Judgment Kanhaiya Singh, J. 1. The only point pressed in support of this application is that the conviction of the petitioners is illegal and fit to be set aside as the offence of which they were convicted was outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, 2. The facts of the prosecution case may be briefly stated. On 15-6-56 one Manoranjan went to a public hydrant to wash his utensils. Prayag Pashi objected to his using the water of the hydrant on the ground that he was an outsider. Manoranjan did not listen. Thereupon, Prayag assaulted him with a lathi. The incident was reported to his brother Chittaranjan. The latter came and found his brother injured. He remonstrated with Prayag who tried to justify his action, Chittaranjan brought his brother to his house. Thereafter, Prayag Pasi and Prasadi Pasi came to his house, dragged Chittaranjan out of the house and assaulted him with lathis. Prayag was charged under Sec.323 of the Penal Code with having voluntarily caused hurt to "Chittaranjan. Prasadi Pasi was charged under Sec.325 I. P. C. with having voluntarily caused grievous hurt to Chittaranjan. They were tried by a Magistrate of the first class. He found both of them guilty. But since evidence did not disclose clearly which of the two accused was responsible for the causation of the grievous hurt, he convicted both of them, under Sec.323 I. P. C. and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months and to pay a fine of Rs. 100.00 each, or in default, suffer one months rigorous imprisonment. On appeal from his decision the learned Sessions Judge, Dhanbad, affirmed the conviction and sentence of imprisonment but set aside the sentence of fine. Prasadi and Prayag have now come up in revision. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that under Sec. 62 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 , the offence under Sec.323, I.P.C. was exclusively triable by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case unless an order to the contrary was passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, His contention further is that when the offence under Sec.325 I. P. C. was not proved the proper course for the Magistrate was to transfer the case to the bench having jurisdiction. He relied upon Sec. 69 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act. He relied upon Sec. 69 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act. I am un-able to accept this argument as correct. Sec. 69 of the said Act provides as follows: "If at any stage of proceedings in a case or suit pending before a Magistrate or Munsif, it appears that the case or suit is one triable by a bench of the Gram Cutcheny, the Subdivisional Magistrate or the Munsif, as the case may be, shall, if he is satisfied that it is a suit or case which is fit to bo tried by it, at once transfer the case or suit to the bench having jurisdiction". It will be seen that Sec. 69 does not oust the jurisdiction of the Magistrate altogether, nor does it provide for automatic transfer of the case to the bench of Gram Cutcherry, Whether in such a situation the case will be tried by the Magistrate or by a bench lies within the discretion of the Subdivisional Magistrate It is for the latter to decide according to his judgment whether under the given circumstances a particular case is fit to be tried by a bench. If he is satisfied that a bench should try it, then only he shall transfer it to the bench. Thus, the satisfaction of the Subdivisional Magistrate about the fitness of trial by a bench is the sole criterion of transfer of the case from the court of the Magistrate to a bench of the Gram Cutcherry. Unless the Subdivisional Magistrate exercises the discretion vested in him under Sec. 69 of the said Act, the Magistrate has jurisdiction and is competent to hear and dispose of the case. His jurisdiction ceases only when transfer of the case is made under Sec. 69. It will be observed further that the Magistrate before whom the case is pending is not to take any action for transfer of the case. Section 69 does not enjoin upon him to refer the case to the Subdivisional Magistrate for orders when at any stage of the proceeding he finds that the case is triable by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry. He may refer the case to him, but it is not obligatory upon him. The language of Sec. 69 is not quite clear. He may refer the case to him, but it is not obligatory upon him. The language of Sec. 69 is not quite clear. But when this discretionary power is vested in the Subdivisional Magistrate, it is obvious that the party who has objection to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate should move the Subdivisional Magistrate for an appropriate order. When no such action is taken by the aggrieved Party and that trial ends in conviction or acquittal he cannot be permitted to impugn the legality of the order on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The reason is that Sec. 69 of the said Act does not create absolute bar to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. 4. Apart from this, on general principles also the contention is not valid. It is the allegation made in a case and not the final conclusion of the court deducible from the facts proved which determine the forum. The jurisdiction of a court to hear a case thus depends upon the statements of the complainant irrespective of truth of those statements, which is a question of evidence. When the allegations of a complainant disclose two offences, one within and the other outside the jurisdiction of a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, the case should be tried by a court which has jurisdiction to try both the offences and not by the bench having jurisdiction over only one of them, for the simple reason that it would be highly inconvenient if two offences are tried by two different tribunals. In such a case the proceedings before a Magistrate cannot be regarded as void for want of jurisdiction. In this case the facts disclosed that the offences committed by the petitioners in course of the same transaction were both simple hurt and grievous hurt falling, respectively, under Sections 323 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code, and under Sec. 62 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, the offence under Sec.325 was not cognizable by the bench of the Gram Cutcherry. Therefore, the Magistrate who had jurisdiction to try both the offences was fully competent to hear and dispose of the proceeding. It will be remembered that the offence under Sec.325 I.P.C. had been committed, but the evidence was not adequate to fix the responsibility on one or the other of the petitioners and, therefore, the conviction was under Sec.323 only. Therefore, the Magistrate who had jurisdiction to try both the offences was fully competent to hear and dispose of the proceeding. It will be remembered that the offence under Sec.325 I.P.C. had been committed, but the evidence was not adequate to fix the responsibility on one or the other of the petitioners and, therefore, the conviction was under Sec.323 only. It will be wholly unreasonable to argue that at the stage of pronouncing judgment when the offence under Sec.323 alone was proved the case should have been transferred to a bench for de novo trial. In my judgment, this is not the Purpose of Sec. 69 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act. The contention, therefore, must be overruled. 5. Lastly, it was contended that the sentence passed on the petitioners was harsh. They have been awarded two months rigorous imprisonment. The injuries caused were grievous, and there was no semblance of jurisdiction for assaulting both Chittaranjan and Manoranjan. Though the conviction was under Sec.323, because of want of evidence as to who caused the grievous hurt, the fact that grievous hurt has been caused cannot be ignored. I, my opinion, the circumstances of this case do not call for reduction in the sentence. This contention also fails. 6. IN the result, the application is dismissed.