Judgment :- 1. The 1st defendant is the appellant. The plaintiffs sued for cancellation of a sale deed Ext. E dated 20-8-1116 executed by their mother the 2nd defendant in favour of the 1st defendant. The property sold originally belonged to the deceased Palpan Narayanan, husband of the 2nd defendant and father of the plaintiffs and additional 4th defendant He conveyed the property to his wife under Ext. A or III dated 5-3-1108. The plaintiffs' case is that Ext. III was a sham transaction and that it was executed to screen the property from the reach of a creditor of Palpan Narayanan who had instituted a suit against him in the Munsiff's Court of Attingal three days before the execution of the deed. Although Palpan Narayanan had properties at Nedumangad, the plaint item was the only property owned by him within the jurisdiction of that court. Palpan Narayanan died before the execution of Ext. E. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that the 2nd defendant had no right to the property and that she was incompetent to execute the sale deed. The 1st defendant contested. He contended that the sale by Palpan Narayanan to his wife was a valid transaction and that the latter was competent to sell the property. It was also pleaded that the 1st defendant was a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of any defect in the title of his vendor and that the 2nd defendant having been allowed to remain as the ostensible owner, the plaintiffs were not entitled to question the sale. The courts below have concurrently found that Ext. E was a sham transaction. It was also found by the lower appellate court that the plaintiffs most of whom were minors could not be taken to have consented to the ostensible ownership of the 2nd defendant. The Second Appeal is from concurrent decrees allowing the suit. 2. I do not see any reason to differ from the finding of the courts below regarding the nature of the conveyance executed by Palpan Narayanan to his wife. The Second Appeal is from concurrent decrees allowing the suit. 2. I do not see any reason to differ from the finding of the courts below regarding the nature of the conveyance executed by Palpan Narayanan to his wife. The circumstances under which the deed was executed such as the near relationship of the parties, the inadequacy of consideration, the fact that this was the only property owned by Palpan Narayanan within the jurisdiction of Attingal Munsiff's Court where a suit for money was filed against him three days prior to the execution of the deed and an application for attachment before judgment of this property made, have been relied on by the courts below in arriving at this finding. 3. The appellant has a further contention that the 2nd defendant having been allowed to remain as ostensible owner, the transaction must be protected as he is a bonafide purchaser for value. Reliance is placed on S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act in support of this contention. It cannot be denied that the appellant paid consideration for the sale. Part of the consideration was payable towards satisfaction of the decree passed against Palpan Narayanan in the suit referred to above and this was paid by the appellant as seen from Ext. F copy of the execution diary in that case. The question remains whether he purchased the property from the 2nd defendant after taking reasonable care to ascertain that she had power to make the transfer and whether he acted in good faith. In the nature of the transaction there was nothing to create a suspicion in his mind that the 2nd defendant was not the real owner of the property. The property was conveyed to her in 1108 by her husband and she obtained mutation of name in revenue records. The original sale deed was missing and the 2nd defendant and her son Natesan the 4th defendant represented that the original deed was lost. The 4th defendant obtained a copy of the same from the Sub-Registrar's Office and handed over the same to the 1st defendant. If ownership continued with Palpan Narayanan, the 4th defendant also would have been entitled to the property after his death. The fact that he obtained a copy of the original deed and gave it to the 1st defendant is therefore a very material circumstance supporting the defence case. If ownership continued with Palpan Narayanan, the 4th defendant also would have been entitled to the property after his death. The fact that he obtained a copy of the original deed and gave it to the 1st defendant is therefore a very material circumstance supporting the defence case. The 4th defendant also attested the sale deed. There was thus no reason for the 1st defendant to think that the 2nd defendant was not the real owner or that her children had any right to the property. The 1st plaintiff and her husband were no doubt residing in the property at that time but in view of the fact that the mortgage right vested in the husband's father, there was nothing to put the 1st defendant on enquiry regarding title to the property. The sale to the 2nd defendant had been allowed to remain unquestioned for nearly 8 years by Palpan Narayanan and afterwards by his children. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the 1st defendant failed to take reasonable care. 4. On behalf of the appellant it was urged that the direction in the sale deed to pay the decree debt in 0. S. No. 214 of 1108 from out of the consideration for the sale should have induced the 1st defendant to make further enquiries as to whether the 2nd defendant was the real owner. It was argued that if ownership vested in the 2nd defendant there was no occasion for her to make such a direction. The 2nd defendant's husband owned several properties and on his death such properties devolved on the 2nd defendant and her children. The 2nd defendant therefore was bound to see that her husband's debts were discharged. If the 2nd defendant's husband was alive on the date of the sale there would have been some justification for drawing an inference adverse to the 1st defendant, as part of the consideration was directed to be utilised for paying a debt of her husband. In the circumstances of the case the direction was quite natural and there was nothing in it to arouse suspicion. The learned judge held that as some of the real owners were minors it could not be held that the 2nd defendant was holding out as the real owner with their consent. He relied on the decision in Satyanarayanamurthi v. Pydayya (A. I. R 1943 Mad. The learned judge held that as some of the real owners were minors it could not be held that the 2nd defendant was holding out as the real owner with their consent. He relied on the decision in Satyanarayanamurthi v. Pydayya (A. I. R 1943 Mad. 459) in support of the proposition that when the persons interested in the property are minors the ostensible owner could not be held to have been holding out as owner with the consent express or implied of such persons. Satyanarayanamurthi v. Pydayya was a case in which a husband acting for himself and as guardian of his minor children conveyed the property to his wife. The initial consent in that case was that of the minors also and it was therefore held that the minors could not be taken to have given their consent. 1 his decision is not applicable to the facts of this case. It was Palpan Narayanan the father of the minors who allowed the 2nd defendant to hold the property in her name and it was he who gave the consent. The heir of a person who creates a benami is bound as between himself and a purchaser from the benamidar by his ancestor's act irrespective of any act or omission of his own and even though he was a minor at the time of the purchase, there being a continuous misrepresentation by his ancestor by which the heir is bound. This principle was upheld by the Privy Council in Ramcoomar Koondoo v. John and Maria Macqueen (19 W. R.292 and Mahomed Mozuffer Hossein v. Kishori Mohun Roy (I.L.R. 22 Cal. 904). The High Court of Calcutta took the same view in Chunder Coomar v. Hurbuns Sahai (I.L.R.16 Cal. 137). The fact that some of the plaintiffs are minors is therefore quite immaterial. 904). The High Court of Calcutta took the same view in Chunder Coomar v. Hurbuns Sahai (I.L.R.16 Cal. 137). The fact that some of the plaintiffs are minors is therefore quite immaterial. In Ramcoomar Koondoo v. John and Maria Macqueen the Privy Council observed as follows: "It is a principle of natural equity, which must be universally applicable that, where one man allows another to hold himself out as the owner of an estate, and a third person purchases it, for value, from the apparent owner in the belief that he is the real owner, the man who so allows the other to hold himself out shall not be permitted to recover upon his secret title, unless he can overthrow that of the purchaser by showing, either that he had direct notice, or something which amounts to constructive notice, of the real title or that there existed circumstances which ought to have put him upon an inquiry that if prosecuted, would have fed to a discovery of it." 5. The 1st plaintiff no doubt made an attempt to prove that direct notice of real title to the property was given to the 1st defendant by herself. Her version is that the 1st defendant's agent approached her for the original sale deed when she asserted that her mother had no title. There is no reliable evidence on this point except the testimony of the 1st plaintiff. Her story that her father handed over the original sale deed to her and not to his wife is also quite unconvincing especially as she was a minor on the date of the execution of :he deed I have already stated that her residence in the property cannot amount to constructive notice that title vested in her It cannot be said that circumstances existed which should have put the 1st defendant upon an enquiry which if prosecuted would have led to the discovery that the 1st defendant was lot the real owner. It may also be stated that though the plaintiffs filed a replication in answer to the written statement, they did not raise the contention that the 1st defendant had notice direct or constructive that Palpan Narayanan continued to be the owner of the property notwithstanding the sale to his wife. It may also be stated that though the plaintiffs filed a replication in answer to the written statement, they did not raise the contention that the 1st defendant had notice direct or constructive that Palpan Narayanan continued to be the owner of the property notwithstanding the sale to his wife. The 1st defendant and her husband who are in possession as mortgagees appear to have instituted the suit to prevent redemption of the mortgage. There is no substance in the argument that the representation pleaded by the 1st defendant in his written statement was that of the 2nd defendant's children. It has to be understood as stating that after Palpan Narayanan's death, they represented that the 2nd defendant was the real owner. On the facts and circumstances of the case I am convinced that the 1st defendant is entitled to resist the plaintiff's claim under S.41 of the Transfer of Property Act. 6. In the result the concurrent decrees passed by the courts below are reversed and the suit is dismissed. The second Appeal is allowed with costs throughout. Allowed.