Judgment Sahai, J. 1. This appeal by defendant No. 1, one of the defendants-first-party, arises out of a suit for declaration of title to, and confirmation or, in the alternative, recovery of possession over, 1 bigha 7 kathas 3 dhurs of land appertaining to khata No. 336 of village Nanaur as described in the plaint. 2. The plaintiff in the suit is Musammat Budhiariwati, widow of Ajodhya Lal Das. One Musammat Bhaiyan was the widow of one Sant Lal Das. Dai Bacha (defendant No. 8) is a daughter of Sant Lal Das and Musammat Bhaiyan. Defendants Nos. 6 and 7 (defendant second party) are the sons of Musammat Dai Bacha. Defendant No. 1 is the purchaser of the suit land from defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8. 3. The plaintiffs case is that Sant Lal Das and Ajodhya Lal Das were separate; but Sant Lal Das had no issue and he adopted Ajodhya Lal as his kartaputra, and thereafter they began to live together and became joint. It is also the plaintiffs case that Sant Lal Das had acquired the suit land, and, on his death, Ajodhya Lal succeeded him and came inte possession of the family properties including that land. Ajodhya Lal died in 1326 Fasli, and the plaintiff succeeded him and came into possession of those properties. Musammat Bhaiyan was getting only maintenance until she died in 1328 Fasli. It is alleged that the plaintiff has continued to be in possession of the disputed land throughout. She has instituted the suit on the allegation that a cloud has been cast upon her title on execution of the sale deeds in favour of defendant No. 1 by defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8. The sale deeds are said to be collusive documents executed without consideration. 4. She has instituted the suit on the allegation that a cloud has been cast upon her title on execution of the sale deeds in favour of defendant No. 1 by defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8. The sale deeds are said to be collusive documents executed without consideration. 4. The defendants case, shortly stated, is that the suit is barred by the provisions of Order .9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the plaintiffs allegation that Ajodhya Lal succeeded Sant Lal and came into possession of the family properties is incorrect, that the suit land was the stridhan property of Musammat Bhaiyan, that Musammat Dai Bacha succeeded to Musammat Bhaiyan and came into possession of that land on her death, and that the sale deeds dated 5th January 1946, and 20th February 1946, executed by Musammat Dai Bacha and her sons in favour of defendant No. 1, in respect of the suit land are genuine and for consideration. 5. The learned Munsif held that the land in suit was not the stridhan property of Musammat Bhaiyan but was acquired by Sant Lal Das, and that the plaintiff had succeeded in proving her title and possession within twelve years of the suit. He, however, dismissed the suit because he came to the conclusion that the suit was barred by the provisions of Order 9, Rule 9. 6. On appeal, the learned 1st Additional Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga agreed with learned Munsif in holding that the suit land was not the stridhan property of Musammat Bhaiyan and that Sant Lal had acquired it. He also held, in agreement with the learned Munsif, that the sale deeds relied upon by defendant No. 1 were invalid and without any consideration, and that the plaintiff had successfully proved her subsisting right, title and interest in the suit land. On the point of application of Order 9, Rule 9, he differed from the Munsif and held that the suit was not barred because the previous suit was dismissed for default under the provisions of Order 9, Rule 3 and not under the provisions of Order 9, Rule 8. 7. The first point which Mr. A. B. Jha has raised on behalf of the appellant is that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the present suit was not barred under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. The first point which Mr. A. B. Jha has raised on behalf of the appellant is that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the present suit was not barred under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The previous suit instituted by the plaintiff, Musammat Budhiariwati, was Title Suit No. 169 of 1947. The 20th November, 1948, was the date for hearing fixed in the suit. A certified copy of the order-sheet (Exhibit 5) shows that, on that date, both the plaintiffs and the defendants applied for time; but their applications were dismissed. Subsequently, lawyers of both sides prayed for time again, and the plaintiffs lawyer filed a petition again on the ground that there was a talk of compromise. The learned Munsif rejected these prayers for time also. Later still, the plaintiffs lawyer stated that he had no further instruction, and, therefore, the learned Munsif dismissed the suit for default. The point which Mr. Jha has seriously pressed is that, in those circumstances, the order of dismissal of the suit for default must be held to have been passed under the provisions of Order 9, Rule 8 and not under the provisions of Order 9, Rule 3. He has contended that the defendants had nothing to do in the suit at that stage, and that the mere fact that the defendants lawyer filed a petition for time and made an oral request for time was sufficient to constitute the defendants appearance, and hence it must be held that the defendants appeared and the plaintiff did not appear within the meaning of Rule 8. In my opinion, there is no substance in these arguments. The mere appearance of a party at any time on a date fixed in the case is not of any consequence at all. In my judgment, the crucial time is the time when the suit is called on for hearing. Even though a party may have appeared at any time on the date fixed, the consequence of his non-appearance or default will, undoubtedly, follow if he happens not to appear at the time when the suit is called on for hearing. In the present case, there can be no doubt that the plaintiff as well as the defendants appeared in the suit at the time when they filed application for time. In the present case, there can be no doubt that the plaintiff as well as the defendants appeared in the suit at the time when they filed application for time. There can also be no doubt that they appeared again when oral prayer for time was made pn behalf of the defendants, and a second, petition for time was filed on behalf of the plff. There is nothing on the record, however, to show that the defendants or their duly instructed lawyer were physically present or were prepared to take steps in the suit at the time when it was called on ior hearing and the plaintiffs lawyer stated before the Court that he had no further instruction. Indeed, the learned Subordinate Judge has held that he does "not find that there was any appearance on behalf of the defendants when the suit was called out and dismissed for default due to non-prosecution by the plaintiff". 8. In support of his arguments, Mr. Jha has relied upon two decisions of this Court. The first one is Basdeo Narain Singh V/s. Harakh Narain Singh, AIR 1923 Patna 156 (A). In that case, an application for time filed on behalf of the plaintiff was rejected and half an hours time was given to the junior lawyer for the plaintiff to consult his senior. No one appeared when the suit was again called out, and hence it was dismissed. It was held that the dismissal was under Order IX Rule 8. The other facts of the case are not at all clear from the report. Rule 8 must have been applied because the defendant has appeared at the time when the suit was ultimately taken up and that fact was not challenged. Had not the defendant appeared at that time. Rule 3 would clearly have been applicable. The decision, therefore, does not afford any assistance in the circumstances of the present case. 9. The other decision which Mr. Jha has relied upon is that in the case of Ranjit Lal Pathak V/s. Rameshwar Singh, ILR 7 Pat 333 : (AIR 1928 Pat 335) (B). In that case, the plaintiff did not appear and the defendant appeared but applied for time. The dismissal of the suit in default was, therefore, held to fall under Order IX Rule 8 and not under Order IX Rule 4. In that case, the plaintiff did not appear and the defendant appeared but applied for time. The dismissal of the suit in default was, therefore, held to fall under Order IX Rule 8 and not under Order IX Rule 4. That case is clearly distinguishable because the plaintiff did not appear at all in that case; whereas the plaintiff applied for time along with the defendants in the present case. At the stage when the suit was called on for hearing in that case, therefore, the plaintiff was absent; whereas the defendant had put in his appearance by filing his petition for time. In the present case, however, the defendants can only be held to have been present on two occasions on the date fixed when the plaintiff was also present, and they cannot be held to have appeared "at the time when the suit was finally called on for hearing and actually dismissed for default". 10. The view which I have taken above is supported by a decision of Raj Kishore Pra-sad, J. in Suraj Prasad Singh V/s. Rambaran Singh 1956 B. L. J. Rule 6 : ( AIR 1956 Pat 127 ) (C). The facts in that case were somewhat similar to the facts of the present case, though I must say that the non-appearance of the defendant at the time when the suit was called out was very clear from the order-sheet in that case. As. however, it is not clear from the order-sheet (Exhibit 5) in the present case that the defendants were present at the stage at which it was necessary for them to appear so as to make Rule 8 applicable, no real distinction can be made between this case and Suraj Prasad Singhs case (C). 11. The next submission which Mr. Jha has made is that a specific issue should have been raised in the trial Court relating to the title of Ayodhya Lal Das and the plaintiff, and that the question as to whether Ayodhya Lal Das succeeded to Sant Lal Das by survivorship or by succession should have been clearly decided. No issue appears to have been raised in this connection but it is clear that the trial Court considered the question of title. No issue appears to have been raised in this connection but it is clear that the trial Court considered the question of title. It relied upon the recitals in certain documents and also upon other evidence in order to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff had proved her title and possession within twelve years of the suit. It does not appear that the Munsifs finding relating to the plaintiffs title was challenged before the learned Subordinate Judge in appeal because the questions which he formulated on the contentions of the parties were only three in number; (1) whether the suit lands were the stridhan property of Musammat Bhaiyan; (2) whether the sale deeds of the defendants respondents were genuine, valid and for consideration; and(3) whether the suit as framed was maintainable. Besides, the findings of the Court below make it clear that Ayodhya Lal succeeded to Sant Lal Das and came into possession of his properties, though it is not clear whether he came into possession of the properties by survivorship or by succession. The findings of the Courts below also show that Ayodhya Lal Das was in possession of the suit land, and, after his death, the plaintiff has been in possession of that land. 12. In these circumstances, it is clear that the title of the plaintiff must be held to have become perfected by being in adverse possession of the land in dispute for very much longer than twelve years. I am, therefore, unable to accept Mr. Jhas submission. 13. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that there is no ground for interference. The appeal is therefore, dismissed with costs.