ORDER R.S. Shukla The dispute in this case relates to the allotment of certain Abadi site in village Kheda, tahsil Mungeli, district Bilaspur. The applicant's application to obtain that site was rejected by the Tahsildar on the main ground that the site being occupied was not available for allotment to the applicant. His order was upheld, in successive appeals, by the Sub-Divisional Officer, and the Deputy Commissioner. The orders of the lower authorities have been attacked in this revision petition on a number of grounds all of which need not be considered at this stage. One of the grounds, however, is that at no stage the applicant was given an opportunity to prove that the site was, in fact, vacant and could legally be allotted to him. The Learned Counsel for the non-applicant, however, took preliminary objection that the present revision against the order of Deputy Commissioner is not tenable because in allotting a site in the Abadi the Deputy Commissioner does not function under any of the provisions of the Land Revenue Code, he acts in his administrative capacity as a persona designate of the State Government. According to him the provisions of Section 227 of the Land Revenue Code are significantly different from those of Section 203 (1) of the repealed C.P. Land Revenue Act, while under the latter Act every person holding land for agricultural purposes was entitled to have a house site of reasonable dimension in the Abadi site of the village, similar right has not been recognised or conferred under Section 227 of the Code which reads as follows: 227. A building site of reasonable dimensions in the Abadi shall not be liable to the payment of land revenue if such is occupied by a Kotwar or a person who holds land or works as an agricultural artisan or an agricultural laborer in such village or in a village usually cultivated from such village. The language of Section 227, in his opinion, provides only for the exemption from land revenue if such site is occupied by an agriculturist etc.; it does not speak of any right or title of such a person to claim a house-site in the Abadi. The language of Section 227, in his opinion, provides only for the exemption from land revenue if such site is occupied by an agriculturist etc.; it does not speak of any right or title of such a person to claim a house-site in the Abadi. Upon this interpretation of Section 227, the Learned Counsel developed the argument that, the right of getting a house-site under Section 203 of the Land Revenue Act, available to the applicant on the date of his application, could survive, on account of pendent lite, only up to the stage of second appeal. Since the present revision before the Board was filed on 30-8-56, i.e., much after the enforcement of the M.P. Code, the right under the repealed Act is not saved by the provisions of Section 239, M.P. Code or by Section 5 of the C.P. General Clauses Act. In this view no relief under Section 203 of the repealed Land Revenue Act can now be given to the applicant by a provisional order of this Court. I am afraid, I cannot subscribe to the views of the non-applicant's Learned Counsel expressed above. There is no doubt that a reading of Section 227 Ibid may, at first sight support the impression of the Learned Counsel. Reference may, however, be made to the rules framed for the allotment of house-sites in the Abadi of a village. These rules are contained in Land Reforms Department's Memo. No. 1118-832 of 55-XXVIII published in the M.P. Gazette, dated 22-5-1956. Part II of these rules relates to building sites in non-urban areas and Rule 16 thereof reads as follows: 16. If the applicant is entitled to a house-site free of land revenue under Section 227 he maybe allotted a site extending to 2,178 square feet, or with the sanction of the Deputy Commissioner, a larger area. If there are more than one such applicant so entitled, the Tahsildar shall allot the site to the applicant who applied first unless he considers there are good reasons for allotting it to one of the other applicants. (underlines mine) Rule 17 deals with the applicants who are not entitled to a site free of land revenue. If there are more than one such applicant so entitled, the Tahsildar shall allot the site to the applicant who applied first unless he considers there are good reasons for allotting it to one of the other applicants. (underlines mine) Rule 17 deals with the applicants who are not entitled to a site free of land revenue. These rules are framed by the State Government under the statutory authority of Section 237 (2) (XXXIV) of the M.P. Code and have the force of law and must be read along with the provisions of Section 227 Ibid. If we do that, it would be clear that Section 227 does not contemplate the abrogation of the right of an agriculturist or of other persons described therein, to obtain a house-site of reasonable dimensions within the Abadi. This right is apparently based on the consideration that as agriculturist must necessarily find a place for his residence in the village in which he is to carry on his cultivation. In fact, without such a residence he would be seriously handicapped in carrying on his cultivation and other jobs ancillary to agriculture. To presume that the Legislature intended to take away this very essential right, which the tenantry has been enjoying ever since the Land Revenue Act, 1917, or even from much earlier time, would be to go too far in stretching one's imagination. I have, therefore, no doubt that the Land Revenue Code has not, in any way, adversely affected the right to obtain a house-site in the village Abadi which an agriculturist had prior to the Code. This being so, I further hold that a Revenue Officer in allotting a house-site acts within the ambit of the Land Revenue Code and the rules made there under and his order, in this respect, is justifiable both in appeal and in revision like any other order passed by him in his capacity as a Revenue Officer under the said Code. Coming to the facts of the Case, a reference to the lower Court's record, however, confirms the allegation of the applicant that he was given no opportunity in the original Court of the Tahsildar to show that the disputed site was vacant. On 27-5-54 the Tahsildar fixed the case for 21-6-54 to consider the report of the Naib-Tahsildar before the parties. On 27-5-54 the Tahsildar fixed the case for 21-6-54 to consider the report of the Naib-Tahsildar before the parties. On 31-5-54, however, he sent for a full report from the Revenue Inspector and ordered the case to be put up on 21-6-54 as originally fixed. But for reasons not on record, he suddenly passed the final order on 3-6-54 and directed the same to be communicated to the parties by Parwana. The procedure adopted by the Tahsildar was no doubt, highly irregular and indefensible. There was no propriety in obtaining a report from the Revenue Inspector over the head of the Naib-Tahsildar and it was materially irregular to have passed the final order prior to the date fixed for the purpose, without hearing or giving an opportunity to the applicant to challenge the reports of the Naib-Tahsildar or the Revenue Inspector. It seems that the applicant in his appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer did not raise the question of opportunity but he did make it a ground in the second appeal. It does not appear that this question ever received the attention of the Courts below, including the learned Deputy Commissioner. I, therefore, agree with the Learned Counsel for the applicant that the procedure adopted in the Courts below was very much irregular and, ordinarily, the case should have been remanded for fresh enquiry on this ground but I would not do so for reasons given below. Whatever may have been the position in regard to the physical occupation of house-site in question on the date of applicant's application in 1953 it is manifest from the latest report of the Tahsildar dated 18-7-55 as also from the earlier report of the Tahsildar dated 3-6-54 and Patwari's reports dated 5-5-54 and 20-1-54 that the site is no longer vacant. Quite apart from these reports, it is clear from the applicant's own application dated 8-10-54 (page 35 of the record) that on that date (8-10-54) the non-applicant was not only in occupation of site but had also started constructing his house thereon. Thus it is clear that the disputed house-site is not at present a vacant site. It may be that it was vacant on 19-9-53, the date of the applicant's first application, but in the face of the facts stated above, there can hardly be any doubt that it is not so now. Thus it is clear that the disputed house-site is not at present a vacant site. It may be that it was vacant on 19-9-53, the date of the applicant's first application, but in the face of the facts stated above, there can hardly be any doubt that it is not so now. As such no useful purpose would be served in remanding the case only to allow the applicant an opportunity to show that the site was vacant on the date of his application. The non-applicant may have acted illegally in occupying the site and may have, therefore, incurred the risk of prosecution but, so far as the applicant is concerned, the fact remains that the site is not now vacant for allotment. Further, it may be observed that no person, even though entitled to get a house-site, can claim allotment of a particular site as a matter of right. This is quite apart from the fact that the house-site in question is or is not vacant or that the applicant has or has not a genuine need of a house-site. The proceedings under revision were started in September 1953 and it is now four years that they have been going on. To remand the case now would only result in multiplying litigation without giving any advantage to the applicant. In the above state of affairs I would not interfere with the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and, with the observations made above, reject the present application. Application allowed.