ORDER T.P. Naik, J. This is a petition under article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of Shri L.B. Sarje, Additional Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur, passed on 19-10-1956 on an election petition filed by Sudama Prasad, Respondent No. 3, under Clause XLII of the Panchayat Rules, 1948, setting aside the election of the Petitioner as a Panch for the Panagar Gram Panchayat from the Subhashganj ward held on 3-5-1956. The Petitioner and the Respondent No. 3 Sudamaprasad were the two candidates for the said election. The Petitioner secured 107 votes as against 102 votes secured by the Respondent No. 3 and was duly declared elected as a Panch from the Subhashganj ward. The election of the Petitioner was challenged by an election petition (Annex. I) filed on 23-5-1956 on the allegations: (1) That the polling booths of Subhashganj and Jagmohanganj wards were located in the same room, though partitioned with a cloth screen and were under the supervision of a single polling officer; (2) that of 217 votes cast, only 209 were found in the ballot boxes of Subhashganj ward; (3) that in the ballot boxes of the Jagmohanganj ward, the ballot papera were in excess by eight; (4) that the location of the two polling booths for the two wards in the same room was in contravention of the Panchayat Act and the rules as also the appointment of a single polling officer for the two booths; (5) that this resulted in the confusion to the voters of Subhashganj ward who were misled into putting their votes into the boxes of the Jagmohanganj ward; and (6) that the result of the election was materially affected by this noncompliance with the Panchayat Act and the Rules. The Petitioner filed a reply (Annex. II) on 16-7-1956 controverting the allegations on the basis of which the election was sought to be set aside. The Respondent No. 9 set aside the election of the Petitioner by his order dated 19-10-1956. He based his conclusions on the averment contained in the election petition of the Respondent No. 3 and the reply of the Petitioner aforesaid (Annexs. I and II). He made no further enquiries. The grounds for setting aside the election of the Petitioner as stated by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner in his order are: 1. He based his conclusions on the averment contained in the election petition of the Respondent No. 3 and the reply of the Petitioner aforesaid (Annexs. I and II). He made no further enquiries. The grounds for setting aside the election of the Petitioner as stated by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner in his order are: 1. That the location of the two booths for two wards in one room with a partition in between was in contravention of the Rule 3 (Clause VI) of the Panchayat Rules as also the appointment of a single polling officer for the two booths; that this irregularity resulted in confusing the voters; and that as 8 votes were thus lost while the difference between the votes polled by the candidates was only 5, 'it could be inferred that it is just likely that the result may have been quite different had the votes been cast in the boxes pertaining to Subhashganj ward instead of in the boxes pertaining to Jagmohanganj ward. This petition is opposed by Respondents 4 to 8 and 11 to 17 though curiously enough Respondent No. 3 who appears to be most concerned has claimed to be discharged on the ground that he has been unnecessarily impleaded in the case. The contention that there is no contravention of the rules appears to be correct. In my opinion, the rules have not been correctly interpreted by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner. Apart from the fact that the location of the booths, as pointed out by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, was the same for all the 15 wards of the Panchayat, which fact could have been established on evidence if proper enquiry were held by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, there is no warrant for saying that the location of the two booths for two wards in one room with a proper partition in between was in contravention of the rules. The rules on which reliance has been placed by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner are in these terms: Rule 3 (Clause VI)-Where poll is necessary, the Deputy Commissioner shall fix the date, hours and places of polling for each ward of village.... Rule 7 (1) (Clause VI)-The Deputy Commissioner shall appoint as many polling officers as may be necessary to preside at each place fixed for polling.... Rule 7 (1) (Clause VI)-The Deputy Commissioner shall appoint as many polling officers as may be necessary to preside at each place fixed for polling.... Rule 3 aforesaid authorises a Deputy Commissioner to fix places of polling for each ward. I see no prohibition in this against providing two or more separate independent booths housed in the same room if it is practicable to do so. Without more evidence, it is not possible to conclude that this would inevitably lead to a confusion. In fact, if the affidavit of the Petitioner be true, this procedure of locating four booths in one room as per plan annexed (Annex. 4) was adopted for all the 15 wards and there is no evidence that this practice generally resulted in any confusion. Again, if the plan (Annex. 4) correctly represents the actual location of the booths for the different wards-and there is no reason to doubt its correctness-I do not see how any confusion can at all result. I also do not agree with the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner that "when the polling booths pertaining to two different wards are located in the same room, it cannot be said that there would be two different places for polling in existence". 'Place' here means particular spot on the surface devoted for a specified purpose e.g., polling. In the instant case, it was sufficiently well demarcated as it was located in a room with a cloth screen in between. By itself, it does not show that any confusion could occur from such location and the plan filed by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner shows that every one of the booths had its separate entrance and exit (one common entrance which also served as an exit) which further negatives any room for confusion based on conjectural surmises which the uncertain averments in the election petition may have created. I am also of opinion that the posting of one polling officer for two booths cannot be said to be prohibited under Rule 7 (1), Clause VI. If the intention was to provide at least one polling officer for each place of polling, the phraseology could have been very simply worded by providing that "the Deputy Commissioner shall appoint at least one polling officer to preside at each place fixed for polling". If the intention was to provide at least one polling officer for each place of polling, the phraseology could have been very simply worded by providing that "the Deputy Commissioner shall appoint at least one polling officer to preside at each place fixed for polling". By expressly providing that he shall appoint "as many Polling Officers as may be necessary", the rule-making authority was giving a discretion to the Deputy Commissioner to appoint one or more according to the need of the polling station and in conceivable cases, the appointment of one polling officer to preside at one or more places fixed for polling could not be said to be prohibited. I therefore do not consider that there was any irregularity or illegality in the conduct of the election. But there is a more fundamental objection to the setting aside of the election in the instant case. Under Clause XLII of the Rules, Rule 2 provides, If, after such inquiry as he considers necessary, the Deputy Commissioner or his sub-ordinate, as the case may be, is of opinion that the election complained of has been procured or induced or the result of the election has been materially affected by corrupt or illegal practice, he may declare it to be void and order a fresh election. It was therefore necessary for the Respondent (petitioner in the election petition) to have established that the "result of the election has been materially affected by corrupt or illegal practice". Though the law requires the Deputy Commissioner to be of the opinion, this opinion is to be based on evidence, so that it can be objectively demonstrated. It is difficult to see how the Respondent No. 3 could claim to discharge this burden without leading any evidence on the point. In any case, the mere fact that the margin was less than the votes lost, is not conclusive of the question. We do not know whether all the eight votes would have gone to the Respondent No. 3. We do not know whether the eight persons who put their voting papers in the other booth did so because they were misled or because they wanted to waste their votes. We do not know whether all the eight votes would have gone to the Respondent No. 3. We do not know whether the eight persons who put their voting papers in the other booth did so because they were misled or because they wanted to waste their votes. I quite agree that this fact is not easily capable of exact proof, yet I am of opinion that elections are not to be lightly set aside and as observed by the Supreme Court while enunciating the principle underlying Section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in Vashist Narain Sharma v. Deva Chandra and Ors. 1955 (1) S.C.R. 509 at pp. 518-19: We are of opinion that the language of Section 100(1)(c) is too clear for any speculation about possibilities. The section clearly lays down that improper acceptance is not to be regarded as fatal to the election unless the Tribunal is of opinion that the result has been materially affected. The number of wasted votes was 111. It is impossible to accept the ipso dixic of witnesses coming from one side or the other to say that all or some of the votes would have gone to one or the other on some supposed or imaginary ground. The question is one of fact and has to be proved by positive evidence. If the Petitioner is unable to adduce evidence in a case such as the present, the only inescapable conclusion to which the Tribunal can come is that the burden is not discharged and that the election must stand. Such result may operate harshly upon the Petitioner seeking to set aside the election on the ground of improper acceptance of a nomination paper, but neither the Tribunal, nor this Court is concerned with the inconvenience resulting from the operation of the law. How this state of things can be remedied is a matter entirely for the Legislature to consider. The English Act to which we have referred presents no such conundrum and lays down a perfectly sensible criterion upon which the Tribunal can proceed to declare its opinion. It directs the Tribunal not to set aside the election if it is of opinion that the irregularity has not materially affected the result. The learned Additional Deputy Commissioner could not base a finding on the question on speculation and conjecture or on a mere possibility. It directs the Tribunal not to set aside the election if it is of opinion that the irregularity has not materially affected the result. The learned Additional Deputy Commissioner could not base a finding on the question on speculation and conjecture or on a mere possibility. I am therefore of opinion that the order of the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner is liable to be quashed. I accordingly set aside his order dated 19-10-1956. The cost of this petition shall be paid by the Respondents Nos. 3 to 8 and 11 to 17. Counsel's fee Rs. 50. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be returned to the Petitioner. Petition allowed.