Judgment :- 1. This is a Second Appeal from conflicting decrees. The plaintiff sued for cancellation of a partition deed in his Tarwad, a sale deed and a deed of settlement executed on the basis of the partition deed and for partition and recovery of his share in the properties. The plaintiff and defendants 6 to 11 are the children of the 5th defendant. The plaintiff and defendants 1 to 18 are members of a Nair Tarwad which became divided under a deed of partition Ext. A dated 29-9-1107. The plaintiffs mother was a minor on the date of the execution of the said deed. The plaintiff's case is that although he was born before the date of the partition deed he was not allotted any share in partition and that the deed is therefore liable to be set aside. The 3rd defendant contended that the plaintiff was born only after the date of partition and that the partition deed was not liable to be set aside. It was further contended that the plaintiff's mother and uncle had executed a settlement deed Ext. C dated 27-8-1119 conveying part of the property obtained by them under Ext. A to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was therefore incompetent to question the deed. Defendants 20, 21, 23 and 24 who have acquired rights in some of the properties supported the 3rd defendant. The trial court found that the plaintiff was born on 27-9-1107 i. e., two days before the execution of the partition deed and that the deed was liable to be set aside as he was not allotted any share in partition. A preliminary decree for partition was accordingly passed. The 3rd defendant preferred an appeal from this decree to the District Court. The Additional District Judge reversed the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit holding that it was not proved that the plaintiff was born before the date of the deed. The plaintiff has preferred this Second Appeal from the decree of the lower appellate court. 2. The main question for decision is whether the plaintiff was alive on the date of the partition deed. The plaintiff did not give his date of birth in the plaint. The contesting defendant denied the allegation that he was born before the date of the partition deed. 2. The main question for decision is whether the plaintiff was alive on the date of the partition deed. The plaintiff did not give his date of birth in the plaint. The contesting defendant denied the allegation that he was born before the date of the partition deed. Even in the replication filed by the plain* tiff, his date of birth was not mentioned. He produced Ext. B a copy of the Register of births of Vamanapuram Pakuthy. It is seen that an entry was made in the register on 31-9-1107 that a male child was born to Govinda Pillai and Devaki of Kallumala Veedu, Mithrummala, Anakudi, on 27-9-1107. The plaintiff's father's name is Govinda Pillai and his mother is Devaki. It was argued that this entry related to the plaintiff's birth and that it should be held on the basis of Ext. B that the plaintiff was born on 27-9-1107. Except for the production of this document the plaintiff has not adduced any evidence to show that he was the child referred to in Ext. B. Neither his father nor his mother has been examined in the case. Ext. B by itself is insufficient for the purpose of holding that the plaintiff was born on 27-9-1107. It was pointed out in Chirutha Amma, Appi Amma v. Neelakanta Pillai Kunju Pillai (1957 K.L.T. 368) that it is not safe to accept a mere entry in the birth register as proof of the age of the child concerned without some evidence or admission of the parties about the identity of the parents and the child mentioned in the register. Such evidence is lacking in this case and there is no explanation for the omission to examine at least the plaintiff's mother who could have given useful evidence on the point. It may also be stated that the address of the mother given in Ext. B is Kallumala Veedu. There is no evidence that Kallumala Veedu is the house of the plaintiff and his mother. This name does not appear either in the plaint or the deeds executed by the members of the tarwad. In the absence of evidence connecting the plaintiff with the entry in Ext. B I am unable to hold that, the plaintiff has proved that he was born on 27-9-1107. 3. This name does not appear either in the plaint or the deeds executed by the members of the tarwad. In the absence of evidence connecting the plaintiff with the entry in Ext. B I am unable to hold that, the plaintiff has proved that he was born on 27-9-1107. 3. It was next contended that even if the plaintiff was not born on 27-9-1107 he was in his mother's womb at that time and that a share should have been allotted to him. The evidence given by Dws. 2 and 3 was relied on for this purpose. Both of them stated that the plaintiff's father refused to participate in the execution of the partition deed as his claim that his wife was pregnant and that a share should be allotted for the child in the womb was not accepted by the other members. This only means that the plaintiff's father' made such a claim at the time of partition. Dws. 2 and 3 have not admitted that the plaintiff's mother was pregnant at the time of the partition deed or that the plaintiff was a child-in his mother's womb at that time. As in the case of Ext. B there is nothing to connect the plaintiff with the claim made by his father at the time of the partition deed. 4. There are other circumstances which support the defence case. The suit was instituted 18 years after the execution of the partition deed. The plaintiff's father who appears to have made a claim for an additional share at the time of partition is not likely to have remained quiescent if the plaintiff had such a valid claim. Ext. C also throws some doubt on the validity of the plaintiff's claim. This is a deed executed by the plaintiff's mother and uncle conveying part of the property obtained by them under Ext. A to the plaintiff. The plaintiff; no doubt was a minor on that date but his father also appears to have taken part in the execution of Ext. C and to have attested it. The plaintiff naturally repudiates Ext. C in this case. The plaintiff's father is not likely to have taken part in such a transaction which would cut at the root of the plaintiff's case if the case now pleaded by the plaintiff is true. C and to have attested it. The plaintiff naturally repudiates Ext. C in this case. The plaintiff's father is not likely to have taken part in such a transaction which would cut at the root of the plaintiff's case if the case now pleaded by the plaintiff is true. In these circumstances the conclusion reached by the learned judge must be upheld. 5. In the result the decree of the lower appellate court is confirmed and the suit is dismissed with costs.