ORDER R.S. Shukla This order will govern Appeal Nos. 28, 29, 30 and 31/IX-I/56 which arise from the common order of the Nistar Officer-cum-Additional Deputy Commissioner, Raipur, passed on 25-11-55 in his corresponding Rev. Case Nos. 272, 274, 275 and 273/IX-I/54-55. In all these cases the appellants' contention before the lower Court was that they were valid tenants on the date of vesting, i. e. 31-3-51, and were, therefore, entitled under section 45(1) of the M.P.A.P.R. Act to continue to be the tenants of the State after vesting. The lower Court, for various reasons stated in its order, however, found that the appellants' claim could not be covered by the provisions of section 45 (1), ibid Hence these appeals. The lower Court's order is purported to have been passed under section 47 (1), Land Revenus Act by way of correction of annual papers. The matter is, however, justiciable by the Board in view of Board's own decisions and High Court's ruling in Balkrishna Nathani v. State 1956 N L J 370. In order to appreciate the issues that are involved in these appeals, material facts may briefly be stated. By four separate unregistered lease-deeds, all dated 1-5-49, one Lakshmi Prasad, proprietor of village Khauli Dabri, tahsil and district Raipur, conferred occupancy rights in perpetuity on the appellants who are admittedly his close relations. Out of the four appellants, in these cases, three were minors on the data of the lease. The other particulars of the transactions are as follows: Appeal Name of Age. No. of Total Annual rent. No. lessee. plots. area. 28 /55. Rajendra Kumar minor. 26 58.80 acres Rs. 22-2-0. 30 /56. Narendra Kumar minor. 22 46.06. " Rs. 17-4-0. 31 /56. Gajendra Kumar. minor. 8 65.25 " Rs. 24-8-0. 29/55. Mst. Kaushlaya Bai. 48 years. 18 47.39 " Rs. 17-11-0. According to citation in the lease-deeds the minors acted through guardian Shyamlal Gupta. As the patwari of the villages did not record appellants' names on all the khasra numbers in accordance with the lease-deeds, for want of cultivation, they moved the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, to get their names recorded on those khasra numbers and the matter came finally to be disposed of by the Nistar Officer-cum-Additional Deputy Commissioner, Raipur. As the patwari of the villages did not record appellants' names on all the khasra numbers in accordance with the lease-deeds, for want of cultivation, they moved the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, to get their names recorded on those khasra numbers and the matter came finally to be disposed of by the Nistar Officer-cum-Additional Deputy Commissioner, Raipur. The order of the A. D. C. is a very lengthy one but the main grounds on which he declined to recognise the occupancy rights of the appellants may be summarized as follows: (1) The lease-deeds, being unregistered, did not convey any title to the appellants; (2) In case of minor appellants, the lease was void inasmuch as a minor is incompetent to enter into a contract; (3) Recovery of rent by the patel or patwari cannot bind the State as they were misguided by the incorrect entries made by the patwari in the khasara and Jamabandi; (4) All the disputed area had not been brought under cultivation. In the end, however, the learned lower Court allowed, in each case, part of the suit-land to be recorded in the name of the appellants on the ground that those areas had actually been brought under cultivation by them before the date of vesting. In this connection he observed that in doing so he was acting under the executive instructions of Government permitting the settlement of lands brought under cultivation by 25-3-1954. Probably the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner referred to Land Reforms Department Memo. No. 3738-479-CR /XXVIII dated 13-10-54. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that as the lease-deeds in question did not mention the period for which the leases were granted, it should be assumed that they were yearly leases and were not required to be registered. This is patently wrong as the citation in the lease-deeds shows that the leases were granted in perpetuity in occupancy rights. The learned counsel then referred to Government Notification Nos. 4376 dated 2-12-75 and 5885 dated 23-8-98 exempting certain agricultural leases from registration (page 125 Hajarnavis). These notifications do not, however, help the appellants as they exempt from registration only such leases the terms of which do not exceed five years and the annual rent reserved does not exceed Rs. 25. Perpetual leases which reserve yearly rent are not covered by these notifications. These notifications do not, however, help the appellants as they exempt from registration only such leases the terms of which do not exceed five years and the annual rent reserved does not exceed Rs. 25. Perpetual leases which reserve yearly rent are not covered by these notifications. It is, therefore, clear that the leases in question which purport to create interest in immovable property were compulsorily registrable and as they were unregistered they conveyed no title to the appellants and cannot be admitted to prove any title. In this connection it was argued, in the light of observations made by their Lordships of the Privy Council in I.L.R. 43 Madras 244, that lease-deeds though unregistered may be used for the purpose of indicating the nature of possession of the appellants on the disputed land on the date of vesting. Further, the relationship of a landlord and a tenant subsisting between the lessor and lessee on the relevant date can be proved by the fact that rents for the year 1949-50 and 1950-51 were paid by the lessees as tenants and accepted by the lessor as Lambardar of the village. It was contended that even if the lease-deeds are not taken into consideration, the subsistence of tenancy rights is proved by the subsequent conduct of the parties. In this connection Board's decision in 1957 M. P. L. J. 751 was cited. It is true that since agricultural leases can be made orally the appellants may prove their tenancy independently of the lease-deed, namely, from the payment of rent in this case. There is, however, another complication in this case. The appellants (1) Rajendra Kumar, (2) Narendra Kumar and (3) Gajendra Kumar were admittedly minors on the date of the lease and the question for consideration is whether an agricultural lease made in favour of a minor through guardian is a valid transaction and is enforceable in law. A large number of rulings were cited by the learned counsel for the appellants in support of the proposition that such a lease is valid and that a lease executed in favour of a minor for his benefit has to be distinguished from the one which may not be beneficial to him. While a contract by a minor is void ab initio, a transaction beneficial to him cannot be discarded simply because of his minority. While a contract by a minor is void ab initio, a transaction beneficial to him cannot be discarded simply because of his minority. Reliance was placed on the decisions in A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 129, A.I.R. 1939 Nag. 301, A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 564, A.I.R. 1935 Bom. 353, A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 322, A.I.R. 1923 All. 17, A.I.R. 1922 Nag. 250, A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 314, A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 244 and A.I.R. 1952 S. C. 23. I have carefully gone through the above decisions but I do not think that they really help the appellants. A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 244 seems to have been misquoted as it has nothing to do with the transactions affecting a minor. A.I.R. 1922 Nag. 250 deals with the meaning and implication of section 25(c), Contract Act. In that case the question was whether a minor on attaining majority could ratify an obligation incurred by his guardian which was not binding on him as minor, It was held that a ward after coming of age is entitled to adopt any of the acts of his guardian, which were done on his behalf, whether they were for his benefit or not. Since the facts of that case disclosed that the minor had ratified his guardian's bond it was held that the bond was binding on the minor. Obviously, this case has no application to the issue before us. Most of the other eases cited above, except 1936 Mad. 564, do not refer to transfer by way of lease. These cases have to be distinguished from the case of a lease which imposes upon a minor personal liability to pay annual rent and to observe other terms thereon. 1936 Mad. 564 is, no doubt, a case of lease but a careful reading of that decision shows that the instant case before me is distinguishable from the case before the Madras High Court. In that case the minor acting through her father and guardian gave out certain premises on lease to the defendant. 1936 Mad. 564 is, no doubt, a case of lease but a careful reading of that decision shows that the instant case before me is distinguishable from the case before the Madras High Court. In that case the minor acting through her father and guardian gave out certain premises on lease to the defendant. The lessor's covenants included certain stipulations: such as (a) not to construct any building on the vacant land comprised in the demise; (b) to pay all taxes in respect of the premises and to keep the lessee indemnified against any claims thereon; (c) to repair the premises both inside and outside and to keep them in good and habitable state and condition; (d) for quiet enjoyment; and (e) to grant a renewal of the lease at the request of the lessee. In a suit by the minor for the recovery of rent the defendant lessees submitted "that the lease was void, and that it was unenforceable; that the plaintiff had been for all these years a minor and the lease deed contains onerous covenants on the part of the lessor as essential part of the consideration for the performance by the lessee of their covenants under the lease." Cornish J. held that ''A covenant is a different thing to a condition and although the failure of a condition may serve to put an end to a term, there is no authority for saying that the failure of a covenant or the impossibility of enforcing a covenant will have that effect." Since the plaintiff minor, on attaining majority, had sued the lessee for rent he had obviously not chosen to avoid the lease which under the law he could, It was held that the fact that some of the lessor's covenants were not enforceable will not enable the lessee to avoid the lease. It would, therefore, be seen that in the Madras case the minor was the lessor and on attaining majority he did not choose to avoid the lease and that the failure of a covenant did not terminate the lease. It was on these grounds that the lease was held enforceable against the lessee. In the case under appeal the minors are the lessees and a personal obligation to pay stipulated rent from year to year has been imposed upon them. It was on these grounds that the lease was held enforceable against the lessee. In the case under appeal the minors are the lessees and a personal obligation to pay stipulated rent from year to year has been imposed upon them. The facts of the Madras case as also the issues in that case are, therefore, not similar. The question before me is whether a contract which imposes a personal obligation on the minor can be validly entered into by a minor or by his guardian. The leading case on the subject, however, is the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri (1) in which their Lordships laid down the principle of law in the following terms: They are, however, of opinion that it is not within the competence of a manager of a minor's estate or within the competence of guardian of a minor to bind the minor or the minor's estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property, and they are further of opinion that as the minor in the present case was not bound by the contract, there was no mutuality and that the minor who has now reached his majority cannot obtain specific performance of the contract. In A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 322 the effect of the above Privy Council's decision was tried to be got over by urging that the contract in the Madras case was for the benefit of the minor. The Madras High Court after referring to the facts of Mir Sarwarjan's case, however, observed that even though in the Privy Council case "the contract was validly entered into and had been ratified by him (minor) the Privy Council held that there was no mutuality and on that ground declared the contract invalid and unenforceable." They, therefore, held that "the validity and enforceability of such contract does not depend on the question whether it was conducive to the benefit of the minor or not." In I.L.R. 11 Bom. 551 it was held by the Judicial Committee that it was not competent for a guardian to bind his ward by personal covenants. In that case a widow, acting as guardian of her minor son, contracted to indemnify the transferee against Government's claim for revenue. 551 it was held by the Judicial Committee that it was not competent for a guardian to bind his ward by personal covenants. In that case a widow, acting as guardian of her minor son, contracted to indemnify the transferee against Government's claim for revenue. It was held in a suit by the transferee, that he could not enforce the contract and the suit so far as it was founded on the personal liability of the minor failed. In 46 Indian Cases 617, the Patna High Court relying on the Privy Council decision in 39 Cal. 232 held that "a lease in favour of a minor which imposes a liability upon a minor is null and void and cannot confer upon him any title. The case just cited should be enough to support the view that a minor is not competent to contract and that a guardian is not competent to bind his ward by way of a personal obligation whether the contract is advantageous to the minor or not of course, this will not apply to a guardian who is appointed by the statute and acts with the sanction of the Court. (See Baburam v. Sardunissa 35 All. 499. In the cases, under appeal, it may further be pointed out that Shyamlal Gupta not being the father of the minors was not the natural guardian of the three appellant minors. There is nothing on record to show how he came to be appointed minor appellants' guardian and whether he was competent to enter into a transaction binding the minors. In this connection, it has to be borne in mind that the leases in dispute were not even registered. In the absence of registration it is so easy for a person to scribe a deed on a plain paper, put up a fake guardian and start arguing that the transaction being through the guardian for the benefit of the minor should be recognisable and enforceable. The real purpose of registration is "to secure that every person dealing with property, where such dealings require registration, may rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the registry as a full and complete account of all transactions by which his title may be effected." Under such circumstances it cannot be stated that Shyamlal Gupta was really a guardian in the legal sense of the term. In the above view it must be held that the leases in favour of the minors in the present case must be held invalid. They cannot confer any title on appellants as they would be deemed to be null and void. In regard to the appellant Mst. Kaushlya Bai (Appeal No. 29/56) it appears from the lower Court's order-sheet entries dated 19-3-53 and 13-8-52 that receipts for the year 1949-50 and 1950-51, in regard to rental paid to the exproprietor, were produced before the lower Court and were returned after perusal. As they are not on record I cannot make further comments but direct that the lower Court should re-examine them and if they appear to have been properly passed by the Malguzar and are referable to the transferred lands they should be accepted as sufficient evidence to show that Mst. Kaushlya Bai was, in fact, accepted by the Lambardar as occupancy tenant before the date of vesting. The question that some of the lands transferred to Kaushlya Bai were not brought under cultivation before the date of vesting would not adversely affect her claim in view of the Board's decision in Sumitrabai v. State 1955 N.L.J. 354. In result, Appeal Nos. 28, 30 and 31 are rejected and Appeal No. 29/56 of Smt. Kaushlya Bai is allowed subject to observations made in para. 16 above. A copy of this order be placed on the record of each case. Rajendra Kumar's appeal dismissed. Appeal dismissed.