ORDER R.S. Shukla This appeal must be dismissed as untenable for reasons given below. The Appellant was Superintendent, Fire Brigade, in the employment of Jabalpur Corporation and after a departmental inquiry was dismissed from service by the Standing Committee vide resolution No. 231, dated 22-6-57 Hence this appeal. Section 56 of the City of Jabalpur Corporation Act, 1948 deals with the appointment of officers and servants of the Corporation other than the principal officers and lays down what authorities would be entitled to make the various appointments. The proviso relevant to the case is as follows: 56. Provided that: (2) the powers of appointing municipal officers and servants, whether, temporary or permanent, whose minimum salary is not less than one hundred and fifty rupees but is less than three hundred rupees shall vest in the Standing Committee. It is conceded that the Appellant's salary is within the range prescribed in the above proviso. The forum for appeals against orders passed under the aforesaid Act is prescribed in Section 415 ibid and Sub-clause (3) thereof reads as follows: (3). If the original order has been passed by the Chief Executive Officer himself, the appeal shall lie to the Provincial Government or such person as it may direct. Further Sub-section (5) of Section 59 ibid provides that "no municipal officer or servant shall be discharged, dismissed or removed from the service of the Corporation by order of any authority subordinate to that which makes appointments to the post he holds at the time of the order". Lastly there is Section 439, which provides for the control of the Provincial Government over the Corporation. This section, in fact, lays down the revisional powers exercisable by the State Government in regard to the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation or the Standing Committee. The State's appellate powers under Section 415 (3) (supra) have, vide Government's Notification No. 2434-4153-XIII, dated 29-5-51, been delegated to the Board of Revenue. The State's revisional powers under Section 439 have not, however, been so delegated to my knowledge. Possibly, this could not be done because the Act does not provide for the delegation of State Government's revisional powers to any other authority. The State's revisional powers under Section 439 have not, however, been so delegated to my knowledge. Possibly, this could not be done because the Act does not provide for the delegation of State Government's revisional powers to any other authority. Since the impugned order was not passed by the Chief Executive Officer, but by the Standing Committee, it is obvious that Section 415 (3) ibid has no application and the powers delegated to the Board cannot come into play. Although there is no specific provision in the Act providing for the dismissal of the Appellant by the Standing Committee but a reading of section 56, proviso (2) (supra) and Section 59 (5) (supra) would show that the Standing Committee being the appointing authority, would also be the dismissing authority in the instant case. Be that as it may, it is clear that this Court does not seem to be empowered to exercise either the appellate or the revisional jurisdiction in a case in which a dismissal order may have been passed by the Standing Committee of the Corporation. A petition of appeal was submitted by the Appellant to the State Government in the Local Self-Government (Urban) Department, which, vide Government's Memo. No. 7794-8119/U-XVIII, dated 18-9-57, has been forwarded to the Board of Revenue "for disposal according to law". The Learned Counsel for the Appellant tried to argue that this Government memo, should be regarded as the necessary authority for the Board to exercise State's revisional powers in the instant case. This interpretation, to say the least of it, is wholly erroneous and obviously no such meaning can be attached to the Government's memo, in question. In view of the legal position stated above, I am clear in my mind that the Board of Revenue has no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain the present appeal which must, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. Appeal dismissed.