SARJOO PROSAD C. J.: This is an application under S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code for revision of an order passed by the District Judge of Cachar in an appeal under S. 17 (1) (a) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936 arising out of an order of the Authority directing payment to the opposite party of the wages claimed. (2) It appears that there was a dispute between the clerical employees of the Tea Estate and the Management. The Labour Inspector appears to have been present at the discussion and so also the petitioner Sri P. C. Bhatia who is a Director of the Tea Company. The parties came to an agreement on 10th May, 1954, by virtue of which it was settled that when the Minimum Wage Order is amended to allow gardens with less than 7.5 maunds yield per acre, to grant increments, the employees named in the agreement would be paid emoluments specified against their names in a separate paragraph of the agreement with effect from 1st January 1954; but till such amendment is made, they would continue to draw the pay which they were drawing. The Minimum Wage Order was amended with effect from 1st October, 1954, and the employees demanded payment of wages at the increased rate in accordance with the terms of the agreement from 1st of January, 1954. The Management contended that they were liable to pay the increased rate only with effect from 1st October 1954, when the Order came into operation, and not from any earlier date. They further took the plea that the date 1-1-1954, as mentioned in the agreement, was a clerical error. The Authority which heard the matter, accept­ed the case of the opposite party and held that the Management was liable to pay the amount claimed to the opposite party at the higher rate of wages as agreed upon in the conciliation meeting held on 10th May, 1954, with effect from 1-1-1954. In other words, he allowed the claim of the opposite party for the wages payable to them at the higher rate for the period from 1-1-54 to 30th September, 1954' amounting to Rs. 56S6/3/-, the amount being payable within two months from the date of the order. The Authority was, however, of the view that the Management should not be liable to pay any compensation in die circumstances of the case. 56S6/3/-, the amount being payable within two months from the date of the order. The Authority was, however, of the view that the Management should not be liable to pay any compensation in die circumstances of the case. He also found that the further claim of the opposite party for deducted wages and compensation there­for had not been satisfactorily established and, therefore, the claim on that head also w;as; refused by him. The petitioners, who are the representatives of the Tea Estate in question -• one being the Manager and the other a Director, preferred an ap­peal against that order, and the learned District Judge affirmed the order in respect of the Wages payable to the opposite party. The opposite party had also preferred an ap­peal against the claim for compensation which had been disallowed. The learned Judge was of the view that as there was no good ground for delay in payment of the increased wage on the supposed plea that there was no agreement to pay the same with effect from 1-1-54, the opposite party employees were also entitled to some reasonable compensation. He, therefore, allowed compensation at the rate of Rs. 67- per head. In the result, he dismissed the petitioners' appeal. (3) The order is now challenged in revision before us on two grounds. It has been contended by Mr. Ghose in the first instance that the opposite party being employees on monthly payment, their case would not fall under the Payment of Wages Act and, therefore, the Authority concerned has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. "Wages' has been defined in S. 2 (vi) of the Act as meaning all remuneration, capable of being ex­pressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whether conditionally upon the regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person employed, or otherwise, to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes any bonus or other additional remu­neration of the nature aforesaid. But it does not include certain other items, to which I need not refer. The definition of the word quite clearly shows that it may apply even to monthly payments. Mr. But it does not include certain other items, to which I need not refer. The definition of the word quite clearly shows that it may apply even to monthly payments. Mr. Ghose, however, relies on S. 4 of the Act in supp of his contention that the word 'wages' should confined in its application to a daily or to a periodical wage-earner which is for less than a month a would not apply to a worker whose pay or sail is on a monthly basis. Now S. 4 says: "(1) Every person responsible for the payment of wages under S. 3 shall fix periods (in this Act: referred to as wage-periods) in respect of which such wages shall be payable, (2) No wage-period shall exceed one month.'' It is argued that sub-s. (2) clearly implies that person who gets a monthly salary cannot come within the sub-section and falls outside the purview of the Act. Speaking for myself, I am unable see how sub-s. (2) can be construed to mean this, at all, it plainly suggests to me that the wage period may include the wage period of a month, but it should not exceed a month. Reference is also made to sub-s. (6) of S. 1 where it is provided that ''nothing in this Act shall apply to wages payable in respect of a wage-period which, over such wage-peril average two hundred rupees a month or more." In this provision also there is nothing to suggest that monthly payment of wage is altogether exclude On the other hand, it can reasonably be construed to mean to include a monthly wage period where the salary or wage does not exceed two hundred rupees or more. Nor does S. 6 of the Act in any manner militate against the construction which I have adopted. Section 6 merely provides that 'all wages shall be paid in current coin or currency notes or in both'. It is quite true that the Payment of Wages Act was not intended to apply to high salaried officers whose (salary exceeds rupees two hundred or more. It is intended to apply to small wage-earners and, therefore, a limitation has been fixed in regard to the amount payable to such persons who can have the benefit of this Act. It is quite true that the Payment of Wages Act was not intended to apply to high salaried officers whose (salary exceeds rupees two hundred or more. It is intended to apply to small wage-earners and, therefore, a limitation has been fixed in regard to the amount payable to such persons who can have the benefit of this Act. But I find nothing in the various provisions to which our attention has been drawn to support the contention of Mr. Ghose that the Act has no application to cases of persons or workers who are drawing a monthly salary or whose wage is payable on a monthly basis provided the salary on the monthly basis does not exceed rupees two hundred or more Mr. Ghose has, however, referred in this connect] to a decision of the Madras High Court in 'In re K. V. V. Sarma, AIR 1953 Mad 269 (A). The judgment in that case was delivered by Govinda Menon, J. (as he then was) and I must confess that the observations made by his Lordship that case do very much lend countenance to the argument of the learned counsel. In that case, the learned Judge observed that "on a construction of the various provisions the Payment of Wages Act, the underlying idea is that the term ''wages" should be understood as compensation paid for work done for a period less than a month. It may be either daily or weekly, but where the payment is to be made monthly, one finds it difficult to apply the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act to such circumstances; and his Lordship was almost emphatic in his observation that on the terms of sub-s. (2) of S. 4 it was clear that the Act was not meant to apply to any kind of salaries payable monthly. I have given my reasons on an anxious exa­mination of the various relevant provisions and I find myself unable to subscribe to the proposition that on the plain terms of sub-s. (2) of S. 4, the Act was not applicable to persons getting a monthly wage. As I said, with great respect, I am inclined Ho think that the section did apply to a case of 'monthly payment but not where the wage period goes beyond that limit. As I said, with great respect, I am inclined Ho think that the section did apply to a case of 'monthly payment but not where the wage period goes beyond that limit. I must, however, point out that Govinda Menon, J., himself in that decision -was not altogether decisive on the point as, at a later stage in the judgment, he observed : '"We are definitely of opinion that if the remu­neration is to be paid daily or weekly, it can be called wages. But where it is monthly remunera­tion payable on the last day of the month or after date, and where the remuneration, considering the general standards of payment, is fairly high, then it has to be understood as salary." To some extent we are relieved of the task of exa­mining this decision too closely in view of certain observations in judgments of the Supreme Court which appear to strengthen the conclusion at which we have arrived. In Divisional Engineer, G. I. P. Rly. v. Mahadeo Raghoo, (JS) AIR 1955 SC 295 (B), it appears that the respondent was a gangman in the employ of die Central Railway drawing Rs. 187- per month; but subsequently in 1947 the Railway Board introduced a scheme of grant of compensatory allow­ance and house-rent. As a result of this, the Railway employees were eligible! for the allowance aforesaid and respondent 'No. 1 became entitled to an; allowance of rupees ten per month. This allowance he drew with the salary for a certain period when Government offer­ed him quarters suitable to his post, which he refused to occupy. Thereafter the house-rent allow­ance was stopped by the Government. He then put in his claim before the Authority for recovery of the amount due. The actual point which' arose for decision in that case was undoubtedly different, the point being whether house-rent allowance came within the pur­view of the definition of 'wages' as contained in the Act; but it is significant that there was no point taken before their Lordships that the respondent 3sfo. 1 in that case, who was getting a monthly salary, was not a wage-earner at all and, therefore, the Payment of Wages Act could not be attracted. 1 in that case, who was getting a monthly salary, was not a wage-earner at all and, therefore, the Payment of Wages Act could not be attracted. In A. V. D' Costa v. B. C. Patel, (S) AIR 1955 SC 412 (C), their Lordships of the Supreme Court at page 416 illustrated their point under the Payment of Wages Act with reference to a monthly wage-earner. They observed thus : "In our opinion, the scheme of the Act as set forth above shows that if an employee were to state that his wages were, say Rs. 100 per month, and that Rs. 10 had been wrongly deducted by the Authority responsible for the payment of wages, that is to say, that the deduction could not come under any one of the categories laid down in S. 7 (2), that would be a straight case within the purview of the Act land the Authority appointed under S. 15 could entertain the dispute." This clearly shows that the matter was beyond any controversy and that even a monthly wage-earner could come within the purview of the Act provided he satisfied the other conditions mentioned in sub-s. (6) of S. 1 of the Act. There is, therefore, no substance in this contention of the learned coun­sel. (4) The next contention of Mr. Ghose is that here the wage payable to the opposite party was in dispute. The Payment of Wages Act presupposes that the wage payable is a fixed wage and it is only when there is delay in payment or there have been deductions in the matter of payment which were unauthorised, that the party aggrieved can take re­course to the provisions of this law. It is an Act for summary decision of matters and was not intended to arm the Authority concern­ed with power to decide complicated questions which would be incidental to a dispute about the monthly wages payable. In this connection, he has referred us to a decision in Rajkumar Mills Ltd. v. Inspector, Payment of Wages, Madhya Bharat, AIR 1955 Madh-B 60 (D). It is the duty of the Autho­rity to decide about the quantum of wages payable, and in doing so, it is bound to adjudicate upon the terms of the contract according to which the wages were due to the party concerned. It is the duty of the Autho­rity to decide about the quantum of wages payable, and in doing so, it is bound to adjudicate upon the terms of the contract according to which the wages were due to the party concerned. In our opinion, the question is hardly a question of law in the present case; here it is entirely a question of fact. In this case, it was the agreement in ques­tion, on the basis of which and by virtue of which the opposite party claimed payment of their wages. Payment of wages was not disputed; nor was the amount payable to them in dispute. The only ques­tion which was in dispute was whether there was a clerical error as to the date mentioned in the agree­ment from which the wages, as agreed upon by the parties, became payable. On this point, the Authority concerned as well as the appellate Court have both found in favour of the opposite party. They have held that there was no clerical error at all and that the wages agreed upon became pay­able from the 1st of January 1954, as mentioned in the document. This was a matter which certainly fell to be decided by the Authority concerned, in directing payment of wages. The point is almost covered by the authority of the decision of the Sup­reme Court in (S) AIR 1955 SC 412 (C), to which I have already referred. Their Lordships held in that case thus:- "If the parties entered into the contract of ser­vice, say by correspondence, and the contract is to be determined with reference to the letters that pass­ed between them, it may be open to the Authority to decide the controversy and find out what the terms of the contract with reference to those letters were. But if an employee were to say that his wages were Rs. 100 per month, which he actually received as and when they fell due but that he would be entitl­ed to higher wages if his claims to be placed on the higher wages scheme had been recognised and given effect to, that would not, in our opinion, be a matter within the ambit of his jurisdiction." The above quotation, if I may respectfully say so, clarifies the ambit of the Authority's jurisdiction to deal with such cases of controversy under the Pay­ment of Wages Act. In this case, the controversy is confined mainly to the date mentioned in the agree­ment between the parties, and there also, the con­tention of the petitioners merely was that it was a clerical error. That has been found to be incorrect for substantial reasons given by the Authority as well as by the lower appellate Court. Even the decision in Anthony Sabastin Almeda v. R. M. Taylor, AIR 1956 Bom 737 (E), on which reliance has been pla­ced by Mr. Ghose for the petitioners, supports the view that we have taken of the matter. Chagla, C. J., there observed as follows:- "It would be open to the Authority to decide what is the quantum of wages due and whether that quantum has been paid or not. We considered the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act in A. R. Sarin v. B. C. Patil, 53 Bom LR 674: AIR 1951 Bom 423 (F) and we laid down that the jurisdiction of the Authority really is to determine the terms of the contract in so far as they relate to' the payment of wages and in so far as he has to decide the liability of the employer to pay wages under the terms of the contract." (5) These decisions quite clearly show that the Authority in the present case did not exceed his juris­diction in determining the matter with reference to the wages payable to the opposite party which they had claimed in the circumstances. We accordingly find no substance in the application, which we dis­miss with costs: hearing fee Rs. 50. (6) DEKA, J.:- I agree. H. G. P. Revision application dismissed.