JUDGMENT Mootham, C. J. - This is an appeal from an order of a learned Judge dated the 20th September, 1955, allowing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The relevant facts are these. 2. The first respondent is the owner of certain premises in Banaras which, on the 9th September, 1953 were in the occupation of a tenant. On that date the first respondent informed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the premises were likely to fall vacant and should be allotted to some other tenant. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer thereafter allotted the premises to one Nageshwar Prasad Dube, the date of the allotment order being the 2nd November, 1953. On the 12th November, 1953, the first respondent applied to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for the premises to be released in her favour, apparently on the ground that she wanted to restart a bullion business through her son-in-law. The application was rejected as the premises had already been allotted to Nageshwar Prasad Dube. Two days later, on the 14th November, the first Respondent again applied for the release of the premises in her favour. This application was considered by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer who, by an order dated the 3rd December, 1953, rejected the application on the ground that it was an afterthought and that she had no genuine need for the premises. Sri Nageshwar Prasad Dube thereafter obtained the possession of the premises and remained in occupation of them until June, 1954. On the 4th June, 1954, the premises were allotted to the second respondent, Sri Ghanshiam Das Agarwal, who entered into possession on the following day. This allotment order was admittedly made without prior intimation to the first respondent. On the 19th June, the first respondent again applied to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for the release of the premises in her favour. This application was rejected on the 3rd July and an application in revision was subsequently dismissed by the Commissioner on the 3rd March, 1955. 3. On the 19th June, the first respondent again applied to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for the release of the premises in her favour. This application was rejected on the 3rd July and an application in revision was subsequently dismissed by the Commissioner on the 3rd March, 1955. 3. The first respondent then filed a petition in this Court in which she challenged the validity of the order of allotment dated the 14th June, 1955, in favour of Sri Ghanshiam Das Agarwal, and she prayed that the order be quashed and that a mandamus be issued to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer requiring him to make a fresh order of allotment after complying with the provision of Rule 6 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules. That petition was allowed by the order which is the subject of the present appeal. The order of allotment in favour of Ghanshiam Das Agarwal was quashed and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was directed to consider the need of the first respondent, and if he found that her need was genuine to allot the accommodation to her. The State now appeals. 4. The learned Judge in the course of his judgment said :- "The proper way to interpret Section 7 and Rule 6 is to hold that in cases where the landlord has, before allotment, applied for the accommodation to be allotted to him the Rent Control and Eviction Officer cannot pass an order of allotment without considering the application of the landlord for such allotment in his favour. The allotment order in those circumstances without considering the application of the landlord will be without jurisdiction and should be quashed." 5. We think with respect that this statement of the law is couched in terms which are too wide. The allotment order in those circumstances without considering the application of the landlord will be without jurisdiction and should be quashed." 5. We think with respect that this statement of the law is couched in terms which are too wide. Rule 6 reads thus :- "Where the District Magistrate is satisfied that an accommodation which has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant is bonafide needed by the landlord for his own personal occupation the District Magistrate may permit the landlord to occupy himself." Now this rule does not impose a duty upon the Rent Control and Eviction Officer when an accommodation falls vacant of informing the landlord of the existence of the vacancy and of ascertaining whether the latter desires that the premises be released in his favour; and we do not think that the learned Judge takes a different view. The right of the landlord to have the accommodation released in his favour arises when it is asserted. The rule presupposes the existence of a pending application by the landlord for permission to occupy the premises, and the obligation imposed on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is to consider that application before making an order of allotment. Whether an application made by a landlord under the rule is a pending application must depend upon the circumstances of the case. We think it would be impossible to hold that because a landlord has once made an application for the release of certain premises in his favour that application must be considered each time a subsequent order of allotment is made notwithstanding the fact that a number of years may have elapsed and the circumstances may have entirely changed. 6. Now, in the present case, the first Respondent had applied in November, 1953, for the release of the premises in her favour. The application was rejected by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the 3rd December, 1933, and the fact that it had been rejected was known to the first respondent. Prima facie therefore there was, in our opinion, no application under Rule 6 pending before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the 4th June, 1954, and he was in law justified in making the order of allotment of that date without reference to Rule 6. 7. Prima facie therefore there was, in our opinion, no application under Rule 6 pending before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the 4th June, 1954, and he was in law justified in making the order of allotment of that date without reference to Rule 6. 7. The learned Judge however took a different view for he was of opinion that the first respondent's application of the 14th November, 1953, must be deemed to be still pending in June, 1954, when the premises again fell vacant. What the learned Judge says is this :- "That application was disposed of by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the finding that her need was not genuine on the ground that allotment had already been made and that this was an afterthought. The prayer of the landlady to allot the shop to her after she had made an application on the 9th September, 1953, for the allotment of the house to a third party may be considered to be an afterthought when the first allottee had taken possession but it cannot be regarded as an afterthought subsequently when another occasion for the allotment of the accommodation arises." With great respect we are unable to agree. The learned Judge appears to take the view if we understand him correctly, that although the first respondent's application was rightly rejected in December, 1953, it nevertheless must be deemed to remain in existence and be considered when the question of making a fresh order of allotment arises. In our opinion the first respondent's application was disposed of by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the 3rd December, 1953, and having been disposed of it could not be treated as an application which was still pending in June, 1954. As the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was not required under Rule 6 to ascertain from the first respondent whether she desired the premises to be released in her favour we are bound to hold that the Rent Control and Eviction Office had jurisdiction to make the allotment order in favour of the second Respondent on the 4th June, 1954. We are therefore of opinion that this appeal succeeds. The order of the learned Judge is set aside and the petition is dismissed. No order for costs was made on the petition, and in the circumstances we make no order for costs in the appeal.