Judgment :- 1. The petitioner in O.P. No. 323/1956 on the file of this Court is the appellant. He had an Abkari contract under the State and for the defaulted amounts due from him under that contract, 25.25 cents of his property and the buildings standing thereon were attached and sold under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, Act VII of 1951. The sale was held on 13-9 -1956 and in the absence of strangers to bid at the auction, the Tahsildar who conducted the sale proceedings, bid the property on behalf of the State for a nominal amount of one anna. Ext. A contains an account of the sale proceedings. O. P. 323/1956 was filed by the petitioner under Art.226 of the Constitution praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari setting aside the sale evidenced by Ext. A. The main grounds of attack against the sale are that the sale proceedings were illegal and improper and that the Tahsildar acted without jurisdiction in conducting the sale and himself bidding the property at the auction. The learned judge who heard the petition came to the conclusion that the several grounds of attack levelled against the sale were all untenable and accordingly he dismissed the petition. The appeal is against that order. 2. At the outset we may point out that the petitioner has not stated why he has chosen to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution when the Revenue Recovery Act itself has prescribed the mode in which a sale held under the provisions of that Act could be impeached. S.39 of the Act states that within 30 days of the date of sale the party aggrieved by the sale may apply to the Collector to set aside the sale on the ground of material irregularity or mistake or fraud in publishing or conducting it. By S.55, the Board of Revenue has been empowered to revise the orders passed on the proceedings conducted by a Collector or a Tahsildar. A right of suit is also reserved under S.56 of the Act in favour of the party aggrieved by the proceedings conducted by these Officers under the provisions of the Act. The attitude of the petitioner in ignoring these provisions and seeking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 is an indication of the lack of bonafides on his part. The attitude of the petitioner in ignoring these provisions and seeking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 is an indication of the lack of bonafides on his part. This aspect is seen to have been taken note of by the learned Single Judge who dismissed the petition. That the petition is lacking in good faith is by itself a sufficient ground on which the order dismissing the petition could be sustained. 3. On the merits of the petition also we are in agreement with the view taken by the learned judge that the grounds urged by the petitioner against the validity of the sale are untenable. Even though the petitioner has disputed the correctness of the amount as stated in Ext. A as representing the arrears due from him under the Abkari contract, he has no case that he is not a defaulter under that contract. The Abkari Act (Act IV of 1073) of Travancore under which this contract was entered into, has prescribed the manner in which the amounts due by way of arrears from an Abkari contractor could be realised, S.24 of that Act states that such arrears may be recovered from the defaulting party as if the same were arrears of land revenue. It was on the strength of this provision that the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act were resorted to for the purpose of realising the amount of abkari dues payable by the petitioner. Sales under this Act have to be conducted by the Tahsildar in the manner prescribed by S.36. It was in exercise of the power conferred by this section that the sale evidenced by Ext. A was conducted by the Tahsildar. It follows, therefore, that there is no substance in the petitioner's contention that the Tahsildar was acting without jurisdiction in conducting the sale. 4. The next ground on which great stress was laid by the learned counsel for the appellant relates to the bid made by the Tahsildar at the public auction. It is argued that the Tahsildar who was the vendor of the property, could not bid at the auction and thus become the purchaser also. This argument proceeds on a wrong assumption that in respect of the property sold in public auction under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, the position of the Tahsildar is that of the vendor of the property. This argument proceeds on a wrong assumption that in respect of the property sold in public auction under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, the position of the Tahsildar is that of the vendor of the property. Even at such a sale the defaulter whose property is put up for auction is the real vendor, the Tahsildar who is conducting the auction being only the statutory authority specially empowered to conduct the auction and thus to effect the sale on behalf of the owner of the property. It is also incorrect to say that the auction sale in the present case was in favour of the Tahsildar. It was the State who bid at the auction. No doubt such bid was made on behalf of the State by the Tahsildar acting as the agent of the State. It is so stated in Ext. A itself, Since the Tahsildar was not bidding the property or acquiring any interest therein for himself directly or indirectly, it cannot be said that he has violated the mandate contained in S.63 of the Revenue Recovery Act, in bidding the property for and on behalf of the State. The section only prohibits an Officer who has any duty to perform in connection with the auction sale from acquiring or attempting to acquire for himself any interest, either directly or indirectly, in the property put up for auction. 5. Still another objection urged on behalf of the appellant is that no written authority had been produced by the Tahsildar to show that the State had authorised him to bid on its behalf at the auction. This contention is based on sub-section 6 of S.36. Under that sub-section the Officer conducting the sale is empowered to insist on the person participating in the auction as the agent of somebody else, to produce a written authority signed by the principal in proof of the alleged agency. This is only an enabling provision and the object of it appears to be that the officer conducting the auction must be satisfied as to the real capacity in which each of the several bidders is participating in the auction. It is obvious that this provision can have no application to the situation where the bid is made by the officer himself as the agent of the State and that fact is recorded in the sale accounts. It is obvious that this provision can have no application to the situation where the bid is made by the officer himself as the agent of the State and that fact is recorded in the sale accounts. Whether the Tahsildar had the authority to bid as the agent of the State, is a matter for his own subjective satisfaction and where he is so satisfied there is no necessity to produce any special written authority. The non-production of such a written authority cannot render the sale illegal. 6. Another ground of illegality urged against the bid by the State is that the bid was for a nominal amount of one anna. It has to be remembered that the sale was in public auction after due proclamation. At such a public auction the sale will be to the highest bidder. An express provision to that effect is contained in Sub-S.(3) of S.36 of the Revenue Recovery Act. When there is only one bidder there is no scope for competition. But all the same there is nothing wrong or illegal in accepting his bid as the highest bid. This was what happened in the present case where the State alone chose to bid the property at the public auction and the sale was confirmed in favour of the State. So long as there is nothing illegal about such a sale, it cannot be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari merely for the reason that the sale was for a nominal amount. 7. The last ground urged on behalf of the appellant was that the amount for which the property was proclaimed for sale was different from the amount shown in the sale notice Ext. B and that this is a defect rendering the sale wholly void. We cannot agree with this contention. The reason for the difference between the amounts shown in Ext. B and in Ext. A is obvious. In Ext. B the principal amount was specified and it was stated that such amount with interest thereon was due from the defaulter. The interest thus due was also calculated and added on to the principal amount and the total amount that was thus due was mentioned in the proclamation. This accounts for the higher amount mentioned in Ext. A as compared with the principal amount alone as mentioned in Ext. The interest thus due was also calculated and added on to the principal amount and the total amount that was thus due was mentioned in the proclamation. This accounts for the higher amount mentioned in Ext. A as compared with the principal amount alone as mentioned in Ext. B. It cannot therefore be said that the property was proclaimed for an amount that was not really due from the defaulter. Even if there has been an error in calculating the amount due from the defaulter, it would not amount to an illegality rendering the sale void. 8. In the result this appeal fails, and it is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100.