JUDGMENT B.K. Chaturvedi, J Respondent (Plaintiff) Satyanarayan is the son of Mangal. He filed a suit alleging that on 20-8-1938 Ramdayal, as the manager of joint Hindu family, consisting of himself and his two sons Dwarkaprasad and Shardaprasad, executed a registered sale-deed in respect of the mortgaged fields Khasra Nos. 125/2, 126 and 128 of mouza Dehari, which were his absolute occupancy lands, in favour of Mangal, the Plaintiff's father, for a consideration of Rs. 950. These fields were mortgaged with possession with the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2, for a consideration of Rs. 450. These Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were also members of the joint Hindu family. Ramdayal needed money to pay off the arrears of land revenue. The sale-deed is dated 20-8-1938, and the material portion of the recital therein is as follows: We are in acute necessity of paying the malguzari rent. Therefore, we absolutely sel' to you for ever the absolute occupancy land in our possession; fields No. 125/2, No. 126 and No. 128, situate at mouzu Dehri, Tahsil and District Hoshangabad, for a consideration of Rs. 950. The sole land is mortgaged with Shyamlal son of Govindram Brahman, resident of Itarai, Tahsil Hoshangabad, with possession with profits in lieu of interest in consideration of Rs. 450. Hence you shall pay the mortgage money and consideration of Rs. 42-8-0 malguzari, in all Rs. 492-8-0, in Baisakh Sudi 15 Samvat 1996 and obtain a receipt (thereof) and may take possession of the sold land in Baisakh. We will have no objection. We have already taken the rest of the consideration money of Rs. 112 by way of earnest money and we shall take Rs. 303 in presence of the Sub-Registrar at the time of registration. In this way, you shall pay Rs. 42-8-0 of consideration to the malguzar as Nazrana. After receiving the amount of sale-deed of Rs. 950, we have executed the deed of sale in respect of the aforesaid land, out of our free will and pleasure. On 1-5-1939 Mangal sent a registered notice to the Defendants (mortgagees) and sent Rs. 403 by money-order as redemption price calling upon them to redeem the mortgage. The Defendants received the amount, but did not take any farther action. Therefore, the Plaintiff, who is the son of Mangal, brought a suit for redemption of the mortgage, dated 21-8-1936, against the Defendants-Appellants. 403 by money-order as redemption price calling upon them to redeem the mortgage. The Defendants received the amount, but did not take any farther action. Therefore, the Plaintiff, who is the son of Mangal, brought a suit for redemption of the mortgage, dated 21-8-1936, against the Defendants-Appellants. The suit was decreed by the trial Court and it was ordered that the Plaintiff could redeem the mortgage by paying Rs. 450 to the Defendants. Against this decree, an appeal was taken to the Additional District Judge, Hoshangabad, who dismissed it with costs. The Defendants have now come in second appeal before this Court. Shri R.L. Sharma, learned Counsel for the Appellants, urges that their case was that Ramdayal and his son Dwarkaprasad had only agreed to sell the fields in suit to Mangal and that the sale-deed was scribed on 20-8-1938 for a consideration of Rs. 950. A part of the consideration was paid before the execution of the document and the remaining was to be paid within a fortnight. Then, the vendors demanded the balance of consideration, but they failed to get it. There was an exchange of notices and the contract was broken. Thereafter the vendors sold the suit fields to the Defendants on 26-6-1939. The first contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the Appellants is that the sale-deed (Exh. P-5) was executed only by Ramdayal, though it purported to be executed by him and his son Dwarkaprasad also, but Dwarkaprasad did not sign it. The learned Counsel, therefore, argued that the agreement could not be enforced even against Ramdayal. In my opinion, this contention is devoid of substance. The main portion of the sale-deed, as reproduced above, clearly indicates that it was definitely a sale-deed, and not an agreement to sell. Then, the learned Counsel advanced an argument that where a document, which was intended to be signed by more than one person, was signed only by some of them, the others having refused to execute the deed when asked to do so, it constituted merely a proposed agreement which had never been perfected. The counsel placed reliance on Sivasami Chetti v. Sevugan Chetti ILR 25 Mad. 389. Shri J.N. Sinha, learned Counsel for the Respondent, distinguished this case by placing reliance on Krishnama Chariar v. Narasimha Chariar ILR 31 Mad. The counsel placed reliance on Sivasami Chetti v. Sevugan Chetti ILR 25 Mad. 389. Shri J.N. Sinha, learned Counsel for the Respondent, distinguished this case by placing reliance on Krishnama Chariar v. Narasimha Chariar ILR 31 Mad. 114 where it was held by a Division Bench that a deed is not invalid because one only of several parties who purported to execute it actually signed it. Several cases have clustered round Sivasami Chetti v. Sevugan Chetti ILR 25 Mad. 389, and the true rule seems to have been laid down by Dalip Singh J. in Umar Baksh v. Mul Raj AIR 1942 Lah. 86 wherein it is stated: If the intention of the parties to an agreement to sell is that nobody would agree to sell his share unless all the others also agreed to sell their shares, it cannot be held that where one of them had failed to sign the document it was a complete document. On the other hand, if the sales are not interdependent in the sense that each vendor might well have sold his share of the property without reference to the sale by others and what really should have been a number of separate sales are rolled into one because of convenience, then the fact that in the agreement to sell one of the vendors had not joined would not affect its validity as between the vendee and the vendor who had signed the agreement to sell. The question of intention has to be settled by reference to the terms of the document and to the circumstances of the case. In Nethiri Menon v. Gopalan Nair ILR 39 Mad. 597 it was laid down that if a document is drawn up in the names of several persons and it is the intention of the parties that all should execute it, it will be incomplete and inoperative till all have done so. It was further added that it is a question of fact in each case as to what was the intention of the parties. Most of the case-law bearing on this point has been reviewed by Govinda Menon J. in Kanniah Gupta v. Subbarami Reddi (1949) II MLJ 390. It was further added that it is a question of fact in each case as to what was the intention of the parties. Most of the case-law bearing on this point has been reviewed by Govinda Menon J. in Kanniah Gupta v. Subbarami Reddi (1949) II MLJ 390. The consensus of opinion has been summed up in the following head-note of this ruling: If a document is drawn up in the name of several persons and it is the intention of the parties that all should execute it, it will become incomplete and inoperative till all have done so, but it is a question of fact in each case as to what was the intention of the parties. Applying the abovenoted principle to the facts of the instant case, it will be seen that Ramdayal was the father and Dwarkaprasad was the son in a joint Hindu family. There could have been no intention here of invalidating the sale-deed merely by withholding the signatures of Dwarkaprasad. There is no evidence that Dwarkaprasad did not deliberately sign it. From the circumstances it appears that he thought that when his father had signed it, he need not sign it. It appears, therefore, that the view taken by the Courts below that the sale-deed is not defective is correct. The second point contended by Shri Sharma was that the full money was not paid. But the rule is well established that if the price is not paid and its payment was made a condition precedent for passing the title, then the title cannot pass. In the present case, there is no such condition laid down in the sale-deed. Under these circumstances, if the full price was not paid, the seller cannot on that account set aside the conveyance. He can only sue for the price; for, the payment of price under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act is not necessarily a sine qua non to the completion of the sale. On this reasoning the two Courts below appear to have come to the right conclusion. Much argument was addressed on the point that the agreement was broken and exchange of notices was relied on in support. On this reasoning the two Courts below appear to have come to the right conclusion. Much argument was addressed on the point that the agreement was broken and exchange of notices was relied on in support. In my opinion, there is no substance in this connection; for, I have already held that there was no agreement to sell the land, but it was definitely a sale-deed; and conveyances perfected by registration could not be placed in the same category as agreements void for want of part of consideration. Then, it was contended that Mangal himself was not present in the Registration Office. But there is no provision under which it was compulsory for Mangal to have remained present at the time of registration. He had sent his brother Hemraj with a special power of attorney for this purpose, and that was sufficient. If a document has been registered according to the rules and law, then that registration cannot be challenged. After registration, the document had been completed, and either Ramdayal or any other member of his family had no interest in the mortgaged property on 26-6-1939 when the Defendants said that it was sold to them by Ramdayal. I would, therefore, hold that the plea of the sale of the property in suit to the Defendants cannot be admitted. Regarding the passing of consideration, I have already said before that this plea cannot be raised about a registered conveyance. Moreover, the passing of consideration can be challenged only by the parties to the transaction; not by the Defendants in the suit. It is true that it cannot be laid down as an invariable rule that mere registration of an instrument, without reference to other circumstances, operates to transfer the property; but certainly where the other circumstances and the recital in the sale-deed go in favour of the transfer, then the registration of the instrument would convey the title in the property to the vendee. Last of all, it was contended that Shardaprasad was not a party to the transaction; but as he is a member of the joint Hindu family, which fact had been admitted by the Defendants in the written statement, it is no use raising this point here. There is a pious obligation on a Hindu son to pay his father's debts. Here, the sale was for legal necessity, i.e. for paying the arrears of land revenue. There is a pious obligation on a Hindu son to pay his father's debts. Here, the sale was for legal necessity, i.e. for paying the arrears of land revenue. For all these reasons, there is no substance in this appeal, which must fail. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.