Judgment 1. The only question involved in these appeals is whether the suit of the plaintiffs for redemption is barred by limitation. The argument advanced on behalf of the defendants-appellants is that Article 134 of the Limitation Act applied to this case and, since the suit was brought more than 12 years from the date of sale, that is, 8-7-1879, the bar of limitation applied. The contrary view point was put forward by the learned Government advocate on behalf of the respondents. It was argued by him that the case is governed by Article 148 of the Limitation Act. It was pointed out that the date of the last assignment (Exhibit 5) is 8-2-1885, and in that document the zerpeshgi right of the mortgagor was distinctly acknowledged, and if that date is the starting point of limitation, the suit is still within the time prescribed by Article 148 of the Limitation Act. In our opinion, the proper Article to apply to this case is not Article 134, but Article 148 of the Limitation Act. Article 134 is in the following terms: "134. To recover possession of immoveabli property conveyed or bequeathed in trust or mortgaged and afterwards transferred by the trustee of mortgagee for a valuable consideration.Twelve years.When the transfer becomes known to the plaintiff." It is clear that in order to make this Article applicable, the transferee should take a transfer of an absolute and not of a restricted title and if the transferee does not profess or intend to take the transfer of an absolute interest or anything more than the qualified interest which the transferor is competent to alienate, there is no occasion for this Article to apply. In other words, the Article is intended to protect a transferee who had reasonable grounds for believing that his transferor had the power to convey and did convey an absolute interest. That is, we think, the right interpretation of Article 134 of the Limitation Act and our view is borne out by two decisions namely, Ram Kanai Ghosh V/s. Hari Narayan Singh Deo, 2 Cal LJ 546 (A); and Huseni Khanam V/s. Ali Husain Khan, ILR 29 All 471 (B). There is also a decision of the Privy Council on this point in James R.R. Skinner V/s. Naunihal Singh. There is also a decision of the Privy Council on this point in James R.R. Skinner V/s. Naunihal Singh. ILR 51 All 367: (AIR 1929 PC 158) (C), where it has been laid down by the Privy Council that the transfer of property mortgaged contemplated by Article 134 is something other than an express transfer of the original mortgage and that it was a transfer by a mortgagee purporting to transfer a larger interest than that given by the mortgage. 2. In the present case it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the document dated 8-7-1879, was an absolute sale by Lachuman of the property in dispute to Ramlagan Lal. A translation of this document was produced before us by learned Counsel for the appellants in the course of hearing. We have looked into the translation and we are satisfied that what Lachuman purported to transfer was not an absolute right in the property free of mortgage. On the contrary, there was an express acknowledgment of the mortgages made by Kamladatt and Gangadhar Dutt on 29-8-1867 and 21-1-1868. There is also a recital in the last paragraph of the document that the vendee has right to take out execution according to the prevailing Act of 1806 and the vended property foreclosed and vested in him. The relevant portion of the translation is as follows: "As both the Baimaiadi of the above noted documents are in the lands of Ramyad Bhagat, so they could not be made over to the vendees. The vendee however has a right to obtain copies of the aforesaid documents from the registry office and take whatever legal steps he thinks proper and to this the executants or his heirs will have no objection. As the stipulated period of the Baimaiadi documents has elapsed the vendee has right to take out execution according to the prevailing Act of 1806 and the vended property foreclosed and vested in him. He may rely (?) the money from the majors or he may enforce whatever conditions are mentioned in the sale deeds dated 29-8-1867 and 31-1-1868 as the occasion arises." We are satisfied, therefore, in this case that the document dated 8-7-1879, executed by Lachuman in favour of Ramlagan Lal did not purport to transfer any absolute interest in the property, out only the qualified interest of the mortgagee. It follows, therefore, that Article 134 of the Limitation Act does not apply to this case and that the . case is governed by Article 148 of the Limitation Act and the starting point of limitation is 8-2-1885, which is the date of exhibit 5, where there is an express acknowledgment of the mortgagors right by the mortgagee. In our opinion, the lower appellate Court has taken the right view on the question of limitation and the suit is not barred. There is no substance in these appeals and they are, accordingly dismissed with costs.