ORDER Mushtaq Ahmad, J. - This is a plaintiff' appeal in a suit for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants (zamindars) from interfering with the plaintiffs' right of fishing in a pond No. 232 and also for Rs. 50 as damages. The plaintiffs claimed the relief as tenants of the pond. 2. In defence it was pleaded that the plaintiffs had not been the tenants of the pond nor had they any right to fish in the same. The issue of tenancy was referred to the revenue court which found it in favour of the plaintiffs, namely that they were tenants. 3. Following the above finding the trial court decreed the suit except for damages, holding that the plaintiffs had a right to fish in the pond in dispute, as fishing was one of the varieties of products of 'land' within the meaning of the UP Tenancy Act. 4. On appeal by the plaintiffs and cross-objection by the defendants, the lower appellate court reversed the above decree and dismissed the entire suit on the finding that fish not being an yield .of "land" within the meaning of the said Act, the plaintiffs could not claim themselves to be tenants of the pond in suit. 5. The only question argued before me by Mr. S. K. Verma, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants, was whether "land" covered by water in which fish was raised could be said to be "land" within the meaning of S. 3 1951. ALJR 300 of the UP Tenancy Act XVII of 1939. The lower appellate court answered this question in the negative on the simple ground that the words "other produce" in this section did not include fish, The learned Civil Judge did not notice the change introduced in this section by dropping the word 'similar' from the definition of "land" in the older S. 3(2) of the Agra Tenancy Act III of 1926. That section defined the word thus : 'Land' means land which is Jet or held for agricultural purposes, or as grove-land or for pasturage. It includes land covered by water used for the purpose of growing singhara or other similar produce, but does not include land for the time being occupied by dwelling-houses or manufactories or appurtenant thereto. 6. That section defined the word thus : 'Land' means land which is Jet or held for agricultural purposes, or as grove-land or for pasturage. It includes land covered by water used for the purpose of growing singhara or other similar produce, but does not include land for the time being occupied by dwelling-houses or manufactories or appurtenant thereto. 6. The definition of the word in S. 3(10) of the UP Tenancy Act XVII of 1939 is as follows:-- 'Land' means land which is let or held for growing of crops, or as groveland or for pasturage. It includes land covered by water for the purpose of growing singhara or other produce, but does not include land for the time being occupied by buildings or appurtenant thereto other than buildings or which are improvements. 7. Thus, while under both the definitions land covered by water was described as included in the term 'land', in place of the words "other similar produce" the new section has only the words "other produce" omitting the word 'similar'. This word 'similar' was used in the older section with reference to singhara. Therefore, whereas, under the former section only such produce as was similar to singhara could form an element of the definition of "land", under the present section any produce, either similar or dissimilar to singhara, could form such an element. This, to my mind, marks a vital change in the former definition of the word "land" and clearly indicates the policy of the legislature in giving a much wider scope to the word "land" now Than under previous Act. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants somewhat feebly conceded that the Bench decision of this Court in Barmeshwar Singh v. Dadan Rai(1) appeared to be against his contention. I have carefully gone through the decision in that case and I do find certain observations there which do not support the argument now advanced before me by the learned counsel. The learned Judges no doubt held there that fish could not be included in the words "other produce" in the present definition of land. This view, speaking with great respect, appears to have been influenced by the supposition that land not covered by water and land covered by water were two independent conceptions. That is to say, according to that supposition land covered by water would be some thing different from land not so covered. This view, speaking with great respect, appears to have been influenced by the supposition that land not covered by water and land covered by water were two independent conceptions. That is to say, according to that supposition land covered by water would be some thing different from land not so covered. This, again with respect, does not, to my mind, appear to be borne out by the definition of the word "land" in either of the two sections. They clearly provide that land covered by water it also included in the terra "land" and in makes no difference whether it is or it is not so covered. Once this position is app(sic)eciated and the words "other produce" are given their natural meaning in the light of this appreciation, it would immediately follow that anything yielded by land covered by water, whether it is fish or anything else, would be a 'produce' as this word is used in S. 3(1) of the UP Tenancy Act. With the Bench decision, referred to above before me I am unable to decide the appeal on the lines herein expressed, and I have no alternative but to refer this appeal to a (Bench of two Judges. 9. Let this case, therefore, be referred to such a Bench. BENCH DECISION Desai, J. 10. The short question for decision by us is whether the land on which there is a pond which abounds in fish is "land" within the Cleaning of Section 3(10) of the UP Tenancy Act. The Appellants answered the question in the affirmative and claimed tenancy rights over the pond. The Respondents, who interfere with their rights of fishing in the pond, contend that the pond is not "land" and that the Appellants have no tenancy rights. The question was answered in the affirmative by the trial court and in the negative by the first appellate court. When the matter came up before Mushtaq Ahmad, J., he was inclined to agree with the Appellants but his attention was drawn to a decision of a Bench of this Court Barmeshwar Singh v. Dadan Rai 1951 ALJR 300 in which it was held that a pond in which fish exists is not "land" within the meaning of Section 3(10), UP Tenancy Act, and consequently he referred the question to a larger Bench. 11. 11. Having heard Sri S.K. Verma, we are satisfied that the question must be answered in the negative. Land is defined to mean "land which is let or held for growing of crops, or as groveland or for pasturage." This definition is followed by the words "it includes land covered by water used for the purpose of growing Singhara or other produce." The land in dispute is covered by water and the water is used for the purpose of breeding fish, but the question is whether breeding fish amounts to "growing singhara or other produce." Fish cannot be said to be a produce and even if it were, it, cannot be said to be a produce grown in water. The words "other produce" must mean a produce like singhara; fish cannot be said to be a produce as singhara can be said to be. The words previously used in the definition were "similar produce", but the word "similar" was substituted by the word "other". We do not accept the contention of Sri S.K. Verma that now water need not contain any produce such as singhara in order to convert its site into land. The word "similar" seems to have been deleted because the Legislature did not intend that the produce must be similar to singhara; there is hardly any produce which can be said to be similar to singhara. But the Legislature did intend that something must be grown in water which can be said to be a produce just as singhara can be said to be a produce. Singhara has been cited by it as an example of produce grown in water. It may be conceded that the alteration from "similar produce" to "other produce" extends the scope of the definition of land, but there is nothing to suggest that it is extended so much as to bring within its compass fish breeding in water. The scope is certainly not extended so as to bring within the meaning of the land something that cannot be said to be a produce and something that cannot be said to be grown in water. Land in order to be "land" within the meaning of the Act must be let or held for growing of crops, or as groveland or for pasturage; this is the fundamental definition of "land". Land in order to be "land" within the meaning of the Act must be let or held for growing of crops, or as groveland or for pasturage; this is the fundamental definition of "land". The words "it includes" do not enlarge, or add to, the fundamental definition contained in the first sentence of Sub-section (10); they only explain what would come within its scope. It might be doubted whether the fundamental definition included land covered by water in which singhara or other produce was grown and to remove this doubt the second sentence beginning with the words "It includes" was enacted. No land can be "land" within the meaning of the Act unless it can be said to be let or held for growing of crops, or as groveland or for pasturage. The land in dispute in the present case is admittedly not let or held as groveland or for pasturage and can be "land" only if it can be said to be let or held for growing of crops. Raising fish in the water is quite different from growing crops; We respectfully agree with the view taken by the Bench of this Court in the case of Barmeshwar Singh 1951 ALJR 300. 12. No other question was raised. 13. The appeals dismissed with costs.