Judgment :- 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for partition. The parties are Marumakkathayees, and one Devaki Amma was their common ancestress. Devaki Amma's husband was one Vishnu Nambeesan, and they had eight children-five sons and three daughters. Defendants 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are their sons and defendant 6 one of the three daughters. The two other daughters, Nangeli Amma and savithri Amma, are both dead, and plaintiff 1, Janaki alias Nangeli Amma, is the only child of Nangeli Amma. savithri Amma has left no issue. Plaintiff 2 is plaintiff 1's minor son. Defendants 7, 8 and 9 are the sons of defendant 6, and defendants 10,16 and 20 her daughters. Defendants 11 to 15 are the minor children of defendant 10, and defendants 17 to 19 the minor children of defendant 16. Defendant 21 is defendant 20's minor son. 2. In 1903, when he had only five children and plaintiff 1's mother (Nangeli Amma) and savithri Amma and defendant 5 were not born, Vishnu Nambeesan executed a will, Ex. B3, bequeathing to his wife, Devaki Amma, and defendants 1 to 4 and 6 and the children who might subsequently be born of him to Devaki Amma the properties which he had obtained in his family partition; and the main dispute in this appeal is about the interpretation and effect of this will. After the execution of Ex. B3 and after the birth of plaintiff 1's mother and savithri Amma and Defendant 5, Vishnu Nambeesan died, and the plaintiffs' case is that after Vishnu Nambeesan's death the properties bequeathed under Ex. B3 belonged in common to Devaki Amma and her eight children, as tenants-in-common and each of them obtaining one-ninth right in the properties. In 1936 Devaki Amma and her eight children executed a partition deed, Ex. Al, whereby certain properties oat of those comprised in the bequest under Ex. B3 were allotted to the shares of defendants 1, 2 and 3, and they were given separate possession of those properties, and the remaining properties, namely, items 8 to 14 in the will, were allotted to the shares of Devaki Arnma and her remaining five children. subsequent to this partition, plaintiff 1's mother and savithri Amma died. Devaki Amma, the common ancestress, died in 1950 after both plaintiff 1's mother and savithri Amma had died. subsequent to this partition, plaintiff 1's mother and savithri Amma died. Devaki Amma, the common ancestress, died in 1950 after both plaintiff 1's mother and savithri Amma had died. In 1952 plaintiffs brought the present suit for partition of the properties left in common by Ex. Al for the shares of Devaki Amma and her five children, defendants 4,5 and 6 and plaintiff 1's mother and savithri Amma. They alleged in the plaint that Devaki Amma and defendants 4,5 and 6, plaintiff 1's mother and savithri Amma had each one-sixth right in those properties and the plaintiffs claimed partition and recovery of possession of (1) the one-sixth share which belonged to plaintiff 1's mother and which devolved on them by right of inheritance after her death, (2) one-fifth of the one-sixth share which belonged to savithri Amma on the ground that after savithri Amma's death her share devolved on Devaki Amma and defendants 4, 5 and 6 and plaintiff 1's mother, and plaintiff 1 had obtained by right of inheritance the share which her mother had, and (3) 2/23 of the one-sixth share which belonged to Devaki Amma on the ground that after Devaki Amma's death her share in the properties had devolved under the provisions of the Marumakkathayam Act on plaintiffs 1 and 2 and defendants 1 to 21. Almost all the defendants entered appearance in the lower court and filed written statements. so far as the interpretation and effect of Vishnu Nambeesan's will were concerned, defendants 1 to 5 supported the plaintiffs' case. Defendants 6 to 22, on the other hand, contended that the bequest under Ex. B3 was not to Devaki Amma and her eight children alone but to Devaki Amma's thavazhi as a whole, that Devaki Amma and her children were not, therefore, entitled to take the bequeathed properties as tenants-in-common and each of them had no separate rights to the properties, that Devaki Amma's thavazhi obtained the properties under the will as their sub-tarwad or thavazhi properties with all the incidents of tarwad properties under the Marumakkathayam Law, that Ex. Al partition was invalid and not binding upon the members of the thavazhi, and that the suit brought on the basis that Devaki Amma and her eight children got the properties under the will as tenants-in-common and had separate rights was therefore not maintainable. Al partition was invalid and not binding upon the members of the thavazhi, and that the suit brought on the basis that Devaki Amma and her eight children got the properties under the will as tenants-in-common and had separate rights was therefore not maintainable. They also contended that, in as much as the plaintiffs had not claimed partition of the properties allotted to defendants 1, 2 and 3 under Ex. Al and had left out those properties in the plaint, the suit was bad as being one for partial partition. The lower court upheld these contentions and dismissed the suit, and so, the plaintiffs have come up in appeal. Defendants 6 to 22 as well as defendants 1 to 5 had various other contentions also. But the lower court has not considered and decided those contentions because of its finding that the suit was not maintainable on the interpretation it took about the will. If the lower court's finding is confirmed in this appeal there will be no necessity to consider those contentions, and if that finding is reversed the suit will have to be remanded to the lower court for consideration and decision of those contentions. Therefore, in either case, it is unnecessary to refer to and consider those contentions in this judgment. 3. We may say at once that we do not consider the lower court's interpretation of the will, Ex. B3, to be correct and that, in our opinion, the bequest thereunder was not to Devaki Amma's thavazhi as a whole but to her and her children as tenants-in-common and with separate rights. A translation of the will is given at page 25 of the printed book containing the appellants' documents. The donees named in the will are Devaki Amma and her five children, Krishnan, Govindan, Vishnu, Narayanan (i. e., defendants 1 to 4) and Devaki (defendant 6), and in Clause.1 thereof the testator says that after his death the properties which he got for his share under the partition deed No. 2133 of 1896 executed in his family "shall be held and enjoyed in equal rights for ever by you, who are my wife and children and also by the children born to the first individual among you as my representatives". The relevant portion of the clause in the original Malayalam document reads: which has been translated "in equal rights as my representatives" clearly indicates the testator's intention that his wife and children were to take the properties as his heirs and with separate and equal rights. Although the presumption under the Marumakkathayam Law is that, when a husband, uncle or brother makes a gift to persons who constitute a natural group which will constitute a thavazhi, the gift enures to the benefit of and is taken by the thavazhi as a whole with all the incidents of tarwad property, this presumption is only a rebuttable presumption, and if there are clear words in the instrument of gift itself showing a contrary intention effect has to be given to such intention. The decisions relied upon by the respondents' counsel, namely, A. I. R.1954 Mad. 234 and A. I. R.1955 Mad. 594, are only to the effect that in the case of such gifts, ordinarily, there is a presumption in favour of the gift being to the thavazhi as a whole and not to the particular individuals, and do not lay down the rule that this presumption is always irrebuttable. As pointed out in Karthiyani Amma v. Kesava Pillai (1957 K. L. T. 355), the rule that a gift by a father to his marumakkathayee wife and children, before the enactment of the new statutes, is to enure to the benefit of The thavazhi as a whole and not merely to the benefit of the particular donees named in the instrument, "is only in the nature of a presumption which could, by the use of apt words, be rebutted". In our opinion, the expression in Ex. B3 extracted above clearly indicates the intention of the testator, Vishnu Nambeesan, that the bequest was for the benefit of his wife and children alone and that they were to take the properties as tenants-in-common with separate and equal rights. 4. In Clause.2 and 3 of Ex. B3 it is provided that after Vishnu Nambeesan's death the senior most male member among the beneficiaries should be in management of the properties bequeathed thereunder and that, if any alienation has to be made, the same must be made jointly by all of them and no alienation made by any one individually shall not be binding on the properties and the other beneficiaries. It was contended by the respondents' counsel that these two clauses would show that what was given to the beneficiaries named in the will was not an absolute estate and that, at any rate, those clauses would show an intention on the part of the testator that the bequest was to be taken by the thavazhi of his wife and children as a whole with the incidents of tarwad properties and was not to be taken by them with separate and equal rights. It is only if an interest is created by a subsequent clause in an instrument of transfer in favour of another transferee conditional on the happening of a specified uncertain event that the subsequent clause can be taken as a clause in defeasance of an earlier clause creating an absolute interest and the absolute interest created by the earlier clause taken as a limited or life estate. Clause.2 and 3 in Ex. B3 do not create any interest in favour of any person on the happening of any specified uncertain event. The gift or bequest, whether it be to Vishnu Nambeesan's wife and children individually or to their thavazhi as a whole, was effected by Clause.l of Ext. B3, and that clause created an absolute estate in favour of the donees or beneficiaries. Clause.2 and 3 do not provide for or contemplate the termination of the interest created by Clause.l on the happening of a specified uncertain event, and the vesting of another interest in a different set of donees or beneficiaries on the termination of the interest created by Clause.l. Therefore, Clause.2 and 3 cannot in any way be deemed to be clauses curtailing the right or interest created by Clause.l. so far as the contention that Clause.2 and 3 evidence or indicate an intention on the part of the testator that the bequest was to be for the benefit of the thavazhi as a whole and not to the beneficiaries named therein individually is concerned, we are by no means satisfied that those clauses evidence or indicate such an intention. Ordinarily the intention of the executant of a document has to be ascertained from the instrument read as a whole and not by reading isolated passages therein without reference to the other passages, and the attempt should be to reconcile as far as possible the apparently irreconcilable clauses. Ordinarily the intention of the executant of a document has to be ascertained from the instrument read as a whole and not by reading isolated passages therein without reference to the other passages, and the attempt should be to reconcile as far as possible the apparently irreconcilable clauses. If, after reading the document as a whole and making this attempt, it is seen that there are two passages which are wholly irreconcilable and repugnant to each other, the subsequent clause in the instrument of transfer or gift, inconsistent with the nature of the gift or interest made by the earlier clause, has to be rejected as repugnant to the earlier clause. Having regard to these generally accepted canons of interpretation, we are of the opinion that Clause.2 of Ext. B3 only provides for the management of the properties till actual division between the tenants-in-common who were to take them tinder Clause.l, since some of the beneficiaries under the will were likely to be minors at the time of the testator's death; and Clause.3 only provides that the powers of management conferred by Clause.2 would not include the power to make alienations such as puramkadams, kanams, etc. If these two clauses are to be taken as conferring a right on the thavazhi as a whole to the properties bequeathed, we feel clear that, in the nature of the absolute right conferred on Vishnu Nambeesan's wife and children individually by Clause.l of the will, these two clauses are wholly repugnant to Clause.l and should not therefore be given effect to. 5. We may also say in this connection that, from the subsequent conduct of the parties also, it is clear that the members of the thavazhi themselves had understood and acted upon the bequest as one in favour of Vishnu Nambeesan's wife and children alone and not as one made in favour of their thavazhi as a whole. Ex. Al partition was effected on 25-7-1936. That partition deed was executed on the basis that the properties comprised in the will belonged only to the wife and children of Vishnu Nambeesan and that the other members of their thavazhi were not entitled to them. At the time of this partition, at least one son of defendant 6 was a major and some of her other children also became majors subsequently. Not only was defendant 6 a party to Ex. At the time of this partition, at least one son of defendant 6 was a major and some of her other children also became majors subsequently. Not only was defendant 6 a party to Ex. Al but none of her children, neither the son who was a major at the time of its execution nor the other children who became majors subsequently, had taken any step to get that partition annulled before the date of this suit even though separate possession of the shares allotted to them under the partition deed was given to defendants 1, 2 and 3 and those defendants were in separate possession of the properties allotted to them from the date of the partition deed. Although defendant 6 alleged in her written statement that she joined in the execution of Ex. Al without knowing the nature of that document she has not gone into the witness box to speak to the truth of that allegation. In the circumstances, it has to be held that Ex. Al was executed with the full knowledge and consent of defendant 6 and that she and other members of her thavazhi had accepted and acquiesced in it, and they had no case that the bequest under Ex. B3 was to Devaki Amma's thavazhi as a whole till the plaintiffs came forward to claim their share. Their present contention must undoubtedly be due to the fact that there are 15 members in their thavazhi as against 2 in the plaintiff's thavazhi. 6. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the bequest under Ex. B3 was not in favour of the thavazhi of Devaki Amma but was in favour of Devaki Amma and her eight children individually and with separate and equal rights to them and that the properties bequeathed thereunder belong to them as tenants-in-common and do not have the characteristics of thavazhi properties. The findings of the court below on issues Nos. I and 2, namely, "Was the bequest by Vishnu Nambeesan in favour of a thavazhi consisting of his wife and children or did it vest the properties in the legatees as tenants-in-common," and "Is the karar dated 25-7-1936 binding on defendants 7 to 21, if the properties are thavazhi properties," are accordingly set aside and those issues are hereby decided in favour of the plaintiffs. As a result of the decision of these issues, we also set aside the finding of the lower court on issue No. 3, namely, "Is the suit bad as being one for partial partition." As the tenants-in-common to whom the bequest under Ex. B3 was made have effected a valid partition between them by Ex. Al dated 25-7-1936 and since the present suit is for the partition of the properties left in common by Ex. Al for Devaki Amma and her five children, namely, defendants 4, 5 and 6 and the plaintiff's mother and savithri Amma, and all the properties allotted to them under the said partition are included in the suit, we hold that the suit is maintainable and is not bad as being one for partial partition. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the court below are set aside, and the suit is remanded to the lower court for fresh disposal after consideration of the remaining issues in the case, namely, issues Nos. 4 to 8, and in accordance with our decision of issues Nos.1 to .3. The parties will bear the costs of this appeal except the court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal which will be refunded to the appellants' counsel. Allowed.