Judgment :- 1. This second appeal is by the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of his possession and injunction alternatively for recovery with mesne profits, which has been concurrently dismissed by the courts below. 2. The plaint schedule property consists of a Paramba about 11/2 acres in extent with a house building standing thereon and various trees yielding and otherwise and is admittedly owned by the plaintiff. On 20.6.1109 plaintiff got Ext. I registered lease in respect of the property from his sister, the 4th defendant, reciting that it had been outstanding, under oral lease, with her from 1096 onwards and fixing a yearly pattam of Rs. 55 out of which Rs. 25 alone was made payable, the balance being allowed for the maintenance of the property. According the plaintiff he had caused Ext.1 lease to be executed in order to prevent an attachment of the movable therein by a creditor of his and the lease deed was not intended to be nor was acted upon. In any event Ext. I was only in the nature of a lease of a building with the land appurtenant thereto so as not to create a permanent tenure. The suit was, therefore, laid for declaration that Ext. I lease was merely sham and ineffective and for injunction to restrain the 4th defendant from disturbing the plaintiff's possession, alternatively for recovery of possession on foot thereof. The 5th defendant, daughter of the 4th defendant, was impleaded as in possession under her. The 1st defendant was the plaintiff's son and the 2nd and 3rd defendants were the 1st defendant's wife and daughter. They were impleaded as persons also disturbing the plaintiff's possession. But we are not concerned with either the 5th defendant or the defendants 1 to 3. The main contest was by the 4th defendant. She contended that Ext. I was real and subsisting and besides, was unquestionable at the hands of the plaintiff. The 4th defendant had further obtained permanent occupancy rights under and by virtue of the Cochin Verumpattamdars' Act, VIII of 1118 and the prayer for eviction on basis of Ext. I was therefore unsustainable. The courts below concurrently found in favour of the 4th defendant on both the issues as to genuineness of Ext. I lease and its non-exemption from the provisions of the Cochin Verumpattamdars' Act, and accordingly dismissed the suit and hence this appeal. 3. Mr. I was therefore unsustainable. The courts below concurrently found in favour of the 4th defendant on both the issues as to genuineness of Ext. I lease and its non-exemption from the provisions of the Cochin Verumpattamdars' Act, and accordingly dismissed the suit and hence this appeal. 3. Mr. N.D.P. Nambooripad learned Counsel for the plaintiff, has not questioned the finding of the courts below on the real nature of Ext. I lease. But he pressed the alternative relief in the plaint for recovery of possession, on two grounds, firstly that Ext. I lease covered by the exception under S.3(c) of the Cochin Verumpattamdars' Act, VIII of 1118 and therefore no permanency of occupation attached to it, and secondly and assuming that the 4th defendant was a Verumpattamdar, the property was required by the plaintiff for his own use under S.8(1)(f) and was accordingly recoverable from the 4th defendant. Taking up the first ground, the relevant portion of S.3 runs as follows: "3. This Act shall not apply to (a) (b) (c) leases of any building owned by a landlord including a house, shop or warehouse and the site thereof, together with the garden or land appurtenant thereto:' The argument is that the lease here is in respect of a building and the site thereof together with garden appurtenant thereto within the meaning of the Cl. (c). Now the question whether a particular lease concerns a building and its site together with the garden or land appurtenant thereto or it is the other way viz., it is in respect of a land or garden with a building appertaining thereto, is ordinarily a question of fact depending upon various considerations viz., the extent and nature of the land, the nature of the building, the income from the land and the probable rent of the building. The trial court, it is true, did not consider these aspects and contended itself by saying that the 4th defendant's occupation as a lessee had commenced from 1096 even before Ext. I date and therefore the permanent occupancy right which the 4th defendant originally had in the Paramba was not lost by the subsequent construction of the present building in 1101 or 1102. I date and therefore the permanent occupancy right which the 4th defendant originally had in the Paramba was not lost by the subsequent construction of the present building in 1101 or 1102. The lower appellate court, however, found on basis of the various tests mentioned above that the land was the main part of the leasehold and the building passed along with it because it happened to be there and therefore S.3(c) could not apply. That court was further willing to say that in view of the net rental of Rs. 25 per year i.e., less then Rs. 3 per month alone reserved under Ext. I, the claim for eviction was hit by Proclamation VI of 1124 even assuming the lease was in respect of a building with the land appurtenant thereto within the meaning of S.3(c) of the Act. Learned counsel says that for purpose of S.3(c) it is enough if there is a building and also a garden in which the building was situate both making up a single unit under the leasehold and he relied upon the Bench decision in Kalikutty v. Krishna Iyer,1951 KLT 258, which was followed in Ramachandran Nair v. Ouseph, 1954 KLT 377. But neither of these cases can be considered to be authority for the position contended for by learned counsel. The contention that was raised in the former of these cases (Kalikutty v. Krishna Iyer,1951 KLT 258) was that S.3(c) authorised the recovery of the building with such portion of the land as could be deemed to be appurtenant thereto leaving the balance of the land covered by the lease in the hands of the lessee. In holding that such construction was not possible, the court observed: "the lease is of the unit composed of the building together with the paramba compound or on which the buildings stand. The buildings and the paramba go together and we cannot find any warrant for the view that when the landlord seeks eviction of such a holding he can recover the buildings together with a portion of the paramba surrounding the buildings but not the rest of the paramba. To hold so would be to go against both the spirit and the letter of the Verumpattamdars' Act". To hold so would be to go against both the spirit and the letter of the Verumpattamdars' Act". The question whether the leasehold came within the purview of S.3(c) merely because there was a building and land constituting a single unit, did not fall to be considered in that case and indeed was not pronounced upon. The case in Ramachandran Nair v. Ouseph, 1954 KLT 377, was concerned with the applicability of the Holdings (Stay of Execution Proceedings) Act VIII of 1950 T.C. which also had exempted from its operation, "buildings rented out including houses, shops or warehouse and the sites thereof, together with the gardens or land appurtenant thereto". Learned Judge referred to Kalikutty v. Krishna Iyer,1951 KLT 258, with approval and went on to hold "That the Holdings (Stay of Execution Proceedings) Act VIII of 1950 will not apply to a case in which a house and the garden on which it stands have been leased together as a single unit, under one lease deed and the garden is being held, and enjoyed as appurtenant to the house". But the essential point for us to notice in this decision is the finding of fact clearly entered that the house and garden were being held together, the garden being considered to be and being in fact only land appurtenant to the house. The land here is about 11/2 acres in extent with a large number of yielding trees thereon and clearly a building attached to it does not turn the scale. S.3(c) of the Cochin Verumpattamdars' Act does not therefore apply and along with the courts below, we repel the contention of the plaintiff based thereon. 4. On the second point, learned Counsel complains that the trial court did not address itself at all on this question while the lower appellate court dismissed it by a simple observation that except a mere statement to the effect that the plaintiff wanted the property to serve as a residence for his daughters there was no evidence to hold that the plaintiff required the building or any part thereof bona fide for his use within the meaning of S.8(1) (f) of the Verumpattamdars' Act. It seems to us however in the nature of the pleadings in the case that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to urge this point at all as any circumstances for recovery of the property. It seems to us however in the nature of the pleadings in the case that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to urge this point at all as any circumstances for recovery of the property. The suit as laid was for purpose of declaration that Ext. I lease was only sham, alternatively and assuming it was true the 4th defendant had not developed any permanent occupancy right in the holding so as to enable her to resist eviction. The plaintiff did not rely on any special exception under the Cochin Verumpattamdars' Act for recovery of property assuming Ext. I had generated a Verumpattam right in favour of the 4th defendant. It is no doubt true that he had mentioned that he required the property for residence of his daughters by the first wife but that was only in connection with the allegation that the 4th defendant had no possession under Ext. I and her attempts to get at possession required to be restrained. That ground was never put forward as a ground of personal necessity within the meaning of S.8(1)(f). The lower appellate court was also correct in saying there was absolutely no evidence on the matter apart from the bare statement of the plaintiff. There is no substance in this second ground as well. 5. The appeal fails in the result and is dismissed with costs.