ORDER R.S. Shukla, Member This order will govern Appeals Nos. 215, 244 and 245/IX-I/55 arising out of lower Court's order in Rev. Case No. 16/IX-I/51-55. The facts of the ease are very lucidly given in the order of the lower Court. Briefly speaking, the case of the Appellants is that by virtue of a deed dated 8-6-48 they were recognised as plot-proprietors of certain areas in village Madhotal, district Jabalpur. Their names were also recorded in the village khasra and they have since been paying rents accordingly. The Additional Deputy Commissioner-Cum-Nistar Officer, Jabalpur, by his order under appeal discarded the aforesaid deed as invalid and held that the disputed land was liable to vest in the State. He, however, made some exception in the case of Narmada Cotton Mills Ltd. Appellant in appeal No. 244 /55 and allowed 13.05 acres to be retained by the Mills because this area had already been built upon and in accordance with Land Reforms Department Memo. No. 877-2506/XXVIII, dated 13-5-54, the said area of 13.05 acres had to be settled with the occupier and assessed at the prescribed rates. On behalf of the Appellants, Shree R.M. Hazarnavis, contended that the order under appeal was justified neither by the C.P. Land Revenue Act nor by Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act. According to him Section 47 (1) of the Land Revenue Act, under which the order under appeal was passed, would not be applicable and the Nistar Officer-cum-Additional Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to interfere with the rights of the Appellants as per decision of the High Court in Balkrishna Nathani v. State 1956 NLJ 370. The Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act also would not apply because it had nothing to do with plot-proprietors, which the Appellants claimed to be. the Act being restricted in its application to Mahals and estates only. Shri Hazarnavis, therefore, argued that the impugned order was without jurisdiction and deserved to be set aside. It is true that in view of the High Court's decision in Balkrishna Nathani's case Section 47 (1) would not apply to the facts of this case but it would not be correct to say that the order in question could not be passed under the C.P. Land Revenue Act. It is true that in view of the High Court's decision in Balkrishna Nathani's case Section 47 (1) would not apply to the facts of this case but it would not be correct to say that the order in question could not be passed under the C.P. Land Revenue Act. As I see it, the case of the Appellants is that they bad acquired plot-proprietorship over the disputed area and were thus entitled to be declared malik-makbuza thereof. It may be mentioned that 'plot-proprietor' is not a recognized term under the Revenue law as such. The term 'plot-proprietor' does not find place in the various tenures that have been referred to or defined in the Land Revenue or Tenancy Acts. In fact the 'plot-proprietor' is an anomalous term and that is why Government in their instructions contained in the Revenue Book Circular, Chapter I, Section 11 have directed that wherever existence of such plot-proprietors is discovered, steps must be taken by the Deputy Commissioner to declare them malik-makbuza u/s 106 (1) (c) read with Section 67 of the Land Revenue Act. Plot-proprietors come into existence when a plot of land in a Mahal is transferred by the malguzar in proprietary rights to a person who has no share in the proprietary profits of the Mahal. As has been observed in the Revenue Book Circular I-11, " such separation could only be effected by a perfect partition or by his (transferee) being declared a malik-makbuza u/s 67 of the Land Revenue Act. Legally, therefore, the transferee becomes jointly or severally responsible for the land revenue of the mahal even if no mutation case is opened and his name does not appear in the mutation register ". Under the above instruction of the Revenue Book Circular whenever a case of plot-proprietor is brought to the notice of a revenue officer he has to examine the transfer-deed to satisfy himself if there has actually been a transfer of proprietary rights. If he is so satisfied further action has to be taken u/s 67 of the Land Revenue Act. Under the above instruction of the Revenue Book Circular whenever a case of plot-proprietor is brought to the notice of a revenue officer he has to examine the transfer-deed to satisfy himself if there has actually been a transfer of proprietary rights. If he is so satisfied further action has to be taken u/s 67 of the Land Revenue Act. Viewed in the light of above observations it would be seen that the real enquiry before the Additional Deputy Commissioner was whether the Appellants had acquired proprietary rights in the disputed area without any share in the proprietary profit in the Mahal and whether further action in accordance with the Revenue Book Circular I-11 was called for in their favour. If on inquiry the Additional Deputy Commissioner was not satisfied that an actual transfer of proprietary rights had occurred, it was perfectly open to him to refuse to recognize the alleged transferees as malik-makbuza and to hold that, on the date in question, no transfer of proprietary rights had taken place. Thus, in my opinion, the proceedings in the lower Court are covered by the provisions of Section 106 (1) Ibid read with Section 67, Land Revenue Act. The fact that the lower Court registered the case under side head IX-I and thereby purported to act u/s 47 (1), Land Revenue Act was merely an irregularity and would not take away the fact that proceedings in effect were u/s 106 (1) (d) Ibid and the Additional Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction to pass an appropriate order. The proceedings in the lower Court will, therefore, have to be examined in the light of the provisions of Section 106, Land Revenue Act. In this connection my attention was drawn to the order passed earlier on 6-2-48 in Revenue Case No. 29/1946-47 by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur. It would appear from this order that proceedings u/s 106 read with Section 67, Land Revenue Act were started sometime back in respect of Manmohan Nagar Lay-out in village Madhotal and certain persons holding various plots in the said lay-out were declared malik-makbuza. In some cases the enhancement was also fixed but in many other cases it was noted by the then Additional Deputy Commissioner that the assessment would remain postponed till actual sale or diversion was made. In some cases the enhancement was also fixed but in many other cases it was noted by the then Additional Deputy Commissioner that the assessment would remain postponed till actual sale or diversion was made. Manmohan Nagar Housing Society, which is one of the Appellants here (Appeal No. 245/55) has claimed certain khasra numbers mentioned in para. 4 (g) of the impugned order. It is difficult to say which of the khasra numbers claimed are covered by the aforesaid order of the previous Additional Deputy Commissioner dated 6-2-48 in Revenue Case No. 29/46-47 because in the earlier case reference to various areas has been made by plot numbers of the lay-out while, in the present case, the area of Manmohan Nagar Lay-out has been referred to in terms of khasra numbers and their acreage. But it is clear that the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner relates to the same area which is the subject-matter of appeal before me. I will leave further details to be ascertained and worked out by the Collector later on. The point that I want to make out here is that the Additional Deputy Commissioner-cum-Nistar Officer, whose order is under appeal, had no jurisdiction to revise the order passed by the previous Additional Deputy Commissioner on 6-2-48. Even if the former had concurrent powers he could not review the order passed in 1948 without the sanction of the Board of Revenue. As such the impugned order would be without jurisdiction to the extent that it hits the order passed in 1948. If the order of 1948 needs review it would be for the Collector of the district to examine the case and review the order as per provisions of Section 47(3) of the Land Revenue Code. In this connection it may be observed that the remark of the Additional Deputy Commissioner in the order dated 6-2-48 that assessment was to be postponed for certain reasons does not take away the fact that he had declared the holders of plots, mentioned in his order, as malik-makbuza u/s 106 (d)/Section 67, Land Revenue Act. Whether the order was right or wrong can only be reviewed by the present Collector of the district and not by the Additional Deputy Commissioner-cum-Nistar Officer. The impugned order will, therefore, have to be set aside to the extent that it overrides the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner dated 6-2-48. Whether the order was right or wrong can only be reviewed by the present Collector of the district and not by the Additional Deputy Commissioner-cum-Nistar Officer. The impugned order will, therefore, have to be set aside to the extent that it overrides the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner dated 6-2-48. These observations apply only so far as Appellant Manmohan Nagar Housing Society is concerned. With regard to other Appellants, I am of opinion that they have totally failed to establish their claim. The basis of their claim is a document dated 8-6-48 described by the Appellants as a Deed of Family Settlement. The lower Court has fully discussed the nature and contents of this deed and has held that it cannot be admitted in evidence, either as a Deed of Family Settlement, or as a deed of partition for want of registration. He, therefore, declined to recognize the validity of the alleged transfer of proprietary rights in favour of the Appellants. I have carefully examined the deed with the assistance of the Learned Counsel of both the sides and share the opinion of the lower Court that the deed in question cannot be regarded as legally conveying any title to the Appellants. It was argued before me that the deed only recites a transaction ( viz. Family Settlement) which had already taken place earlier and as such it did not require registration. A reading of the deed does not support this contention as would be clear from the last para, of the deed which is in the following terms: It is clear from the portion underlined above that whatever rights or interests were sought to be created or conferred according to the so-called family settlement-deed, they were intended to come into operation only with effect from the date of the execution of the deed. It can, therefore, hardly be said that the deed was merely a recital of a past transaction. It is further pertinent to note that this deed does not bear the signatures of Lala Manmohandas, the father of the five Appellants ( Appeal No. 215/55 ), who was then alive and was the ex-proprietor of village Madhotal as also the Karta of the joint family of the aforesaid Appellants. It is further pertinent to note that this deed does not bear the signatures of Lala Manmohandas, the father of the five Appellants ( Appeal No. 215/55 ), who was then alive and was the ex-proprietor of village Madhotal as also the Karta of the joint family of the aforesaid Appellants. This lacuna has remained unexplained and it can hardly be said that the document can operate either as a family settlement or a partition in the total absence of the consent of the most essential member of the family. I need not dwell any further on the admissibility of the deed in question vis-a-vis the transfer of proprietary rights to the Appellants as the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner has very fully dealt with the matter and I see no substantial reason to take a view different from the lower Court. To sum up, the position that emerges is as follows: Five sons of Lala Manmohandas who are Appellants in Appeal No. 215/55, having admittedly a share in the proprietary profits of the Mahal before 8-6-48 ( the date of the deed ) could not become plot-proprietors as they were themselves co-sharers of the entire village. As I have observed the term 'plot-proprietor' is applicable only in relation to a transfer of a plot or plots in proprietary rights to a person who has no share in the proprietary profits of the village. All the five sons of late Lala Manmohandas being members of the joint family with him, were co-proprietors and enjoyed the proprietary profits. As such they could not be created plot-proprietors for that would be meaningless. A proprietor or a co-sharer cannot be a plot-proprietor of a portion of his own Mahal. Even if this be possible (for the sake of argument) the deed in question, which is the only evidence, tendered in support of the title of the Appellants, being unregistered would be insufficient to convey the requisite title. A proprietor or a co-sharer cannot be a plot-proprietor of a portion of his own Mahal. Even if this be possible (for the sake of argument) the deed in question, which is the only evidence, tendered in support of the title of the Appellants, being unregistered would be insufficient to convey the requisite title. If in the instant case transfer of proprietary rights was not possible or has not been proved the Appellants cannot claim the right to be declared malik-makbuza and it will have to be assumed, as the lower Court has done, that the Appellants were holding the disputed land only as " grass-land " or " khudkasht land " and since these lands were lying fallow successively for more than 4 years on the date of vesting they were liable to vest in the State as unoccupied grass-land u/s 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act. With regard to the Narmada Cotton Mills (Appeal No. 244 /55) I agree that the alleged transfer-deed dated 8-6-48 cannot be recognised for want of registration and also for the reasons given by the lower Court in paragraphs 9 and 10 of its order. With regard to appeal No. 245 /55 by Manmohan Nagar Housing Society I have already observed that the impugned order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner being defective will stand quashed to the extent that it militates against the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner passed on 6-2-48 in Revenue Case No. 29/46-47. The Collector will please determine the. area in respect of which the order under appeal hits the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner dated 6-2-48. If there is any area to which the Additional Deputy Commissioner's order dated 6-2-48 does not apply the claim of the Manmohan Nagar Housing Society will be determined in accordance with the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner under appeal. These observations will, of course, not apply to the area of 1305 acres allowed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner to the Narmada Cotton Mills in accordance with the Land Reforms Department Memo. No. 877-2506/XXVIII, dated 13-5-54 for that is an executive action of the Additional Deputy Commissioner and cannot be questioned in this appeal. For reasons given above, Appeals Nos. 215 and 244/55 are rejected and the order of the lower Court in Appeal No. 245/55 is modified to the extent indicated in para. 11 above. No. 877-2506/XXVIII, dated 13-5-54 for that is an executive action of the Additional Deputy Commissioner and cannot be questioned in this appeal. For reasons given above, Appeals Nos. 215 and 244/55 are rejected and the order of the lower Court in Appeal No. 245/55 is modified to the extent indicated in para. 11 above. Ordered accordingly. Appeals No. 215 /55 and No. 244 /55 dismissed; order in Appeal No. 245/55, modified. Final Result : Dismissed