Judgment Chaudhari, J. 1. This application in revision is directed against an order dated 1-10-56 whereby in a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a Magistrate of the first class at Bhagalpur ordered the petitioner to execute a bond of Rs. 5,000/-with two sureties of the like amount each to keep the peace for a period of one year. The order of the learned Magistrate was upheld in appeal by the Additional Sessions Judge of Bhagalpur. The petitioner has now come up in revision. The question which at present arises for determination is whether the certified copies of the orders of the two Courts below filed by the petitioner in this Court along with his revision petition are chargeable with Court fees according to the Court-fers Act, and if so, what is the proper value of the stamps to be affixed on the two documents. The Stamp Reporter has reported that tinder Article 9 of Schedule I of the Court-fees Act Orders of the Original Court and the appellate Court are chargeable with a court-fee of the value of Rs. 52.75 and Rs. 50.75 respectively. 2. Mr. B.C. Ghosh, appearing for the petitioner, contends that Article 9. Schedule I of the Courts fees Act has no application to this case. According to him there is no proper provision in Schedule I of the Court-fees Act for charging court-fees on judgments and orders of a criminal Court. In support of his contention learned counsel has mainly urged two points. It is submitted, in the first place, that under Sec.371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure an accused in a warrant case is entitled to a copy of the judgment or a translation thereof free of cost. It is argued that it could never have been the intention of the framers of the Court-fees Act to direct levy of court-fee on a document which the accused was by virtue of another enactment entitled to get without payment of any cost. The other point pressed is that the Madras Legislature has enacted a new article, being Article 6A under Madras Act V of 1922, providing that a copy or translation of a judgment or order of ft criminal Court was to be stamped with a court-fee stamp of annas 8 only. The other point pressed is that the Madras Legislature has enacted a new article, being Article 6A under Madras Act V of 1922, providing that a copy or translation of a judgment or order of ft criminal Court was to be stamped with a court-fee stamp of annas 8 only. Learned Counsel con-tends that the introduction of the new Article 6A by the Madras Legislature supports the view that Schedule I as it originally stood before the aforesaid amendment by the Madras Legislature, contained no provision for assessment of Court-fee stamps on judgments and orders of criminal Courts. 3. The argument based upon Sec.371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has no force. The order against which the present revision is directed was passed in a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. An application to take proceedings under that section is not an accusation of an offence nor an order passed under Sec.118 a conviction of an offence. The Legislature in fact studiously avoided the use of the word "accused" in connection with a proceeding under Sec.107, although sometimes a person proceeded against under this section is loosely described by Subordinate Magistrate as an ac-cused. It is a misnomer to use that expression in security proceedings. Sec.371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides for giving copies of judgments to accused persons does not, therefore, apply to this case and the petitioner was by no means entitled to a copy of the learned Magistrates order in this case free of cost. Mr. B.C. Ghosh has not disputed this, taut he urges that Article 9 does not apply to criminal proceedings at all. 4. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to examine Articles 6, 7 and 9 of Schedule I. Article 6 provides for payment of a fixed Court-fee in respect of a copy or translation of a judgment or order not being, or having the force of a decree, when such judgment or order is passed by any Civil Court other than a High Court, or by the presiding officer of any Revenue Court or Office, or by any other judicial or Executive Authority. In the case of such Courts a fixed court fee is chargeable on the value of the subject-matter of the litigation. In the case of such Courts a fixed court fee is chargeable on the value of the subject-matter of the litigation. When such judgment or order is passed by a High Court a fixed court fee is chargeable irrespective of the value of the subject-matter. At one time Mr. Ghosh argued that this was the only article which if at all, could apply to judgments or orders passed in criminal cases but subject to the condition that such judgments or orders were passed by the High Court. I do not find it possible to accept Mr. Ghoshs contention. Articles 6 and 7 are complementary to each other. While Article 6 applies to a judgment or an order not being or having the force of a decree, Article 7 applies to a copy of "decree or order having the force of a decree." Both these articles provide for levy of a fixed Court fee, the amount varying according to the Court or authority which passed it The mention of the words "not being or having the force of a decree" in Article 6 and "a decree or order having the force of a decree" in Article 7 clearly indicates that the articles refer to judgments or orders passed in civil cases. That this was the intention of the legislature is indicated further by the fact that the basis of assessment in both the articles is the pecuniary value of the subject-matter of the proceeding. In the case of subordinate Courts there are two kinds of valuation -- one up to Rs. 50.00 and the other exceeding Rs. 50.00 there being no limitation as to valuation in the case of the High Court. The questions of valuation of the subject-matter and judgments or orders having or not having the force of a decree are quite foreign to a criminal proceeding. It seems to me clear, therefore that neither Article 6 nor Art. 7 applies to judgments or orders passed in criminal proceedings. 5. We next come to Article 9 which is a residuary article. It seems to me clear, therefore that neither Article 6 nor Art. 7 applies to judgments or orders passed in criminal proceedings. 5. We next come to Article 9 which is a residuary article. Column 1 f this Article is extracted below : "Copy of any Revenue or judicial proceeding or order not otherwise provided for by this Act or copy of any account statement, report or the like taken out of any Civil or Criminal or Revenue Court or office or from the office of any Chief Officer charged with the executive administration of a Division." 6. The practice of this Court is to levy court-fees on judgments or orders filed in this Court under this residuary article. Mr. B.C. Ghosh contends that the practice is quite erroneous and should cease. Incidentally he has argued that judgments are not expressly included in this article, obviously because a judgment is no part of a judicial proceeding. I am unable to uphold the contention that a judgment is not a part of a judicial proceeding. Sec.366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apparently refers to "judgment" as part of the trial. The question, however, is not material as Article 9 specifically refers to orders not otherwise provided for by the Act. The two documents in question are orders and not judgments passed in a proceeding under Sec.107. Article 9 will, therefore, govern these documents. 7. The question as to whether Article 9 applies to an order passed in a criminal proceeding was considered in James Paul Alexandar V/s. James Arthur Edwards, AIR 1953 Trav-Co. 212 (A), where Koshi C. J. and Gobinda Piliai J. held that Article 10, Schedule I of the Travancore Court-fees Act, corresponding to Article 9 of the Indian Court-fees Act governs a judgment or order of a Criminal Court and is therefore, liable to be stamped. 8. The legislature in Madras has no doubt introduced a new article to govern the decisions of criminal Courts prescribing a fixed Court fee of half a rupee for a copy or translation of a judgment or order of a criminal Court, it does not, however, necessarily follow that such judgments or orders do not fall within the ambit of the residuary Article 9. There appears to have been a special reason why the legislature in Madras introduced this new article. There appears to have been a special reason why the legislature in Madras introduced this new article. It will be noticed that under Article 9 of the fee prescribed is 8 annas for every 360 words or fraction of 360 words. The fee prescribed in the third column has no doubt been raised in this State by means of a local amendment and a surcharge on the fee leviable has also been introduced, but the basis of assessment on the number of actual words has continued. This apparently causes a hardship, for while copies of judgments and orders in civil cases require a fixed court-fee of a small amount such judgments and orders passed by Criminal Courts require to be stamped with a very much higher Court-fee calculated on the actual number of words. As has been pointed out in AIR 1953 Trav-Co. 212 (A), the Madras Legislature realising the hardship, introduced the new article prescribing a uniform court-fee of 8 annas only for all such documents of a criminal Court. Indeed there is hardly any reason why a distinction should be maintained between judgments of criminal Courts and civil Courts and the anomaly is certainly a matter which claims the attention of the Legislature. We are, however, concerned with pronouncing what the law is and cannot seek to convert ought into is. 9. In the resuit, the contention of learned Counsel that no stamp need be affixed on the two orders filed in this case must fail. The petitioner is directed to affix the necessary stamps, as stated in the earlier part of this order within two weeks from this date. Jamuar, J. 10 I agree.