Judgment :- 1. The Second Appeal arises from concurrent orders overruling the judgment-debtor's objection to execution of the decree. The only point raised in second appeal is, that execution is barred under S.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decree was passed on 20-12-1111 corresponding to 4-8-1936. The last execution petition about which objection is raised is one filed on 12-6-1954, beyond 12 years of the decree. The decree-holder's case is that the execution petition immediately preceding this viz. E. P. No. 833 filed on 18-11-1123 was not judicially disposed of. 2. A few facts necessary for the decision of the Second Appeal may be stated. On 20-6-1120, E. P. No. 572 was filed by the decree-holder praying for the attachment of the decree in O. S. No. 170 of 1119 obtained by the judgment-debtor. Attachment was allowed but the Execution Petition was dismissed on 31-10-1120 without mentioning that the attachment would continue. However the parties and the court proceeded thereafter on the basis that the attachment continued. The next execution petition filed on 25-12-1121 was dismissed on 25-12-1121 with a specific direction that the attachment of the decree would continue. E. P. No. 833 was the next one filed in the case This was once dismissed for default on 7-11-1124 but was restored to file on 4-11-1125 and was finally dismissed on 14-11-1950. The question for decision is, whether the order of dismissal on 14-11-1950 was judicial or only ministerial. The prayers in the execution petition were: (1) To sell the debts mentioned in the proclamation schedule which would be filed after the disposal of miscellaneous petition No. 18791 filed along with the execution petition for reviewing a prior order; (2) To sell the properties charged under the decree; (3) To arrest and detain defendants 1 and 2 in prison, and (4) To attach and sell other properties of defendants 1 and 2. On receipt of the execution petition the court ordered that it should be reported for orders after the disposal of C. M. P. 18791. This miscellaneous petition was dismissed on 23-1-1124. Thereafter notice was ordered on the execution petition and after service of notice, the court ordered on 9-4-1124 that proclamation schedule should be produced on 16-4-1124. The decree-holder then filed a schedule for sale of the claim for money which was the subject-matter of O. S. No. 170 of 1119 the attached decree. This miscellaneous petition was dismissed on 23-1-1124. Thereafter notice was ordered on the execution petition and after service of notice, the court ordered on 9-4-1124 that proclamation schedule should be produced on 16-4-1124. The decree-holder then filed a schedule for sale of the claim for money which was the subject-matter of O. S. No. 170 of 1119 the attached decree. On 1-5-1124 the decree-holder was ordered to produce a copy of the decree in O. S. No. 170 of 1119 and the case was posted for that purpose to 8-5-1124 on which date the decree-holder filed a memo stating that O. S. No. 1.70 of 1119 had not been decreed. The decree-holder was then ordered to apply forgetting himself appointed as receiver in respect of the subject-matter of O. S. No. 170 of 1119. Accordingly he filed an application on 25-5-1124 which was dismissed for default on 5-10-1124. The execution petition was then posted for further steps. On 18-10-1124 the decree-holder applied by C. M. P. 1075 to review the order dated 5-10-1124. He was asked to produce a copy of the order sought to be reviewed. He applied for adjournments three times to comply with this order and finally the review petition and the execution petition were dismissed on 7-11-1124. A petition to rest re execution petition to file was filed on 21-11-1124 and the petition was allowed on 4-4-1125. On 11-4-1125 the decree-holder applied for restoraction of C. M. P. No. 10775. This was allowed on 18-2-1950. The execution diary shows that C. M. P. No 10775 was finally dismissed on 21-10-1950 as it was not pressed. Thereafter nothing more remained to be done in respect of the first prayer in the execution petition and the court posted the execution petition to 1-11-1950 for taking further steps. The court did not sit that day and the case was adjourned to 14-11-1950. On that day the decree-holder filed a memo which has since disappeared from the records. Learned counsel for the Respondents stated that the memo was to the effect that the decree-holder proposed to execute the decree in O. S. No. 170 of 1119. Even though the memo is missing it is clear that the decree-holder did not take any step to enable the court to grant the remaining prayers in the execution petition which was accordingly dismissed on 14-11-1950 keeping the attachment in force. Even though the memo is missing it is clear that the decree-holder did not take any step to enable the court to grant the remaining prayers in the execution petition which was accordingly dismissed on 14-11-1950 keeping the attachment in force. It is this order of dismissal which is the subject of controversy now. That part of the record in which the order of dismissal was made has become torn off but it is seen from the Register of Execution Petitions got down from the Execution court that the order was "Dismissed Attachment will subsist". It may also be stated that after 14-11-1950 the decree-holder was executing the attached decree till 4-6-1954 on which date he filed an application recording satisfaction of that decree. The present execution petition was filed on 12 -6-1954 3. The facts which I have stated above in some detail clearly show that the dismissal of execution petition on 14-11-1950 was by a judicial order. The order was passed in the presence of the decree-holder on a day on which the case was posted for taking further steps and what occasioned the dismissal was the decree-holder's failure to pursue the prayers in the execution petition by taking further steps necessary to enable the court to grant those prayers. As the decree-holder did not choose to comply with the order for taking further steps the court had no alternative other than to dismiss the execution petition. The dismissal was thus brought about by the default of the decree-holder which prevented the court from proceeding with execution. Learned counsel for the Respondent contended that the direction in the order of dismissal to keep the attachment in force would show that a judicial disposal of the execution petition was not intended. I do not think this is a correct test to decide the effect of the order. An order keeping alive the attachment is contemplated only if the execution petition is judicially dismissed. If the dismissal is only for ministerial purposes, the execution petition would continue undisposed of and the attachment would necessarily remain in force. Another argument advanced by the Respondent is that the steps taken by him for executing the attached decree would save execution from being barred. This may be correct so far as the bar under Art.182 of the Limitation Act is concerned. Another argument advanced by the Respondent is that the steps taken by him for executing the attached decree would save execution from being barred. This may be correct so far as the bar under Art.182 of the Limitation Act is concerned. In this case it is not Art.182 but S.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure that is pleaded as a bar to execution. Lechman v. Thindi Ram (I. L. R.7 All. 382) and Goa Loan Office Company Ltd. v. Dhrit Kunda Lal (8 Indian Cases 674) relied on by the Respondent only hold that an application to execute the attached decree is a step in aid of execution of the decree from which the attachment was ordered. Reliance was also placed on Vasudeva Pai Venkateswara Pai v. Babbi Kammathi Atchutha Kammathi (6 T.L.J.77), Krishnaru Krisharu v. Sree Devi Antharjanam (1951 D.L.R.T.C. 365) & Muthu Veeranna Chettiar v. Muthu Venkitaraman Chettiar (A.I.R.1951 Mad.7) which have laid down that when there are more prayers than one in the execution petition & only one is dealt with by the court and there is nothing to indicate that the other prayers were still under consideration or dealt with by the court, the execution petition so far as such prayers were concerned would be deemed to be pending. These decisions are not applicable to this case. Here the court posted the execution petition to a definite date & directed the decree-holder to take further steps in respect of the prayers he had made. He did not want any of those prayers to be granted but indicated that he would seek his remedies by executing the attached decree. It was in view of such default that the court dismissed the execution petition. If instead of posting the case for further steps the court had dismissed the execution petition on 1-11-1950 it might have been open for the decree-holder to say that the other prayers were not considered or dealt with by the court. On the facts of this case I hold that execution petition No. 833 was dismissed by a proper judicial order and that the present execution petition cannot be treated as one in revival of or in continuation of Execution Petition 833. The present Execution Petition is therefore barred under S.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. On the facts of this case I hold that execution petition No. 833 was dismissed by a proper judicial order and that the present execution petition cannot be treated as one in revival of or in continuation of Execution Petition 833. The present Execution Petition is therefore barred under S.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. In the result, I allow the Second Appeal, reverse the concurrent orders and dismiss E. P. No. 453 dated 12-6-1954. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.