Ganapatia Pillai, J.- The appellant in this case was the second wife and now widow of one Duraiswami Reddiar, who died on 10th August, 1951, aged about 68 years. By his first wife, Kamalakshi Animal, who died in 1936, Doraiswami Reddiar has a son called Sithapathi Reddiar, who is the respondent in this appeal. The appellant was married to Doraiswami in 1938. By O.S. No. 33 of 1945, which was a suit for partition instituted by Sithapathi, the respondent, there was a division of all the family properties between Doraiswami and his only son Sithapathi, It is admitted that though only a preliminary decree for partition was passed in that case, by agreement of parties all the family properties were divided and since 1945 the father Doraiswami and his son Sithapathi had been in separate enjoyment of the properties which fell to their respective shares in this partition. The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the respondent for partition of the properties mentioned in Schedules A to C to the plaint, which admittedly belong to his father, at the time of his death in 1951. The case of the respondent in the plaint was that his father Doraiswami died intestate, and he (the respondent) was entitled to a half share in Doraisami’s properties, the other half going to the appellant. This claim was met by the appellant by propounding the will, Exhibit B-1, alleged to have been executed by Doraiswami on 9th August, 1951. According to the terms of this will Doraiswami left all the properties, which he had obtained by partition, to his second wife the appellant absolutely. Regarding outstandings and moveables comprised in Schedules B and C of the plaint, the appellant raised a contest by denial of existence of some of them. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to take any more notice of this contest. The respondent attacked the will of Doraiswami as a forgery. His case was that his father was unconscious continuously for 3 days prior to the date of the will, and that the will Exhibit B-1 was really fabricated by the appellant with the assistance of her two brothers, and after Doraiswami had died. The respondent attacked the will of Doraiswami as a forgery. His case was that his father was unconscious continuously for 3 days prior to the date of the will, and that the will Exhibit B-1 was really fabricated by the appellant with the assistance of her two brothers, and after Doraiswami had died. The learned District Judge, who tried the suit, came to the conclusion that though Doraiswami was conscious on 9th August, 1951, when he is said to have executed the will, it was not genuine in the sense that the proof adduced of execution of it by Doraiswami was not sufficient to carry conviction to his mind. However the learned District Judge was satisfied that if execution of the will by Doraiswami was proved by the evidence on the record, it should be held that he executed it in a sound disposing state of mind. The main question for consideration in the appeal therefore, is whether Exhibit B-1 has been proved to be the last will and testament of Doraiswami executed by him when he was in a sound disposing state of mind. ****** [After discussing the evidence His Lordship continued]: We have little difficulty in agreeing with the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that Doraisami was conscious for the last 3 days before his death. The evidence of D.W. 3, the Villupuram doctor, who attended upon Doraiswami both on the 8th day and on the 9th day of August, 1951, has not been impaired in cross-examination. This taken along with the evidence of D.W. 1, the defendant herself, and D.W. 8 her brother amply establishes the falsity of case of the respondent, namely, that his father was unconscious continuously for three days before his death. A number of witnesses were examined on the side of the plaintiff (respondent) to show that some of them were continuously in the company of Doraiswami during the last three days of his illness and to their knowledge no will was executed by Doraiswami. In the very nature of things, such negative evidence is of a little value, when there is positive evidence of the execution of the will by Doraisami in the shape of the testimony of D.Ws. 2, 5, 6 and 7. In the very nature of things, such negative evidence is of a little value, when there is positive evidence of the execution of the will by Doraisami in the shape of the testimony of D.Ws. 2, 5, 6 and 7. The next question for consideration is whether the signature of Doraisami in Exhibit B-1 can be taken to be proved as his genuine signature on the strength of the evidence of these witnesses, especially in the face of the evidence given by the hand-writing expert, P.W. 1. The purport of the evidence of this expert was that the signature of Doraiswami found in Exhibit B-1 was a forgery by tracing. The learned Judge in the Court below was himself of the opinion that the reasons given by the expert were inconclusive, and there was ground for difference of opinion about the validity of those reasons. Before examining the evidence of this expert we would point out the consideration which must be kept in view in evaluating the evidence of such witnesses. The first consideration is that very few people always sign in the same manner on all occasions. The second consideration is that the opinion of an expert as to the genuineness of a signature should be received with great caution, especially in a case where there is positive evidence of persons who saw the testator sign the will in question. Thirdly all the tests evolved by the experts in the matter of comparison of hand-writing and signatures are merely tentative in character. Lastly opinion evidence is usually very weak evidence. * * * * * After discussing the evidence in detail His Lordship proceeded:- Under the circumstances the finding of the lower Court as regards the genuineness of the will, Exhibit B-1. as shown from the following passage, is almost a halting one: “In the circumstances of the case it is not possible to say that the will is genuine and it was executed by Doraisami. Perhaps, as suggested by the expert, the signature has been traced. If however the will was genuine in the sense that it was executed by Doraisami, it must be held that it was executed while he was in a sound and disposing state of mind. Perhaps, as suggested by the expert, the signature has been traced. If however the will was genuine in the sense that it was executed by Doraisami, it must be held that it was executed while he was in a sound and disposing state of mind. The fact that the defendant would have influenced him to leave the entire properties to her will not be an infirmity so as to affect the disposing state of mind. But I hold the genuineness of the will has not been proved satisfactorily” In our opinion, this conclusion is neither warranted by the evidence in the case nor by the facts proved regarding the circumstances under which the will was executed. We are satisfied on the scrutiny of the evidence that even three weeks prior to the date of his death Doraisami had contemplated execution of a will, and in fact attempted to execute Exhibit A-4, but this attempt proved infructuous, that Doraisami was anxious that after his lifetime his property should go to his second wife, and that he should execute an instrument to see that his divided son put no obstacles in the way of his widow enjoying his properties, and he actually carried out the object by executing Exhibit B-1 in a sound disposing state of mind. Disagreeing with the learned District Judge we hold that Exhibit B-1 has been proved to be the last will and testament of Doraisami by acceptable evidence. We permitted Mr. M. S. Venkatarama Ayyar, learned counsel for appellant to raise an additional ground not mentioned in the memorandum of appeal. It relates to the questions of law, whether even if the will Exhibit B-1 was not genuine, and Doraisami be deemed to have died intestate, his widow, the appellant would not be entitled to the properties in suit, by reason of the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act. A decision of this question may be unnecessary in this appeal, in view of our finding as to the genuineness of the will. However, as the question was fully argued by both learned counsel appearing in that case, we would indicate our opinion on this point. A decision of this question may be unnecessary in this appeal, in view of our finding as to the genuineness of the will. However, as the question was fully argued by both learned counsel appearing in that case, we would indicate our opinion on this point. Section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act (XVIII of 1937), as amended by Act XI of 1938, provides for succession to the separate and joint family properties of a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu Law, or by customary law when he dies intestate leaving his widow or the widow of a predeceased coparcener. According to clause (1) of section 3 of the Act the widow would be entitled to take a share in the separate property just as a son along with other heirs of the propositus. Clause (2) of section 3 provides for succession to interest in joint family properties in the case of a Hindu governed by any school of law, other than the Dayabaga or by customary law and enacts that in such a case the widow of the propositus shall have the same interest in the property which he was possessed of at the time of his death as he himself had. Clause (3) of section 3 provides that in the case of the succession either under clause (1) or clause (2) of that section the estate inherited by the widow shall be analogous to the women’s estate known to the Hindu Law, except for the difference that in the case of succession under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, the widow would be entitled to claim partition just like a male coparcener. This Act was intended as a beneficent piece of legislation to give Hindu women better rights in property. To construe the provisions of such an Act, it would be proper to look to the previous state of the law which it was intended to modify. Before this Act no Hindu widow governed by the Mitakshara school of law could have claimed any share in the separate property of her husband in the presence of a son, grandson or great grandson or any share in his joint family property in the presence of any coparcener of her husband. The Federal Court in Umayal Achi’s case1, had to consider the effect of clause (1) of section 3. The Federal Court in Umayal Achi’s case1, had to consider the effect of clause (1) of section 3. In that case one Arunachalam Chettiar died leaving his two widows and the widow of a predeceased son. The widow of the pre-deceased son claimed a share in the properties left by Arunachala, who was the last surviving coparcener of a joint family. She based her right under section 3 (1) of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act. In considering the question whether property held by the last surviving coparcener of a joint family could be called his separate property, the Federal Court ruled that the term ‘separate property' used in section 3 (1) of the Act should be understood in a restricted sense, and could be properly applied only to such property in respects of which the son of the last surviving coparcener would not be entitled to claim coparcenary rights but only a right of inheritance by succession at the moment of his father’s death if he survived him. The next step in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant was that every other class of property of a male known to Hindu Law must come under the category of joint family property or an interest in joint family property mentioned in clause (2) of section 3. This argument found favour with a Bench of this Court presided over by the learned Chief Justice and Ramaswami, J., in Subramanian v Kalyanarama2. There a widow claimed a share in the property of her husband who had become divided from his two sons sometime before his death. Krsihnaswami Nayudu, J., against whose judgment that L.P.A. had been preferred had held that the ruling of the Federal Court in Umayal Achi’s case1, should be confined to the properties obtained by a sole surviving coparcener, and should not be extended to the property obtained by the last male holder in a partition of family properties. The Bench in Subramania’s case2was of the view that the principle of the Federal Court decision would equally apply to property taken by a member of the joint family at a partition of family properties. This seems to be warranted by the reasoning found in the judgment of Varadachariar J., who delivered the leading judgment in Umayal Achi’s case1. The Bench in Subramania’s case2was of the view that the principle of the Federal Court decision would equally apply to property taken by a member of the joint family at a partition of family properties. This seems to be warranted by the reasoning found in the judgment of Varadachariar J., who delivered the leading judgment in Umayal Achi’s case1. If the property obtained by Doraisami at the family partition of 1945 is not separate property, within the meaning of section 3 (1) of the Act, we agree with Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar, that it must be deemed to be an interest in Hindu joint family property within the meaning of section 3 (2) of the Act. With respect, we concur with the Bench in Subramanian v. Kalyanarama2, in their opinion on this matter. However this does not dispose of the impediment in the way of the appellant getting all the properties of Doraisami disposed of under the will. In Subramanian v. Kalyanarama2, the widow was given a third share in the properties of her husband by the decree of the trial Court But she had not appealed against that decree. Therefore the question as to what would be the quantum of the interest of the widow under section 3 (3) of the Act, was, left open in that case, at it did not arise for decision. The learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the Full Bench decision in Narayan Sah v. Sankar Sah1, which following the ruling in Manjanatha v. Narayana2, upheld the principle of equality of shares in partitions among coparceners governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. He particularly drew our attention to the passage in the judgment of Wallace, J., in that decision, wherein the learned Judge mentions three points on which the decision in Manjanatha’s case2. rested. The second of these points was that to allow a coparcener, who had already taken his share in a prior partition to take a further share in the properties in a partition which takes place subsequently would be to defeat the principle of equality in partition both among branches of a family and among members of the same branch. By analogy he argued that the respondent having already taken away his share of the family properties in the partition of 1945 would have no right to claim any share again in the properties left by Doraisami. By analogy he argued that the respondent having already taken away his share of the family properties in the partition of 1945 would have no right to claim any share again in the properties left by Doraisami. The rule laid down in the Full Bench decision above mentioned does not in our opinion directly apply to the facts of the present case. But the analogy is very striking. If the property, which Doraisami left is to be deemed to be joint family properties, then sub-section (2) of section 3 provides that his widow shall stand in the shoes of her husband in respect of this property and shall have in that property the same interest which he himself had. Even if the fiction of a notional partition at the time of Doraisami’s death is to be assumed the argument was that the rule in the Full Bench case would prevent the respondent from taking any further share in the properties now in dispute. But it is not really necessary to invoke the rule in Narayana Sah v. Sankar Sah1, because the very object of the legislation, Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, was to modify the ordinary rule of Hindu Law, by which a widow like the appellant before us would be excluded from taking any benefit in the properties of her husband, which he obtained in a joint family partition in the presence of her step-son. Therefore the true effect of sub-clause (2) of section 3 of the Act would be to exclude the respondent from taking any share in the properties in suit left by his father, even if he had died intestate. The phrase “an interest in joint family property” in section 3 (2) will in our opinion, cover an interest partitioned as well as unpartitioned. A similar view was taken by a Bench of the Orissa High Court in Visalamma v. Jagannadha Rao3. In our opinion even if the will Exhibit B-1 is not genuine, the claim of the respondent for a share in the properties left by his father should be negatived. In the result, the appeal is allowed. A similar view was taken by a Bench of the Orissa High Court in Visalamma v. Jagannadha Rao3. In our opinion even if the will Exhibit B-1 is not genuine, the claim of the respondent for a share in the properties left by his father should be negatived. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The decree of the lower Court is set aside and the suit of the respondent is dismissed with full costs of the defendant regarding the suit and half the costs of the defendant regarding the appeal, as we allowed the defendant to raise a new point in the appeal not adverted to in the Court below. P.R.N. ---------------- Appeal allowed.