Judgement JUDGMENT: The points for determination in this second appeal relate to the nature of the interest bequeathed to Shanmugathammal, the deceased wife of the plaintiff-appellant, under the will, Ex. A-1, executed by her father Velayutha Konar, on 11-2-1924. Velayutha Konar died in 1927, leaving him surviving his widow, Chellathammal, and three daughters, Arumugathammal, Subbammal and Shanmugathammal. Chellathammal was the step-mother of the daughters. Under the will, he divided his properties into three separate shares, describing them in schedules 1, 2 and 3 appended to the will. He bequeathed the properties in schedule 1 to his first daughter, Arumugathammal, those in schedule 2 to his second daughter, Subbammal and those in schedule 3 to the third daughter, Shanmughathammal. In regard to each of these three daughters, he said in the will that she would hold and enjoy the properties described in the appropriate schedule absolutely and with full powers of alienation. He had to pay about Rs. 250 in 25 monthly instalments of Rs. 10 each towards a, chit which he was subscribing to; and he directed his daughters to pay that chit debt in equal shares. If any daughter defaulted and if any of the other daughters had on that account to pay more than her proportionate share, he said that such daughter could recover the excess out of the property bequeathed to the daughter who defaulted. He directed the sons-in-law to meet the expenses of the funeral and annual ceremonies of himself and his wife; and then appear in the will the clauses which have given rise to the present controversy. "If any one of my said three daughters has no issue, she shall till her lifetime enjoy the same without making any distribution whatever thereof, and after the lifetime, the same shall pass on to my other daughters having heirs. If any one without any issue as mentioned above effects any alienation, that will not be valid." Velayutha, the testator, died in 1927. The will shows that all the three daughters were married on the date of the will. Shanmughathammal, the third daughter, died in 1929. It is admitted that no child was born of her womb. Chellathammal, Velayutha Konars widow, died on 9-1-1943. Schedule 3 which described the property bequeathed to Shanmughathammal consists of an item of wet land and moveable properties in the possession of the testator. Shanmughathammal, the third daughter, died in 1929. It is admitted that no child was born of her womb. Chellathammal, Velayutha Konars widow, died on 9-1-1943. Schedule 3 which described the property bequeathed to Shanmughathammal consists of an item of wet land and moveable properties in the possession of the testator. There is no evidence as to what happened to the moveable properties after Chellathammals death. The immoveable property, namely, the item of wet land, was taken possession of by the other two daughters and was in their (or their representatives) possession, when the suit which has given rise to this second appeal was instituted on 5-12-1952. Shanmugathammals husband is the plaintiff. Arumugathammal, the surviving daughter of Velayutha Konar, is the first defendant. Velayutha Konar, the second defendant, is the son of the other daughter, Subbammal. 2. The plaintiff-appellant contends that, under the will, Shanmughathamal took an absolute estate in the immoveable property described in the third schedule, that the property devolved on him on his wifes death and that he became entitled to the possession of the property on the death of Chellathammal in 1943. The defendants contend that, under the will, Shanmughathammal took only a life-estate in the property, or, that in any event the estate conferred on her was subject to the executory devise made in favour of her sisters, which was capable of taking effect; and that the devise did take effect and the sisters became entitled to the property on Shanmughammals death. 3. The learned District Munsif held that Shanmughathammal took an absolute estate and that it passed on her death to her husband, the plaintiff-appellant. In appeal, the learned District Judge held that the bequest in favour of Shanmugathammal was subject to the defeasance clause in favour of her sisters, which took effect and by reason of which the property bequeathed to Shanmugathammal devolved on her sisters on her death. 4. The points for determination are, (1) Did Shanmughathammal take a life estate in the property described in schedule 3 to the will, Ex. A. 1? and (2) Is the estate granted to Shanmughathammal under the will Ex. A. 1, subject to an executory devise in favour of her sisters, capable of taking effect on Shanmugathammal dying without issue? 5.Point 1: In construing a will, we start with the proposition that all its clauses should, if possible, be given effect to. A. 1? and (2) Is the estate granted to Shanmughathammal under the will Ex. A. 1, subject to an executory devise in favour of her sisters, capable of taking effect on Shanmugathammal dying without issue? 5.Point 1: In construing a will, we start with the proposition that all its clauses should, if possible, be given effect to. The rule has its basis on the principle that a testator does not intend to say inconsistent things and that he wishes that everything that he says should come to pass. That, of course, involves the condition that everything that the testator says is capable of being legally given effect to. On the question of giving effect to a will thus, two questions are involved. The first is whether all the terms could be so construed as to harmonise with one another; and the second is whether, thus construed, all the terms could legally be given effect to. 6.In the early part of the Will, Ex. A. 1, the testator says that each of the daughters will take the property allotted to her absolutely and with full powers of alienation. In a subsequent portion of the will, he says that, if any of the daughters has no issue, she shall enjoy the property during her lifetime without subjecting it to any encumbrance and that the property shall on her death pass over to her sister or sisters who have heirs. Is there any necessary inconsistency between these two parts of the will? As pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, the testator expected that, in the usual course of things, each of his daughters would have children; and, therefore, the earlier part of the will provides for what may be called normalcy. The testator, however, was not unaware of the possibility of a daughter or daughters not having children. The later part of the will provides for the special contingency of a daughter not having issue. The later part should therefore be read as a proviso to the earlier part. Thus read, what the will says is this: each of the daughters shall enjoy the property given to her under the will absolutely, provided that, if any of the daughters does not have issue, she shall have no power of alienation and the property shall pass, free of all encumbrances, to her sister or sisters who have issues surviving. Thus read, what the will says is this: each of the daughters shall enjoy the property given to her under the will absolutely, provided that, if any of the daughters does not have issue, she shall have no power of alienation and the property shall pass, free of all encumbrances, to her sister or sisters who have issues surviving. 7.The testator was an agriculturist and the draftsman of the will was clearly a person without the requisite knowledge of law or skill in drafting. I shall give an example of the lack of knowledge and skill. It is clear from the will that the testator desired that his wife should have a life estate in the properties and that his daughters should have no right to possession or enjoyment of the properties during his wifes lifetime. The proper way to give effect to that idea was to state that his wife was granted a life estate and that the interest conferred on the daughters could be reduced to possession only after the wifes lifetime. But that is not the language used in the will. What the will says is, "This will should come into force after my lifetime and the life-time of my first wife Chellathammal." The will would, of course, take effect if at all, at the moment of has death. Its operation could not be deferred until after the death of Chellathammal. So as, however, to give effect to the testators intention, we have to construe that particular sentence not as deferring the operation of the will, but as conferring on Chellathammal a life estate in the properties with gifts-over in favour of the daughters. I am mentioning that circumstance merely to show that, in construing the will, we should not adopt standards which would be appropriate to a will drafted by an expert draftsman. 8. On the first question, namely, as to the intention of the testator as expressed in the clause conferring an absolute estate and the clause depriving the childless daughters of the power of alienation, I hold that the testator intended that the daughter who had no issue at the time of his death should have a life estate in the property allotted to her and that the daughter or daughters who had issue at that time should each take an absolute estate in the property respectively allotted to them. 9.The question arises as to what happens if the daughter, who having no issue at the time of the testators death, takes only a life estate, has a child or children born to her thereafter. The answer would obviously be that the proviso which deprives the daughter who has no issue, of the power of alienation, would cease to be applicable, and the general clause conferring an absolute estate would come into operation on the birth of such issue and the life estate would get augmented into an absolute estate. The point, in my opinion, is placed beyond doubt by the sentence in the will which says "If anyone without any issue as mentioned above effects any alienation, that alienation will not be valid." It follows therefrom that, if a daughter having issue, effects an alienation, such alienation would be valid; that is to say, the alienation would not cease to have effect on such daughters death. 10. In this case, Shanmughathammal had no issue at any time. The estate which she took, on the death of her father, in the properties described in Schedule 3, was a life estate. It never got augmented into an absolute estate. Since the estate ceased on her death, there was nothing which the plaintiff could inherit. I find the point in the affirmative. 11. Point 2 : This is the only point on which the learned District Judge dismissed the plaintiffs suit. He said that the will contained an executory devise in favour of the sisters of Shanmugathammal on her dying issueless that the devise was capable of taking effect and took effect and that consequently the property passed to her sisters on her death. Some little complication might have arisen if Shanmugathammal, who died issueless, had had issue during her lifetime. In construing point No. 1, I have given reasons for the view that the estate which devolved on Shanmughathammal when the will took effect, namely, on the date of her fathers death, was a limited estate and that it was capable of being augmented into an absolute estate if a child was born of her womb. If a child was born and if such child died during Shanmughatham-mals life-time, the estate would not, in my opinion, get contracted into a limited estate. If a child was born and if such child died during Shanmughatham-mals life-time, the estate would not, in my opinion, get contracted into a limited estate. She might, for example, have a son, for the expenses of whose marriage she sells a part of the property. The alienee would under the terms of the will get an absolute estate in the property alienated. If the son died issueless thereafter and the mother who survived the son died issueless, the property of which she died possessed, would, in my opinion, pass to her heirs and not, under the will, to her sisters. No such problems present themselves for solution in this case, because the plaintiffs wife had never any child born of her. Therefore, the clause in the will which says "if anyone of my said three daughters had no issue ......... the same (the property bequeathed to her under the will) shall pass on to my other daughters having heirs," becomes an executory devise capable of taking effect, when the other daughters have children. That point is covered by direct authority. The case in Govindaraja Pillai v. Mangalam Pillai, 63 Mad L. J. 911 : (AIR 1933 Mad 80) (A) dealt with a pre-nuptial settlement by a husband in favour of his wife in the following terms : "I have accordingly given you the undermentioned properties valued at Rs. 1000 and you shall yourself from this day hold and enjoy the same with all rights. Should any issue be born to us, that issue shall get the properties after our death. If there is no issue, after your death, your brothers should take the properties." It was held that the estate taken by the wife was an absolute estate subject to defeasance in the event of her dying without issue and that the defeasance clause was not opposed to any rule of law. Consequently, her brothers were held entitled to the properties on her death without issue. On the point, there is no difference in principle between a transfer inter vivos and a bequest (Vide S. 28 of the Transfer of Property Act and S. 131 of the Indian Succession Act). To the same effect, though slightly different reasons are given, is the decision in Mst. Rameshwar Kuer v. Sheolal Upadheya, ILB 14 Pat. 640 : (AIR 1935 Pat 401) (B). 12. To the same effect, though slightly different reasons are given, is the decision in Mst. Rameshwar Kuer v. Sheolal Upadheya, ILB 14 Pat. 640 : (AIR 1935 Pat 401) (B). 12. On the other side, the learned Counsel for the appellant places strong reliance on Tiru-chendur Sri Subramaniaswami Temple v. Rama-samia Pillai, 1940-2 Mad L. J. 510 : ( AIR 1941 Mad 39 ) (C). The bequest in that case was in these terms : "I have bequeathed to my son Pichai Pillai the right to all my properties and moneys etc. and he shall alone enjoy them. If he or his son has no child, the said properties shall pass to Sri Subrahmaniaswami at Tiruchendur." It was held by this Court that there was no executory devise in favour of the deity. The judgment was affirmed by the Privy Council in Sri Subramaniaswami Temple v. Ramaswami Pillai, 1950-1 Mad L. J. 300 : (AIR 1950 PC 32) (D). The claim made on behalf of the temple could not have been upheld except on the view that there was a gift-over in favour of the son of Pichai Pillai in the event of Picha Pillai leaving a son and an alternative gift-over in favour of Sri Subramaniaswami in the event of Picha Pillai dying without a son and a further gift-over in favour of Sri Subramaniaswami in the event of Pichai Pillai having a son and such son dying issueless. Pichai pillai took an absolute estate in the properties bequeathed. If he died leaving a s°n, such son would take an absolute estate in the properties, provided they had not been alienated during the fathers life-time. The intention of the testator was that, if such son of Picha Pillai died without issue, the properties should be taken by the temple. The effect of the judgments of this court and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is that the law will not give effect to such intention. The terms of the will before us are in pari materia with the terms of the instruments construed in 63 Mad L. J. 911 : (AIR 1933 Mad 80) (A) and ILR 14 Pat 640 : (AIR 1935 Pat 401) (B). The terms of the will before us are in pari materia with the terms of the instruments construed in 63 Mad L. J. 911 : (AIR 1933 Mad 80) (A) and ILR 14 Pat 640 : (AIR 1935 Pat 401) (B). I find that the bequest to Shanmughathammal was subject to an executory devise in favour of her sisters in the event of her dying without issue and that that devise was capable of taking effect, and, in the events that happened, took effect. 13. No other point is argued. The second appeal is dismissed with costs (one set). Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.