Judgment :- 1. This is a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India for quashing an order of the 2nd Respondent, the Central Road Traffic Board, Trivandrum, confirming the order of the 1st Respondent, the Regional Traffic Board, Quilon, dismissing an application of the petitioner for the grant of a permit for a stage carriage. The petitioner's application was duly published and there were no objectors. However the 1st Respondent dismissed it on the ground that the proposed route overlapped the State Transport monopoly route for a distance of 5 miles. On appeal the 2nd Respondent confirmed the decision. The Respondents declined to consider the application on the merits. The order of the 1st Respondent reads as follows: "The route applied for overlaps the State Transport route for a distance of 5 miles while the maximum limit is 4 miles. The application is therefore rejected". The appellate order is extracted below. "The Road Traffic Board has evidently relied upon the Government order contained in G. P. T. 4-2272/52 PWC dated 12-7-1952. Government have several times ordered that the instructions on the above order must be adhered to. In the face of these instructions the appellant's prayer cannot be granted." A copy of the order of the Government relied on by the Respondents has been produced as Ext. P1. This contains 13 rules "to regulate the grant of permits by the Transport Authorities for Stage carriages." R.6 provides:-" Private bus services shall not be allowed to over-lap State Transport Services more than 4 miles but this restriction will not affect the permit already granted." 2. The main point urged on behalf of the petitioner is that this rule is ultra vires of the powers of the Government. In framing these rules, the Government did not purport to act under any provision of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act. The learned Government Pleader who appeared for the Respondents was not able to point out any section of the Act which enables the Government to frame a rule of this kind. In my opinion the State Government had no power to make R.6 under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939. The learned Government Pleader who appeared for the Respondents was not able to point out any section of the Act which enables the Government to frame a rule of this kind. In my opinion the State Government had no power to make R.6 under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939. The Act has now been amended by Act 100 of 1956 and certain specific provisions relating to State Transport undertakings have been introduced in Chapter IV (a) which enable a State Transport undertaking to prepare and submit for approval to Government schemes involving exclusion of private undertakings from specified areas or routes as provided in S.68 (a) to (f). Until such a scheme is approved by the Government, the Government cannot issue executive orders which in effect modify the provisions of the Act regarding grant of permits by Transport Authorities. R.6 relied on by the Respondent is clearly one issued in excess of the powers conferred on the Government by the Act. 3. The learned Government Pleader sought to support the orders in question on the ground that the orders in effect mean that the existing transport facilities are adequate. I am unable to read such a meaning into the orders. The adequacy or otherwise of the existing facilities is no doubt a relevant factor which the Transport authorities have to take into consideration in considering applications for grant of permits but there is nothing in these orders to indicate that the Respondents have considered this aspect. On the other hand the orders show that the respondents felt that consideration of the application on the merits was unnecessary in view of the rule referred to above. 4. This is a clear case in which the respondents failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them under the Act. They were bound to consider the application on the merits and decide the same. The petitioner is therefore entitled to have the orders quashed. 5. The orders of the Respondents dismissing the petitioner's application for permit are therefore quashed and the 1st Respondent is directed to take the application back on its file and decide the same afresh according to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The original petition is thus allowed. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs. Allowed.