Petitioner under the compromise decree. They based this claim on Section 20(b) of the UPZA and LR Act and alleged that they were the adhivasis of the entire plots because they were recorded as occupants of the same in the khasra and the khatauni of 1356F. This application was contested mainly on the ground that the Respondents had voluntarily given up possession over the disputed half share of the plots to the Petitioner and were not entitled to restoration of possession over that half because they could not be said to have been "evicted" therefrom within the meaning of Explanation I to Section 20. It was also urged that the compromise provided for the correction of the entries in the village papers in accordance with its terms. Though no correction had in fact been made it would be deemed to have been made is contemplated by Explanation III of the Section. The trial court dismissed the application of the Respondents on the ground that as they had not been "evicted" from the portion over which they claimed possession they could not maintain the application u/s 232. The Respondents Nos. 4 to 6 went up in appeal to the Addl. Commr. The trial court dismissed the application of the Respondents on the ground that as they had not been "evicted" from the portion over which they claimed possession they could not maintain the application u/s 232. The Respondents Nos. 4 to 6 went up in appeal to the Addl. Commr. who allowed the Appeal and ordered the restoration of possession to the Respondents, as claimed by them. An application in revision was then filed before the Board of Revenue by the Petitioner and has been dismissed by the order which is sought to be quashed by this writ petition. 3. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the Addl. Commr. as well as the Board of Revenue committed a manifest error of law in taking the view that the Respondents Nos. 4 to 6 had been "evicted" from the land in dispute within the meaning of the term as used in Explanation I to Section 20 of the UPZA and LR Act when in fact they had voluntarily given up possession over the land in pursuance of a compromise. Another error which they had committed was that they had overlooked the provision in the compromise about the correction of the entries in the village papers. The Respondents had based their claim to be adhivasis on the ground that they were entered in the village papers as occupants in 1356F. That entry must be deemed to have been corrected in view of the compromise and could not on that account be relied upon by the Respondents. 4. Both the contentions urged by the learned Counsel appear to be without force. The Respondents Nos. 4 to 6 could maintain the application u/s 232 of the ZA and LR Act, if they/were persons to whom Section 20(b) of the Act applied. As it is not disputed that the Respondents were persons who were recorded as occupants of the land in dispute in the khasra and khatauni of 1356F, it is obvious that their case was covered by Section 20(b) of the Act. The compromise which was arrived at in 1951 contemplated a correction of the entries in the papers relating to that year (1951) or of subsequent years and not of the entries of 1356F. On the basis of the compromise therefore it could not be deemed that the entries relating to 1356F had been corrected. The compromise which was arrived at in 1951 contemplated a correction of the entries in the papers relating to that year (1951) or of subsequent years and not of the entries of 1356F. On the basis of the compromise therefore it could not be deemed that the entries relating to 1356F had been corrected. Explanations III to Section 20 could not in the circumstances apply. On the basis of the entries in 1356F therefore the Respondents could claim to have become adhivasis of the land in dispute on the coming into force of the ZA and LR Act, and. became on that account entitled to apply u/s 232 of the Act. 5. For successfully maintaining an application u/s 232 of the Act the only two conditions which appear to be necessary are (1) that the applicants should be persons to whom Section 20(b) of the Act applies, and (2) that the application is filed within the period of limitation provided in the section. Both these conditions were fulfilled by the Respondents. If, as appears to be the case, Section 20(b) applied to the Respondents they became entitled as adhivais under that provision to take possession if they were out of possession and to retain possession if they were in possession. In the present case, they were not in. possession of the land on the date when the Act came into force. They, therefore, became entitled u/s 232 of the Act to recover possession. Explanation I to Section 20 of the Act does not lay down any additional condition which an adhivasi who falls u/s 20(b) should comply with in order to become entitled to get the benefit of Section 232 of the Act. The explanation appears to have been enacted for the benefit of the adhivasis falling under Clause (b) of the section and only makes it clear that they will-be entitled to regain possession of their land even if they have been evicted from it after 30-6-1948 by any order or decree. It cannot therefore be said that an adhivasi falling under Clause (b) of Section 20 can get the benefit of Section 232 only if he has been 'evicted' from the land after that date as contemplated by the explanation. The explanation cannot obviously be interpreted as imposing a further restriction on the right of an adhivasi to claim possession. It cannot therefore be said that an adhivasi falling under Clause (b) of Section 20 can get the benefit of Section 232 only if he has been 'evicted' from the land after that date as contemplated by the explanation. The explanation cannot obviously be interpreted as imposing a further restriction on the right of an adhivasi to claim possession. The contention that the Respondents could claim to recover possession u/s 232 only if they had been evicted within the meaning of the explanation cannot therefore be accepted as correct 6. Both the contentions pressed being thus without force, the petition must fail. It is accordingly dismissed.