Judgment 1. In the suit out of which this appeal arises the plaintiffs claimed a sum of Rs. 80/-by way of contribution. The case of the plaintiffs was that khata No. 25 of village Nainpura belonged to defendants 3 and 4. Defendant No. 4 who was the mother of defendant No. 3, executed a rehan bond in respect of 13 bighas of the land in favour of the plaintiffs. Subsequently defendant No. 4 created another rehan in respect of 61/2 bighas of the same property in favour of defendants 1 and 2. Subsequently defendants 1 and 2 instituted a redemption suit. Suit No. 36 of 1945, and obtained a decree against the plaintiffs on the 27th August, 1946 for recovery of possession as Well as damages by way of mesne profits. The defendants obtained delivery of possession in Chait 1353 Fasli. In the meantime the rent of the holding had become due and the plaintiffs, who were in possession of another portion of the holding had to pay the entire rent off the holding for the years 1352 to 1354 Fasli. On the basis of these facts the plaintiffs claimed contribution. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the claim was barred by res judicata and also on the ground that the payment was voluntary. The lower appellate Court reversed the finding of the Munsif with regard to the voluntary nature of the payment, but the lower appellate Court held that the claim was barred by res judicata and it was the duty of the plaintiffs to have put forward their claim in the proceedings taken for mesne profits. 2. The argument presented by Counsel for the appellants is that the view taken by the lower appellate Court was wrong and the claim of the plaintiffs was not barred by res judicata. In support of this argument learned Counsel referred to four cases, namely, Draksharam Chandramouli V/s. Satya Narayana AIR 1926 Mad 1020 (A), Pichi Aiyar V/s. Subbarayar AIR 1915 Mad 1213 (B), Baidyanath Dutta V/s. Kanhailal Marwari, AIR 1939 Pat 264 (C) and Vithaldas Gulabdas Seth V/s. The Hyderabad Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 1923 Bom 24-(D). In our opinion, the principle of none of these cases is applicable to the present case. Ltd., AIR 1923 Bom 24-(D). In our opinion, the principle of none of these cases is applicable to the present case. The reason is that the proceedings for mesne profits in the present case were proceedings arising out of a decree passed in a suit for redemption and in a case of this description the principle of res judicata applies so far as the claim for contribution is concerned. We consider that the present case falls within the principle laid down in the decision of the Madras High Court in Ameenammal V/s. Meenakshi AIR 1920 Mad 531 (E). It was pointed out in that case by Sadasiva Aiyar and Spencer, JJ. that where a transaction of mortgage had become fully ripened, so that the rights and liabilities of the parties could be dealt with by the Court before which the suit was brought in res-pect of that transaction, whether the suit was for foreclosure by the mortgagee or for sale by the mortgagee, or in the alternative for foreclosure or sale by the mortgagee, or for redemption by the mortgagor, all questions, including even claims for rent due on transactions inseparably connected with the mortgage, relating to the taking of accounts between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, ought to be decided in one and the same and in the very first suit, and no second suit could be brought by either party for any claim arising out of that same transaction of mortgage. To a similar effect is a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vinayak Shivrao V/s. Dattatraya Gopal, ILR 26 Bom 661 (F). At page 667 Jenkins, C.J. stated as follows: "Now, the question is one which arises directly out of the mortgage transaction, which was the subject-matter of the litigation in the former suit. But the decree in a suit for redemption must be such as to enable the Court to do complete justice: Jennings V/s. Jordan, (1881) 6 AC 698 at p. 704 (G) and as far as it is possible, the Court endeavours to make a complete decree that shall embrace the whole subject and determine upon the rights of all the parties interested in the estate : Palk V/s. Clinton (1805) 12 Ves. 48 (H). 48 (H). So in this case the claim on which we are now asked to adjudicate is one that could and ought to have been advanced in the former suit. Without a determination on it, there was not a complete adjustment of the right of the parties. It furnished, if well founded, a good ground of defence to the claim of redemption, and so must be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit (Sec.13, explanation II, Civil Procedure Code). It has been urged that it makes a difference that the claim was not in existence when the redemption suit was commenced, but this, in my opinion, does not assist the plaintiff. "Where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward only because they have from negligence inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time": Henderson V/s. Henderson, (1843) 3 Hare 100 at p. 115 (I). The claim that the plaintiff urges in this suit in our opinion falls precisely within the principle laid down by Vice-Chancellor Wigram. Even in a common law action it was said by Blackburn, J.: "I incline to think that the doctrine of res judicata applies to all matters which existed at the time of giving of the judgment, and which the party had an opportunity of bringing before the Court."; Newington V/s. Levy, (1870) 6 CP 180 (J). Even in a common law action it was said by Blackburn, J.: "I incline to think that the doctrine of res judicata applies to all matters which existed at the time of giving of the judgment, and which the party had an opportunity of bringing before the Court."; Newington V/s. Levy, (1870) 6 CP 180 (J). Beyond doubt must this be so in a redemption suit, which has for its purpose the complete adjustment of the rights of the parties, and the decree in which, when properly framed, provides for matters even up to time when it is ultimately carried into effect." We may also refer in this connection to the provisions of Order 34, Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code, which provides in what form a preliminary decree should be passed in a suit for redemption and also to Section 76 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the mortgagee is bound to pay the Government revenue and all rent accruing due in respect of the land during his possession. 3 For these reasons we hold that the lower appellate Court was right in holding that the suit is barred by res judicata. We, accordingly, dismiss this appeal with costs.