Judgment :- 1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of property in denial of a prior kanom demise executed by the plaintiff's predecessor Stani, which has been dismissed concurrently by the courts below. 2. The suit properties form portion of a cherikkal which originally belonged in Jenmom to the Stani of the Mannermala Kovilakam who went under the name and style of Onnukure Ayirathil Vallabha Rama Raja a stanom appurtenant to the family of Walluvanad Raja. To that stanom a member of the Puthen Kovilakam branch of the Manjeri Kovilakam was adopted. On this adoptee becoming exclusively entitled to the stanam of Onnukure Ayiraram he executed a gift deed dated 7-3-1041 and filed in the case as Ext. A-7 conveying all the stanam properties and perquisites, inclusive of the suit properties in favour of the members of his natural family, the Puthen Kovilakam. There is some controversy as to whether the properties covered by the gift enured under its terms to the Puthen Kovilakam tarwad just like its other ancestral properties or on the other hand appertained to the stanam created in the fifth male member in order of age for the time being, in the Kovilakam, who was to manage them and to which position the plaintiff succeeded in 1113 (1937-38). It was common ground, however, that the four other stanams in the Manjeri Kovilakam inhering in the first four members, viz., the karnavapad, Elemasthani and the next two male members in point of age, were only stanams loosely so-called, that is to say, with no properties attached. The plaint properties had been outstanding under kanom of 14-9-1916. They were redeemed and recovered by the plaintiff's predecessor on 12-1-1934 in execution of a decree of court. Some few months later he granted a kanom thereof in favour of the 1st defendant under Ext. B2 dated 28-8-1935 with a term of 12 years and fixing the kanom amount of Rs. 685-11-5 and the purapad as 65 paras of paddy and 8 annas per year, as under the prior kanom demise. The plaintiff, after he became the Stani, collected the purapad in due course from the 1st defendant up to 1121 (1945-46). The plaint averred that the plaintiff was unaware during all this interval between 1113 and 1121 that Ext. 685-11-5 and the purapad as 65 paras of paddy and 8 annas per year, as under the prior kanom demise. The plaintiff, after he became the Stani, collected the purapad in due course from the 1st defendant up to 1121 (1945-46). The plaint averred that the plaintiff was unaware during all this interval between 1113 and 1121 that Ext. B2 was a new kanom demise, otherwise he would not have acted on it and that in fact, it was a fraudulent and collusive transaction brought about without any stanam necessity and in excess of the powers of the late Stani and that it was therefore void and not binding on the plaintiff or his swaroopam. The suit was laid accordingly on 2-9-1947, in the plaintiff's capacity as the successor Stani for recovery of the properties with mesne profits for the past year 1122 and for the future at the rate of 350 paras of paddy per annum and without reference to Ext. B2 kanom. The plaint was later amended on 15-3-1948 so as to sustain the suit on basis of a cause of action attached to the plaintiff's Kovilakam rather than himself. The defendants 2 and 3 were impleaded as persons in possession under the first defendant. 3. The 1st defendant contested the suit mainly on the footing that the demise of the properties by way of the kanom in the case had been effected only in the usual course of enjoyment by the plaintiff's predecessor Stani and there had been no fraud or collusion at all in the matter. The plaintiff had further accepted the same and acted thereon with full knowledge and for considerable time and was accordingly estopped from questioning it. After the amendment of the plaint on 15-3-1948 the first defendant raised also a question of limitation and further the non-maintainability of the suit without the karnavan on the party array. 4. The courts below differed among themselves on the construction of Ext. A7 gift of 1041 of the Onnukure Aiyiram stanam properties in favour of the Puthen Kovilakam. After the amendment of the plaint on 15-3-1948 the first defendant raised also a question of limitation and further the non-maintainability of the suit without the karnavan on the party array. 4. The courts below differed among themselves on the construction of Ext. A7 gift of 1041 of the Onnukure Aiyiram stanam properties in favour of the Puthen Kovilakam. For while the Munsiff was of the view that the stanam created thereby in the 5th member of the Kovilakam was not a mere courtesy stanam but a stanam in the full legal sense, viz., a position of dignity, with properties attached, the Additional Subordinate Judge found that the properties enured under the gift absolutely to the Puthen Kovilakam as any other of its tarwad properties only, the 5th member stani held the power of management without reference to the karnavapad but on behalf of the Kovilakam. The courts below were however uniform in holding that in executing Ext. B2 kanom demise, the plaintiff's predecessor had not exceeded his powers, the Munsiff viewing the matter from the stand-point of a Stani, the judge from both the stand-points of Stani and tarwad manager. They were again uniform in finding that the plaintiff was in any event estopped from questioning the validity of Ext. B2 having acted thereon for very long. On the question of limitation the Munsiff was willing to hold that the suit as amended would be barred since the amendment was applied for more than 12 years after Ext. B2 date but he found that the suit was in time consistently with his finding that the properties absolutely belonged to the plaintiff as Stani. The Judge found that even on the basis of the amendment no bar of limitation will arise, for, as soon as it was allowed; on ground that it introduced no new cause of action it related back to the date of plaint, which was undoubtedly within time. And lastly both courts were of the view that the absence of the karnavapad on the party array did not affect the maintainability of the suit. In the result they were agreed that the suit was devoid of merit and dismissed it accordingly. Hence this second appeal by the plaintiff. 5. Mr. And lastly both courts were of the view that the absence of the karnavapad on the party array did not affect the maintainability of the suit. In the result they were agreed that the suit was devoid of merit and dismissed it accordingly. Hence this second appeal by the plaintiff. 5. Mr. D.A. Krishna Warrier appearing for the plaintiff-appellant strenuously contended before me firstly that the court below having found rightly that the properties were the Puthen Kovilakam tarwad properties failed to apply the correct law governing the manager's power to create a fresh kanom in respect thereto. He urged that the court had omitted in this connection to give due weight to the significant fact also found by it, that mesne profits at the rate of 350 paras of paddy was properly claimable from the property. This meant that the recital in Ext. B2 that the pattom of the properties was 96 paras of paddy and purapad was therefore fixed at 65 paras and 8 annas was an inordinately low estimate so as to render Ext. B2 kanom demise totally incompetent as against the Kovilakam. On this Mr. Kuttikrishnan Menon, learned Counsel for the respondent did not concede that Ext. A7, on proper construction only brought into being a new set of tarwad properties for the Puthen Kovilakam; his contention was that the creation of a Stani in the legal sense was the real object of Ext. A 7 and the Munsiff 's finding on the matter was preferable to that of the Judge. But he was willing to have the validity of Ext. B2 considered from the view-point pressed for, on the other side. Even so, he submitted, Ext. B2 would stand the test. As regards the "low returns" aspect learned counsel said that the quantum of mesne profits now found cannot be any criterion for fixing the pattom and the michavaram in respect of a kanom demise as Ext. B2 of the year 1935. Indeed this question though allowed to be raised in this court, involved, according to learned counsel, the ascertainment of fresh facts, and on this ground alone cannot be seriously taken notice of in deciding the issue. As I have come to the conclusion along with the court below, that Ext. B2 of the year 1935. Indeed this question though allowed to be raised in this court, involved, according to learned counsel, the ascertainment of fresh facts, and on this ground alone cannot be seriously taken notice of in deciding the issue. As I have come to the conclusion along with the court below, that Ext. B2 cannot be said to be incompetent, even viewing the plaintiff's predecessor's status as special manager alone of the properties, it has become unnecessary for me to discuss in any detail the scope of Ext. AT It is enough to indicate that if the question really arose, I would accept the interpretation favoured by the Judge. Taking up then the question of the extent of powers of the plaintiff's predecessor, as manager of the properties on behalf of the Kovilakam to alienate tarwad properties by way of kanom, under Ext. B2 we have to notice, to begin with, that the plaintiff has given up the case of fraud and collusion in the matter of the execution of Ext. B2 with which he came before court. Stress was however laid on the fact that the plaintiff's predecessor got actual possession of the properties without paying anything to the prior Kanari seeing that the arrears of rent and costs due from him far exceeded the kanartham and value of improvements due to him, and it was more than a year thereafter that he granted Ext. B2 to the 1st defendant and this transaction under Ext. B2 was unsupported by any apparent necessity or benefit so far as tarwad was concerned. And reliance was placed on the implication said to arise from S.33 of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, XXII of 1933. S.33 runs as follows: - "33. (1) Except for consideration and for tarwad necessity or benefit and with the written consent of the majority of the major members of the tarwad no karnavan shall sell immovable, property of, the tarwad or mortgage with possession or lease such property for a period exceeding twelve years. (2). No mortgage with possession or lease with premium returnable wholly or in part, of any such property executed by a karnavan for a period not exceeding twelve years, shall be valid unless such mortgage or lease is for consideration and for tarwad necessity or benefit. (2). No mortgage with possession or lease with premium returnable wholly or in part, of any such property executed by a karnavan for a period not exceeding twelve years, shall be valid unless such mortgage or lease is for consideration and for tarwad necessity or benefit. (3) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to restrict the power of the karnavan to grant, in the usual course of management for a period not exceeding twelve years, any lease without premium returnable wholly or in part, or the renewal of an existing kanom". Now we may take it that the powers of the plaintiff's predecessor as manager could be assimilated to that of the karnavan of a tarwad as provided in the section. The question then is, whether the section imposed any special restriction in the matter of the grant of Ext. B2 kanom. The law before the Act may be taken to be summarised in Sundara Aiyar's Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law, 1922 edition, page 79: "The usage in Malabar has rather been in favour of allowing the karnavan to execute kanom and otti mortgages and leases simple. One cannot help thinking that the Travancore Rule that Mortgages for a term like absolute sales require the assent of the junior members is really not of native origin at all. It is, on the other band, the result of the application of the ideas of the English Law which treat mortgages as a species of alienation. So far as the British Courts are concerned, the question may be regarded as set at rest by the decision in Kunhamod v. Kuttiath Hajee, (1881) I. L. R.3 Mad. 169". In that case Sir Charles A Turner, Kt. So far as the British Courts are concerned, the question may be regarded as set at rest by the decision in Kunhamod v. Kuttiath Hajee, (1881) I. L. R.3 Mad. 169". In that case Sir Charles A Turner, Kt. C. J., and Muthuswamy Iyer, J, had occasion to consider the extent of power of the karnavan of a Malabar tarwad to make a lease of tarwad property for 99 years and they observed: "While, equally with a manager of a joint Hindu family, he is incompetent to alien the estate without the consent of the other members of the tarwad, except to supply the necessities of the tarwad, or to discharge its obligations, he cannot only singly make leases at rack-rents ordinarily for the term of five years for cultivation but leases with fines repayable on the expiry of the terms in the nature of mortgages (kanoms), and mortgages (otti), in which little more than a right to redeem may be left to the family, Edathil Itti v. Kopashon Nayar (I. M. H. C. R.123) We have not been able to ascertain that he has ordinarily power to make any other dispositions of the property than such as are sanctioned by local usage (1 M. H. C. R.123) and although this court ought, so far as it is justified in so doing, to construe liberally the powers which managers are competent to exercise so as to enable them to deal with tarwad property as it would be dealt with by a prudent owner for the benefit of the family, and to interpose no unnecessary obstacles to the employment of property in new industries, in so doing it undertakes what in some cases may be no easy duty - the determination of what acts are and what are not beneficial -and it cannot lose sight of the fact that the office of karnavan is fiduciary, Koiloth P. M. Koran v. P. M. C. Nair, 2 Mad. Jur.117, and that a Court has no authority to confer on karnavans larger powers than such as are sanctioned by usage". In 1. M. H. C. R.123 referred to above Scotland, C. J. & Strange, J., held that a karnavan may singly make an otti mortgage. Jur.117, and that a Court has no authority to confer on karnavans larger powers than such as are sanctioned by usage". In 1. M. H. C. R.123 referred to above Scotland, C. J. & Strange, J., held that a karnavan may singly make an otti mortgage. To my mind, S.33 of the Marumakkathayam Act has not imposed any change in regard to the power of the karnavan to grant a kanom in the ordinary course of management of the tarwad properties provided of course the terms of the kanom demise are not in any way onerous. No implication in this regard can be drawn from the use of the expression "renewal" alone "of an existing kanom" in clause (3) of the section. And it should be remembered that the properties herein had been outstanding on kanom at any rate from 1916 and again the law in 1935 when Ext. B2 was executed, had not brought the idea of semi permanency even as a characteristic of the transaction. Reference may be made in this connection to A. I. R.1937 Mad. 35, Kunhukuttan v. Imbichikuttam where it was laid down that once a landlord accepts a surrender, he has in the ordinary course of management of stanom properties the right to lease the property for the customary period or demise it on nominal kanom for the usual period of twelve years provided the terms of such leases or kanom demises are not onerous or otherwise to the detriment of the stanom. And it was immaterial whether the new demise was granted to the same person or a stranger or whether it was granted the same day or a few days or months hence. The case was no doubt concerned with the powers of a stanomdar. But it seems to me that the powers of the special manager under Ext. A7 who could act without reference to the karnavapad, cannot be considered to be any less. It follows therefore that even though Ext. B2 can strictly be called a fresh kanom demise the predecessor of the plaintiff cannot be said to have exceeded his powers in executing the same. 6. As regards the aspect of 'low returns' which learned counsel for the appellants pressed before me it seems to me that in the absence of any date as to what was the proper return which could be expected at the date of Ext. 6. As regards the aspect of 'low returns' which learned counsel for the appellants pressed before me it seems to me that in the absence of any date as to what was the proper return which could be expected at the date of Ext. B2 from properties of the nature covered by it and also the custom of the locality in the matter of fixing the kanom amount or purappad concerned, it is impossible to consider the validity of Ext. B2 transaction from the point of view of mesne profits fixed by the Judge. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent in this connection it is pointed out that at the time of the demise the demisee paid to the jenmi a sum of about Rs. 1000 and it was usual in those days when paddy was selling very cheap to allow the kanomdar interest at the rate of 20 paras for every sum of Rs. 100 advanced by him and calculating at that rate the pattern shown in the demise cannot be considered to be low. I have therefore to reject this argument. I therefore hold, along with the courts below that Ext. B2 demise cannot be challenged as beyond the powers of the plaintiff's predecessor. The above finding is enough to dispose of the appeal. But I should not omit to observe that there was hardly any merit in the plaintiff's approach to court at the time he did, for grant of relief in denial of Ext. B2. The courts below were unwilling to accept the explanation offered by the plaintiff that he was unaware of the legal implications of the terms of Ext. B2 during all the years after he became the stani and until he instituted the suit. Learned counsel says the doctrine of estoppel under S.115 of the Evidence Act cannot apply because the plaintiff had not been guilty of any declaration or act or conduct which could be said to have misled the 1st defendant in any way in getting Ext. B2 or continuing in possession thereunder. But the question is not so much an estoppel in that sense but what in colloquial language is called 'blowing hot and cold'. As seen from Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. B2 or continuing in possession thereunder. But the question is not so much an estoppel in that sense but what in colloquial language is called 'blowing hot and cold'. As seen from Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. pages 171-174, the doctrine of estoppel is wider in its scope and takes in its compass also cases where people are not allowed to behave inconsistently. 7. The only surviving question is a question of limitation arising from the amendment of the plaint after the lapse of more than 12 years from Ext.B2 date and pressed by the learned counsel for the respondents. No doubt the 1st defendant would have been in a position to attack in appeal the correctness of the order passed by the Munsiff. But that did not mean she could object when she was not the appellant and when she had not also filed any objection against the order on the amendment. 8. It follows that there is no substance in this second appeal and I therefore dismiss it with costs.