JUDGMENT This is an application under Art. 133 of the Constitution for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court and arises out of a proceeding of this Court* under Art. 226 of the Constitution in which this Court refused to grant a writ of certiorari cancelling the order of the Government refusing to renew the leases of the land m question in favour of the petitioners. 2 The petition filed was a joint petition by 387 lessees, and all the facts were not admitted and the exact particulars relating to the case of each petitioner were not clear, and the plea of the petitioners that they had become "landholders" who have a permanent right of use and occupancy in their land was negatived, assuming that the facts alleged by the petitioners were correct. It was held that on those facts they could not be anything but (annual tenants) and as such the matter of renewal of the leases in their favour was purely a matter within the discretion of the Government. 3 The contention of the learned Government Advocate on behalf of the opposite party is that the application is not tenable because the proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not a Civil Proceeding" within the meaning of Art. 133 of the Constitution and the petitioners, therefore, have no right of appeal to the Supreme Court under that Article, and the recent Full Bench case reported in Collector of Monghyr v. Pratap Singh Bahadur, (Si) AIR 1957 Pat 102 (A), was strongly relied upon. 4 In that case the Full Bench made the following observations in paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 of their judgment: "The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art, 226 is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the High Court not for the purpose of declaring the civil rights of the parties but for the purpose of ensuring that the law of the land is implicitly obeyed and that the various tribunals and public authorities are kept within the limits of their jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction, a jurisdiction meant to supervise the work of the tribunals and public authorities and to see that they act within the limits of their respective jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction, a jurisdiction meant to supervise the work of the tribunals and public authorities and to see that they act within the limits of their respective jurisdiction. In a proceeding under Art. 226 the High Court is not concerned with the determination of the civil rights of the parties; the only object of such a proceeding under Art. 226 is to ensure that the law of the land is implicitly obeyed and that various authorities and tribunals act within the limits of their respective jurisdiction. Art. 229 states that the High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, directions, orders of writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari". "It is also important to state in this connection that in dealing with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court the Constitution does not adopt rigorous classification of proceedings into two categories, namely, civil and criminal, which are mutually exclusive and together exhaustive. There is no such dichotomy in the scheme of the Constitution. *See AIR 1958 Manipur 1 . This view in borne out by the examination of the relevant article of the Constitution. Art. 132 enacts that appeals shall lie from judgment, decrees or orders of a High Court whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding", if the cases involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. This clearly indicates that the Constitution-makers contemplated that there might be proceedings in the High Court which are neither civil nor criminal. Art. 133 provides for appeals against orders passed in civil proceedings and Art. 134 provides for appeals against orders passed in criminal proceedings. Article 135 reserves the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court in matters not falling within Art. 133 or Art. 134, if the Federal Court had jurisdiction over such matters at the time of the Constitution. Art. 136 (1) provides as follows: 136 (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. It is manifest that Arts. Art. 136 (1) provides as follows: 136 (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. It is manifest that Arts. 133 and 134 are limited to orders passed in civil or criminal proceedings. But the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art 136 to grant special leave extends to orders passed in any cause or matter by any Court or Tribunal. The articles of the Constitution, therefore, clearly contemplate that there may be proceedings other than civil and criminal proceedings and that in respect of such other proceedings the governing provisions are Arts. 135 and 136". "In my opinion, the nature of the proceeding depends on the nature of the jurisdiction of the Court which the petitioner happens to invoke. The expression used in Art. 133 is a civil proceeding of a High Court and not the expression civil cause or matter which is manifestly of wider import On its general acceptation, the term proceeding means the form in which the action is brought or defended, the manner of intervention by parties, the mode of deciding issues, of opposing judgment and of executing (Bouviers Law Dictionary). It follows that the expression civil proceeding of a High Court must be interpreted to mean the form of proceeding of the High Court in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction." 5I respectfully agree with those observations. There are also cases in which it was held that an order rejecting a writ petition under Art. 226 is not a "judgment, decree or final order", as contemplated under Art. 133: see Shriram Hanuman Bux v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (S) AIR 1955 Nag 257 (B) and Gajjan Mal Mohan Lall v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1957 Him Pra 5 (C). 6 I venture to suggest one more aspect which in my opinion may be helpful in judging the nature of the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. While under Art. 32, the Supreme Court can issue writs only for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, the High Courts can under Art. 226 issue them not only for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights but also for other purposes, that is, for enforcing other legal rights. While under Art. 32, the Supreme Court can issue writs only for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, the High Courts can under Art. 226 issue them not only for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights but also for other purposes, that is, for enforcing other legal rights. It is, therefore, open to doubt if the framers of the Constitution intended to extend to the Supreme Court under Art. 133 the power which they denied it under Art. 32. It, therefore, appears to me for this reason also that Art. 133 was not intended to cover proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 7 The result is that the application fails and is dismissed with costs. Application dismissed.