SARJOO PROSAD, C. J.: In this application under Art. 226 of the Consti­tution, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari or mandamus directing the respondents to can­cel or recall or forbear from acting on or giving effect to certain orders passed by the Director of Posts and Telegraphs, Assam Circle, and for quashing the same. The said orders appear to have been affirmed also by the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. (2) The petitioner was appointed a clerk in the1 postal department in 1926 and he was serving as such in the Gauhati Post Office in the permanent cadre in 1948 when he was appointed Town Inspec­tor for Gauhati town. It appears that on 1-7-48, some Privilege Ticket Order concession was granted to the employees of the Government of India with retrospective effect from 1-1-48. The petitioner alle­ges that under the said concession, if an employee on leave for more than 15 days went outside his sta­tion for a change, he was entitled to get two-thirds of the fare and freight charges for the journey by train and back from his station. In March 1948, the petitioner availed himself of the said concession, and it is alleged that he went to Bombay for treatment, and duly submitted a bill for Rs. 714, which he recovered from the Department. Thereafter in June 1949, he again tried to avail him-self of the concession. This time he alleges that he -went to Calcutta for treatment and accordingly sub­mitted a bill on 18-7-49 for a sum of Rs. 250-8-0. On this occasion, the payment of the bill was with­held. The petitioner then wrote letters to the Direc­tor of Posts and Telegraphs, Assam Circle, demanding payment of the amount. Almost a year after, by an order dated 19-9-50, passed by Mr. Irshad Hussain, the then Superinten­dent of Post Offices (respondent No. 4), the petitioner was reverted from the post of Town Inspector to that of a clerk at Dhubri. This was followed by another order on 7-10-50 directing the petitioner to refund the sum of Rs. 714 withdrawn by him by way of the aforesaid concession. The petitioner appealed against the order reverting him to the post of clerk, but the appeal was rejected, and his petition to the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs was also •dismissed. This was followed by another order on 7-10-50 directing the petitioner to refund the sum of Rs. 714 withdrawn by him by way of the aforesaid concession. The petitioner appealed against the order reverting him to the post of clerk, but the appeal was rejected, and his petition to the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs was also •dismissed. With reference to the order calling upon him 'to refund the sum which he had withdrawn by way of alleged concession, the petitioner claimed that he had actually performed the journey and incurred the expenses in question, but his claim with reference to that amount was rejected and his appeal failed, with the result that he was refused payment of his bill for Rs. 250-8-0 which he had submitted. The De­partment further filed a regular complaint on 3-3-51 for the prosecution of the petitioner in respect of the sum of Rs. 714 which was alleged to have been ille­gally withdrawn by him, and a complaint was also filed on 17-3-51 against him for attempting to cheat the Department by presenting another bill for a sum of Rs. 250-8-0, and pending the disposal of these prosecutions, the petitioner was suspended on 3-4-51. The Police appear to have submitted a final re­port against the petitioner and he was discharged on 13-12-51; but on presentation of a protest petition by the Superintendent of Post Offices, the order of discharge was set aside and a regular trial followed. The petitioner, however, was eventually acquitted of the charges on 8-9-53. After the acquittal, he was reinstated in his appointment as a clerk and posted at Dhubri, and his period of suspension was treated as leave admissible to him. The petitioner protested against the order of his removal from the post of Town Inspector, Gauhati, but in vain, and the Au­thorities affirmed their previous order. His petition to the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs also did not succeed. After the order of his reinstatement but before he joined his duties, the petitioner also submitted a bill for Rs. 559-2-6, claiming re-imbursement of the legal and other ex­penses which he had incurred in connection with his defence in the criminal charges instituted against him. This claim was rejected by the Superintendent of Post Offices by his order dated 2-2-54, and the order was subsequently affirmed by the higher authorities concerned. 559-2-6, claiming re-imbursement of the legal and other ex­penses which he had incurred in connection with his defence in the criminal charges instituted against him. This claim was rejected by the Superintendent of Post Offices by his order dated 2-2-54, and the order was subsequently affirmed by the higher authorities concerned. (3) On these facts, the petitioner submits that the orders reverting him from the post of Town. Ins­pector to that of a clerk and refusing to pay his legal, expenses which he had incurred in defending himself in the criminal prosecutions launched against him, were illegal, without jurisdiction and void. Two questions, therefore, which arise for consideration are:- (1) whether the order reverting the petitioner from the post of Town Inspector to that of a clerk, was illegal and without jurisdiction and amounted to a sort of penalty imposed upon him, and, as such, could not be made without giving him a proper hearing, as provided by the departmental rules and, as claimed by him, according to the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution; and (2) .whether the Department was bound to sanc­tion payment of the expenses which the petitioner had incurred in connection with his defence in the criminal proceedings, and whether the Department was under any obligation to refer the matter under Art. 320 of the Constitution to the Public Service Commission for determination of the question. (4) On the first question, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the post of a Town Ins­pector was a substantive post and the petitioner had been appointed to the same substantively and, as such, he was entitled to hold the post for the period of three years for which it was tenable, and that the Postal authorities had no jurisdiction without any valid reason to transfer him before the expiry of that period, to the post of a clerk which, according to the contention of the petitioner, was of an inferior grade. He further points out that the post of Town Inspector carried a special pay of Rs. 20 p.m., of which the peti­tioner was deprived on his reversion to the post of a clerk. He further points out that the post of Town Inspector carried a special pay of Rs. 20 p.m., of which the peti­tioner was deprived on his reversion to the post of a clerk. He submits, on these grounds, that the order reverting the petitioner to the post of a clerk was illegal, inoperative and amounted to reduction in rank of the petitioner and, as such, both under the Fun­damental Rules as also under Art. 311 of the Consti­tution, the Authorities could only do so after draw­ing up regular proceedings against him and after giv­ing him an opportunity to be heard in the matter. It appears, however, from the various annexures which form part of the record, filed both by the petitioner and by the respondents in the case, and the authen­ticity whereof cannot be challenged, that the perma­nent post which was held by the petitioner was that of a clerk or sub-postmaster, and that on 15-4-48 he was appointed 'to act' as Town Inspector at Gau­hati. The order shows that Mir Samsul Hussain, Sub-Postmaster, Nalbari, officiating clerk, Head Office, was appointed to act as Town Inspector, Gauhati, with immediate effect from the date of the order. This is also confirmed by the extract from the Ser­vice Book of the petitioner which shows that he was only temporarily holding the post of Town Inspector. It appears from R. 11 of the Posts and Telegraphs Manual, Vol. IV (Establishments), Ch. VIII, p. 91, that an official appointed as a Town Inspector was not ordinarily to be allowed to hold such a post for more than three years .continuously at one time, and that an official who has worked as a Town Inspector for three years, should not ordinarily be appointed to such a post within the next three years. The maximum duration, therefore, as provided for by this rule, for which the post could be held at a time, appears to be three years. The rule, how­ever, does not show that it divested the authorities concerned of the discretion to transfer the incumbent holding the post of Town Inspector to some other post before the expiry of three years. It is to be re­membered that in this case the petitioner was only temporarily holding the post of Town Inspector. The rule, how­ever, does not show that it divested the authorities concerned of the discretion to transfer the incumbent holding the post of Town Inspector to some other post before the expiry of three years. It is to be re­membered that in this case the petitioner was only temporarily holding the post of Town Inspector. The appointment order does not show that he had been substantially appointed to the post; and even if he had been so appointed, the Authoritie.s could transfer him from the post at an earlier date if the exigencies of administration so required. The order reverting him in this case indicates that in the interest of service, the petitioner was appointed to be a clerk at Dhubri. The post of sub-postmaster or clerk was the substantive post which the petitioner held, and we are unable to say that in making the order of transfer, the Authorities were guilty of any infringement of the rules. (5) It is contended, however, by the petitioner that the order of transfer was more in the nature of a penalty, having regard to the background of the facts stated earlier. It is submitted that in case the petitioner had not been suspected of presenting false bills or at least wrongly alleged by some of the au­thorities to have presented false bills, the order in question would not have been passed against him; and that being so, it amounted to a reduction in rank as provided by R. 49 of the Civil Services (Classifi­cation, Control and Appeal) Rules. Stress has been laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner on cl. (iii) of R. 49, wherein it is provided that reduction to a lower post or time-scale or to a lower stage in a time-scale, does amount to penalty. The learned counsel further says that even if it is assumed that the post of Town Inspector was of the same grade as that of a clerk, inasmuch as it carried an additional emolument or special pay of Rs. 20 per month, of which the petitioner was dep­rived on his transfer, the matter would fall under the purview of this clause. The learned counsel, there­fore, submits that in the circumstances, there should have been a proceeding against the petitioner, as pro­vided by R. 55, and that not having been done, the entire order was illegal. 20 per month, of which the petitioner was dep­rived on his transfer, the matter would fall under the purview of this clause. The learned counsel, there­fore, submits that in the circumstances, there should have been a proceeding against the petitioner, as pro­vided by R. 55, and that not having been done, the entire order was illegal. His contention that Art. 311 of the Constitution applies to the case, is also based upon the self same assumptions. It may be pointed out that R. 49 ob­viously has got no application to the case because of the reasons which I have given earlier. The peti­tioner had, of course, served as a Town Inspector for a period of two years and a half, but it was open to the authorities to revert him to his substantive post at an earlier date. I can find nothing on the face of the order passed to indicate that it was by way of penalty, whatever the underlying motives may have been. It is not for us to judge of the underlying motives; when the order itself does not show that it was passed against the petitioner as a measure of punishment, and there is nothing to indicate that in making the order, the authorities sought to prejudice the petitioner in his service by imposition of any penalty. The petitioner being the holder of a temporary or officiating appointment, it was open to the autho­rities concerned to revert him to his substantive post; and in this case the relevant rule gave them ample discretion in the matter. If on the face of the order itself it had been shown that it was passed as a mea­sure of punishment, in that case the petitioner might possibly have invoked the protection of R. 55, but that not being so, we do not think that the authorities violated the rules in any manner by making the order in question. There is no reason to assume that the order was not a normal routine order. The point does not, therefore, bear any scrutiny and has to be decided against the petitioner. (6) The next contention of die petitioner that he should be allowed the expenses which he incurred in connection with his defence in the criminal prosecu­tion, does require some consideration. The point does not, therefore, bear any scrutiny and has to be decided against the petitioner. (6) The next contention of die petitioner that he should be allowed the expenses which he incurred in connection with his defence in the criminal prosecu­tion, does require some consideration. The Postal department appears to have rejected his claim sim­ply on the ground that the re-imbursement of the expenses incurred by him in connection with his de­fence was not admissible under the rules. It ap­pears to us that their attention, while dealing with the question, was not drawn to Art, 320 of the Con­stitution. Article 320, cl. (3), requires, inter alia, that the Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission, as the case may be, shall be consulted, on any claim by or in respect of a person who is serving or has served under the Gov­ernment of India or the Government of a State, in a civil capacity, that any costs incurred by him in de­fending legal proceedings instituted against him in respect of acts done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty, should be paid out of the Con­solidated Fund of India, or, as the case may be, out of the Consolidated Fund of the State. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Medhi has particularly emphasised the fact that in order to at­tract the operation of Art. 320 of the. Constitution, the acts done or purporting to be done should be in the execution of his duty, and that it is only then that in defending such acts, the petitioner could be entitled to the benefit of the Article. He also refers to the proviso to cl. (3) by virtue of which the Presi­dent or the Governor or Rajpramukh, as the case may be, may make regulations specifying the mat­ters in which either generally or in any particular class of case or in any particular circumstances, it shall not be necessary for a Public Service Commis­sion to be consulted. Mr. Medhi, however, has not been able to place before us any such regulation which could have defi­nitely prevented the reference of the matter in dis­pute for the opinion of the Public Service Commis­sion. Mr. Medhi, however, has not been able to place before us any such regulation which could have defi­nitely prevented the reference of the matter in dis­pute for the opinion of the Public Service Commis­sion. We feel, however, that the matter has not been approached by the Postal authorities from the above point of view, nor did the petitioner at any stage attempt to draw their attention to this aspect of the matter . We are, therefore, unable, in the present circumstances, to decide finally as to whether the peti­tioner was entitled to the benefit of Art. 320. We have no doubt that if he makes a proper application to the authorities concerned, they will fully consider the matter, and if they refer the matter for considera­tion of the Public Service Commission, in that case the Commission would decide whether or not, in the circumstances, the petitioner would be entitled to re­imbursement of the amount claimed. (7) For the reasons stated above, we feel that the application cannot succeed. The Rule is accord­ingly discharged but in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. (8) DEKA, J.:- I agree. R. G. D. Rule discharged.