Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, the Peermade Tea Company Limited, questions the right of the Upputhura Panchayat to levy the "house tax" demanded in respect of the six buildings specified in Para.2 of the affidavit in support of the petition. The 2nd respondent is the Panchayat (represented by its President), the 1st, the Executive Authority of the Panchayat, and the 3rd, the Director of Local Bodies, Trivandrum. 2. Ext. P2 is the order of the 2nd respondent dated 3-1-1955 dismissing the petitioner's appeal, Ext. PI dated 21-12-1954. The concluding paragraph of the order is: "Your Pleader mostly urged against the levy of house tax to the non-residential buildings. But in out bye-laws S.40 to 60 explains about the house tax that included all kinds of buildings, so, we can't accept your appeal and can't allow any exemption to non-residential buildings. If you are not satisfied go ahead to the Director of Panchayats". 3. Then the petitioner moved the 3rd respondent (Ext. P3) dated 19-1-1955. Regarding the petitioner's contention that "there is no provision in the Panchayats Act or Rules or the Bye-laws of the Respondent Panchayat for the levy of house tax on any building other than a house" he said: "Under the provisions of the Panchayat Act non-residential buildings also are assessable to house tax". (Ext. P. 4) 4. S.56 of the Travancore-Cochin Panchayats Act, 1950, provides that: "Any Panchayat, (a) alter observing such preliminary procedure and rules as may be prescribed; (b) subject to such bye-laws as may be framed by the Panchayat; and (c) subject to the previous sanction of Government, may impose, at such rates not exceeding the maxima prescribed, all or any one or more of the following. (1) a cess on land other than any land or class of lands which Government may by notification in the Gazette, exempt; (2) any rate, tax, cess or any licence or other fee for the discharge of the duties under this Act" Chapter VI of the Travancore-Cochin Panchayat Rules, 1951, deals with taxation and R.130 which is headed "House Tax" provides: "House-tax shall be levied at 4 per cent of the net annual rental value of the House". What has apparently been done is the fixation of the rate itself and not its maximum as contemplated by S.56 (c). What has apparently been done is the fixation of the rate itself and not its maximum as contemplated by S.56 (c). No complaint is made on this account and it is unnecessary to consider whether such a procedure is in conformity with the Act. 5. The word "house" has not been defined either in the Travancore-Cochin Panchayat Act, 1950 or in the Travancore-Cochin Panchayat Rules, 1951, or in the Bye-laws of the Upputhura Panchayat. The only definition available is of the expression "building" in S 2 (1) of the Act: "'building' includes a house, out-house, stable, latrine, shed, but and any other such structure whether of masonry, wood, brick, mud, metal or any other material whatsoever". 6. It is agreed that the six buildings in controversy are non-residential in character and the only question for determination is whether such non-residential buildings can be considered as "houses" and made liable to "house-tax" as has been done in this case. 7. The word "house" ordinarily means a building for human habitation and it is in that sense that Coke used it when he said: "The house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose". (Semayne's Case 5 Rep. 91). "It is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary" (Learned Hand, J., 148 F. (2d) 737) and over the years the meaning of the word has grown and altered. 8. In (1878) 9 Ch. D.425 Cotton, L, J. said: "With regard to the word 'house', it is impossible to say it is to be confined to a building used wholly, or almost wholly, for residential purposes". and in (1900) A. C. 383 Lord Halsbury pointed out that "the word is no longer the expression of a simple idea" but "an ambiguous word" with "no common or ordinary meaning so fixed and definite that by the mere use of the word you can determine in what sense the Legislature has used it". and in (1900) A. C. 383 Lord Halsbury pointed out that "the word is no longer the expression of a simple idea" but "an ambiguous word" with "no common or ordinary meaning so fixed and definite that by the mere use of the word you can determine in what sense the Legislature has used it". According to him "one must understand the subject-matter with respect to which it is used in order to arrive at the sense in which it is employed in a statute" and must search "otherwise than in the word itself what is the meaning in which the Legislature has used it, since the natural and ordinary meaning of an ambiguous word cannot be ascertained without the context". 9. In (1917) 86 L. J. K. B.1331 Lord Reading said: "It is certainly not permissible to say that the word 'house' means only a dwelling house. The word has a wider meaning than a dwelling house for human beings". and held that aeroplane hangars were "houses" within the meaning of the Provisional Order before him. He dealt with the decision of the House of Lords in (1900) A.C. 363 as follows: "As was shown by the observations of Lord Halsbury in (1900) A. C. 383), the word is ambiguous. The House of Lords was dealing with the inhabited house duties, and the question was what meaning should be given to the word 'house'. They )aid down the rule that in order to understand the meaning of the word it was necessary to consider the object of the statute in which the word is used. In speaking of the judgment of the Master of the Rolls, Sir George Jessel, in 45 L. J. Ex. 886 Lord Halsbury said: 'It establishes undoubtedly that the word 'house' is an ambiguous word; it shows that you must search otherwise than in the word itself what is the meaning in which the Legislature has used it, since the natural and ordinary meaning of an ambiguous word cannot be ascertained without the context. Every word of this reasoning, applicable to a case under another statute, is applicable to the case now before us. They expressed a general proposition and were not confined to the particular statute before the House". 9. Every word of this reasoning, applicable to a case under another statute, is applicable to the case now before us. They expressed a general proposition and were not confined to the particular statute before the House". 9. Interpreting the word 'house' in the light of these decisions and in accordance with the context and object of the Travancore-Cochin Panchayats Act, 1950, the Travancore-Cochin Panchayat Rules, 1951, and the Bye-laws of the Upputhura Panchayat, we feel no hesitation in holding that the house-tax imposed is not confined to dwelling houses and that it will apply to buildings like those mentioned in Para.6 of the affidavit in support of the petition. 10. Part IV of the Bye-laws of the Upputhura Panchayat (Ext. P 5) deals with house tax. It consists of Bye-laws 40 to 60 (both inclusive). The words "building" and "house" are used indiscriminately in those Bye-laws as if they mean the same thing, and Bye-law No. 46 provides: "The licence fees paid for the storage of articles in the buildings assessed shall be deducted from the net annual rental value" thereby showing that the buildings assessable are not necessarily dwelling places or residential buildings as contended by the petitioner. It has also to be noted that when the Legislature wanted to deal with buildings used for residential purposes in S.51 of the Act it did not use the word "building" or "house" but the expression "dwelling house". 11. In the light of what is stated above the petition has to be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.