JUDGMENT K.T. Koshi, C.J. 1. A Division Bench of which one of us was a member referred these two appeals for decision by a Full Bench. The order of reference in A. S. No. 525 of 1954 is as follows:- "The question that falls for decision in this appeal against the decision of the District Court of Kottayam on a Land Acquisition Reference enhancing the value awarded by the Acquisition authority is whether the notice under S.9(3) of the Act requires fifteen days' time and whether failure to give such time would preclude the application of the provisions of S.24(2) (Indian Act 25(2) ) to the case. Notwithstanding the want of fifteen days' notice the land owner had entered appearance before the Acquisition authority on the date fixed for the hearing of the matter, but omitted to make a claim for any specific amount towards the value of the land proposed to be acquired. The lower court held that the fifteen days' time mentioned in S.9(2) applied also to the notice under S.9(3) and as the hearing was within fifteen days of the service of the notice the stringent provisions of S.24(2) (Travancore Act) cannot be applied to the case. There is no decision of this Court on the point. The authorities elsewhere are not uniform. In the circumstances we refer the case for decision by a Full Bench of this Court." In A. S. No. 526 of 1954 the reference order is in these terms:- "The question that arises for decision in this appeal is the same as that in A. S. 525 of 1954. For reasons stated in our order of even date made in that case this case is also referred to a Full Bench for decision." The learned District Judge who dealt with these cases in the lower court has discussed the question raised in the reference orders in paragraph 4 of his judgment. As mentioned in the order of reference in A. S. No. 525 of 1954 the learned Judge held that the fifteen days' time mentioned in S.9(2) of the Land Acquisition Act applied also to the notice under S.9(3) and that as the hearing before the Land Acquisition Authorities was within fifteen days of the service of the notices, the stringent provisions of S.24(2) of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act should not be applied to the case. When the appeals were heard by us we went into the history of the acquisition proceedings right from the publication of the declaration under S.6 of the Land Acquisition Act, but we were not able to get to know when the notices under S.9(2) and S.9(5) were issued or when the valuation of the properties acquired were made or what steps the Acquisition Authorities took after the claimant appeared before them pursuant to the notice under S.9(3). The awards by the Land Acquisition Authorities were passed on 29-7-1953, that is, within nine days of the date of the hearing pursuant to the notice under S.9(3). Admittedly the notice issued under S.9(3) did not show the value offered to the claimant and there is nothing to show that even the rough valuation statement was ready or available for his perusal on the hearing date. In the circumstances we are inclined to think that these are pre-eminently fit cases where the learned Judge below could have exercised his discretion in holding that there was 'sufficient reason' for the claimant's failure to make a proper claim as required by law rather than seek to decide the question of law as to whether a notice under S.9(3) required the same period of fifteen days mentioned in S.9(2). The decision of the point necessarily involves the question whether the notice under S.9(5) was issued or published and in the absence of any material on record about it, it was not very safe to pronounce upon the question. In his judgment the learned Judge mentions the question of 'sufficient reason' as one of the question to be decided by him, but no decision on it was rendered by him, apparently in view of his decision on the insufficiency of the notice under S.9(3). Be that as it may, we hold here that the claimant was precluded by sufficient reason for making a proper claim before the Land Acquisition Authorities and that therefore the penal consequences of his failure should not be visited upon him. That no doubt is the conclusion which the learned Judge below came to, but we prefer to base our conclusion on a different ground. 2. In their appeals the State has raised only this question and not that the lower court went wrong in enhancing the compensation. Their appeals therefore fail and we dismiss them. 3. That no doubt is the conclusion which the learned Judge below came to, but we prefer to base our conclusion on a different ground. 2. In their appeals the State has raised only this question and not that the lower court went wrong in enhancing the compensation. Their appeals therefore fail and we dismiss them. 3. In both the appeals there are cross objections claiming more amounts by way of compensation, but we find no material whatever to further enhance the compensation fixed by the lower court in either case. These memoranda are also therefore dismissed. 4. In the circumstances of the case parties will bear their costs in the appeals as well as in the matter of cross objections. Order accordingly.