Judgment :- 1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of money due under two hypothecation bonds The bonds were executed by defendant 1, and plaintiff sought to recover the amounts from both defendant 1 personally and the hypothecated properties. Exts. A and III are the two hypothecation bonds. Ext. A is a chitty hypothecation bond executed by defendant 1 on 9-1-1106 in favour of the Union Christian Bank, Kurupumpady, a partnership concern of which the plaintiff was the manager and which is not now in existence. The Union Christian Bank was conducting a chitty, and defendant 1, had subscribed a ticket in that chitty and prized the ticket on the 9th instalment. He received the prize amount and executed Ext. A hypothecating the plaint properties as security for payment of the subscriptions for the future instalments. The plaintiff's case was that defendant I had defaulted to pay the subscriptions from the 14th instalment which was on 25-4-1108 & that the Bank was entitled, under the terms of Ext A, to get a consolidated payment of the subscriptions for all the twelve instalments thereafter and interest on the consolidated amount from 25-4-1108. The suit was filed on 29-9-1123, and the plaintiff relied upon a payment of Rs. 8/- by defendant 1 on 21-12-1117 in partial discharge of the interest on the amount under Ext. A and the written acknowledgment (Ext. Al) of that payment signed by defendant 1, contained in Ext. A itself, to save the claim from limitation. Defendant 1 had executed another hypothecation bond also in respect of the plaint properties on 9-1-1106. Ext. III is that hypothecation bond. It was executed in favour of one Ahamed, who was a minor aged 3 years on the date of the hypothecation bond, and his grand-mother, Aisa Umma. Under the terms of Ext. III the principal amount thereof, namely, Rs. 300/-, was to be paid to Ahamed after he attained majority and the annual interest was to be paid to his grand-mother for and on his behalf till he attained majority. Sometime after the execution of Ext. III Ahamed died and after his death his sister, defendant 4, assigned Ext. III in favour of defendant 3, and the latter in his turn assigned the same to the Union Christian Bank. Ext. D dated 23-7-1117 is the assignment by defendant 4 in favour of defendant 3, and Ext. Sometime after the execution of Ext. III Ahamed died and after his death his sister, defendant 4, assigned Ext. III in favour of defendant 3, and the latter in his turn assigned the same to the Union Christian Bank. Ext. D dated 23-7-1117 is the assignment by defendant 4 in favour of defendant 3, and Ext. B dated 13-8-1117 is the assignment by defendant 3 in favour of the Bank According to the plaintiff, on 21-12-1117 defendant 1 paid Rs. 22 to the Bank in partial discharge of the interest on the amount under Ext III also and an acknowledgment (Ext. B1) of the payment was made in Ext. B and signed by him. So far as Ext. III was concerned, the plaintiff's case was that the cause of action in respect of the amount due thereunder arose only in 1121 when alone Ahamed would have attained majority if he had not died earlier. Plaintiff also relied upon the acknowledgment of payment, Ext. BI, as an acknowledgment saving the claim from limitation, if for any reason it was held that the cause of action in respect of Ext. III had arisen earlier. Claiming that he had been duly authorised by the Bank and the partners to realise the amounts due under the two hypothecation bonds, plaintiff brought the suit for recovery of the principal and interest due under Exts. A and III. A moiety of the principal was claimed in each case on account of arrears of interest. The suit was contested by defendant 2, who had taken a sale deed (Ext. IV) of the plaint properties from defendant 1 on 8-8-1111. His main contentions were that the plaintiff had no proper authority to file the suit, that the debt under Ext. III had been discharged and the Bank had waived its right to get the amount under Ext. A, that the cause of action in respect of Ext. III arose in 1110 when Ahamed had died, that the claims under both Exts. A and III were barred by limitation, and that the acknowledgments relied upon by the plaintiff to save the suit from limitation were not binding on him and the plaint properties as they were made by defendant 1 after he had executed Ext. IV in his favour and at a time when he (defendant 1) had no right to the plaint properties. IV in his favour and at a time when he (defendant 1) had no right to the plaint properties. The genuineness of the acknowledgments were also disputed by defendant 2. 2. The courts below concurrently found that the plaintiff had proper authority to file the suit, that the acknowledgments, Exts. A-1 and BI, were genuine, that Ahamed died in 1115 and the cause of action in respect of Ext. III arose in 1115, and that the defendant's plea of discharge of Ext. III and waiver of the rights under Ext. A were false. On the question of limitation, the first court held that the acknowledgments, Ext. Al and BI, were valid and binding on defendant 2 and the plaint properties and that they would save the suit from limitation, and the lower appellate court held that they were insufficient to save the suit from limitation so far as the plaint properties were concerned as they were made by defendant 1 after he had parted with his rights in the plaint properties As a result of these findings, the first court decreed the plaintiff's suit in terms of the plaint with costs, and the lower appellate court reversed that decree and dismissed the suit so far as the plaint properties were concerned. Plaintiff has therefore filed this second appeal. 3. According to the plaintiff, the cause of action in respect of Ext. A arose on 25-4-1108. Since the suit has been filed only on 29-9-1123, more than twelve years after the cause of action arose, the claim under Ext. A would normally be barred by limitation. But the plaintiff relies upon Ext. A as an acknowledgment under S.21 (1) of the Travancore Limitation Act, VI of 1100, for saving the claim from limitation. Since the suit has been filed only on 29-9-1123, more than twelve years after the cause of action arose, the claim under Ext. A would normally be barred by limitation. But the plaintiff relies upon Ext. A as an acknowledgment under S.21 (1) of the Travancore Limitation Act, VI of 1100, for saving the claim from limitation. S.21(1) reads as follows: "Where interest on a debt or legacy, or part of a debt or legacy, is before the expiration of the prescribed period, paid as such by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf, or by the manager of a Malabar tarwad or of an undivided family in the case of debts binding on the tarwad or family, as the case may be, and when the fact of such payment appears in writing signed by the person making the same, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made". The lower appellate court considered that, as the payment and acknowledgment under Ext. Al were made by defendant 1 after he had parted with all his interests in the mortgaged properties and at a time when he had no right to them, the said payment and acknowledgment were insufficient to save the suit from limitation so far as the plaint properties were concerned. What S.21 (1) really provides is that, when interest on a debt or part of a debt is paid, before the claim in respect of it becomes barred, by the person liable to pay the debt and the payment is acknowledged in writing signed by the payer, there will be a fresh period of limitation for a suit on the original debt computed from the time when the payment is thus made. There is nothing in S.21 (1) limiting the fresh period of limitation, obtained oh account of the payment and acknowledgment only to suits against the payer and persons claiming under him. If the payment and the acknowledgment are made by the person liable to pay the debt the advantage of the fresh period of limitation conferred by S.21 (1) would accrue not only for the purpose of obtaining the reliefs against the payer but also for obtaining all lawful reliefs which can be obtained in a suit on that debt. On the hypothecation debt under Ext. On the hypothecation debt under Ext. A the Bank was entitled to get a relief against defendant 1 personally and a relief against the hypothecated properties for sale of the same for realising the debt Defendant 1 was liable to pay the debt until the claim against him personally was barred by limitation. Under the law in Travancore, the period of twelve years for suits to enforce payment of a debt charged upon immovable property is applicable not merely to the remedy against the properly but to the personal remedy against the debtor as well (see the Full Bench case Thuppan Neelacantan Nampooripad v. Kanakku Narayanan Parameswaran, 3 T.L.J. 1). Therefore, on the date of Ext. Al, namely, 21-12-1117, the claim against defendant 1 personally in respect of the cause of action on Ext. A, which had arisen on 25-4-1108, had not become barred by limitation, and so, defendant 1 was on the date of Ext. Al, a person liable to pay the debt under Ext A. On the plain meaning of the language of S.21 (1) it would therefore appear that the payment and acknowledgment made by defendant 1 on 21-12-1117 were sufficient to confer on the Bank and persons claiming under it a fresh period of limitation from that date for a suit on Ext A for all the reliefs which could be asked in respect of that hypothecation bond 4. The cases relied upon by the lower appellate court for holding that an acknowledgment made by a person who had parted with all his rights in the mortgaged properties and had no further interests in them, is not a sufficient acknowledgment, are all cases falling under S.19 of the Limitation Act. The cases relied upon by the lower appellate court for holding that an acknowledgment made by a person who had parted with all his rights in the mortgaged properties and had no further interests in them, is not a sufficient acknowledgment, are all cases falling under S.19 of the Limitation Act. S.19 (1) of the Travancore Limitation Act reads: "Where before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he derives title or liability, or by some person who is, either by operation of law or by contract, entrusted with the general management of the affairs of a family in so far as such acknowledgment relates to transactions binding on such family, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed". There is material difference between this section and S.21 (1). So far as S.19(1) is concerned, the acknowledgment has to be made by the person against whom the property or right is claimed or by persons under whom he derives title or liability; and so far as S.21 (1) is concerned the acknowledgment has to be made by the person who is liable to pay the debt at the time of that acknowledgment. For a valid acknowledgment under S.19(1) it is essential that it must have been made by the defendant in the suit against whom the property or right is claimed or by his predecessor-in-interest. That is not necessary in the case of payment and acknowledgment under S.21 (1). For a payment and acknowledgment under S.21 (1) all that is necessary is that the person making the payment and the acknowledgment must have been a person who was liable to pay the debt at the time of the said payment and the acknowledgment. He need not necessarily be the defendant in the suit nor the person in whom were vested at the time of the acknowledgment the rights which the defendant has at the time of the suit. He need not necessarily be the defendant in the suit nor the person in whom were vested at the time of the acknowledgment the rights which the defendant has at the time of the suit. A payment and an acknowledgment under S.21 (1) could have been made on 21-12-1117 by defendant 1, for although he had sold the property before that date to defendant 2 he still remained liable to pay the debt as the personal claim against him was not then barred by limitation. 5. The view that I have taken as regards these two sections is supported by authorities A Full Bench of the Travancore High Court has held in Subramonia Ayyan v. Kunjuthommen (XI T. L. J. 213) that payment by the hypothecator to the hypothecatee of interest due on the hypothecation deed, before the expiration of the period prescribed for limitation, and the fact of such payment appearing in writing signed by the hypothecator has the effect, under S.20 of the Limitation Regulation, of keeping alive the hypothecation deed against a third party to whom the title to the property had passed before the date of such payment. This is a direct decision by the Travancore High Court on the question raised in this case. S.20 of the Travancore Limitation Regulation referred to in the decision corresponds to S.21 (1) of the Travancore Limitation Act, VI of 1100 which replaced the Limitation Regulation which was in force till 1100. The sections in the Indian Limitation Act corresponding to S.19 (1) and 21 (1) of the Travancore Limitation Act VI of 1100 are S.19 (1) and 20 (1). There is a slight difference between the language of S.20 (1) of the Indian Act and S.21 (1) of the Travancore Act. The sections in the Indian Limitation Act corresponding to S.19 (1) and 21 (1) of the Travancore Limitation Act VI of 1100 are S.19 (1) and 20 (1). There is a slight difference between the language of S.20 (1) of the Indian Act and S.21 (1) of the Travancore Act. But that difference is not material so far as the present question is concerned, for under S.20 (1) of the Indian Act also the payment and the acknowledgment have to be made by a "person liable to pay the debt or legacy", and what follows as a consequence of the payment and acknowledgment is: "a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made." The Madras High Court has held in Thayyanagaki Amma v. Sundarappa (A.I.R.1942 Mad 200) that S.20 does not require, unlike S.19, that interest or part of the principal should be paid by the party against whom the debt or legacy is claimed or by some person through whom he derives title or liability but enacts simply that a fresh period of limitation shall be computed where interest or part of the principal has been paid by the person liable to pay or by the debtor, and saves the right of suit by the creditor in its integrity against all persons, who might have been sued within the prescribed period, and that consequently a part payment by a mortgagor after he has parted with the mortgaged property but is personally liable to pay on his covenant saves the right of suit against the purchaser of the equity of redemption. Patanjali Sastri, J. (who subsequently became the Chief Justice of India) says in that case: "It will be observed that this section does not require, unlike S.19, that interest or part of the principal should be paid by the party against whom the debt or legacy is claimed or by some person through whom he derives title or liability but enacts simply that a fresh period of limitation shall be computed where interest or part of the principal has been paid by the person liable to pay or by the debtor. A fresh period of limitation for what suit? Evidently for such suit as the creditor might have brought before the expiration of the prescribed period. A fresh period of limitation for what suit? Evidently for such suit as the creditor might have brought before the expiration of the prescribed period. That is to say, the right of suit is saved in its integrity against all the persons who might have been sued within the prescribed period. This difference in language is the more remarkable as S.20 follows immediately on S.19 which has made an acknowledgment binding only on the party making it or some person in privity with him. The following observations of the Privy Council in (1886) 11 A. C. 639 are here pertinent: It must be remembered that payment and acknowledgment are two very different things. As regards the person making them, acknowledgment may, as pointed out in (1862-63) 1, De. G. J. & S.122, be made by a person who, though a party to the mortgage contract, has ceased to have any substantial interest in it, and has nothing to lose by the acknowledgment; whereas, payment is certain to be made only by those who have some duty or interest to pay. As regards the recipient, so long as he is paid according to the intention of the contracting parties, he is in full enjoyment of his bargain, and is not put upon any further assertion of his rights, but not so if he only receives acknowledgment. If therefore we find that the Legislature has used different language about the two cases, we must not readily conclude that it has done so by accident or without meaning it. The view we have expressed is in accord with the decision of the Calcutta High Court in 33 Cal. 1278 the principle of which has also been followed in 41 All III and 12 Pat. 93 " The opinion expressed in Thayyanayaki Ammal v. Sunderappa has subsequently been followed in Narayana v. Venkatesa (A. I R.1943 Mad. 395), Kempamma v. Racha Setty (A. I. R.1947 Mad. 329) and by Govinda Menon, J., in Valliappa v. Rangayya (A.I.R.1956 Mad. 177). 6. 93 " The opinion expressed in Thayyanayaki Ammal v. Sunderappa has subsequently been followed in Narayana v. Venkatesa (A. I R.1943 Mad. 395), Kempamma v. Racha Setty (A. I. R.1947 Mad. 329) and by Govinda Menon, J., in Valliappa v. Rangayya (A.I.R.1956 Mad. 177). 6. In support of the contention that a payment and acknowledgment made by a mortgagor after he had parted with all his rights in the mortgaged property is of no avail so far as the remedy against the mortgaged property is concerned, reliance was placed by the respondent's learned Counsel on a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court, namely, Pavayi v. Palanivela Goundan (A. I. R.1940 Mad. 470). The head-note of that case reads: "A mortgagor who has lost all interest in the mortgaged property cannot by an acknowledgment within the meaning of S.19 or by the payment of interest or principal within the meaning of S.20 bind the person on whom his interest has devolved." Although this head-note supports the contention of the respondent's learned counsel the actual decision is of no help to him. Referring to that case and after extracting the above head-note, Patanjali Sastri, J., has said in Thayyanayaki Ammal v. Sunderappa (A. I. R.1942 Mad 200): "This would seem, no doubt, to support the contention, but it appears from the facts stated by the Full Bench who were dealing with a case placed before them and not; answering a question of law referred to them that when the mortgagor made the payment there was no subsisting liability to pay as the enforcement of the personal covenant had become barred and the mortgaged property had been alienated before the date of such payment. In view of this fact, it could hardly have been maintained that there was a payment by the debtor or the person liable to pay within the meaning of S.20 of the Act, and no question could therefore arise with reference to that provision. This was pointed out at (I. L. R.1940 Mad) P. 886 where it was observed: A payment of interest to start a fresh period of limitation must be made by the person liable to pay the debt or by his agent duly authorised in that behalf. If the personal remedy against the mortgagor is barred he is no longer liable to pay the debt. If the personal remedy against the mortgagor is barred he is no longer liable to pay the debt. It is thus clear that the Full Bench were not concerned on the facts before them with the question whether a part payment by a mortgagor who has parted with the mortgaged property but is personally liable to pay on his covenant saves the right of suit against the purchaser of the equity of redemption". In Narayana v. Venkatesa A. I. R.1943 Mad. 395) also the judgment' was written by Sir Lionel Leach, C.J., who had written the judgment in Pavayi v. Palanivela Goundan (A.I. R.1940 Mad. 470) Referring to A. I. R.1940 Mad. 470. Leach C. J., has said in A. I. R.1943 Mad. 395: "The Subordinate Judge based his decision on the judgment of the Full Bench (AI.R.1940 Madras 470) in I. L. R. (1940) Mad. 872, but that case has no Bench (A.I.R.1940 Madras 470) in I.L.R. (1940) Mad. 872, but that case has no application here.' There it was held that a mortgagor who had lost all interest in the mortgaged property and was hot personally liable to pay the debt could not bind by an acknowledgment under S.19 or by a payment of principal or interest under S.20, Limitation Act, the person on whom his interest had devolved. In order to bind the assignee in such circumstances the acknowledgment or payment must be made before the mortgagor had parted with his interest in the property. We are concerned in the present ease with the question whether a payment falling within S.20 - made, of course, by a person entitled to do so - starts a new period of limitation which affects a second mortgagee whose charge was created before the payment" And after saying this, Leach, C.J., followed in A. I. R.1943 Mad. 395 the decision of Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., in A. I. R.1942 Mad. 200 and concluded with the observation: "A payment made by a person entitled to make the payment under S.20, limitation Act, creates a fresh period of limitation against all persons who might have been sued within the prescribed period". The decisions, one of the Assam High Court and the other of the Patna High Court, were also referred to by the respondent's learned counsel. In the Patna case, A.I.R. 1955 Pat. The decisions, one of the Assam High Court and the other of the Patna High Court, were also referred to by the respondent's learned counsel. In the Patna case, A.I.R. 1955 Pat. 505, the acknowledgment was made by the mortgagor after the personal remedy against him had become barred by limitation. Therefore that case is of no avail to the respondent. In the Assam case, A.I. R.1951 Assam 68, the distinction between S.19 and 20 has not been noticed at all and the question was not specifically raised and considered, whether the acknowledgment would have been valid if the mortgagor had made it before the personal remedy against him had become barred by limitation. 7. Following the decisions of the Travancore High Court and the Madras High Court, referred to above, I hold that a payment of interest and a signed acknowledgment thereof in writing made by a hypothecator before the personal remedy against him was barred by limitation would give to the hypothecatee and persons claiming under him a fresh period of limitation from the date of the acknowledgment for a suit for all the reliefs which the hypothecatee is entitled to get in a hypothecation suit and such an acknowledgment is binding not only upon the hypothecator but also upon the hypothecated property and third parties to whom the title to the hypothecated property had passed before the payment and acknowledgment. It follows that Ext. Al is a valid acknowledgment under S.21 (1) of the Travancore Limitation Act, VI PC 1100, and is therefore binding on defendant 2 and the hypothecated properties and that the suit in so far as Ext. A is concerned is not barred by limitation. 8. As regards the claim in respect of Ext. III, the plaintiff's case is that the cause of action arose only in 1121 and that no question of limitation can therefore arise in respect of it, for the suit has been filed in 1123. According to the concurrent findings of the courts below, the cause of action arose in 1115 when the minor, Ahamed, in whose favour Ext. III was executed, died. Under the terms of Ext. III the hypothecator was bound to pay the amount only after Ahamed attained majority, and Ahamed and his guardian had no right to demand payment earlier. It is also admitted that Ahamed was only 3 years old on the date of Ext. III was executed, died. Under the terms of Ext. III the hypothecator was bound to pay the amount only after Ahamed attained majority, and Ahamed and his guardian had no right to demand payment earlier. It is also admitted that Ahamed was only 3 years old on the date of Ext. III Therefore there can be no doubt of the fact that the cause of action in respect of Ext. III would have arisen only in 1121 if Ahamed had not died before he attained majority. Both the courts below seem to think that, because of S.17 (1) of the Travancore Limitation Act VI of 1100, immediately on the death of Ahamed a cause of action would accrue to his legal representative on Ext. III for recovering the amount due thereunder. There is no difference between S.17 (1) of the Travancore Limitation Act and S.17 (1) of the Indian Limitation Act. That section reads: "Where a person who would, if he were living, have a right to institute a suit or make an application dies before the right accrues, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased capable of instituting or making such suit or application". This section only provides for, a case when there is no legal representative capable of instituting the suit at the time the cause of action would have arisen to the deceased person if he had been living. In such a case, the section provides that, although the cause of action has arisen, the period of limitation shall not run until there is a person capable of instituting the suit on the cause of action But there may be cases in which there is a legal representative, long before the cause of action arises, who is capable of instituting the suit. S.17 (1) does not say that such a legal representative can institute the suit even before the time the cause of action would have arisen to the deceased if he had not died. To institute the suit the legal representative has to wait till the time the cause of action would have arisen to the deceased if he had not died, and the period of limitation cannot commence to run before the right to sue has arisen. To institute the suit the legal representative has to wait till the time the cause of action would have arisen to the deceased if he had not died, and the period of limitation cannot commence to run before the right to sue has arisen. The legal representative gets only the rights of the deceased person and can get no higher rights. If the deceased person, if he was alive could have brought the suit only in 1121, his death earlier would not entitle his legal representative to bring the suit earlier, „ This has been put in very pithy language by the Privy Council in Murugesam v. Minakshisundara (A. I. R.1936 P. C. 309) wherein their Lordships have said: "The intention of S.17 is to limit the time during which an action may be brought and not to take away the rights of a person who is a possible defendant to an action, and it was not intended to accelerate any right of action against such a person". On the facts of that case, Their Lordships have said: "If the plaintiff had attained the age of twentyone he would doubtless have had at that time a right to recover the Rs. 15000 upon executing the document to which reference has been made; but defendant 1, the present appellant, would have been quite entitled to say that no action could be brought against him to recover the Rs. 15000 until 30th September 1926, the date when the plaintiff would have attained twenty-one. The right to sue therefore in this case had not accrued at the time when the plaintiff died and, accordingly, the section, not having the effect of accelerating the right against the appellant, has no effect as causing time to run from that date " The same principle governs the present case. At the time of the death of Ahamad there was no right to sue upon Ext. III, and that right arose only in 1121. Therefore even though there was in 1115 a legal representative of Ahamad capable of instituting the suit the period of limitation commenced to run only from 1121. The suit, filed in 1123, cannot therefore be barred by limitation. In this view, the decision of the lower appellate court as regards the claim under Ext. III also has to be reversed. 9. The suit, filed in 1123, cannot therefore be barred by limitation. In this view, the decision of the lower appellate court as regards the claim under Ext. III also has to be reversed. 9. It may also be mentioned that, even in the view taken by the lower appellate court that the cause of action in respect of Ext. III had arisen in 1115, its finding that the suit filed in 1121 is barred by limitation is not right and cannot be accepted, for the suit being one for recovery of money charged upon immovable property the plaintiff had twelve years from the date the cause of action arose to file the suit. Since the cause of action arose, according to the lower appellate court, only in 1115, the period of limitation would expire only in 1127, and so, the suit, filed in 1123, would not be barred by limitation. 10. The respondent's counsel Contended that defendant 4 was not the sole legal representative of Ahamed and that therefore the assignment executed by her alone in favour of defendant 3 would not confer upon defendant 3 the right to the entire amount under Ext. III. The findings of the courts below in regard to this matter are concurrent, namely, that defendant 4 was the sole legal representative, and no ground has been made out for interfering with their concurrent findings. 11. No other point was urged at the time of the hearing. 12. In the result, the second appeal is allowed with costs throughout. The decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and that of the first court is restored. Allowed.