Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by defendants 1 and 3 against the decree and judgment of the learned District Judge, Anjikaimal confirming the (decree in O. S.292 of 1953, District Munsiff's Court, Ernakulam. 2. The plaintiff-1st respondent herein filed the suit for evicting the defendants from the suit house based on title. Her case was that the property belonged absolutely to her deceased husband and that her husband had permitted the 1st defendant, who was one of his brothers, and the members of his family to occupy the house to be surrendered when required. It is the further case of the plaintiff that after her husband's death, she also permitted the defendants to continue in occupation of the house. It may be stated that the 1st defendant was the brother of the plaintiff's husband and the 2nd, defendant the wife of the 1st defendant and the other defendants were the children of Defendants 1 and 2. 3. Defendants 1 and 3, alone contested the suit and according to them, the property belonged to the joint family of the husband of, the plaintiff and his brothers and that the property devolved subsequent to the death of the plaintiff's husband on the contesting defendants and the other members of the family. They also pleaded that their possession of the property was not by virtue of any permission as pleaded in the plaint, but because of their right as members of the joint family to whom the property belonged. It was also stated, that the title to the property was pending final adjudication in the High Court in A. S.195 of 1951. 4. Though the title of the plaintiff was also disputed in the suit, it is seen that by virtue of the decision of the High Court in A. S.195 of 1951 this question has become concluded against the defendants and the plaintiff's husband has been held to be the absolute owner of the suit property and it follows that plaintiff as widow, has obtained title to the same. 5. 5. In view of this decision, the contesting, defendants appear to have amended the written statement" by taking up a further plea that if the case of the plaintiff of permissive occupation is accepted, they will be entitled to the protection granted under S.5 (1) of Proclamation VI of 1124 which was to the effect that no suit for eviction of a tenant of a building, the monthly rent of which is below Rs. 3/- is maintainable. 6. At this stage, it must be stated that even according to the plaintiff, no amount was payable by the defendants for the occupation of the premises and in fact, she even gave up the claim for compensation originally included in her relief 7. I must state that issue 2 is not very happily worded, but the question whether the defendant is a tenant entitled to the protection of the Proclamation did arise by virtue of Issue 7 and the parties joined issue on the question whether the occupation of the 1st defendant was as a tenant or only a permissive one. 8. The learned District Munsiff held that the 1st defendant was only a licensee with permission to reside in the house until asked to surrender and he also held that Proclamation 6 of 1124 has no application. The trial court's reasoning on Issue 7 to the effect that the house if let would fetch a rent of more than Rs. 3/-does not appeal to me. 9. The learned District Judge, on appeal by the contesting defendants, quite rightly, in my opinion, did not accept the reasoning of the trial court on Issue 7, based on rent. But the learned judge discussed the question as to whether the defendants 1 and 3 were tenants so as to claim the protection of Proclamation 6 of 1124 or they were only licensees. He accepted the case of the plaintiff of the permissive nature of occupation of the defendants as stated in Para.3 and 4 of the plaint and in this view, he held that the defendants were not tenants, and as such, confirmed the decree of the trial court. 10. In Second Appeal before me, Mr. He accepted the case of the plaintiff of the permissive nature of occupation of the defendants as stated in Para.3 and 4 of the plaint and in this view, he held that the defendants were not tenants, and as such, confirmed the decree of the trial court. 10. In Second Appeal before me, Mr. Narayana Menon, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that in view of the fact that exclusive possession has been given to his clients, they should be considered to be tenants and not licensees and he also contended that to constitute the relationship of a landlord and tenant it is not necessary that any rent should be payable. 11. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent Sri. Raman Pillai, contended that the defendants were not tenants in any sense of the term and they were only allowed to be in permissive occupation and such permissive occupation will not make them tenants in law. 12. Having lost on the question of title by virtue of the decision of the High Court in A. S.195 of 1951, the main case set up by the defendants of being in possession in their own right as members of a joint family has fallen to the ground. In fact, even though in Para.3 and 4 of plaint, it has been categorically stated that the defendants were allowed to be in permissive occupation, originally by her husband and later continued by the plaintiff, the defendants were rest content to merely say that the house belonged to all the members of the family. The defendants never even set up an alternative case of their being the tenants of the suit property under either the plaintiff or the plaintiff's husband. After the disposal of the appeal in the High Court, they amended the written statement, by adding Para.10 (a) thereto. Even in the amendment, what they stated was, that if the court comes to the conclusion that the defendants are in possession as alleged in Para.3 and 4 of the plaint, the suit for possession is not sustainable by virtue of Proclamation 6 of 1124. It is very significant that even after having lost their case in the High Court appeal, the defendants never chose to furnish any particulars to the court about the nature of the tenancy. It is very significant that even after having lost their case in the High Court appeal, the defendants never chose to furnish any particulars to the court about the nature of the tenancy. In fact, if a finding is arrived at on the basis of Para.3 and 4, as even stated by the defendants, it must necessarily be only a case of permissive possession and not tenancy. In fact, it looks as if that the defendants have absolutely no case of tenancy whatever, excepting relying upon the Proclamation 6 of 1124. Both the courts have considered the evidence and come to the conclusion that the defendants were in permissive occupation of the building as pleaded by the plaintiff. Such permissive occupation will not make the defendant, a tenant in law. Unless the defendants are able to satisfy the court that they are persons who are let into possession as tenants of the property any reference to the Proclamation VI of 1124 will not avail them. In this case, they have miserably failed to substantiate their contentions. The fact that they are in occupation of the premises, as even accepted by the plaintiff, will not make the defendants tenants in the eye of the law, once the case of the plaintiff of the permissive nature of occupation is accepted. In this context the following observations of a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case reported in Dinendro v. Union of India (A.I.R.1952 Cal. 915 at 918 is very apposite. "The difference between a tenant and an occupier is well known. There must be contract of tenancy before a person can be a tenant. But if there is no contract, and the possession of a person is permissive, then it is a case of an occupier. Rent is realisable from the tenant. Profit on the other hand is payable by a person for the use of another's property with his consent, when the rent or the period is not fixed. Occupier is not a tenant. When the rent has been agreed, the tenant pays the agreed rent. Where the rent has not been fixed, the occupier must pay such sum as the occupation is worth". I respectfully agree with these observations of the learned judges and I hold that the occupation of the defendants in this case is only a permissive occupation and not that of a tenant. 13. Where the rent has not been fixed, the occupier must pay such sum as the occupation is worth". I respectfully agree with these observations of the learned judges and I hold that the occupation of the defendants in this case is only a permissive occupation and not that of a tenant. 13. In this view, the Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with the costs of the plaintiff-1st respondent.