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1957 DIGILAW 197 (ALL)

Parsidhdhan Singh v. Gaya Prasad

1957-04-26

V.D.BHARGAVA

body1957
JUDGMENT V.D. Bhargava, J. - This is an application in revision u/s 116, CPC arising out of an order passed by the Munsif sending an issue back to the revenue court for decision in view of Section 5 of the UPZA and LR (Amendment) Ordinance of 1954. 2. The facts of the case are that the Plaintiff claimed Adhivasi rights and they were denied by the Defendant. When the suit was filed it was thought that since the question raised was of Adhivasi rights it raised the question of title and on that belief an issue was remitted to the civil court for decision. Before the civil court could decide that issue and send its finding to the revenue court, the UPZA and LR (Amendment) Ordinance came into force from 6-8-1954. Section 5 of the said Ordinance added Sub-clause (5) to Section 332 of the Principal Act. It was in the following terms. 5. Whether a person is or is not an Adhivasi or asami of the land, shall not be deemed to raise a question of title within the meaning of Sub-section (1) but for purpose of appeal from a decree of revenue court in a suit or proceedings the provisions of Sub-section (4) shall apply as if the issue about title had been decided by a civil court. 3. Acting upon this amendment the Munsif passed an order that after the amendment it was the revenue court which was entitled to decide the case, and referred the case back to the revenue court for further proceedings. Against that order this application in revision has been filed. 4. The first question that arises is whether any case has been decided by the court of the Munsif. He has merely sent the case back to the revenue court. He has decided nothing and, in my opinion, merely, referring the case for a finding or sending it back, would not amount to a case decided and no application u/s 115 of the CPC would lie. 5. Apart from this, on merits also I am inclined to agree with the learned Munsif. On 6-8-1954 if any person was claiming an Adhivasi right, it could not be said that any question of title arose by virtue of the amendment of Section 332. 5. Apart from this, on merits also I am inclined to agree with the learned Munsif. On 6-8-1954 if any person was claiming an Adhivasi right, it could not be said that any question of title arose by virtue of the amendment of Section 332. Till that date the question had not been decided and, therefore, from that date if no question of title was involved the civil court would have no jurisdiction to decide. It will be only the revenue court which would have jurisdiction to decide the case. 6. Learned Counsel for the applicant has urged that the amendment of Section 332 was not retrospective and, therefore, would not apply to the present case when the issue had already been remitted. It is not a question of the Act being retrospective. It is in the nature of procedural or adjective law and as soon as the Act comes into force that procedure is to be followed. If a finding had already been given by the civil court then there may have been something to be said, but if a finding had not been given before the Ordinance came into force, the jurisdiction of the civil court had come to an end. 7. As a matter of fact Section 332 was not very clear. It had not specifically stated that Adhivasi and asami rights were questions of title. It appears that owing to a certain decision, as a matter of routine these matters were being referred by the revenue court to the civil court and the Legislature thought it fit to make that point clear and the amending section is not really a repealing section but it is only a modifying section. 8. Learned Counsel for the applicant had argued that by virtue of Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act where any Act repeals any enactment hitherto or here-after to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal is not to affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. In my opinion the Ordinance of 1954 was not a repealing ordinance but was an amending ordinance. Moreover, whether a suit should be tried in a revenue court or civil court is a matter which does not give any right or privilege or obligation to any party. In my opinion the Ordinance of 1954 was not a repealing ordinance but was an amending ordinance. Moreover, whether a suit should be tried in a revenue court or civil court is a matter which does not give any right or privilege or obligation to any party. It is purely a matter of procedure and therefore, even if it be a repealing Act, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will not apply to the facts of this case. 9. It was further argued that the Ordinance was unconstitutional, because it was not open to the Govt. under Article 213 of the Constitution to promulgate an ordinance which related to an Act which had already been reserved for the consideration of the President. I need not dilate on this point because the Ordinance was superseded by the UPLR (Supplementary Act) Act XXXI of 1952 and the Act had received the assent of the President and the same provision about the addition of Section 332-A had been made, and this Act has made amendment operative from the date of the promulgation and even if, for the sake of argument, it be accepted that that ordinance was invalid, the present Act would protect the action of the Munsif, or in any event, when the case will be sent back to the Munsif, he will have no jurisdiction to decide it. 10. I accordingly see no reason to interfere. The application in revision is dismissed, but make no order as to costs.