ORDER R.S. Shuklu The applicant is a teacher employed under the Municipal Committee, Balaghat, and was, on the date, of filing this application undergoing Teachers' Training Diploma Course at Khandwa. His present pay is Rs. 69 plus dearness Rs. 30 total Rs. 99 per menses. Applicant's claim for pay and allowances during the two years' training period was refused by the Municipal Committee by its resolution dated 10-7-55. His successive appeals before the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Deputy Commissioner, Balaghat, were rejected on the ground that no appeal could lie as the refusal by the Municipal Committee to pay the amount in question did not amount to a departmental punishment within the meaning of Section 25 (6) of the C.P. Municipalities Act. The applicant has now come up in revision and has challenged the legality of the orders passed by the Courts below. A preliminary question arose whether the present revision petition before the Board was tenable. The Learned Counsel for the applicant referred to the provisions of Section 58, C.P. Municipalities Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the 'Act') and relied on a Division Bench case of this Board reported in Vithalrao v. Secretary, Municipal Committee, Nagpur 1952 N L J 570. In Vithalrao's case a revision had been filed against an appellate order passed under Section 83 of the Act and it was held that the word 'control' as used in the marginal heading of Section 58 ibid includes the power to revise and the finality of an appellate order, as laid down in Section 83 (3) ibid, is no bar to revision proceedings under the amended Section 58 of the Act. Relying on this decision, the Learned Counsel for the applicant contended that the Board could, in the present case also, interfere in revision under Section 58 ibid. I am unable to subscribe to the Learned Counsel's view. The Division Bench's case is clearly distinguishable from the present one. In that case the appeal was based on the provisions of Section 83 of the Act and the subject-matter related to the assessment of a Tax. The soundness of decision, in so far as it deals with the scope of Section 58 vis-a-vis an appellate order under Section 83, cannot, if I may say so with respect, be doubted. In that case the appeal was based on the provisions of Section 83 of the Act and the subject-matter related to the assessment of a Tax. The soundness of decision, in so far as it deals with the scope of Section 58 vis-a-vis an appellate order under Section 83, cannot, if I may say so with respect, be doubted. But that decision can have no application in the present case which pertains to a matter between the Municipal Committee as employer and that applicant as its servant. In this connection, reference may be made to Rule 3 of the rules framed under Section 25 (6) of the Act which reads as follows: 3. A revision shall lie to the State Government against an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in second appeal under Sub-rule (ii) in the case of an employee drawing Rs. 150 per menses and above. These revisional powers of the State Government have since been delegated to the Board of Revenue. It may be noted that this rule imposes a restriction on the revisional powers of Government (and now on the Board), limiting its jurisdiction to a case of an employee drawing Rs. 150 or above. In Prahlad Gangadhar v. Municipal Committee, Achalpur 1955 N L J 109 the validity of Rule 2 (1) under Section 25 (6) which imposes a similar restriction and permits revision only in case of employees drawing Rs. 50 or above, came up for consideration before the High Court. It was held that "Section 58, has preserved the right to the State Government to control its subordinate officers in exercise of their powers conferred upon them by the Act. But that does not mean that the State Government is bound to exercise its powers in any particular case. If the State Government has laid down certain limitations on its own powers, it cannot be said that it has, in so doing, acted ultra-virus". It was finally held in that case that "a revision application will not lie at the instance of employee drawing a salary below Rs. 50 p. m.". Earlier, in Rajaram Gangaram v. Municipal Committee 1953 N L J 399 a Division Bench of the Board of Revenue held identical views in regard to the scope of revisional powers against a second appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner under Rule 2 (ii). 50 p. m.". Earlier, in Rajaram Gangaram v. Municipal Committee 1953 N L J 399 a Division Bench of the Board of Revenue held identical views in regard to the scope of revisional powers against a second appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner under Rule 2 (ii). In that case it was observed by the learned Members that "the powers available to the Board are strictly those available to the State Government, subject to limitation self-imposed or otherwise. The State Government are competent to decide in what classes of cases they would entertain revision and in what classes they would not. Rule 3 of the rules framed under Section 25 (6) of the Act which provides that a revision application is entertain-able by the State Government only in the case of an employee drawing Rs. 150 and above per month, does no more than embody such a decision for the guidance, firstly, of Government and secondly, of the authorities to whom powers in this behalf have been delegated and, simultaneously also, for the information of the parties". The case law cited above makes it clear that in considering the question of tenability of a revision application against a second appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner, the provisions of Section 58 ibid will have to be read as subject to the restrictions imposed under Rule 3 framed under Section 25 (6) ibid. If we do that, it is obvious that the present application, made at the instance of the applicant is not tenable before the Board as his pay is admittedly below Rs. 150 p. m. The Learned Counsel for the applicant spent a good deal of time in arguing that the scope of rules framed under Section 25 (6) is not strictly limited to the cases arising out of disciplinary action or departmental punishments inflicted on the municipal employees. According to him these rules cover a wider area and envisage a remedy for an employee "against an order of the Committee" irrespective of the fact whether it deals with disciplinary action or not. As such, any order of the Committee is subject to a revision under Section 58 ibid. According to him these rules cover a wider area and envisage a remedy for an employee "against an order of the Committee" irrespective of the fact whether it deals with disciplinary action or not. As such, any order of the Committee is subject to a revision under Section 58 ibid. In this connection, he referred to the observations made by the Board in 1956 N.L. J. 106 and by the High Court in M.P. No. 57/55, dated 30-8-56 and argued that the alleged wider jurisdiction of the rules under Section 25 (6) can be invoked by the provisions of Section 167 (2) (VII) of the Act. As such, it would be competent for this Court to interfere, even if the subject-matter of the present case is not a departmental punishment within the meaning of Section 25 (6) ibid. Assuming, for a moment, that the order of the Municipal Committee refusing the allowances in question was an order given under the provisions of the Act and assuming that the rules under Section 25 (6) are wider in scope, the position does not seem to improve. For we cannot get over the restrictions imposed by Rule 3 and even if the matter in dispute be justifiable by this Board, the present revision application will be untenable for reasons given in para. 5 above. In the above view, the application must fail and is dismissed accordingly. Application dismissed.