Judgment 1. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of certiorari and prohibition to quash the order dated 7th March 1955, on the ground of illegality and lack of jurisdiction. By virtue of the power vested in it under Section 126 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 , the Cantonment Board, Dinapore, served the petitioner with a notice dated 20th August 1953, asking him to remove his bungalow No. 24, Mahal No. 1, Ward No. 4 of the Dinapore Cantonment on the ground that it was in a ruinous state on the pain of his prosecution under Section 268 of the said Act. From this order the petitioner took an appeal on 18th September 1953, to the appellate authority under Section 274 of the Act. Twice dates were fixed for the hearing of the appeal, but the petitioner did not appear on one ground or the other. Eventually, this application was heard in his absence. The officer empowered to hear the appeal also held local inspections and examined the records of the entire case, and on being satisfied that the bungalow was in a ruinous state, he by his order dated 7th March 1955, maintained the notice of removal served upon the petitioner. Then, the present application was filed. 2. Mr. Chhatrapati Kumar Sinha, appearing for the petitioner contended that the order of the Cantonment Board and of the appellate authority directing removal of his building was ultra vires and without jurisdiction. This contention is based upon the provisions of Section 126 of the Cantonments Act. He urged that this section did not empower the Board to direct removal of any building solely on the ground that it was in a ruinous state. Apart from being in a ruinous state, the building must also be a nuisance or dangerous to persons passing by or dwelling or working in the neighbourhood. If it was not either a nuisance or dangerous to persons, Section 126 did not grant the Board an authority to remove or demolish any building even though in a ruinous state. In my opinion, this contention has no force and cannot prevail. The plain wording of Section 126 does not warrant such a construction. If it was not either a nuisance or dangerous to persons, Section 126 did not grant the Board an authority to remove or demolish any building even though in a ruinous state. In my opinion, this contention has no force and cannot prevail. The plain wording of Section 126 does not warrant such a construction. It reads as follows:- - "Where in a Cantonment any building, or wall or anything affixed thereto, or any well, tank, reservoir, pool, depression, or excavation, or any bank or tree, is in the opinion of the Board, in a ruinous state or, for want of sufficient repairs, protection or enclosure, a nuisance or dangerous to persons passing by or dwelling or working in the neighbourhood, the Board by notice in writing may require the owner or part-owner or person claiming to be the owner or part-owner thereof, or, failing any of them, the occupier thereof, to remove the same or may require him to repair, or to protect or to enclose the same in such manner as it thinks necessary; and, if the danger is, in the opinion of the Board, imminent, it shall forthwith take such steps as it thinks necessary to avert the same." It will be noticed that the removal of a building situate in a Cantonment area may be ordered on either of the two conditions: (a) the building is in a ruinous state; or (b) it is out of repairs, unprotected or un-enclosed. In case of (b), there is a further condition which must be fulfilled before a building is removed, namely, for want of sufficient repairs, protection or enclosure, the building is a nuisance or dangerous to persons passing by or dwelling or working in the neighbourhood. Mere absence of repair or protection or enclosure is no ground for removal of a building. It must also be shown that due to want of repairs it was very unsafe for a person to go near it or to dwell or work in the neighbourhood. Mr. Sinha contended that no building should be removed howsoever bad its condition may be, unless it is also dangerous to persons passing by or living in the neighbourhood. The language in which Section 126 is couched shows unmistakably that the framers of the Act contemplated that a building in a ruinous state was necessarily a nuisance or dangerous to persons. Sinha contended that no building should be removed howsoever bad its condition may be, unless it is also dangerous to persons passing by or living in the neighbourhood. The language in which Section 126 is couched shows unmistakably that the framers of the Act contemplated that a building in a ruinous state was necessarily a nuisance or dangerous to persons. It was, therefore, not necessary to superimpose this condition on a building in a ruinous state. They have made a clear distinction between a building in a ruinous state and a building out of repairs or without protection or enclosure. An unenclosed, unprotected or unrepaired building is not necessarily dangerous to persons, but a building in a ruinous state postulates such a condition. This is why in Section 126 a clear distinction has been made between a building in a ruinous state and a building out of repairs; and the building in the latter category is further hedged in with the condition that it must also be dangerous to persons passing by or dwelling or working in the vicinity. Mr. Sinha was conscious of this interpretation, and hence to get out ol this difficulty he argued that the word or after the expression ruinous state in Section 126 was wholly inappropriate, and ho in ited the Court to ignore it altogether. The function of a Court is to interpret the law and not to amend, modify or alter it. We have to take the section as it is, and find out the true and correct meaning of the provisions and their scope and extent. Apart from this, there appears to be no warrant for either deletion of the word or or for treating it as either redundant or a mistake. Mr. Sinha could not show how this word could be regarded as a mistake or a superfluity. If we take the plain words of the section, the deletion of this word will make the whole section meaningless. Mr. Sinha could not show how this word could be regarded as a mistake or a superfluity. If we take the plain words of the section, the deletion of this word will make the whole section meaningless. In my opinion, this section clearly lays down two conditions, on the fulfilment of either of which a building may be ordered to be removed: (1) it must be in a ruinous state, or (2) for want of sufficient repairs, protection or enclosure it is nuisance or dangerous to per-gons passing by or dwelling or working in the neighbourhood; in the cases falling under the first category, it is not necessary to show affirmatively that it portended danger to human beings. This consequence is envisaged in the word ruinous. In the cases falling under the second category, it must further be shown that it was a nuisance or dangerous to persons. Manifestly, the appellate authority was conscious of this distinction and observed that in the case of a building in a ruinous state, it was not necessary to prove further that it was dangerous to persons passing by. In this case, the demolition was ordered because the building was found to be in a ruinous state. Therefore, the order of the Cantonment Board and of the appellate authority was within their respective competence and intra vires. 3. . It was next contended by him that the order to demolish the entire building was illegal, because only the southern portion of the building was out of repairs. He referred to his application and contended that the petitioners averment that the building was partially ruinous was not controverted by the other side. It will be noticed that the order of the appellate authority is based not only upon records and evidence before it but also upon local inspection which disclosed that the building as a whole was in a ruinous state. There was, therefore, sufficient refutation of this allegation in the record, and there is no further proof of the building being only partially out of repairs. Apart from this, partial damage to the building may afreet the whole building and render the entire building uninhabitable or dangerous to the people living in the vicinity. After all, it is a question of subjective satisfaction of the Cantonment Board. Apart from this, partial damage to the building may afreet the whole building and render the entire building uninhabitable or dangerous to the people living in the vicinity. After all, it is a question of subjective satisfaction of the Cantonment Board. It is for the Board to consider whether in its opinion the building was in a ruinous state, and if the Board has formed the opinion that the building is in a ruinous state, then in the absence of sufficient material on the record it is difficult to say that that opinion is based upon no evidence so as to deprive the Board of its jurisdiction to order removal. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention either. 4. Next it was contended that there was denial of natural justice, in that the petitioner was not afforded adequate opportunity to represent his case before the appellate authority. This is of course not quite accurate. As will appear from the order of the appellate authority, the petitioner was given sufficient opportunity, but he all along evaded, on some pretext or the other, the order to remove or repair the building. He had been given notice on two occasions to pull down or reconstruct the building, but to no effect. This proceeding was the third of its kind, and in this case also he had been given sufficient notice of the hearing of the appeal, and two dates were fixed for disposal. On these two dates he absented himself and sought adjournment on one ground or the other. On the first occasion he applied for adjournment on the ground of illness of his granason. On the second occasion the ground was his own illness. He was allowed adjournment on the first occasion, but on the second occasion the appellate authority rejected it, as in its opinion there was no sufficient ground for further extension of time. It will appear that the petitioner could have very well placed his case before the appellate authority through a pleader. This he aid not choose to do. Any way, it was entirely within the discretion of the appellate authority to accept or reject his prayer, and there is nothing to show that the exercise of this discretion was arbitrary or capricious or that the discretion was demonstrably groundless. This he aid not choose to do. Any way, it was entirely within the discretion of the appellate authority to accept or reject his prayer, and there is nothing to show that the exercise of this discretion was arbitrary or capricious or that the discretion was demonstrably groundless. The appellate authority has given good grounds for the rejection of his second prayer for adjournment. As observed by Farwell, L. J., in the case of Rex V/s. Board of Education, (1910) 2 KB 165 at p. 179 (A), "if the Tribunal has exercised the discretion entrusted to it bona fide, not influenced by extraneous or irrelevant considerations, and not arbitrarily or illegally, the Courts cannot interfere; they are not a Court of appeal from the Tribunal, but they have power to prevent the intentional usurpation or mistaken assumption of a jurisdiction beyond that given to the Tribunal by law, and also the refusal of their true jurisdiction by the adoption of extraneous considerations in arriving at their conclusion or deciding a point other than that brought before them, in which cases the Courts have regarded them as declining jurisdiction." This is not the case here. Here, the prayer for adjournment was refused, according to the rules of reason and justice and not according to private opinion or whims. Natural justice does not imply unfettered liberty to the litigants to determine and direct the course of the hearing of their cause, nor does it make the hearing dependent upon the convenience of the litigants. The principal of natural justice does not connote unqualified indulgence on the part of the Court towards the litigants. All that it implies is that no man should be condemned unheard. In other words, it means that the party whose civil rights are affected must have reasonable notice of the case he has to meet and an opportunity of stating his case. It is a recognised principle of our jurisprudence that no man should be deprived of his life or property without having an opportunity of being heard. Once a person affected is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard, there is sufficient compliance with the fundamental principle of natural justice. If the party does not avail of that opportunity and fails to place his case before the Court or Tribunal, either personally or through a lawyer, there is no denial, of justice to him. Once a person affected is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard, there is sufficient compliance with the fundamental principle of natural justice. If the party does not avail of that opportunity and fails to place his case before the Court or Tribunal, either personally or through a lawyer, there is no denial, of justice to him. He is himself to blame if he has allowed the opportunity of being heard to slip away. In this case, I find that the petitioner was given adequate opportunity of being heard, and he deli- berately omitted to appear before the appellate authority, presumably with a view to postpone indefinitely the demolition of the building. In my opinion, there is no violation of the principle of natural justice. 5. His next contention is that the provisions of Section 126 are void, because it infringes the constitutional guarantee to acquire, hold and dispose of the property as provided in Article 19(1)(f). of the Constitution. The order of the Board to remove the building does not, in essence, interfere with the right of the petitioner to hold his property. All that it envisages is that the property which the petitioner holds must be kept in a proper state of repairs to prevent danger to the society. There is no constitutional guarantee to keep ones property in such a state as to be dangerous to the human beings. This provision is sufficiently protected by Clause (5) of Article 19 which provides that nothing in Sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of Clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any or the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. Section 126 of the Cantonments Act does nothing beyond imposing reasonable restrictions upon the right of the petitioner to hold his property. There is, in my opinion, no infraction of Article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. 6. Section 126 of the Cantonments Act does nothing beyond imposing reasonable restrictions upon the right of the petitioner to hold his property. There is, in my opinion, no infraction of Article 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. 6. Lastly, it was contended that destruction which is implied "in the order of removal of the building means in the context of the present case acquisition by the State, and, therefore, Section 126 of the Cantonments Act is unconstitutional, since it makes no provision for payment of compensation, as enjoined by Clause (2) of Article 31 of the Constitution. For the purpose of this application, I assume that this was an acquisition by the State for public purpose. This argument manifestly overlooks the provision of Clause (5) of Article 31 of the Constitution which provides as follows: "5. Nothing in Clause (2) shall affect - (a) the provisions of any existing law other than a law to which the provisions of Clause (6) apply, or (b) the provisions of any law which the State may hereafter make - (i) for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax or penalty, or (ii) for the promotion of public health or the prevention of danger to life or property, or (iii) in pursuance of any agreement entered into between the Government of the Dominion of India or the Government of India and the Government of any other country, or otherwise, with respect to property declared by law to be evacuee property." This clause provides an exception to Clause (2) of Article 31 and exempts from its operation (1) all existing laws barring those which were enacted not more than eighteen months before the commencement of the Constitution, and (2) all, laws to be made in future either by the Union or by the States which have for their objectives the purposes specified in categories (i), (ii) and (iii) of Sub-clause (b). Existing law as defined in Article 366 of the Constitution, means any law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of this Constitution by any Legislature, authority or person having power to make such a law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation." The Cantonments Act was enacted in 1924, that is, more than eighteen months before the commencement of the Constitution. Therefore, this Act is an existing law and falls under Sub-clause (a) of Clause (5) and is, therefore, not open to attack on the ground either that there was no public purpose or that no compensation was provided. The laws falling under Sub-clause (a), though relating to the compulsory acquisition or taking possession of private property by the State, are ipso facto saved from being questioned on the ground of their contravention of Clause (2) of this Article. So, the present Act is saved under Article 31 (5)(a), and the Courts have no power to examine its validity either on the ground of absence of provision of compensation or on the ground of non-existence of public purpose. This contention, also, therefore, is devoid of substance and must be overruled. 7. It follows that there is no merit in this application. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 32. Ramaswami 8 I agree.