Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by a Nair husband against the order of the learned District Munsiff of Krishnapuram dismissing his application for dissolution of a marriage with his wife, the respondent in this appeal. The application was filed by the husband for dissolution of marriage mainly on the grounds of the wife suffering from incurable disease, of the wife being guilty of habitual cruelty and also of incompatibility of temperament. The application was opposed by the wife who in turn, charged the husband with immorality, drunkenness and cruelty. The learned District Munsiff has put to the delegates the various heads under which divorce was asked for. He has also stated that if the allegations of the husband under the particular heads are held to be established, then the husband would be entitled to obtain a divorce. The delegates have given their opinion on each one of the points put to them in the negative and based on this verdict the learned District Munsiff has dismissed the application of the husband. 2. In appeal before us, Mr. T.s. Krishnamurthi Ayyar, the learned counsel for the appellant, contends that the order of the learned District Munsiff is vitiated by defects in procedure. He also contended that some of the points which are really to be decided by the court have been put to the delegates and as such, there is an error in law committed by the learned District Munsiff. In this connection, it is useful to refer to the provisions of the Nair Regulation.11/100 and to the rules framed thereunder in order to appreciate the powers of the High Court in respect of the matters coming up in appeal in such matters. s.7 (4) provides for an appeal to the High Court at the instance of an aggrieved party from any decision of the District Munsiff relating to dissolution or award or both except when it relates exclusively to costs. The proviso to s.7(4) states that no appeal shall lie against the decision of the District Munsiff to the dissolution of marriage except on the ground of the decision being contrary to some law or usage having the force of law or of some substantial error or defect in the procedure or any investigation of the case which may have produced error or defect in the decision of the case. It will be seen from the proviso that the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain an appeal is restricted to the grounds stated in the said proviso. 3. Rule 35 of the rules framed under the said Regulation, provides that after the whole evidence on either side has been taken and the parties have been heard, as required by law relating to the procedure of civil courts for the time being in force, the Munsiff shall proceed to charge the delegates summing up the evidence, specifying the points on which their verdict is required and laying down the law by which the delegates are to be guided. R.36 enjoins on the District Munsiff to record accurate notes of such charge to be kept along with the records of the case. R.37 provides that it is the duty of the District Munsiff to decide all questions of law arising in the course of the trial and it also provides for certain incidental matters being decided by the District Munsiff. R.38 provides for the District Munsiff expressing his opinion on any questions of fact or on any question of mixed law and fact in the course of his summing up. R.39 casts the duty on the delegates of deciding on the facts and certain other matters. 4. It is also necessary to refer to two other rules which relate to interference by the High Court regarding the verdict of the delegates. R.46 provides that if the verdict of the delegates is contrary to law or any rules having the force of law or is vitiated by fraud or material defect or mistake or is unsupported by any evidence, High Court may set aside their verdict and order a fresh trial. R.47 states that except in cases mentioned in R.46 no verdict of the delegates shall be set aside except on the grounds stated therein and even then, only if the High Court is of the opinion that a party has been prejudicially affected or there has been a failure of justice. 5. The contention of Mr. T.s. Krishnamurthi Ayyar is that questions C and D should not have been put to the delegates but should have been decided by the court itself; and in support of his contention he has relied upon the decision of the Travancore High Court in Manomony Pillai v. Velayudhan Pillai (23 T. L. J. 512). 5. The contention of Mr. T.s. Krishnamurthi Ayyar is that questions C and D should not have been put to the delegates but should have been decided by the court itself; and in support of his contention he has relied upon the decision of the Travancore High Court in Manomony Pillai v. Velayudhan Pillai (23 T. L. J. 512). We have ourselves gone through the entire records and also with special reference to the questions C and D. In our opinion, these questions arise out of the facts mentioned by the husband in his application for dissolution which have been controverted by the wife in her counter-statement. The points arising under the two heads are essentially questions of fact, the truth or falsity of which have to be decided only by the delegates as provided under R.39, cl. (a) of the rules. We cannot say that the District Munsiff has committed any error in law in putting these questions to the delegates. In fact, in the decision in Manomony Pillai v. Velayudhan Pillai (23 T. L. J. 512) relied upon by Mr. Krishnamurthi Ayyar it will be seen at page 515 of the Reports that a question more or less similar to question D in this case is one which should be very properly put by a District Munsiff to the delegates. The decision relied upon does not support the contention of Mr. T. s. Krishnamurthi Ayyar. The next contention of Mr. Krishnamurthi Ayyar is that the last question namely F should not have been put to the delegates. The question and answer are as follow: "Is the marriage between the petitioner and the counter-petitioner liable to be dissolved? The verdict of the delegates is in the negative." 6. We are in agreement with Mr. T. s. Krishnamurthi Ayyar so far as this question is concerned. After having got the verdict of the delegates on the relevant points, it is ultimately the duty of the Court to come to a conclusion whether the marriage should be dissolved or not. But in our opinion, this contention of Mr. Krishnamurthi Ayyar will not help him because once the court has accepted the verdict of the delegates on the points referred to them, the inevitable conclusion will be that the husband is not entitled to ask for dissolution. But in our opinion, this contention of Mr. Krishnamurthi Ayyar will not help him because once the court has accepted the verdict of the delegates on the points referred to them, the inevitable conclusion will be that the husband is not entitled to ask for dissolution. In our opinion, we are not satisfied that there is such a serious error committed by the court in having put this question to the delegates. It has not really affected the final decision in the case and it cannot in any way be stated that the putting of the last question to the delegates has in any way prejudiced the case of the husband-appellant. We may also refer to the decision in sankaran Nair sankaran Nair v. Lakshmi Pillai Bhargavi Pillai (1953 K. L. T. 700) to which one of us was a party. That decision lays down the scope of the appellate powers of the High Court under the Nair Act with reference to s.7, Clause.4 of the rules framed thereunder. In that decision it has been laid down that the powers of the High Court in hearing appeals under the Nair Act are very limited and it is not open to the High Court to go behind the verdict and see whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the same. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.