Judgment K.Sahai, J. 1. All the four petitioners have been convicted under Sec. 430 of the Penal Code, and each of them has been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100.00 or, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. 2. It appears that some of the petitioners have been fighting about the existence of a karha (water channel) for irrigation of some agricultural lands from a canal. In 1949, the canal authorities took steps for acquisition of the site of that karha. After acquisition of the land, the karha began to be reconstructed, and the reconstruction was completed on 25-7-1955. 3. The prosecution case is that the petitioners demolished the karha, or, at least, a major portion of it, on 1-8-1955, in the morning and transplanted paddy at the place. The canal authorities made enquiries, and thereafter the Canal S. D. O. (P. W. 5) submitted a report (exhibit 1) at the Nasriganj Police Station. That report was treated as the first information report. The defence case of the petitioners is that they are innocent, and that they did not demolish the karha. 4. The Courts below have held that the petitioners demolished the karha, and transplanted paddy in the place. These are findings of fact. But the point which Mr. K.B.N. Singh has raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the trial has, in this case, been vitiated. His first contention is that the trial has been vitiated because there has been an inadequate examination of the petitioners under Sec.342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and, in any case, the petitioners were not examined under that section after a new charge was framed against them on 4-4-1956. His second contention relates only to petitioner Gaya Singh, It appears that this petitioner is deaf and dumb. The argument which Mr. K.B.N. Singh has advanced is that the procedure laid down under Sec.341 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should have been followed in his case. 5. I proceed to consider the points raised by Mr. K. B. N. Singh in the order in which I have mentioned them above. The trying Magistrate originally framed a charge on 21-11-1955, against the petitioners for an offence under Sec. 431. The trial proceeded, and the prosecution evidence was closed on 23-2-1956. 6. 5. I proceed to consider the points raised by Mr. K. B. N. Singh in the order in which I have mentioned them above. The trying Magistrate originally framed a charge on 21-11-1955, against the petitioners for an offence under Sec. 431. The trial proceeded, and the prosecution evidence was closed on 23-2-1956. 6. On the same date, the trying Magistrate examined the petitioners under Sec.342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 4-4-1956, the learned Magistrate considered a petition filed by the Prosecuting Inspector in which he prayed for a charge for an offence under Sec. 430 being framed against the petitioners. The trying Magistrate acceded to this prayer, and framed a charge accordingly. He then gave an opportunity to the defence lawyer to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, if he so liked. The defence lawyer, however, declined to cross-examine any prosecution witness. Hence, the Magistrate adjourned the case to the next day, that is, to 5-4-1956, for arguments, and he actually heard arguments on that date. He did not examine the petitioners under Sec.342 after addition of a new charge on 4-4-1956. 7. Mr. K.B.N. Singh has drawn my attention to the statement of the petitioners recorded on their examination under Sec.342, and there can be no doubt that their examination was inadequate. A judgment cannot, however, be set aside merely on account of inadequate compliance with Sec.342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has to be shown that prejudice has been caused to the accused who were not properly examined under Sec.342, and that there has been a miscarriage of justice (vide Moseb Kaka Chowdhury V/s. State of West Bengal, (S) AIR 1956 S. C. 536 (A). It has not been shown before me in this case that any prejudice has been caused to the petitioners on account of their inadequate examination or that any miscarriage of justice has resulted. Mr. K. B. N. Singh has only submitted that the charge for an offence under sec. 431 could only succeed against the petitioners if it had been proved that a navigable channel had been rendered impassable or less safe for navigation and that in view of this charge, the petitioners could well have refrained from cross-examining any of the prosecution witnesses examined against them. 431 could only succeed against the petitioners if it had been proved that a navigable channel had been rendered impassable or less safe for navigation and that in view of this charge, the petitioners could well have refrained from cross-examining any of the prosecution witnesses examined against them. On this basis, he has argued that they should have been questioned after the charge for an offence under Sec. 430 of the Penal Code was framed against them so that they might put up their defence as against that charge, in my opinion, there is no substance in this argument. It is true that the original charge against the petitioners was for an offence under Sec. 431 of the Penal Code; but the allegation of fact against them from the very beginning was that they had demolished a karha connected with a canal, and that they had transplanted paddy upon it. They had full notice of these facts, and it cannot be said that they were taken by surprise when the new charge was framed against them on 4-4-1956. Indeed, the petitioners lawyer appears to have cross-examined the witnesses fully in regard to these facts. Besides, they could get their lawyer to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses further after the second charge had been framed, if they thought that any part of their defence against that charge had to be freshly put up or supplemented. As I have already said, their lawyer declined to cross-examine the witnesses further, though the learned Magistrate gave him an opportunity to cross-examine them. The provisions of Sec.342 are meant to give an opportunity to an accused to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. They are not meant to enable an accused to say whatever he likes about a charge which is framed against him. The petitioners had already been examined under that section at the close of the prosecution evidence. No further evidence was adduced after that date. It is clear, therefore, that the learned Magistrate was not required to examine the petitioners further after 4-4-1956, merely because he framed a new charge on that date. There was nothing wrong in his framing a new charge on that date in view of Sec.227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowered him to add a charge before delivering judgment. There was nothing wrong in his framing a new charge on that date in view of Sec.227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowered him to add a charge before delivering judgment. In these circumstances, it is clear that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioners on account of their inadequate examination before the new charge was framed or non-examination after the new charge was framed. The conviction of the petitioners cannot, therefore, be set aside on the first ground raised by Mr. K. B. N. Singh. 8. Coming now to the second point, I find that the learned Magistrate has stated at the top of the statement of Gaya Singh under Sec.342 as follows : "This accused is unable to speak. He is deaf and dumb," After writing the question which he put to the petitioner, he has written as follows : "Jabab :- - The witness keeps silent." There is nothing to show that this petitioner understood the question put to him, nor is there anything to show that he understood any other part of the proceeding in the trial Court. Sec.341 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would have been applicable, if it could be clearly found that this petitioner was unable to understand the proceedings. As it is, there is no report of the Magistrate on this point, nor is there any other clear indication on the record. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the trial of this petitioner has been fair and legal. That being so, I am of opinion that his conviction cannot be maintained. 9 Lastly, Mr. K.B.N. Singh has pressed the question of sentence. The sentence imposed upon petitioner Gaya Singh has, of course to be set aside because his conviction is being set aside. So far as the sentence imposed upon the other petitioners is concerned, I do not think that it is severe. 10. In the result, I set aside the conviction and sentence imposed upon Gaya Singh, leaving it open to the authorities concerned to prosecute him afresh, if they so choose. The application of the other petitioners is, however, dismissed.