Judgment Ramaswami, J. 1. In this case the petitioners have obtained a rule from the High Court calling upon the respondents to show cause why a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be issued for the purpose of quashing the notification of the State Government dated the 27th of November, 1954, under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (Central Act 1 of 1894) with regard to the acquisition of 2.34 acres of land for the purpose of extension of the Agricultural College at Sabour. The petitioners have also obtained] a rule asking the respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of mandamus should not be issued restraining the State Government from making any declaration under Sec. 6 of Act I of) 1894 and from taking any further proceedings with regard to the acquisition of the disputed land. 2. The main argument addressed on behalf of the petitioners is that the proceedings taken by the State Government are illegal and ultra vires since Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act are unconstitutional and violate the guarantee given by Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. It is necessary at this stage to reproduce Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, since much of the argument in this case turned on the language of these sections. Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is in the following terms : "4. Publication of preliminary notification, and powers of officers thereupon.-- (1) Whenever in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality." Section 5A is to the following effect:-- "5A. Hearing of objections.-- 1. Any person interested in any land which has been notified under Sec. 4, Sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a Company may, within thirty days after the issue of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be. 2. 2. Every objection under Sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, submit the case for the decision of the appropriate Government together with the record of the proceedings held by him and a report containing his recommendations on the objections. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final. 3. For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if the land were acquired under this Act". Section 6 enacts as follows: "6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.-- 1. Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Sec. 5A, Sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer only authorised to certify its orders; Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. 2. The declaration shall be published in the Official Gazette, and shall state the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected. 3. The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be; and, after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing." On behalf of the petitioner Mr. B.C. Ghosh conceded that the Land Acquisition Act could not be impeached on the ground that it violated Article 31 of the Constitution. B.C. Ghosh conceded that the Land Acquisition Act could not be impeached on the ground that it violated Article 31 of the Constitution. The reason was that the Act was saved by Article 31, Clause (5), which states that nothing in Article 31, Clause (2) shall affect the provisions of any existing law other than a law to which the provisions of Clause (6) apply. Counsel also conceded that the Act could not be attached under Article 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, because of Clause (4) of Sec.299 which states that nothing in the section shall affect the provisions of any law in force at the date of the passing of the Act. But the submission put forward on behalf of the petitioners is that the Land Acquisition Act contravenes Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution because the restrictions imposed by the Act are not reasonable restrictions and the saving provisions of Article 19 (5) cannot be applied to the case. The argument is fallacious and misconceived because it is based upon the assumption that Article 19 (1) (f) applies to a case where there is not merely partial deprivation of property but a complete and total deprivation of property. This assumption is not correct since the legal position is well settled that Article 19 (1) (f) cannot be applied to a case where there is complete and total deprivation of property rights. The reason is that Article 19 (1) (f) read with Article 19 (5), assumes or postulates the existence of property which can be enjoyed or over which the rights can be exercised, otherwise the reasonable restrictions contemplated and envisaged by Article 19 (5) cannot be imposed and the language of Article 19 (5) would carry no meaning at all. That is the view expressed by the majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal V/s. Subodh Gopal Bose, 1954 SCR 587 : ( AIR 1954 SC 92 ) (A) and also in a subsequent case, Dwarkadas Shrinivas V/s. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd., 1954 SCR 674 : ( AIR 1954 SC 119 ) (B). That view has been expressly affirmed by a decision of the Supreme Court in, State of Bombay V/s. Bhanji Munji, 1955-1 SCR 777: ((S) AIR 1955 SC 41 ) (C). That view has been expressly affirmed by a decision of the Supreme Court in, State of Bombay V/s. Bhanji Munji, 1955-1 SCR 777: ((S) AIR 1955 SC 41 ) (C). The question of law involved in that case was the constitutional validity of Sec. 5 (1) and Section 6 (4) (a) of the Bombay Land Acquisition Act (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948) as subsequently amended. It was held by a unanimous Bench of the Supreme Court that Article 19 (1) (f) was not attracted to the case as there was a total deprivation of property and hence the legislation must be tested with reference to Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. It was pointed out in that case that under the provisions of the Bombay Act the right to occupy the premises had gone as also the right to transfer, assign, let or sub-let the premises. What was left was merely the husk of title in the leasehold and, therefore the provisions of Article 19 (IX (f) were not attracted. Mahajan, C. J. who delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court states at page 779-80 (of SCR): (at pp. 43-44 of AIRX as follows : "We will first deal with Civil Appeal Nos. 145 and 146 of 1952 where tenants and licensees are concerned. In our opinion, Art, 19 (1) (f) does not apply to them. In 1954 SCR 587 ; ( AIR 1954 SC 92 ) (A) and 1954 SCR 674 : ( AIR 1954 SC 119 (B), the majority of the Judges were agreed that Articles 19 (1) (f) and 31 deal with different subjects and cover different fields. There was some disagreement about the nature and scope of the difference but all were agreed that there was no overlapping. We need not examine those differences here because it is enough to say that Article 19 (1) (f) read with Clause (5) postulates the existence of property which can be enjoyed and over which rights can be exercised because otherwise the reasonable restrictions contemplated by Clause (5) could not be brought into play. We need not examine those differences here because it is enough to say that Article 19 (1) (f) read with Clause (5) postulates the existence of property which can be enjoyed and over which rights can be exercised because otherwise the reasonable restrictions contemplated by Clause (5) could not be brought into play. If there is no property which can be acquired, held or disposed of, no restriction can be placed on the exercise of the right to acquire, hold and dispose of it, and as Clause (5) contemplates the placing of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of those rights it must follow that the Article postulates the existence of property over which these rights can be exercised. In our opinion, this was decided in principle in A.K. Gopalan V/s. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 88 ; ( AIR 1950 SC 27 CD), where it was held that the freedoms relating to the person of a citizen guaranteed by Article 19 assume the existence of a free citizen and can no longer be enjoyed if a citizen is deprived of his liberty by the law of preventive or punitive detention, In the same way, when there is a substantially total deprivation of property which is already held and enjoyed, one must turn to Article 31 to see how far that is justified". 3. On behalf of the petitioners Counsel made the submission that in spite of the decision of the Supreme Court in 1955-1 SCR 777: ((S) AIR 1955 SC 41 ) (C), it was still open to us to hold that the point is still undecided and to re-examine afresh whether Article 19 (1) (f) was applicable to a case of this description in support of his argument Counsel referred to a passage in the judgment of Mukherjee J. in Sa-ghir Ahmad V/s. State of U. P., 1955-1 SCR 707 at p. 724: ( AIR 1954 SC 728 at p. 737) (E), where the learned Judge has discussed the argument of the respondents in that case whether the expression "reasonable restrictions" as used in Article 19 (6) of the Constitution may in certain circumstances include total prohibition. In this connection reference was also made to the case of! In this connection reference was also made to the case of! Cooverjee B. Bharucha V/s. Excise Commissioner, and the Chief Commr., Ajmer, 1954 SCR 873 : ( AIR 1954 SC 220 ) (F), where the point for consideration was the validity of the Excise Regulation I of 1915, and it was held by the Supreme Court that there was no violation of Article 19 (1) (g) of the_ Constitution, and that for the purpose of determining reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Article 19 (6) regard must be had to the nature of the business and the conditions prevailing in a particular trade. It was further decided by the Supreme Court in that case that the State can certainly have the right to prohibit trades which are illegal, immoral or injurious to the health and welfare of the public. After referring to this decision, Mukherjee J. proceeded to say that though the normal use of the word "restriction" in Article 19 (6) seems to be in the sense of "limitation" and not "extinction", he would on this occasion prefer not to express any final opinion on this matter. In my opinion, this observation of Mukherjee, J. in 1955-1 SCR 707: ( AIR 1954 SC 728 ) (E), does not support the argument of Counsel for the petitioners. It is important to notice that 1955-1 SCR 707: ( AIR 1954 SC 728 ) (E), was a decision of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of Article 19 (1) (g), read with Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. That was not a case with regard to the interpretation of Article 19 (1) (f), read with Article 19 (5), of the Constitution. I have already shown that the expression "reasonable restrictions" occurring in Article 19 (5), read along with Article 19 (1) (f), has been the subject-matter of interpretation by the unanimous Bench of the Supreme Court in 1955-1 SCR 777; ((S) AIR 1955 SC 41 ) (C) and also in two previous decisions of the majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court in 1954 SCR 587 : ( AIR 1954 SC 92 ) (A) and 1954 SCR 674 : ( AIR 1954 SC 119 ) (B). The question at issue in the present case has been expressly and unmistakably decided in all these three cases of the Supreme Court and it has been held that so far as Article 19 (1) (f) and Article 19 (5) are concerned, they have no application to a case of total and complete deprivation of property and the test of constitutional validity in such a case was Article 31. In my opinion, the argument of Mr. B.C. Ghosh on this part of the case must be rejected as unsound and must fail. 4. I shall, however, assume in favour of the petitioners that Article 19 (1) (f) applies to the case. Even upon this assumption I am unable to agree with the argument of the petitioners that the restrictions imposed are unreasonable or that there is a violation of the constitutional guarantee under Article 19 (1) (f). The submission put forward on behalf of the petitioners was that the State Government had an unfettered and absolute discretion under Sec. 6 of the Act to declare that any particular land was needed for public purpose. It was also pointed out that Sec. 6 (3) made the said declaration by the State Government conclusive and not justiciable in a Court of law on the question of public purpose. It was also contended that no right of appeal is granted to the petitioners from the decision of the State Government. I do not think that there is any substance in this argument. I do not agree with the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners that the satisfaction of the State Government under Sec. 6 is an arbitrary or capricious satisfaction. It is necessary to notice that Section 5A provides for any person interested in the land to make an objection before the Collector. Any kind of objection may be preferred, objection either as to the existence of public purpose or objection with regard to private detriment caused to the owner or any person interested in the land. Sub-section (2) of Section 5A also imposes a duty upon the Collector to grant an oral hearing. Any kind of objection may be preferred, objection either as to the existence of public purpose or objection with regard to private detriment caused to the owner or any person interested in the land. Sub-section (2) of Section 5A also imposes a duty upon the Collector to grant an oral hearing. Under this sub-section the Collector is required to give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by a pleader, and after hearing the objection and after making such further enquiry, if any as he thinks necessary, the Collector should submit the case for the decision of the State Government together with the record of the proceedings and a report containing his recommendations on the objections. Turning to Sec. 6 we see that a duty is again imposed upon the State Government to consider the report made by the Collector under Sec. 5A, Sub-section (2), and the declaration of the State Government must be made, after the consideration of the report and after the State Government is satisfied that the particular land is needed for a public purpose. It is true that Sec. 6 (3) gives finality to the decision of the State Government but it is clear from the provisions of Sec. 5A and Sec. 6 that the discretion of the State Government to make a declaration of public purpose is not uncontrolled or vagrant. On the contrary, the discretion of the State Government to make a declaration under Sec. 6 is controlled and circumscribed by adequate safeguards. My concluded opinion is that the restrictions imposed by Sections 4 and 6 are reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Article 19 (5), and the provisions of Sections 4 and 6 do not violate the guarantee given by Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. I would reject the argument of learned Counsel for the petitioners on this part of the case. 5. Lastly, it was contended that the proceeding taken against the petitioners was mala fide and should be quashed for that reason. It is alleged in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the application that the petitioner No. 2 was an active political worker and that he had criticised the action of the authorities with regard to the Agricultural College. 5. Lastly, it was contended that the proceeding taken against the petitioners was mala fide and should be quashed for that reason. It is alleged in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the application that the petitioner No. 2 was an active political worker and that he had criticised the action of the authorities with regard to the Agricultural College. In paragraph 10 of the application it is stated that the petitioners had asked for an opportunity to be heard by a pleader at the time of the hearing of the objection under Sec. 5A, but the prayer was disallowed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. In paragraph 15 it is alleged that waste land near about the College was not acquired but the land of the petitioners was specially chosen by the authorities for acquisition. There is a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents. The allegations made by the petitioners have all been denied in the counter-affidavit and these allegations have been characterised as untrue and baseless. It is asserted in the counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents that the acquisition of land was made in public interest for the extension and development of the Sabour Agricultural College. It is also stated in the counter-affidavit that not only the land of the petitioners but all waste lands have been included for the purpose of land acquisition proceedings. In my opinion, the case of mala fide made out by the petitioners has not been established and Counsel for the petitioners has not been able to make good his submission on this point. 6. For these reasons I hold that the petitioners have made out no case for grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution against the respondents with regard to the land acquisition proceedings in question. I would accordingly dismiss this application with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100/-. Raj Kishore Prasad, J. 7 I agree.