Modi, J.—This is a second appeal by the defendant Mst. Chandanbai against the judgment of the Civil Judge, Udaipur, dated the 10th December, 1951, in a suit for redemption. 2. The plaintiff respondent Jagjiwanlal is a minor and brought this suit through his next friend Mst. Kankubai, his mother, in his capacity as the legal representative of his ancestor jawanji who is alleged to have made the mortgage of the suit shop-cum-house, situate in village Dhulev, and the boundaries whereof are mentioned in para(l) of the plaint, in favour of Sankad Chand an ancestor of the defendant appellant by a mortgage deed dated Kali Vadi 11, Svt. 1926 for Rs. 861/-. The Mortgage was with possession. It was further alleged in the plaint that the mortgagee had spent a sum of Rs. 111/5/- by way of improvements to the suit property in Svt. 1930 and this was acknowledged on behalf of the plaintiffs ancestors on the deed itself, and later in Svt. 1952 a further sum of Rs. 39/- was spent on repairs thereof, and the same was also acknowledged to have been spent on behalf of the plaintiffs ancestors and thus a sum of Rs. 1011/5/-became payable with respect to the mortgage upto the Svt. year 1952. The case disclosed in the plaint further was that in Svt. year 1986, the plaintiffs estate was taken under the management of the Court of Wards of the former State of Udaipur, and some proceeding was apparently commenced in connection with the redemption of the mortgage, and during that proceeding, the mother-in-law of the defendant appellant Mst. Kesharbai widow of Hiralal made an application through her son-in-law Ratanlal on Kati Vadi 7th Svt. 1987 in which the mortgage in question was admitted, (See Ex. 1), and Ratanlal further gave a statement (Ex. 2) in which he admitted the mortgage and he also produced a copy of the mortgage (Ex. 3) before the Munsarim of the Court of Wards. Although it was not mentioned in so many words, the plaintiff obviously relied on those documents as containing the admission of Mst. Kesharbai and Ratanlal with respect to the mortgage, and these admissions were intended to be utilised as acknowledgments so as to bring the plaintiffs salt within limitation. 3) before the Munsarim of the Court of Wards. Although it was not mentioned in so many words, the plaintiff obviously relied on those documents as containing the admission of Mst. Kesharbai and Ratanlal with respect to the mortgage, and these admissions were intended to be utilised as acknowledgments so as to bring the plaintiffs salt within limitation. The plaintiff further alleged that he had asked for redemption of the suit property a number of times from the defendant appellant, and had also given a notice in writing for the same purpose, but the defendant appellant declined to give redemption. Consequently, the plaintiff instituted the present suit for redemption on the 8th April, 1943, in the court of the Munsiff, Dungarpur. 3. The defendant appellant resisted the suit on a number of grounds though she admitted that she was the descendant of Sankadchand and was his sole legal representative. The appellant denied the plaintiffs title to the suit property as also the alleged mortgage of Svt. 1926, for Rs. 861/- and the alleged endorsements as to repayments in Svt. years 1933 and 1952. The defendant further denied that the estate of the plaintiff respondent was ever placed under the management of the court of wards and contended that, in any case, the entire proceedings which had taken place there were inadmissible in evidence. In particular she denied that her mother-in-law, Mst. Kesharbai, or the latters son in-law Ratanlal had made any application or produced a copy of the deed of mortgage or made any acknowledgment with respect to the mortgage before the Munsarim, and alternatively that if the persons above-named had done any such thing, then the defendant appellant was not bound thereby inasmuch as neither the defendants mother-in-law nor Ratanlal had any right whatever to conduct any proceedings in connection with the mortgage or to make any acknowledgments in respect thereof, and, therefore, the appellant being the sole owner of her husbands estate after the latters death was not bound by any acknowledgments alleged to have been made by Mst. Kesharbai, her mother-in-law or Ratanlal. Kesharbai, her mother-in-law or Ratanlal. It was further contended that the plaintiff had never made any demand for the redemption of the mortgage, and that the defendant had never received any notice and that if a notice had been received, in any case, she had never admitted the existence of the mortgage in her reply and that all she remembered in that connection was that a reply had been given, and even if the mortgage of Svt. 1926 were to be accepted for the sake of argument to have been made, then the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation. It was also contended by the defendant apelt.. that she and her husband in his life-time and the latters ancestors had been in possession of the suit property for a period of about 100 years and that she had inherited the suit property as the sole heir to her husbands estate. It was pleaded that the acknowledgments on which the plaintiff respondent relied were unauthorised and false, and, therefore, they did not avail the plaintiff to bring his suit within limitation. It was further pleaded in that connection that the relations of the defendant appellant with her mother-in-law, Mst. Kesharbai, were strained and that she lived separately from the former, and, consequently, she had no authority to make any acknowledgment on behalf of the defendant. Lastly, it was contended that the mortgage was an unregistered one, and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence, and, therefore, the plaintiffs suit should be dismissed. 4. The trial court framed six issues in all including the general issue for relief, and dismissed the plaintiffs suit by its judgment dated the 20th August, 1951. The plaintiff then went in appeal to the Civil Judge, Udaipur, who set aside the judgment of the trial court, and decreed the plaintiffs suit. The present appeal has been filed from the aforesaid judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge. 5. Learned counsel for the defendant appellant attacks the judgment of the court below principally on the grounds that Mst. The present appeal has been filed from the aforesaid judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge. 5. Learned counsel for the defendant appellant attacks the judgment of the court below principally on the grounds that Mst. Kesharbai, mother-in-law of the defendant appellant and Ratanlal who was her son-in-law had no authority whatsoever to act on behalf of the defendant, and, therefore, any acknowledgments made by them with respect to the alleged mortgage were of no avail to the plaintiff respondent, and further that in any case, the plaintiff respondents suit was barred by limitation inasmuch as the said acknowledgments had not been made within the sixty years period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act of Svt. 1918 which was in force in the former State of Mewar at the time the present suit was brought. It may however be mentioned that while this was the main line of attack, some subsidiary grounds were also strenuously raised, namely, that there was no legal proof of the mortgage of Svt. 1926 or of the acknowledgments of Svt. 1987 or that the plaintiff was a desendant of Jawanji, and he had, consequently, no right to file the present suit. 6. Before I deal with the principal ground of attack as respects the authority of Mst. Kesharbai and Ratanlal to make any acknowledgments so as to be binding on Mst. Chandanbai or with the point as to limitation, 1 propose to deal with the other points adverted to above. 7. Firstly, as regards the mortgage of Svt. 1926, it has to be borne in mind that the original deed of mortgage was naturally with the defendant appellant. A notice was given to her to produce it but she did not do so. The plaintiff respondent, therefore, had no alternative but to prove it by secondary evidence. The evidence produced by the plaintiff respondent on this point consists of the oral evidence of certain witnesses as also a copy of the copy of the mortgage deed of Svt. year 1926, which last mentioned copy is alleged to have been produced in the court of wards by Ratanlal under the authority of Mst. Kesharbai, mother-in-law of the defendant appellant. year 1926, which last mentioned copy is alleged to have been produced in the court of wards by Ratanlal under the authority of Mst. Kesharbai, mother-in-law of the defendant appellant. Now leaving aside the oral evidence altogether on the ground that it may not be difficult to produce such evidence, if any party was so minded, I see no valid reason to disregard the copy of the mortgage dead of Samvat year 1926, which, to my mind, was undoubtedly produced by Ratan Lal before the Munsarim of the court of wards department in Svt. 1986. The defendant appellant is certainly lying when she says that no proceedings whatsover had taken place with regard to the mortgage in question before the Munsarim of the court of wards. The copy of an application alleged to have been filed by Mst. Keshar Bai on Kati Vadi 2, S. 1987 has been brought on this record, and in this application it was mentioned that whereas a shop-cum-house of Bhandari Kalulal was mortgaged with her and that a copy of the mortgage deed had been requisitioned. Mst. Keshar Bais submission was that she was a widow, and, therefore, she was sending the copy of the mortgage dead with her son-in-law, Dosi Ratanlal, and she was also authorising Ratanlal to make the necessary submissions on her behalf. This application was scribed by Chhaganlal at the instance of Mst Keshar Bai and was attested by one Fatehlal. The next important document in this connection is Ex.2. This is a copy of the statement of Ratanlal which was recorded by the Munsarim on the same date. Ratanlal deposed that the property of Bhanda-riji in connection with which enquiries were being made from him was under mortgage with his Sadu, Hiralal, for Rs. 861/-. There is some confusion with regard to the exact relationship of Hiralal with Ratanlal. Ratanlal calls Hiralal his Sadu, which shows that Ratanlal was married to Hiralals wifes sister while Hiralals widow, Mst. Keshar Bai, has in her application referred to him (i.e , Ratanlal) as her son-in-law. This confusion in my opinion is of no materiality in the circumstances of this case, and it seems to me that Ratanlal was married to the younger sister of Hiralals wife and, therefore, she was referring him as her Damad, though strictly speaking Ratanlal would be her brother-in-law. This confusion in my opinion is of no materiality in the circumstances of this case, and it seems to me that Ratanlal was married to the younger sister of Hiralals wife and, therefore, she was referring him as her Damad, though strictly speaking Ratanlal would be her brother-in-law. To revert to Ratanlals statement, he said that Hiralal was dead and that his widow, Mst. Keshar Bai, had asked him to produce a true copy of the mortgage deed which he was producing. What is important to note is that Ratanlal also deposed that the original was with him, and he would be prepared to produce it whenever the Munsarim would call for it. It was further stated that a sum of Rs. 151/5/- had been spent by way of repairs or improvements on the mortgaged property with the consent of Bhandariji. I am next referred to Ex. 3, which is a copy of a copy of the mortgage deed which was produced by Ratanlal before the Munsarim. In this deed it was mentioned that a sum of Rs. 46( /14/- had been taken by Bhandari Jawanji by mortgage of his shop-cum-house, and that a sum of Rs. 4G0/2/- was further taken as a loan, the total thus amounting to Rs. 861/-, on the security of the same property as mentioned before, and further that the money carried no interest and the property no rent. This deed was dated Rati Vadi 11 Svt. 1935, and was signed by Bhandari Jawanji. Then there is an endorsement on the deed relating to the expenditure of Rs. 111/5/- which had been spent in connection with certain improvements to the property under mortgage. This endorsement is dated Svt. 1933. Sawan Sudi 4th. Then there are further entries made on Asoj Vadi 12, Svt. 1952, in all amounting to Rs. 39/-. These entries relate to certain minor expenditure incurred in connection with the property under mortgage. At the foot of the Copy of the mortgage, it was further state by Ratanlal that he had the original mortgage in his possession and that whenever the Sarkar would like him to produce it, he would produce the same. In this connection, I should also like to refer to Ex.4 which is a copy of an entry from the books of Jawanji. This entry relates to a credit entry of Rs. In this connection, I should also like to refer to Ex.4 which is a copy of an entry from the books of Jawanji. This entry relates to a credit entry of Rs. 400/2/-, and it mentions that a shop had been given in mortgage to Soni Sankad Chand Mangalji. It is further mentioned that a sum of Rs 460/14/- was payable to Sankad Chand Mangalji already. This latter entry is dated Rati Vadi 12th, Svt. 1926. 8. Now the question is whether Ex. P. 3 taken with the other evidence referred to above is good secondary evidence of the mortgage of Svt. 1926, which is the foundation of the respondents suit. I should like at this place to consider the effect of the statement of Ratanlal who was produced by the plaintiff as his own witness. I may state at once that Ratanlal who doubtless belongs to the hostile camp his deliberately tried to suppress the truth, still his evidence read between the lines is of distinct significance in the circumstances of this case. It is perfectly clear that Ratanlal was deputed by Mst. Keshar Bai, mother-in-law of Mst. Chandan Bai defendant appellant, to represent the mortgagee before the Munsarim of the Court of Wards, and, therefore, Ratanlal was examined in that case, and he also produced a letter of authority from Mst. Keshar Bai and further he produced a true copy of the deed of mortgage of Svt. year 1926 saying that he had the original in his possession. When Ratanlal produced this copy before the Munsarim, it is only common sense as well as elementary procedure to say that this copy must have been compared with the original and I hold accordingly. Ratanlal clearly admitted in his examination-in-chief that he had produced "the paper given by Mst. Keshar Bai before the Munsarim at her instance. The reference to this paper, in my opinion is somewhat vague ; and it is contended that it is rightly not referable to Ex. 1, the letter of authority given by Mst. Kesharbai but to the document, namely, the deed of mortgage of Svt 1926. I am disposed to consider, how, ever, that that reference is most probably to the letter of authority given by Mst. Kesharbai to Ratanlal, from the manner in which Ratanlal, has referred to it in his examination in-chief. 1, the letter of authority given by Mst. Kesharbai but to the document, namely, the deed of mortgage of Svt 1926. I am disposed to consider, how, ever, that that reference is most probably to the letter of authority given by Mst. Kesharbai to Ratanlal, from the manner in which Ratanlal, has referred to it in his examination in-chief. He was also asked whether 113 statement had been recorded by the Munsarim after he dad produced the paper. It appears to me to be clear that it was only after Ratanlal should have produced his letter of authority from Mst Kesharbai that the question of his statement should have arisen. So far as his statement is concerned, Ratanlal was rather evasive as to whether he had given any statement or not, and took shelter under the plea that his eye-sight was weak and, therefore, he could not say whether Ex 2 had been signed at all by him or not. Ratanlal also admitted that he had received a notice from the plaintiff Jagjiwanlal before the present suit was filed, and that he had given a reply to that notice. This notice is Ex. 5. A reference to this notice which is dated the 22nd September, 1949, shows that Ratanlal stated therein that he did not remember whether he had produced any document before the Munsarim or not, and that if it might have been that Kesharbai had asked him to produce any document, then she should have taken it buck from him. Ratanlal, also stated therein that if there was any writing from him in the munsarmat, that he would produce the document whenever the Sarkar would requisition the same, that was wrong, and that he was not bound by such a statement, and that the Munsarim in those days was in a position to get anything written by any body by exerting illegal pressure. It is further stated in this notice that Ratanlal remembered that the plaintiff by securing the assistance of the Munsarim and by collusion with him, and with Mst Keshar Bai, had got a certain document produced from Kesharbai in connection with some shop but the whole thing had leaked out in due course, and Mst Keshar Bai had clearly said that whatever document was said to have been produced by him was a fraudulent one, and that Mst. Kesharbai had further given a notice to the plaintiff respondent that all that had happened in the munsarma, was a fraud. Ratanlal admitted that this notice was signed by him. Ratan Lal further said in his deposition that he had heard Ex. 2 which was the statement alleged to have been given by him before the Munsarim. and he admitted that the Munsarim had told him after he had produced the letter of Mst. Kesharbai ("Kesharbai ka Kagaz") that it was necessary to take down his statement, and, therefore, he might have given his statement and his signatures might base been also taken on that statement. Ratanlal further said that the Munsarim had kept with him the paper which had been given to him by Kesharbai The reference to "the paper of Kesharbai" in the context in which they appear are therefore, though vague, rightly referable to Ex. 1 Ratanlal was then asked with reference to Ex. 3, whether that was the copy of the document which he had produced, but again he gave an evasive reply that he had not read it at that time. He also referred at that stage to Kesharbais story that she had told him that the Munsarim had already got him apprehended by a peon or a constable, and that her thumb mark had been taken on a piece of paper. I have no hesitation in saying that the reference to the thumb mark is again on Ex. because there is no other paper on which her thumb mark appears on the record before the Munsarim or could have appeared. Ratanlal was further asked where the document which he had produced was. His reply was that he had given it to the Munsarim. This is a clear lie because so far as the deed of mortgage is concerned the original deed had never been left with the Munsarim, and only a copy thereof had been given to him though the original deed was certainly with Ratanlal at the time. He also presended that he was not literate and that the Munsarim might have written anything that he liked and got his signature on that. Ratanlal further stated that there was another shop of Bhandariji under mortgage with . He also presended that he was not literate and that the Munsarim might have written anything that he liked and got his signature on that. Ratanlal further stated that there was another shop of Bhandariji under mortgage with . he Panchas, and he might have put his signature on some paper before the Munsarim under the impression that he was being asked to produce that paper. He also pretended to say that the statement which he gave before the Munsarim was probably in connection with the shop or shops under mortgage with the Panchas. It is impossible to take this part of Ratanlals statement at its face value, for clearly Ex 2 refers to the shop which was under mortgage with Mst. Kesharbai, widow of Hiralal and not with respect to the shops which may have been mortgaged with the Panchas. Ratanlal finally went to the length of saying that the Munsarim had falsely noted in his statement or on the back of the khat that the original deed of mortgage was with him, and that he would produce it whenever he would be required to do so. Because his version now was that he had never said so, and the original document was never with him, I am not prepared to believe this version of Ratanlal for a single moment. Ratanlal was further asked pointedly whether the endorsement at the foot of Ex. 3 that the original mortgage deed was with him and he would be ready to produce it when called upon to do so was in his handwriting or bore his own signature or not but he evaded a straight reply to that question by saying that his eye-sight was weak and, therefore, he could not say whether the endorsement was or was not in his hand-writing or the same had been signed by him. In spite of all these lies, Ratanlal has certainly admitted this much that Hiralals widow had given him a copy of a document, and that he had produced it before the Munsarim The reference therein was clearly to deed of mortgage. From Ratanlals entire statement, as has been discussed above, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that he had been authorised by Mst. Kesharbai to appear on her behalf before the Munsarim and that while he so appeared, he produced a true copy of the mortgage deed of Svt. From Ratanlals entire statement, as has been discussed above, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that he had been authorised by Mst. Kesharbai to appear on her behalf before the Munsarim and that while he so appeared, he produced a true copy of the mortgage deed of Svt. 1926 (Ex. 3) along with a letter of authority from Mst. Kesharbai (Ex. 1) before the said officer, and he also undertook to produce before that officer the original deed whenever called upon to do so and which was with him at all relevant times, though he was wriggling hard to get out of this position from stage to stage in the course of his deposition. The deed of mortgage could not but have been with the mortgage, and in any case the mortgagor would not have it. I am satisfied that the documentary evidence which has been produced in this case by the plaintiff is perfectly good secondary evidence of the deed of mortgage of Svt. 1926, and that that being so, it is unnecessary to discuss the oral evidence of the witnesses who have deposed to have seen the original deed while it was being produced before the Munsarim or on some other occasion. 9. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant however is that the copy of the copy of the mortgage deed is not legal secondary evidence within the meaning of sec. 63 of the Evidence Act, because that was never compared with the original. I am clearly of opinion, however, that under sec. 63 (3) the copy of the mortgage deed which was produced before the Munsarim by Ratanlal constitutes good secondary evidence of the original deed of mortgage. Mst. Kesharbai had been called upon by the Munsarim to produce the original deed of mortgage. Mst. Kesharbai gave this over to her relation Ratanlal, and gave him a letter of authority and so he produced a copy of the deed before the said officer. I find it impossible to think that in the ordinary course of official business this copy was not compared with the original which Ratanlal certainly had in his possesion at that very time (See the foot note on Ex. P. 3 itself). I find it impossible to think that in the ordinary course of official business this copy was not compared with the original which Ratanlal certainly had in his possesion at that very time (See the foot note on Ex. P. 3 itself). This copy was sent for at the trial and it was before the court, but a copy thereof appears to have been taken by the respondent and placed on this record and exhibited. If the very copy which was on the record of the court of wards should have been transferred to the record of the trial court, I have no doubt it would have been perfectly unexceptionable secondary evidence of the original mortgage deed. The question in these circumstances which arises is, whether this copy of the copy of the mortgage deed should be excluded from evidence as inadmissible. My answer to this question is clearly in the negative. The reason is this. The objection raised by learned counsel is, to my mind, an objection merely to the mode of proof of a document which was doubtless relevant. Such an objection to be valid should be raised at the very time a document is sought to be tendered in evidence and proved, and if not so raised, it should be deemed to have been waived, because if it had been raised, it would have been perfectly possible for the respondent to have prayed for the very copy of the document which was on the record of the Munsarims office to be taken on this record. This view has the high authority of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Gopaldas vs. Shri Thakurji (1) where they expressed themselves in the following words :— "Where the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof put forward is irregular or insufficient, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. A party cannot lie by until the case comes before the court of appeal and then cemplain for the first time of the mode of proof." In this state of the law, I hold that the objection that the copy of the copy of the deed is not legally admissible secondary evidence is of no avail to the appellant and hereby repel it. 10. In this connection, I also desire to add that although the initial burden of proof in a case of this character rests upon the plaintiff mortgagor to prove the mortgage by some prima facie evidence this burden of proof is comparatively not heavy, and when the question of the quantum of the evidence required from either party is to be considered, then, as observed by their Lordships of the Privy Gjuncil in Rajah Kishan Dutt Ram Pandey vs. Narendra Baha-ioor Singh (2), regard must be had to the opportunities which each party must naturally be supposed to have of giving evidence, and the consideration cannot be omitted that it is the defendant who would naturally have the mortgage deed, and it would be more in his or her power to give evidence of its contents than in that of the plaintiff. In case, we find that the plaintiff respon-dent has produced fairly good secondary evidence of the mortgage in the shape of what was virtually a copy of the mortgage deed which had been produced by Mst. Kesharbai through her agent Ratanlal before the Munsarim of the court of wards in Svt. 1989, and indeed there could not be better and more reliable evidence in this connection than that produced by the respondent. My finding, therefore, is that the mortgage deed of Svt. 1925 is thoroughly proved on this record, It is true that this mortgage deed was unregistered, but there is nothing to show that the mortgage was compulsorily registrable at the time it was made in Svt. year 1926, according to the law which was in force in the former State of Mewar at that lime. The plea taken by the defendant appellant in her written statement to the effect that the document was inadmissible In evidence owing to nonregistration has, therefore, no force and must be repelled. The deed, Ex. J, along with the letter of authority of Mst. Kesharbai widow of Hiralal dated Kati Badi 2nd, Svt. The plea taken by the defendant appellant in her written statement to the effect that the document was inadmissible In evidence owing to nonregistration has, therefore, no force and must be repelled. The deed, Ex. J, along with the letter of authority of Mst. Kesharbai widow of Hiralal dated Kati Badi 2nd, Svt. 1987, and also the statement of Ratanlal made on the same day before the Munsarim, to my mind, clearly establish that the mortgage was acknowledged by Mst. Kesharbai and her agent Ratanlal to be a subsisting one as late as Svt. 1987, and that indeed cannot be and has not been seriously questioned on the language of these documents. So far as the question of the plaintiff being a descendant of the original mortgagor Jawanji is concerned, it is enough to say that this point was never seriously contested by the defendant, and secondly, no clear issue was raised on it. It may, however, be pointed out that there is evidence to show that the plaintiff is the sole heir of the original mortgagor Jawanji. The plaintiffs Munim P. W. 7 Chhaganlal clearly deposed that the plaintiff is the son of Devilal, and Devilal was the son of Kalulal, and the name of Kalulals father was jawanji. No cross-examination was directed against this evidence on behalf of the defendant appellant nor was any rebuttal evidence Jed on the fitters behalf to contest that the present plaintiff is a direct descendant of the deceased Jawanji. The plaintiff respondent was, therefore, perfectly entitled to bring the present suit. In these circumstances, I over-rule this contention also. 11. I now come to the most important contention of learned counsel for the defendant appellant, and that contention is that even if it is established that the mortgage of Svt. 1926 was proved and the acknowledgments of Svt. 1927 relied on by the pltff-rspdt. were also proved, the plaintiff respondent must still prove that Mst. Kesharbai and Ratanlal were authorised to act for Mst. Chandanbai defendant appellant, and that until this was proved satisfactorily, the plaintiff respondents suit must still fail because any acknowledgements made by them had not the authority of the defendant. Mst. Chandanbai. Now, I have no hesitation in saying at the very outset that so for as Ratanlal was concerned, be was duly authorised by Mst. Kesharbai, the mother-in-law of Mst. Chandanbai to act for the former. Mst. Chandanbai. Now, I have no hesitation in saying at the very outset that so for as Ratanlal was concerned, be was duly authorised by Mst. Kesharbai, the mother-in-law of Mst. Chandanbai to act for the former. The plaintiff respondent had confronted Ratanlal with the original letter of authority which Kesharbai (who was no longer alive when the present suit was brought) had executed in his favour, and which he had produced before the Munsarim, and also his own statement as taken down by the Munsarim together with the copy of the mortgage deed which had been produced at the instance of Kesharbai, and Ratanlal chose to give evasive, prevaricating and self-contradictory answers in his deposition with respect to them. The position, to my mind, is, however, clear that Ratanlal had been duly authorised by Mst. Kesharbai to represent her before the Munsarim, the farmer being a widow and unable or disinclined to take part in the proceedings herself. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, strenuously contended before me that the execution of that letter of authority by Mst. Kesharbai has not been proved, particularly because it has not been shown why the scribe of the letter, Chhaganlal, and the attesting witness, Fatehlal, were not produced, nor was it shown that they were otherwise not available. The plaintiff respondent did produce P. W. Laxmilal to prove the attestation of Motilal another attesting witness to Ex.1—Laxmilal being the maternal grandson of the deceased Motilal; but it is contended that this was not enough to prove the execution of the deed, Ex. 1 by Mst. Kesharbai. Now this evidence by itself may not he enough to prove the execution of the letter of authority of Mst. Kesharbai. It is also true that the plaintiff respondent should have tried to produce the scribe and the other attesting witness or at least shown that they were dead or otherwise unavailable. All this, however, is not enough, in the circumstances of the case, to hold that the execution of Ex. 1 by Mst. Kesharbai has not been proved. The best person to prove or disprove it in the circumstances of this case was Ratanlal. Ratanlal is the son-in-law (or brother-in-law) of Mst. Kesharbai. He was definitely confronted with Ex. ), the letter of authority. He had not the courage to deny that that letter had not been executed by Mst. Kesharbai. Kesharbai has not been proved. The best person to prove or disprove it in the circumstances of this case was Ratanlal. Ratanlal is the son-in-law (or brother-in-law) of Mst. Kesharbai. He was definitely confronted with Ex. ), the letter of authority. He had not the courage to deny that that letter had not been executed by Mst. Kesharbai. On the other hand, his statement is replete with portions, which, to my mind, definitely go to show that the letter in question was undoubtedly executed by Mst. Kesharbai. In these circumstances, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the execution of that letter by Mst. Kesharbai stands proved on this record, and I hold accordingly. 12. The question still remains whether Mst. Kesharbai had the authority to represent Mst. Chandanbai and to act for her, for if she was not, the acknowledgments made by Ratanlal as the authorised agent of Kesharbai or by Mst. Kesharbai herself would not be binding on the defendant appellant Chandanbai. It may be mentioned at once that there was no express authority given by Mst. Chandanbai to Mst. Kesharbai in this connection. Certain circumstances have, however, been brought on this record by placing reliance on which the court below came to the conclusion that Mst. Kesharbai had implied authority to represent Mst. Chandanbai, her daughter-in-law, before the Munsarim in Svt. 1987. Let us look at these circumstances now. In the first place, there can be no disputing the position that Mst. Kesharbai and Mst. Chandanbai were the only two members surviving in the family of the deceased Hiralal or his son Surajmal in Samvat year 1987. Mst. Kesharbai was the mother-in-law, and Mst. Chandanbai was the daughter-in-law being the widow of deceased Surajmal. Mst. Chandanbai examined herself as a witness in this case, and according to her evidence, she was 40 years of age at the time of her deposition on the 26th October, 1950. It further appears from her statement that at the time of her marriage, she was 14 years of age and her husband Surajmal at that time was 16 years of age, and that Surajmal died after about two years of the marriage. According to these dates as given by Mst. Chandanbai herself, she was about 16 years of age at the time of her husbands death. The precise year of Mst. Chandanbais husband Surajmals death is not known. According to these dates as given by Mst. Chandanbai herself, she was about 16 years of age at the time of her husbands death. The precise year of Mst. Chandanbais husband Surajmals death is not known. Mst. Chandanbai would, however, have us believe that she had remained with her mother-in-law Mst Kesharbai for a period of about four months or so after her marriage only, and that thereafter she had started living separately from her mother-in-law, although it does not appear from her statement that any petition had been effected between her husband and her father-in-law during her life time. The case of the defendant appellant has not stopped merely at this, and some attempt has been made on her behalf by producing witnesses to show that Mst. Kesharbai had become insane and, therefore, she used to live with some other relation of her and not with her daughter-in-law, and that she was in no position to manage the affairs of the household. Now, so far as the plea of insanity of Mst. Kesharbai is concerned, I have no hesitation in rejecting it outright, because not a word is mentioned to that effect in her writ ten-statement, and i am satisfied that this is an afterthought. Again, it is difficult to believe that a young widow, who, if not a minor, in any case was in her teens, should have been allowed to live on her own after the death of her husband in the society to which Mst. Chandanbai belongs. According to all probabilities, she must have remained with her mother-in-law, and the mother-in-law would be managing the affairs of the family consisting of herself and her daughter in-law, there being no male member in the family. The plea that Mst. Chandanbai was managing her own affairs after the death of her husband is clearly and cogently belied by the circumstances that the document of mortgage, with which we are concerned in the present case, was in possession of Mst. Kesharbai, that she had authorised her near relation Ratanlal to represent the family before the Munsarim, and that Ratanlal had actually so represented her. If Mst. Chandanbai were in independent charge of the family and its affairs, 1 have little hesitation in saying that there would be no occasion for Mst. Kesharbai to act in the manner in which she did. If Mst. Chandanbai were in independent charge of the family and its affairs, 1 have little hesitation in saying that there would be no occasion for Mst. Kesharbai to act in the manner in which she did. I also agree with the learned Civil Judge when he says that when the question of redemption of this mortgage in Svt. 1987 was taken up by the Munsarim of the Court of Wards, Mst. Chandanbai, a young widow, could not have been expected to represent the family before the Munsarim, and that it was only natural that her mother-in-law should have been left to represent the family affairs rather than that an inexperienced and recently widowed daughter-in-law should bother herself with a matter like this. Granting that Mst. Chandanbai was the heir of her husbands estate, as indeed she was, one would naturally expect in the circumstances that she would leave the representation of the family in courts and offices to her mother-in-law, the oldest surviving member in the family. 1 also desire to point out that the documents in which these acknowledgments were made came to be written long before the institution of the present suit, and 1 can see no sinister or ulterior motive on the part of Mst. Kesharbai or Ratanlal so that they should have done anything to injure the interests of Mst. Chandanbai. I am, therefore, disposed to hold that Mst. Kesharbai had an implied authority to represent her daughter-in-law Mst. Chandanbai before the Munsarim in the circumstances of this case. 13. The next question is whether the acknowledgments in question are binding upon the appellant. My answer to this question is clearly in the affirmative. There is ample authority for the proposition that the authority of the agent making an acknowledgment need not always be express and it may be implied and that where it is implied, it is capable of being presumed from the attendant circumstances of a case. In Gangaram vs. Lachman Singh 3) it was held that it was unquestionable that no valid acknowledgment could be made by a general agent unless he was expressly or impliedly authorised in that behalf, but the authority may be presumed and that the question was one of inference to be drawn from the surrounding circumstances of a given case, This case was followed in Srivilliputtur Muncl. Council vs. Arunachala(4), and the same view was taken in Ebrahim Haji Yakub vs. Chunilal Lalchand(5). This view, in my opinion, receives considerable support from the decision of the Privy Council in Braja Sunday vs. Bhola Nath(6) also. 14. Having regard to this state of law and the circumstances of this case, I have no hesitation in holding in agreement with the court below that Mst. Kesharbai being the mother-in-law had implied authority to act for and to make acknowledgments on behalf of the defendant appellant. It must follow that Exs. i and 2 constitute valid acknowledgments of liability within the meaning of sec. 14 of the Mewar Limitation Act or sec. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act. 15. It was next contended by learned counsel for the defendant appellant that even if Mst. Chandanbai had implied authority from her widowed daughter in-law to act for her, this acknowledgment was not within time. The argument was put in this way. The period of limitation was admittedly 60 years as prescribed by Art. 1 of the Mewar Limitation Act of 1988 This period expired in Svt. 1986. The acknowledgments on which the plaintiff respondent relies are said to have been made some time in Svt. 1987, and therefore, they are clearly barred by limitation. It is further contended in this connection that sec. 22 of the Mewar Limitation Act which gave a period of 8 years grace for the filing of suits relating to causes of action for which no period of limitation was prescribed heretofore cannot be of any avail, because this cannot amount to the period prescribed as used in sec. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act. I have been referred to a large number of cases in this connection on either side, and it appears that there is a divergence of judicial opinion on the question whether an acknowledgment of liability under section, in order to be effective, must be made during the period prescribed by the first schedule to the Act, or the period prescribed will include any period prescribed by the Act whether in the body of the Act or in the first schedule thereof. I consider it somewhat unnecessary for the purposes of the present appeal to go into this question, because, in my opinion, the language of sec. I consider it somewhat unnecessary for the purposes of the present appeal to go into this question, because, in my opinion, the language of sec. 14 of the Mewar Limitation Act of 1988, which was in force at the time, is simple, and all it says is that if a party has made an acknowledgment admitting his liability before the expiry of limitation, then limitation shall be computed from the date of such acknowledgment. The relevant portion of sec. 14 of the Mewar Limitation Act, which is in Hindi, runs as: ^^vxj fe;kn xqtjus ds igys nwljs Qjhd us dskbZ ubZ fy[kr dj nh gks fd ftlesa mlus viuh nsunkjh dcwy djuh gks rks ,sls u;s fy[kr dh rkjh[k ls fe;kn fxuh tkosxhA** The language of the section is quite plain, and all it requires is that the acknowledgment should have been made "before the expiry of limitation". I am of opinion, therefore, that there is no scope for interpreting the words Miyad Gujarne Ke Pahle in the light of the controversy which has arisen in the Indian courts on account of the expression before the expiration of the period" prescribed for a suit or application in sec. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act. All that the Mewar Limitation Act prescribes is that new deed or acknowledgment should have been made before the expiry of limitation. I have no hesitation in saying that sec. 22 of that act as much lays down the period of limitation for a suit as the schedule, and it will be going too far to hold that an acknowledgment made within the period of grace under sec. 22 of the Mewar Limitation Act should be held as falling outside the expression "before the expiry of period of limitation as used in sec. 14 of that Act. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the acknowledgments relied on by the plaintiff in the present case, and which were made in Svt. 1987 were certainly made "before the expiry of limitation" within the meaning of sec. 14. The result is that I hold that the present suit which was field by the plaintiff respondent on the 14th April, 1948, was not barred by time within the meaning of sec. 14 of the Mewar Limitation Act, 1988. 16. 1987 were certainly made "before the expiry of limitation" within the meaning of sec. 14. The result is that I hold that the present suit which was field by the plaintiff respondent on the 14th April, 1948, was not barred by time within the meaning of sec. 14 of the Mewar Limitation Act, 1988. 16. I may add that even if the view is taken that the same controversy which has arisen as to the meaning of the expression before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application". Arises under sec. 14 of the Mewar Limitation Act, I am disposed to hold the view that that expression includes not only the period prescribed by the first schedule, but it includes the period prescribed by the Act, that is, in the body of the Act also, and, therefore, an acknowledgment made within the special period of grace properly falls within the expression "the period prescribed". I have been referred in support of this view to Sheo Partab Singh vs. Tajammul Husain (7), Ram Duttamal vs. Kesardas (8), Suryanarayana vs. Venkataraju (9), Shankerlal vs. Rana Lal Singh (F-B)(10), Subbareddi vs. Venkatramayya (11) and Udhavji Anandji vs. Bapudas Ramdas (12). I consider it unnecessary to discuss these rulings as in my view the Full Bench decision of this Court to which I was a party, in Jethmal vs. Amb. Singh(13) clearly lends support to the view that the period prescribed in sec. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act or sec. 14 of the Mewar Act not only means the period prescribed by the schedule thereof but also the period laid down or fixed by the various sections of the Act. It follows that the contrary view taken in some other cases, namely, Nandram vs. Ranchoddas (14), Maganlal vs. Amichand (15), Anisuddin Ahmed vs. Kalipada (16) and Shanti Parkash vs. Harnamdas(17) to which 1 need not refer in detail, cannot be accepted as laying down the correct law so far as our court is concerned. In any case, therefore, I am clearly of the opinion that the acknowledgments made in the present case in Samvat year 1987 were made before the expiry of the limitation, and, therefore, they effectively save limitation. 17. In any case, therefore, I am clearly of the opinion that the acknowledgments made in the present case in Samvat year 1987 were made before the expiry of the limitation, and, therefore, they effectively save limitation. 17. It was also contended on behalf of the defendant in this connection that the acknowledgments, if any, had been made in the present case in official confidence, and, therefore the respondent should not be allowed to take advantage of them. I have carefully considered this contention and I am of opinion that there is no force in it. The question of an acknowledgment having been made in official confidence or otherwise is of relevance only when the correspondence containing such acknowledgment is sought to be produced, and an objection is raised to its production under sec. 124 of the Indian Evidence Act. Where, however, the material containing the acknowledgment has already been produced, and no such privilege is claimed the question of the acknowledgment having been made in official confidence is, in my opinion, altogether immaterial. I may also add that there is no proof whatsoever on this record to show that such acknowledgments as had been made by Mst. Kesharbai and Ratanlal before the Munsarim of the court of wards in the present case had at all been made in official confidence within the meaning of sec. 124 of the Evidence Act, and, therefore, no question of any privilege arising in connection with such acknowledgment could at all have been claimed. 1 have therefore no hesitation in holding that this ground is without any merit and I over-rule it. 18 The result is that this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.