Judgment R.K.Choudhary, J. 1. This is an application by the mother of a minor girl Bibi Ruksana against an order refusing to reconsider the order appointing the opposite party who is the grandfather of the minor as guardian of the person ant) property of the minor under the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act. 2. The short facts are these. On 7-7-1951, Zahuruddin, father of the minor girl, died leaving a widow, the petitioner, and the minor child. Sometime in March, 1952, the petitioner remarried the brother of her former deceased husband. On 21-5-1955, the opposite party namely the grandfather of the minor girl, made an application before the District Judge of Bhagalpur for his being appointed as guardian of her person and properties. On 6-6-1955 the Court ordered for service of general notices and also for service of notice on the petitioner. On 10-6-1955, the opposite party himself received all the notices including the notice of the petitioner. On 7-7-1955, the petitioner was, however, divorced by her second husband and she went to live with her father at his house. As no one objected to the appointment of the opposite party as the guardian of the minor, he was appointed a guardian of her person and properties on 23-7-1955. On 4-8-1955, the petitioner alleged, she got knowledge of the above appointment and on 8-8-1955, she filed objection to his appointment and made a prayer for re-calling the order of appointment. This application was dismissed by the learned Second Additional District Judge who heard it and hence this civil revision application has been presented by her in this Court. 3. The learned Additional District Judge rejected the application of the petitioner on two grounds, namely, (1) that the application was barred by Section 48 of the Guardians and Wards Act and (2) that no fraud was practised by Kabiruddin, the opposite party, in the matter of service of notices on Bibi Walima, the petitioner. 4. The learned Additional District Judge has held that the order appointing the guardian does not amount to a decree and so the provisions of Order 9, Rule 13, Civil P. C., are inapplicable. The view that lie has taken is perfectly correct in this regard. 4. The learned Additional District Judge has held that the order appointing the guardian does not amount to a decree and so the provisions of Order 9, Rule 13, Civil P. C., are inapplicable. The view that lie has taken is perfectly correct in this regard. He has further held, as already observed, that Sec. 48 of the Guardians and Wards Act which provides that an order made under that Act is final and could not be liable to be contested by suit or otherwise, was a bar to this application. True it ia that under this section an order made under this act except in certain cases enumerated therein is final and is not liable to be contested by suit or otherwise. But it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court has ample jurisdiction to recall an order passed under this Act in appropriate cases. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Rashmoni Dasi V/s. Gunada Sundari Dasi, 26 Ind Cas 275 : (AIR 1915 Cal 49) (A). In this case it was held that Sec. 48 of the Guardians and Wards Act did not preclude the District Judge from reconsidering his order and that he had jurisdiction to entertain the application for revocation of his order in the exercise of his inherent power. It was further held that the principle of Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable quite as much to Courts called upon to deal with matters under the Guardians and Wards Act as to ordinary civil Courts and, therefore, a Court which exercises powers under the Guardians and Wards Act has ample inherent jurisdiction to deal with matters brought before it of which cognizance may be required in the interest of justice. It was also held that a Court is competent to recall an order obtained from it by suppression or misrepresentation of facts. As against this Counsel for the opposite party has placed reliance on another Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Kamini Mayi Debi V/s. Bhusan Chandra Ghose, AIR 1926 Cal 1193 (B) wherein it was held that the proper remedy, in a case where the objector applies to revise a previous ex parte order appointing one guardian is under Sec.39 of that Act. This case, however, does not (decide) the point whether in appropriate cases the Court could invoke its (inherent) power to do justice between the parties for which only it exists. The earlier Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of 26 Ind Cas 275 : (AIR 1915 Cal 49) (A) was not considered in the latter case. In my opinion, on the authority of the later Calcutta case it cannot be said that the Court had no inherent jurisdiction under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revise its order in appropriate cases. In other words, the earlier Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court referred to above clearly lays down, and with that view I perfectly agree, that in appropriate cases the Court passing an order under the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act has ample jurisdiction under Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to recall its previous order. 5. In the present case the allegation of the petitioner was that no notice of the application made by the opposite party had been served on her and it was stated that she had no knowledge of the proceeding at all. Her further case was that the opposite party got his appointment as guardian of the minor girl by an ex parte order of the Court by misrepresenting to the Court that notice had been served on her, if these facts are established, there can be no reason to doubt that the Court under Sec.151 of the Civil Procedure Code can recall its previous ex parte order appointing the opposite party as guardian of the minor girl. 6. Then the question remains whether the allegations made by the petitioner are correct. The learned Additional District Judge has come to a finding that no fraud was practised by the opposite party in the matter of service of notice on the petitioner. It is no doubt a finding of fact with which this Court would not interfere sitting in revision. But in the present case it appears that the learned Additional District Judge in coming to the above finding has committed an error of record and has omitted to consider the relevant evidence adduced by the petitioner before him. It is no doubt a finding of fact with which this Court would not interfere sitting in revision. But in the present case it appears that the learned Additional District Judge in coming to the above finding has committed an error of record and has omitted to consider the relevant evidence adduced by the petitioner before him. In this case admittedly the notice of the application was not served on the petitioner personally nor is there any report of the serving peon that any attempt was made to send it to her or to make her known of the contents of the notice. Notice issued against her was received by the opposite party himself at whose instance the notice had been issued. In other words, the applicant in the guardianship case himself received the notice in that very case. On the face of it such service of notice is absurd. The learned Additional District Judge, however, was influenced with the argument advanced on behali of the opposite party which he accepted that the petitioner was living peacefully with the opposite party at the time when the notices were received by him and, therefore, there was no notice for him to have practised any fraud on her, and on this rinding he came to the conclusion that no fraud was practised by him in the matter of service of notice on her. The petitioner was examined on commission and she definitely stated in her evidence as follows : "After the death of my husband the treatment of the family members was not congenial. They did not take care of food and clothing for my children and myself. When I found such treatment I demanded, the money and the document with respect to the lands for our maintenance. Kabiruddin did not give the documents and said that if I marry his second son Nazir I would get every comforts in the house. I wanted to live in the house of my deceased husband along with my daughter to remember my deceased husband. It is why I had to marry Nazir. After I was married to Nazir his treatment towards me was not good. His treatment in other words was cruel. I told of his treatment to his family members, but they did not listen. About seven months ago Nazir demanded the money which was deposited in the post office in my name. It is why I had to marry Nazir. After I was married to Nazir his treatment towards me was not good. His treatment in other words was cruel. I told of his treatment to his family members, but they did not listen. About seven months ago Nazir demanded the money which was deposited in the post office in my name. I refused to give the money. On the 7th July 1955, on Thursday he divorced me . . . ." On this evidence it is clear that it could not be said with certainty that the relationship between the petitioner and the opposite party was cordial even at the time when the notice was purported to have been served on her. If this evidence had been considered by the learned Additional District Judge, he might have come to a different conclusion. Since, however, I have examined the evidence, no useful purpose would be served by remanding the case to the Court below for passing an order for considering the evidence. 7 From the facts stated above, it is clear that notice of the application made by the opposite party for his appointment as guardian of the minor girl was never served on the petitioner and that it was fraudulently suppressed from her by having been received by the opposite party himself at whose instance it had been issued. The finding of the learned Additional District Judge, therefore, that no fraud was practised on the petitioner by the opposite party in the matter of service of notice is unjustified and against the weight of evidence and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 8. In the result, the application is allowed with costs and the order of the court below rejecting the application of the petitioner to recall the order of appointment of the opposite party as guardian of her minor girl and the order of the court below dated the 23rd of July 1955, appointing the opposite party as guardian of the person and properties of the said minor are set aside. The case is now sent back to the court below for a fresh consideration of the ap plication made by the opposite party for his appoint ment as the guardian of the person and properties of the minor after giving opportunity to the petitioner to contest the same. Hearing fee Rs. 32.