Judgement JUDGMENT :- The appellants in. this second appeal are plaintiffs in the first court. The subject of dispute between the parties is a well called Govinda Kinar situated in S. No. 589/5 in the village of Pathai. It is common ground between the parties that the well is situated in a poromboke land, which obviously is not the exclusive property of any community or persons residing in Pathai village. The claim of the appellants as plaintiffs was that this well was constructed by one Govindan many years ago, and that this Govindan was one of the ancestors of some Pillaimars of the village. Their further case was that the Pillaimars and Kongamars of Pathai village alone were entitled to take water from this well, and they sought an injunction to restrain the Asaris and Thevars in Pathai village from drawing water from this well. 2. Both the Courts below have concurrently found that the claim of the well having been dug by Govindan, the alleged ancestor of some of the Pillaimars, the plaintiffs in the suit, was not made out. Both the Courts have also found that the well in question is a public well, both because it is situated in a Government poromboke land and also for the reason it has been consistently shown in the well register, Ex. B.2, maintained in the village by the Karnam for all public wells. These two findings are sufficient to conclude that the claim, as put forward in the plaint, to exclusive ownership or title in the well by the two communities in the village, Pillaimars and Kongamars, cannot be sustained. Realising the difficulty of the situation, Mr. Gopalakrishnan, the learned counsel for the appellants, raised a new point before me, which does not seem to have been urged in either of the courts below. His contention is that even if the well in question is a public well in which every member of the public has got right to take water, the right claimed by the representatives of the two communities, who came forward as plaintiffs, is a customary right which ought to have been recognised by the lower Courts. His contention is that even if the well in question is a public well in which every member of the public has got right to take water, the right claimed by the representatives of the two communities, who came forward as plaintiffs, is a customary right which ought to have been recognised by the lower Courts. In particular, he drew my attention to the observations made by the lower appellate Court, that from the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiffs that Court was satisfied that for 55 years the well in question has been exclusively used by the Pillaimars and Kongamars of that village. The learned counsel rightly pointed out that law does not set out a limit or require a minimum period of enjoyment for acquisition of customary right by the public or by a section of the public. Apart from the fact that this question was not raised in any of the courts below, there is the requirement namely that customary rights can be. recognised by Courts only if the custom is reasonable, besides being ancient and certain. This question of reasonableness can straightway be disposed of by a reference to Art. 15 of the Constitution which lays down categorically that no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. It is clear in view of this article that if a section of the public puts forward an exclusive right to the use of a public well, it must establish that that well was not dedicated to the use of the general public, but was dedicated to the exclusive use of the particular section, of the public. In the first place the mere user of a well by a section of the village community would not, by itself, be sufficient to indicate exclusion of other residents of the village from use of the well. In the first place the mere user of a well by a section of the village community would not, by itself, be sufficient to indicate exclusion of other residents of the village from use of the well. It may be that the particular well in question, by reason of its situation, is more accessible to members of one community in the village and the other residents of the village do not use that well either because another well, which is situated closer to their habitation, has better supply of water, or has got better access. Mere user in the absence of evidence, that other members of the village community had been prevented from using that well when they attempted to do so, would not be sufficient to establish dedication of the well to a particular community. Of course, Mr. Gopalakrishnan, the learned counsel for the appellants, pointed out that in 1931 the Asaris attempted to use this well and the Pillaimars prevented them from doing so. But, that is a recent instance which cannot be taken as sufficient proof of immemorial user or dedication for the use of Pillaimars and Kongamars alone. The learned counsel for the appellants drew my attention to the decisions in Kuar Sen v. Mamman, ILR 17 All 87 (A) and Palaniandi Thevan v. Puthiran Gonda Nandan, ILR 20 Mad 389 (B). In ILR 20 Mad 389 (B), a Bench of this Court has held that no fixed period of enjoyment is laid down by law as necessary to establish a customary right, and a customary right to use a well may exist apart from a dominant heritage. The well in question in that case was one situated on the private land of defendants 1 to 3, in which the Shanars of the village claimed a right of user. It was decided by the Bench that the Shanars could well establish a customary right to the use of the well even though they had not established any right of easement. The facts in the instant case are entirely different. The well now in dispute is a public well, and there can be no question of a section of the community claiming customary right in such a well. In ILR 17 All 87 (A), the dispute related to a piece of land which, a section of the people claimed as land used on ceremonial occasions by them. The well now in dispute is a public well, and there can be no question of a section of the community claiming customary right in such a well. In ILR 17 All 87 (A), the dispute related to a piece of land which, a section of the people claimed as land used on ceremonial occasions by them. That decision laid down that by virtue of a local custom an easement could be acquired by a section of the community in the land which was not a private one. I am not able to see how this decision has any bearing on the question involved in this litigation. Certainly, in view of Art. 15 of the Constitution, I cannot call the custom relied on by the plaintiffs in this case to be either reasonable or in accordance with enlightened modern notions of utility of public wells, if the plaintiffs had raised this new case of customary right in the lower courts. Therefore I would hold that even they must fail. 3. In view of the concurrent findings of both the Courts on the case set out and tried in both lower Courts this second appeal must fail and it is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. No leave. Appeal dismissed.