Judgment The short question raised in this revision is whether a Revenue Divisional Officer acting under Madras Act XXV of 1955 and who ordered a landlord’s application against a tenant ex parte had the power to set aside the ex parte order and restore the application for being re-heard. The Revenue Divisional Officer before whom the application was made was of the view that he had no such power, and I agree that that view is right. Rule 8 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Rules, 1955, provides that the proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Officer shall be summary and shall be governed as far as possible by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code having regard to (a) the issue of service of summons ; (b) the examination of parties and witnesses and (c) the production of documents. It is clear that under this rule the Revenue Divisional Officer was not empowered to set aside an ex parte order made by him. But the contention of Mr. Raghavachariar, the learned counsel for the petitioner was that apart from any such powers, the Revenue Divisional Officer functioning as a Court had inherent jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order made by him. But he has not been able to cite any authority in support of his contention that a Court has got inherent jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order passed by it. Ordinarily when once a matter is disposed of, finality attaches to the order and unless a Court is clothed with special powers to set aside that finality and restore the application, it must be held that the Court has no inherent jurisdiction. In similar circumstances, two learned Judges of this Court have expressed the same view, Balakrishna Ayyar, J., in W.P. No. 560 of 1954 and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in W.P. No. 520 of 1954. I respectfully agree with those learned Judges and hold that the Revenue Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte order and restore the application. The revision is therefore dismissed with costs. R.M. ----- Revision dismissed.