JUDGMENT Tandon, J. - This is a revision against an order passed in appeal by the court below setting aside the order of the Munsif for return of the plaint for presentation to the proper court. 2. Bhagwan Das Plaintiff held a decree against Umrao Singh, Defendant No. 1, who was a fixed rate tenant of the plots in suit. In execution of this decree these plots were put to sale and, purchased by the Plaintiff on 25-3-1942. Thereafter the sale was confirmed in his favour. The Plaintiff claimed that he obtained possession as well on 16-6-1942 on the lands so purchased. His allegation further is that Umrao Singh applied for the setting aside of the sale and the matter came upto this Court but he was unsuccessful and the sale remained intact. Umrao Singh made yet another effort for setting aside of the sale before the revenue court but he was not successful there either. It is next alleged that he (the Plaintiff) filed a suit against Umrao Singh u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act, 1939 for possession of those plots which are described in Sch. B of the plaint which was decreed in his favour in July 1944. According to the Plaintiff he also obtained possession of those plots in execution of the decree in December 1944. It is, however, further the allegation of the Plaintiff that the Defendants 2 to 6 have been holding the aforesaid plots on Adhia on behalf of Umrao Singh, and have in collusion with him prevented him (the Plaintiff) from taking possession of them. Then in para 7 of the plaint it is stated that the Defendants, obviously referring to all the six Defendants, have no connection with or interest in the plots but they are nevertheless sticking to them. 3. On these allegations the Plaintiff has asked, firstly for a relief for possession over the plots mentioned in Sch. B and, secondly for a decree for Rs. 400 on account of mesne profits for the period of two years next before the institution of the suit. 4. Defendant No. 1 alone appeared and filed a written statement. Against the remaining Defendants the suit has proceeded in their absence. B and, secondly for a decree for Rs. 400 on account of mesne profits for the period of two years next before the institution of the suit. 4. Defendant No. 1 alone appeared and filed a written statement. Against the remaining Defendants the suit has proceeded in their absence. One of the defences urged was that the first Defendant was the tenant of the plots in question, hence the suit was not cognizable by a civil court, on the contrary was cognizable by the revenue court in view of Section 180 of the UP Tenancy Act, 1939. The Munsiff found this issue in favour of the Defendants and directed the plaint to be returned to the Plaintiff for presentation to the proper court. The Plaintiff appealed against this order which was reversed by the learned Civil Judge. The present revision is directed against the order of the learned Civil Judge. 5. Section 180 of the UP Tenancy Act, 1939 prior to its amendment in 1947 was as under: (1) A person taking or retaining possession of a plot or plots of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force and without the consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant shall be liable to ejectment under this section on the suit of the person so entitled, or when the joint consent of more than one person is required on the suit of any one or more of such persons, and also to pay damages, Which may extend to four times the annual rental value calculated in accordance with the sanctioned rates applicable to hereditary tenants. (2) If no suit is brought under this section or a decree obtained under this section is not executed the person in possession shall on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for such suit or for the execution of such decree, as the case may be, become a hereditary tenant of such plot or plots. 6. (2) If no suit is brought under this section or a decree obtained under this section is not executed the person in possession shall on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for such suit or for the execution of such decree, as the case may be, become a hereditary tenant of such plot or plots. 6. After its amendment in 1947 by UP Act No. X of 1947 it became as under: (1) A person taking or retaining possession of a plot of land without the consent of the person entitled to admit him to occupy such plot and otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force, shall be liable to ejectment under this section on the suit of the person so entitled, and also to pay damages which may extend to four times the annual rental value calculated in accordance with the sanctioned rates applicable to hereditary tenants: Provided that notwithstanding the provisions of sub Section (1) of Section 246, where such a person taking or retaining possession is one of the co sharers whose joint consent is required to bring such suit, he shall not be required to join as Plaintiff in the suit. In such a case, the decree passed in favour of the Plaintiff shall be deemed to be in favour of all such co sharers. Explanation I. A co-sharer in the proprietary rights in a plot of land taking or retaining possession of such plot without the consent of the whole body of co-sharers or if an agent appointed to act on behalf of all of them, shall be deemed to be in possession of such plot otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law within the meaning of this section. Explanation II. A tenant entitled to sublet a plot of land in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force may maintain a suit under this section against the person taking or retaining possession of such plot otherwise than in the circumstances for which provision is made in Section 183. Explanation II. A tenant entitled to sublet a plot of land in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force may maintain a suit under this section against the person taking or retaining possession of such plot otherwise than in the circumstances for which provision is made in Section 183. (2) If no suit is brought under this section or a decree obtained under this section is not executed, the person in possession shall become a hereditary tenant of such plot, or if such person is a co-sharer, he shall become a Khudkasht holder, on the expiry of period of limitation prescribed for Such suit or for the execution of such decree, as the case may be: Provided that where the person in possession cannot be admitted to such plot except as sub-tenant by the person entitled to admit, the provisions of this Sub-section shall not apply until the interest of the person so entitled to admit is extinguished in such plot u/s 45(f). 7. Two significant changes were introduced, one in Sub-section (1) and the other by the inclusion of Explanation II to the effect that a tenant entitled to sub-let a plot of land could also commence a suit under that section in circumstances other than those provided for in Section 183. The change made in Sub-section (1) itself was partly by transposition of certain words to what may be said a more convenient place and partly by the substitution of the words "the person entitled to admit him as tenant" by the words "the person entitled to admit him to occupy such plot." One of the reasons which may have compelled the legislature to make this change might have been the decision by a Full Bench of the Oudh Chief Court reported in Ori Lal v. Ganeshi 1947 AWR (C.C) 7 wherein it was held that the landlord of the plot could alone file a suit under this section. We shall revert to it later when discussing another point raised in this case. 8. The suit out of which this revision has arisen was commenced in 1946 i.e. prior to the said amendment. It was accordingly contended that the unamended section governed the case. We shall revert to it later when discussing another point raised in this case. 8. The suit out of which this revision has arisen was commenced in 1946 i.e. prior to the said amendment. It was accordingly contended that the unamended section governed the case. As the present suit would in either event have lain in the revenue court, it does not appear necessary to enter into the controversy whether the amended or the unamended section applied to it. According to the amended provision the suit will undoubtedly lie in the revenue court. The difficulty pointed by the learned Judges of the Chief, Court of Oudh in the Full Bench decision of Ori Lal v. Ganeshi 1947 AWR (C.C) 7 has been done away with by the amendment and it has been expressly stated that a suit by a tenant of the land can also be filed u/s 180. The question which has, therefore, to be considered is did the suit lie in the revenue courts under the unamended section also. 9. In the Full Bench-case of D.N. Rege v. Mohammad Haider 1946 AWR (H.C.) 403 it was laid down that: The distinction between an ordinary suit against a trespasser in a civil court and a suit u/s 180, UP Tenancy Act, 1939, is that the Plaintiff in the first case alleges that the Defendant is setting up a title against his proprietary interest whereas in the second case the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant is setting up a title to hold the land as a tenant. The civil court has no jurisdiction where a claim to a tenancy has been set up before the institution of the suit and the revenue court has no jurisdiction where it has not been so set up. 10. Proceeding further it was again observed: Jurisdiction of a court does not depend upon the defence which is set up after the suit is instituted but upon the State of affairs which existed before the- institution of the suit. A Plaintiff, however, cannot give either the civil court or the revenue court jurisdiction by making false allegations in his plaint. He should as far as possible ascertain the facts before he files a plaint. 11. A Plaintiff, however, cannot give either the civil court or the revenue court jurisdiction by making false allegations in his plaint. He should as far as possible ascertain the facts before he files a plaint. 11. The test laid down, therefore, was the nature of title which may have been set up by the Defendant before the institution of the suit; in other words the state of affairs which existed before the institution of the suit. Though the defence which may be set up subsequently by the Defendant will not determine or be relevant for deciding the forum in which the Plaintiff should have instituted the suit still it is the duty of the Plaintiff to give correct facts and he cannot confer jurisdiction on one or the other court simply by making incorrect allegations. If, therefore, the state of affairs existing prior to the institution of the suit and of which the Plaintiff was aware pointed out that the title set up by the Defendant was that he claimed to be the tenant of the plot then the jurisdiction in respect of a suit for possession would in view of the above decision belong to the revenue court. 12. In the instant case the Plaintiff said in para 1 of the plaint that the Defendant No. 1, against whom too the relief for possession had been asked, was a tenant of the plot. Then in the succeeding paragraphs he pointed out that although he had purchased those plots at a court auction and also made repeated efforts to secure possession, he had not succeeded in effectively retaining possession over them, on the contrary, the first Defendant had in collusion with Defendants 2 to 6, who were cultivating on Adhia on his behalf, had succeeded in usurping possession. Thus the case put forward in the plaint so far as Defendant No. 1 was Concerned, was that the Defendant No. 1 claimed to be tenant of the plots and was retaining possession thereof under cover of that claim, and in the case of Defendants 2 to 6, it was that they were holding the plots on behalf of Defendant No. 1 on Adhia. It was thus clear that the Plaintiff knew when he commenced the suit that the Defendants were setting up a title to hold the plot in suit as tenants thereof. It was thus clear that the Plaintiff knew when he commenced the suit that the Defendants were setting up a title to hold the plot in suit as tenants thereof. That being so and the plots being land as defined in the UP Tenancy Act, 1939 the case was covered by the provisions of Section 180, UP Tenancy Act, 1939. 13. It was, however, contended on behalf of the Plaintiff opposite-party that Section 180 of the UP Tenancy Act, 1939 applied to those cases only where the Plaintiff claimed to be proprietor of the land, Where, however, the Plaintiff did not claim proprietary interest in the land but claimed to be the tenant of the plots, as in the instant case, Section 180 was not applicable. Reliance has been placed in support of the proposition on the Full Bench decision reported in Ori Lal v. Ganeshi. 1947 AWR (C.C) 7 It was held in this case that Section 180 contemplated suits by landlords against persons taking or retaining possession of agricultural land without any title. Persons who do not assert any title to proprietary or under proprietary rights in the land cannot avail of this section. Reliance was placed on the Word "tenant" as also on the expression "without the written consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant" occurring in Section 180. These, it was held, showed that the suit could be commenced under that section by such persons only as were entitled to admit a person in occupation as tenant. But since a tenant can be admitted by a landlord alone it was held that the suit could be commenced by a landlord only. Though it was urged that the word "tenant" included a sub-tenant also, but this argument was not accepted as it was held that the word had been used in Section 180 in the restricted meaning of a tenant-in-chief alone. It was, therefore, held that even though the tenant maybe permitted under the law to admit a sub-tenant he could not be said to be a person who could admit the person in occupation as tenant. 14. Tenant has been defined in Clause (23) of Section 3 of the UP Tenancy Act, 1939 to be the person by whom rent is, or but for a contract express or implied would be payable and includes, except where the contrary intention appears, a sub-tenant. 14. Tenant has been defined in Clause (23) of Section 3 of the UP Tenancy Act, 1939 to be the person by whom rent is, or but for a contract express or implied would be payable and includes, except where the contrary intention appears, a sub-tenant. In view of this definition, ordinarily the expression "tenant" will include a sub-tenant also. A sub-tenant will not be included in those cases only where a contrary intention appears. What has, therefore, to be considered is whether there is anything in Section 180 or elsewhere in the UP Tenancy Act, 1939 to show that the word "tenant" used in the former has been used in the restricted sense of a tenant-in-chief alone. Unlike Section 183 of the UP Tenancy Act, 1939 which deals with the remedy for wrongful ejectment of a tenant Section 180 has not used the word "tenant". It has, on the other hand, given the right of suit to a person who is entitled to admit the Defendant as a tenant. Ordinarily, no doubt, the landlord of the land is the person who can admit a tenant but where the law has given similar right to the tenant also it cannot be said, simply because the word "tenant" and not the sub-tenant has been used in Section 180, that the tenant is not a person who can admit a tenant, or to be more precise, a sub-tenant The learned Judges, in the above Full Bench decision of the Oudh Court, too, felt that Section 180, taken by itself contained no direct evidence that the word tenant had been used in it in the restricted sense of a tenant-in-chief. They, however, considered that such an inference nevertheless followed, partly, from the scheme embodied in Section 180 itself, and, partly, from Section 183 which in their view was the provision in the Act dealing with the remedies by a tenant for his wrongful ejectment. They, however, considered that such an inference nevertheless followed, partly, from the scheme embodied in Section 180 itself, and, partly, from Section 183 which in their view was the provision in the Act dealing with the remedies by a tenant for his wrongful ejectment. It was pointed out that Section 180 provided that the Plaintiff besides asking relief for possession could ask damages also but his remedy in this respect was limited to an amount equal to four times the annual rental value; further, that Sub-section (2) of the section laid down that if no suit was brought under it, or decree obtained under it was not executed, within the period prescribed for institution of the suit or the execution of the decree, the person in possess on of the plot become a hereditary tenant of the land. This provision conferred a very curtailed right to get compensation as compared to the usual right of a party to get full compensation for the loss sustained by him on account of his dispossession. Again, it gave to the person in possession the right of a hereditary tenant on the expiry of the period of limitation. In the view of the learned Judges, these extraordinary provisions could be explained in this way only, namely, that the person who might bring a suit u/s 180 must be the proprietor of the plot. u/s 183, the right of a tenant to compensation for dispossession is doubtless unlimited; the person in wrongful possession does not also acquire the status of a tenant, It was again held that this conflict between the two sections could be explained by the fact alone that a tenant could not take advantage of the provisions of Section 180 as otherwise a person claiming to be a sub-tenant would upon the expiry of the period for the institution of the suit or the execution of the decree become a hereditary tenant of the plot though the landlord had not been a party to the suit. We have considered the difficulties pointed out by the learned Judges but with great respect we are unable to agree with their conclusions. None of these considerations should in our view influence the meaning of the expression tenant used in Section 180. 15. We have considered the difficulties pointed out by the learned Judges but with great respect we are unable to agree with their conclusions. None of these considerations should in our view influence the meaning of the expression tenant used in Section 180. 15. Admittedly, a landlord can bring a suit against a person who has taken possession of a plot of land otherwise than in accordance with law for his ejectment under this section. If, therefore, he does not still bring a suit against the person in occupation and such person though claiming to be a subtenant becomes ultimately the hereditary tenant of the plot it would not, in our view, give rise to any anomaly, such as cannot be explained having regard to the purpose and policy underlying the UP Tenancy Act, 1939. One of the purposes, as too clear, of Section 180 was that a person in wrongful possession of a plot of land should be evicted therefrom at the earliest occasion and where he is not so evicted within the time provided in that behalf an indefeasible right to the occupation of the plot should accrue in favour of the person who is so in possession and has not been ejected. There can be this other explanation also. It is too well recognised that development of land or the improvement of agriculture is not reasonably possible so long as there is any element of uncertainty or other hindrance in the way of a person's possession over the land held by him. He does not bother himself with improving his holding or investing money on it unless he is assured that he will not be evicted from it. No wonder, therefore, that the legislature thought it fit that any One who is permitted at tolerated to continue in possession of any land, whether the person who has so permitted be the landlord himself or the tenant-in-chief, does not displace him from it. On the other hand his possession is confirmed and he is allowed to continue in possession in his own independent right to the exclusion of the right of any other person. In other words, he is conferred the status of the tenant-in-chief. In our view, no real distinction exists, so far as this aspect is concerned between the case of a landlord and the case of a tenant-in-chief. In other words, he is conferred the status of the tenant-in-chief. In our view, no real distinction exists, so far as this aspect is concerned between the case of a landlord and the case of a tenant-in-chief. If the person in possession can prescribe against the landlord, he can as well do so against the intermediate holder of the land also. We are accordingly of the view that the fact that the person in possession of the land became a hereditary tenant on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for a suit u/s 180 was no ground for holding that the word "tenant" in that section did not include a sub-tenant. The expression "tenant" should be interpreted to include a subtenant also, as the definition requires. 16. It was also pointed out in the above case of Ori Lal v. Ganeshi 1947 AWR (C.C) 7 that a tenant's remedy for eviction had been provided in Section 183 of the UP Tenancy Act, 1939 and Section 180 was applicable to the case of landlords alone. Once again, we are with respect unable to accept this view. Section 183 has made provision for those cases only which have been expressly provided in it. The section is not exhaustive so far as remedies against dispossession available to tenants are concerned. One can easily conceive of cases which do not fall under any of the categories for which provision exists in Section 183. This section, as will appear from it, applies to those cases only where the tenant is ejected or prevented from taking or obtaining possession: (1) by his landholder; or, (2) by a person claiming as land-holder to have a right to eject him; or, (3) by any person admitted to or allowed to retain possession by such landholder or a person so claiming. The case of a tenant ejected by a person, who claims as a sub-tenant, does not fall under any of the above categories for which provision exists in Section 183. But if the word "tenant" in Section 180 includes a sub-tenant, as is the definition also of that expression, such a suit can be commenced by a tenant under this section. It cannot, therefore, be said that Section 183 was the lone provision under which a tenant could seek his remedy against his dispossession. But if the word "tenant" in Section 180 includes a sub-tenant, as is the definition also of that expression, such a suit can be commenced by a tenant under this section. It cannot, therefore, be said that Section 183 was the lone provision under which a tenant could seek his remedy against his dispossession. As a matter of fact, the doubts, if any, in this respect, have been removed by the amendment made in Section 180 in 1947. Explanation II added to this section in 1947 has now specifically said that a tenant entitled to sub-let a plot of land shall be entitled to maintain a suit under the section in circumstances for which provision does not exist in Section 183. To our mind, this position existed even prior to the amendment. The amendment has merely helped to place the position beyond doubt. No new provision has been made. It has only stated what was already the true intention of Section 180. Again we are unable to discover anything in Section 183 either to show that the word "tenant" as used in Section 180 referred to a tenant-in-chief only and not included a sub-tenant. 17. Therefore, disagreeing with the view taken in the Oudh case we are of the opinion that the word "tenant" in Section 180, UP Tenancy Act, 1939 included a sub-tenant also in accordance with the definition of that expression. That being so, a tenant also could commence a suit under that section. We further hold that the present suit lay in the revenue court. 18. We, therefore, allow the application, set aside the order passed by the court below and restore the order made by the learned Munsif and further direct that the plaint shall be returned to the Plaintiff for presentation to proper court. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.