DEKA, J. : This rule was issued on an ap­plication under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ of mandamus or certiorari or any other prerogative writ for quashing an award passed by the Judge, Industrial Tribunal, Assam directing reinstatement of one Abdur Rahman to his office as a truck driver with back pay for the period he was out of office. (2) The facts shortly put are that Md. Abdur Rahman claimed to be an employee in the ser­vice of the Management of Messrs. Mohon Rice Mill, Tezpur. He was a driver drawing Rs. 105/-per month and was employed on 5th May, 1954 and worked upto 16th July, 1955 on which date he was dismissed without any notice and with­out assigning any reason for his dismissal. It was alleged that the Management did not follow the procedure laid down under the standing Borders applicable to all industrial establishments in Assam and acted in contravention of section 12 (a) or 14(4) of the aforesaid standing orders. The action of the Management was alleged to be arbitrary, illegal and in violation of the .standing orders as aforesaid. The Indian National Trades Union Congress prayed for re­instatement of Md. Abdur Rahman with all back wages from the date of his dismissal till re­instatement. (3) The Management of M/s- Mohon Rice Mill Tezpur belonging to Shri Mangilal Agarwalla filed a written statement contesting the claim of the driver. The contention of the Mill was that Abdur Rahman was not an employee of the Mill but he was a driver and a personal employee of Shri Mangilal Agarwalla, the owner of the Mill. His duty was to drive a public car­rier vehicle which belonged to Mangilal Agar­walla and it was his personal property. Abdur Rahman was not a workman of the Mill and he ,had no dispute with the mill as such. It was further alleged that there was no dispute which could be a subject matter of-reference under section 10(1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to go into the matter. (4) The learned Judge of the Industrial Tri­bunal classified the objections raised on behalf of the Mill as follows:- (1) It is pleaded that Md. Abdur Rahman is not a workman as defined under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as amend­ed. (4) The learned Judge of the Industrial Tri­bunal classified the objections raised on behalf of the Mill as follows:- (1) It is pleaded that Md. Abdur Rahman is not a workman as defined under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as amend­ed. (2) That when it is not an industrial dispute, as defined under Section 2(k) of the Act, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the matter. (3) That as Md. Abdur Rahman was a per­sonal employee of Sri Mangilal Agarwalla, no industrial dispute as de-fined under section 2(k) of the Act, can be raised for a dispute between two individuals. The learned Judge came to the finding that though Abdur Rahman was a driver of a truck "belonging to Mangilal, he was in fact an em­ployee of the mill as he was paid from the funds of the mill. He further held that the dispute between the parties came within the definition of 'industrial dispute' as defined in section 2(k) of the Act. He rejected the suggestion that Ab­dur Rahman was a personal employee of Man­gilal Agarwalla as alleged. (5) It also appears that an objection was raised before the Tribunal to the effect that an individual could not raise an industrial dispute even if he is found to work in an industry. The learned Judge rejected this contention as well on the ground that the case of the employee was taken up by the I. N. T. U. C. He expressed himself on this issue in the following manner:- "It is now a settled law that even an indi­vidual can raise a dispute if any Union takes up his cause. In this case, it is proved that Rahman was a member of Tezpur Mill Mazdoor Union and when he was dismissed his case was taken up by the Mill Mazdoor Union who forwarded it to the I. N. T. U. C. Branch at Tezpur, to which Tezpur Mill Mazdoor Union was affiliat­ed." He further relied on section 36 of the In­dustrial Disputes Act for the purpose of holding that the workman could be represented by the Trade Union Congress. (6) The learned counsel for 'the petitioner has taken almost the identical points before us, his contentions being- (1) that the respondent No. 2 (Abdur Rahman) was not a workman within the scope of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore the dispute raised by him could not be a dispute described in section 2(k) of the said Act; (2) that the dispute being an individual one it could not come within the scope of section 2(k), nor was a reference competent under sec­tion 10(1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act; (3) that the I. N. T. U. C. had no locus stfmdi to take up the case of the respondent; and (4) that there were no materials to show that the respondent No. 2 was an employee of the mill; and hence the Industrial Disputes Act had no application to the facts of the case. (7) We do not propose to go into the point as to whether Abdur Rahman was an employee of the Mill or a personal employee of Mangilal Agarwalla, the proprietor of the mill, since the learned Judge, Industrial Tribunal finds that the respondent No. 2 was an employee of the mill, though left to ourselves the possibility is not rul­ed out that we might have been inclined to take a dif­ferent view on facts. The other contention, name­ly as to whether the I. N. T. U. C. could repre­sent the case of a worker cannot be a matter of serious dispute, provided there be proper autho­risation. Therefore the only point which is of material importance is whether the dispute as to dismissal and re-employment of Abdur Rah­man was an individual dispute or it was an "in­dustrial dispute'' coming within the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act. (8) "Industrial Dispute" is defined in the Act as follows:- "'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers pnd employees, or between employers and workmen, or between! workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.'' (9) Mr. Bhattacharjee appearing for the dis­missed worker has drawn our attention to the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court made in the case of "Clerks of Calcutta Tramways v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd-" 1956 SCR 772 : ( (S) AIR 1957 SO 78) (A). Bhattacharjee appearing for the dis­missed worker has drawn our attention to the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court made in the case of "Clerks of Calcutta Tramways v. Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd-" 1956 SCR 772 : ( (S) AIR 1957 SO 78) (A). The relevant observation runs as follows:- "It is now well settled that generally the necessary pre-requisites for this Court's interference to set right decisions arrived at by Tribunals whose conclu­sions on questions of fact are final can be classi­fied under the following categories, namely, (i) where the Tribunal acts in excess of the juris­diction conferred upon it under the statute or regulation creating it or where it ostensibly fails to exercise a patent jurisdiction ; (ii) where there is an apparent error on the face of the decision and (iii) where the Tribunal has erroneously applied well-accepted principles of jurisprudence. It is only when errors of this nature exist, that interference is called for." (10) In this particular case we are to decide whether the Tribunal had acted in excess of its jurisdiction conferred upon it under the statute. With a view to decide this point we must go into some of the facts. The case was started on the basis of a report made to the Labour Officer, Government of Assam by Shri B. Sarma, Secre­tary, I. N. T. U. C., Tezpur Branch. The contents of the report were as follows:- "I have received a complaint from one Abdur Rahman, a driver of Mohan Rice Mill, Tezpur that he was dismissed without notice and his wages were not paid in full. He is an employee of the said Mill for about 8 years. His dismissal is illegal and unjust. I would therefore request you to take steps in the same at an early date/' Copy of this document was made annexure B (2) to the petition filed in this Court. On this report, action was taken by the Conciliation Officer and the Conciliation Officer in turn having failed to effect a conciliation between the emplo­yer and the employee made a report to the Gov­ernment on the basis of which a reference under section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act was made to the Judge, Industrial Tribunal, who passed the award after hearing the parties which has been challenged before us by this petition for a prerogative writ. (11) We have to examine in this case as to whether Abdur Rahman was supported by any other worker of the industry or by any Union of such workers. In case he was so sup­ported, the dispute would come within section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act though only the interest of a single worker was involved. Both the parties have cited several rulings be­fore us for consideration and I would like to begin with the latest that is decided by the Sup­reme Court, reported in Central Provinces Trans­port Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan, 1957 SCA 1: ((S) AIR 1957 SC 104 ) (R). In this case Venkatarama Ayyar J., observed as follows: "The question whether a dispute by an in­dividual workman would be an industrial dis­pute as defined in S. 2 (k) of the Act No. XIV of 1947, has evoked considerable conflict of opinion both in the High Courts and in Industrial Tri­bunals, and three different views have been ex­pressed thereon: (I) A dispute which concerns only the rights of individual workers, cannot be held to be an industrial dispute. * * ° * (II) A dispute between an employer and single em­ployee can be an industrial dispute as defined in section 2 (k). * * * (III) A dispute between an employer and a single employee can­not per se be an industrial dispute, but it may become one if it is taken up by the Union or a number of workmen." His Lordship further goes on to observe "The preponderance of judicial opinion is clearly in favour of the last of the three views stated above, and there is considerable reason behind it. Not­withstanding that the language of S. 2 (k) is wide enough to COVET a dispute between an em­ployer and a single employee, the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act does appear to contem­plate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion, to settle only disputes which involve the rights of workmen as a class and that a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of an adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the Union or number of workmen/' (12) His Lordship of course observed in that particular case that in the view which their Lord­ships took of the rights of the respondent under the statute there was no need to express a final opinion on the' question whether a dispute simpliciter between an employer and a workman would be an industrial dispute within section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (13) There is, however, an earlier decision of the Supreme Court D. N. Ranerjee v. P. R. Mukherjee, 1953 SCA 303 : AIR 1953 SC 58 (c). There what was held was that a single em­ployee's case might develop into an industrial dispute when it is taken up by the Trade Union of which he is a member and there is a concerted demand by the employees for redress. The re­levant paragraph in the judgment which gives a clear exposition of the position runs as follows: "The words 'industrial dispute' convey the meaning to the ordinary mind that the dispute must be such as would affect large groups of workmen and employers ranged on opposite sides on some general questions on which each group is bound together by a community of in­terest such as wages, bonuses, allowances, pen­sions, provident fund, number of working hours per week, holidays and so on. Even with reference to a business that is carried on, we would hardly think of saying that there is an industrial dispute where the employee is dismiss­ed by his employer and the dismissal is question­ed as wrongful. Even with reference to a business that is carried on, we would hardly think of saying that there is an industrial dispute where the employee is dismiss­ed by his employer and the dismissal is question­ed as wrongful. But at the same time, having regard to the modern conditions of society where capital and labour have organised themselves into groups for the purpose of fighting their disputes and settling them on the basis of the theory that in union is strength, and collective bargaining has come to stay, a single employee's case might develop into an industrial dispute, when as often happens, it is taken up by the trade union of which he is a member, and there is a concerted demand by the employees for redress. Such trouble may arise in a single establish­ment or a factory. It may well arise also in such a manner as to cover the industry as a whole in a case where the grievance, if any, passes from the region of individual complaint into a general complaint on behalf of all the workers in the industry. Such wide-spread extension of labour unrest is not a rare phenomenon but is of frequent occurrence. In such a case, even, an industrial dispute in a particular business becomes a large scale industrial dispute, which the Government cannot afford to ignore as a minor trouble to be settled between the particu­lar employer and workman". From these two judgments alone we can see that, what was really needed to be investigated on the objections of the parties was, as to whe­ther Abdur Rahman's case had been sponsored by any of the workers of his industry or by the union to which he' belonged or by a federation of the unions of one of which he was a member. Though the learned Judge of the Industrial Tri­bunal has observed that Abdur Rahman's case was taken up by the I. N. T. U. C. which is a federation of which the Mill Mazdoor Union was one of the units, it does not really appear from the record that the Mill Mazdoor union had taken up the case of Abdur Rahman. Though the learned Judge of the Industrial Tri­bunal has observed that Abdur Rahman's case was taken up by the I. N. T. U. C. which is a federation of which the Mill Mazdoor Union was one of the units, it does not really appear from the record that the Mill Mazdoor union had taken up the case of Abdur Rahman. It is admitted by Abdur Rahman himself that no other worker of the Mill to which he belonged joined him in his cause or in the mat­ter of his being reinstated to his office as a dri­ver of the truck, nor is there any evidence to show that the Mill Mazdoor Union ever took up the case at his instance'. All that he says in his deposition before the Tribunal is that the Secretary of the Mill Mazdoor Union Kashil Prasad referred him to the Secretary of the I. N. T. U. C. When he approached him, which only implies that the latter by himself refused to take any action. The report of the Secretary of the I. N. T. U. C. to the Labour Officer also does not dis­close that he took up the cause of the employee Abdur Rahman at the instance of the I. N. T.U. C. or at the instance of the Mill Mazdoor Union or that there was any resolution of any of the unions or any other materials to suggest that ha took up the cause of respondent No. 2 at the in­stance of his union or even with its knowledge. His report annexure B (2) to which I have al­ready referred only suggests that the Secretary, I. N. T. U- C. was personally approached by Ab­dur Rahman and he reported to the Secretary that he had been an employee pf the mill for a period of about eight years and the Secretary considered his dismissal to be illegal and unjust. He however, made no inquiries about the truth of the statement made to him, nor did he take up the case with the millowner, nor did he consult any recognized union. The Secretary, I.N.T.U.C. did not come forward to depose in the proceeding before the; Judge, Industrial Tribu­nal, nor does he produce any document to show that it was at the instance of his union, or of the union of Mill Mazdoor of Tezpur that he took up the cause of Abdur Rahman. The Secretary, I.N.T.U.C. did not come forward to depose in the proceeding before the; Judge, Industrial Tribu­nal, nor does he produce any document to show that it was at the instance of his union, or of the union of Mill Mazdoor of Tezpur that he took up the cause of Abdur Rahman. The learned Judge, Industrial Tribunal gives no indication that he had any materials before him to hold that I.N.T.U.C. was properly authorised to take up the dispute that was purely of the nature of a personal dispute involving the interest of Abdur Rahman alone. The workers in the mill were apathetic and none of them took up his case and there is nothing to show that the Mill Mazdoor Union or I.N.T-UC. as such, made a common cause with him. The dispute affected nobody except an individual and no general question involving the interest of the community of workers was involved. Even in the present proceeding before us where Koshil Prasad, the Secretary of the Mill Mazdoor Union has filed an affidavit sup­porting respondent No. 2's cause, he does not state therein that any representation was made to him by any worker except Abdur Rahman or the Union itself took up his cause and moved the I.N.T.U.C. to take necessary steps in the matter. In paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit by Koshil Prasad it is stated that the Indian National Trade Union Congress had every right to represent the case of discharged workman as Tezpur Oil and Rice Mill Mazdoor Union of which Md. Abdur Rahman was a member was affiliated to the National Trade Union Congress, Tezpur Branch. Assuming this is true, namely that the Indian National Trade Union Congress could represent the Tezpur Oil and Rice Mill Mazdoor Union or any worker who was a mem­ber thereof, there was nothing to show that the I.N.T.U.C. obtained any such consent or authori­sation from the Mill Mazdoor Union or that the I.N.T.U.C.. itself took up the cause of the dis­charged worker. itself took up the cause of the dis­charged worker. It has been amply discussed in the observa­tions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the dispute to be an industrial dispute should be of such a nature which is not confined to one or two individuals, but their cases are taken up by the Trade Union of which they are members or that there is a concerted demand by the employees on their behalf, which charac­teristic is absolutely wanting in this case. There­fore, the learned Judge of the Industrial Tribu­nal had no other alternative on the facts of this case but to come to a finding that the dispute was confined to Abdur Rahman and his employer and he was not supported by any other member of the Mill or by any union of which he was a member and accordingly it was not an indus­trial dispute. This being the state of things, the reference could not be said to be a valid reference under section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act since there was no industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (k) of the said Act. Sub­sequent proceedings were therefore without jurisdiction. (14) In the case of Bengal Club Ltd. v. Santi Rajan Somaddar, 60 Cal WN 856: ( AIR 1956 Cal 545 ) (D) Sinha, J. observed that "where an in­dividual workman is dismissed, and his dismis­sal is not objected to by any Union of workmen or by a majority of his fellow workmen, that is an individual dispute between the employer and an individual workman, and is not an "industrial dispute' and never developed into one. Under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,' Government can only make a reference if in its opinion any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. If no industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, Government has no power to refer to the tribunal and the tribunal has no power to adjudicate upon the alleged dispute so referred. What is an industrial dispute is an objective fact and Government cannot turn a dis­pute which is not an industrial dispute into an industrial dispute by merely making an order of reference. What is an industrial dispute is an objective fact and Government cannot turn a dis­pute which is not an industrial dispute into an industrial dispute by merely making an order of reference. Nor does the tribunal derive jurisdic­tion merely by the fact that there is a reference.'' A similar view has been expressed by Rajagopalan, J. in the case of Radhakrishna Mills (Pollachi) Ltd. v. State of Madras (S) AIR 1956 Mad 113 (E). This view further finds support from many other cases to which reference has been made in the judgment of the Supreme Court in 1957 SCA 1: ( (S) AIR 1957 SC 104 ) (B). la this view of things we consider that the re­ference under section 10 (1) (c) was illegal and the award passed on such a reference is liable to be quashed which we do accordingly under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Rule is made absolute, but in the circumstances of the case, we make no order for costs. SAJROO PROSAD, C. J. : (15) I entirely agree. The only point of importance, which arises for decision in this case, is whether the there was an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), so as to attract the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to proceed under the law. If no such dispute exists, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is ousted and any reference to the Tribunal made under section 10 (1) (c) of the Act of a so-called dispute is illegal and ultra vires and thus saps the whole foundation of the proceedings. The Tribunal in deciding any such reference will be, therefore, acting in excess of; its jurisdiction. As to what constitutes "indus­trial dispute'' within the meaning of the Act has been considered from time to time by the Sup­reme Court. The decision in 1953 SCA 303 : AIR 1953 SC 58 (C) should have, in my opinion, settled the matter. It was held therein that a single employee's case might develop into an industrial dispute when, as it often happens, it is taken up by the trade union of which he is a member and there is a concerted demand by the employees for re­dress. It was held therein that a single employee's case might develop into an industrial dispute when, as it often happens, it is taken up by the trade union of which he is a member and there is a concerted demand by the employees for re­dress. In a later decision in 1957 SCA 1: ((S) AIR 1957 SC 104 ) (B) in which the earlier case was unfortunately not even referred to, some doubt appears to have been cast upon the finality of the views expressed in the earlier judgment on, the point. In this later decision, their Lordships observed that the question whether a dispute by an individual workman would be an indus­trial dispute as defined in section 2 (k) of the Act (Act XIV of 1947) had evoked considerable conflict of opinion both in the High Courts and in the Industrial Tribunals and on the facts oft that particular case, they thought it unnecessary to express any final opinion on the question whe­ther a dispute between an employer and a worker would be an industrial dispute. It would thus appear that the question was set at large in spite of the earlier pronounce­ment. But, if the decision is carefully examined, it is obvious that even in that case, their Lord­ships were inclined to support the view, which was taken by them in the previous judgment. A perusal of the judgment shows that they pro­ceeded to classify the1 divergent views to which they referred under three different heads: (1) a dispute which concerns only the rights of indi­vidual workers could not be held to be an indus­trial dispute;(2) a dispute between an employer and a single employee could be an industrial dispute as defined in section 2 (k) ; and (3) a dispute between an employer and a single em­ployee could not per se be an industrial dispute, but it might become- one, if it were taken up by the union or a number of workmen ; and they further made it clear that the preponderance of judicial opinion was clearly in favour of the last of the three views stated above and that there was considerable reason behind it. They held that notwithstanding that the lan­guage of section 2 (k) was wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single em­ployee, the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act did appear to contemplate that the machin­ery provided therein should be set in motion to settle only disputes involving the rights of workmen as a class and that a dispute touching individual rights was not intended to be the sub­ject of an adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the union or a number of workmen. I notice that in a very recent decision of the Supreme Court - the jud­gment in the case appears to have been delivered by Kapur, J. only on the 20th of this month - in. an appeal from a decision of the High Court of. Allahabad, which arose under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, where the provisions were analogous, their Lordships affirmed the view which they had taken in the earliest of the cases discussed by me above. Kapur, J. is reported to have held there that an individual dispute cannot per se become an industrial dispute, but may become one if taken up by a Trade Union or a number of workmen. The observations apply with equal force to the interpretation of the term in the Central Act with which we are con­cerned here. (16) Applying the above test it is obvious that there was no industrial dispute in the pre­sent instance. It is admitted that no other worker of the Mill to which Abdur Rahaman claims to belong joined him in supporting his cause, aga­inst the employer. Nor was there any evidence to show that any Mill Mazdoor Union of which the worker was a member or that the Indian National Trade Union Congress as such, to which the Union may have been affiliated, ever took up his cause. In fact, there is nothing to show that the Rice Mills Mazdoor Union as such authorized the Indian National Trade Union Congress to which it is said to have been affiliated to take up the cause of the worker either with the employer or with the authorities or that the Indian National Trade Union Congress as such authorised the Secretary to do the same. The dispute thus is confined only to two individuals and the Secre­tary of the Indian National Trade Union Con­gress appears to have taken tip the matter with the authorities at his own initiative without being duly authorised by the Trade Union Congress itself for that purpose. My learned Brother has rightly pointed out that the essential charact­eristics of an industrial dispute are completely lacking in this case. In the circumstances, we are bound to hold that the award given by the Indus­trial Tribunal on an illegal reference must be quashed. Order accordingly.