Judgment :- 1. The suit which has given rise to this Second Appeal was one for redemption of a mortgage. The plaintiff's deceased father Mathevan Kunchan was the mortgagor. He died leaving a widow and five children including the plaintiff. Alleging that the equity of redemption belonged to the sub-tarwad consisting of the widow and children of the deceased, the plaintiff instituted this suit on behalf of the sub¬tarwad seeking redemption of the whole property. The defendant-mortgagee contended that the widow and children got specific shares on his death, that he had purchased the 1/6th share of one of the children and that the plaintiff was entitled to redeem only his 1/6th share. Although the trial court found that the plaintiff was entitled only to 1/6th of the property, it allowed the plaintiff to redeem the whole property. On appeal the trial court's decree was modified and the decree for redemption was limited to the plaintiff's 1/6th share. The plaintiff has preferred this Second Appeal claiming redemption of the whole mortgage. 2. The only point for decision is whether the plaintiff can be allowed to redeem more than 1/6th of the property. It was not disputed that the heirs of the mortgagor became entitled to the property as tenants¬in-common, each getting 1/6th share and that the defendants had purchased the share of one of the heirs. The suit was brought on behalf of the sub-tarwad and it was found by the trial court that the heirs of the mortgagor did not obtain the property as a sub-tarwad. Redemption cannot therefore be allowed on that basis. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant did not contend that the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the 1/6th share acquired by the defendant by purchase. The argument advanced was that the mortgage should be deemed to be extinguished to the extent of the 1/6th share purchased by the defendant and that the plaintiff should be allowed to redeem the remaining 5/6th. Apart from the fact that the plaintiff did not choose to make the other heirs of the mortgagor parties to the suit, his prayer cannot be allowed as the integrity of the mortgage became broken when the defendant purchased the share of one of the heirs. Apart from the fact that the plaintiff did not choose to make the other heirs of the mortgagor parties to the suit, his prayer cannot be allowed as the integrity of the mortgage became broken when the defendant purchased the share of one of the heirs. According to the appellant, he is entitled as part-owner of the equity of redemption to redeem the whole of the residue which includes the share of the other co-owners who are not parties to the suit. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Privy Council in Mirza Yadali Beg v. Thukaram and another (A. I. R.1921 P.C.125) in support of this argument. It was contended that the Privy Council in effect overruled the earlier decision in Azimut Ali v. Jowahir Singh (13 M. I. Appeals 404) which held that when the integrity of a mortgage was broken by the mortgagee acquiring a share in the equity of redemption, the plaintiff who owned only a share was entitled to redeem only his share and no more. Some reported decisions such as Pala Singh v. Attar Singh (A. I. R.1954 Punjab 81) and Ghasiram v. Hiralal (A. I. R.1954 Madya Bharat 67) have taken the view that the earlier decision has been overruled by the decision in Mirza Yadali Beg v. Thukaram and another. With great respect I am unable to accept this view because Mirza Yadali Beg v. Thukaram was a case in which the integrity of the mortgage was not broken at all. The plaintiff in that suit was purchaser of one of 16 villages mortgaged and he sued for redemption of 9 villages which had been foreclosed by the mortgagee. The plaintiff had not been made a party to the foreclosure proceedings. The Judicial Commissioner held that the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the 9 villages on payment of the whole mortgage money after debiting the mortgagee with a fair occupation rent for the 9 villages during the period of his possession. The Privy Council also came to the conclusion that the mortgagee did not obtain perfect title to the 9 villages by foreclosure as the plaintiff was not made a party to the foreclosure proceedings. Since the mortgagee got only an imperfect title to the 9 villages, the integrity of the mortgage did not become broken up. The Privy Council also came to the conclusion that the mortgagee did not obtain perfect title to the 9 villages by foreclosure as the plaintiff was not made a party to the foreclosure proceedings. Since the mortgagee got only an imperfect title to the 9 villages, the integrity of the mortgage did not become broken up. After holding that the plaintiffs were not affected by the foreclosure proceedings, Viscount Haldane who delivered the judgment held: "The only question that arises is whether they are entitled to redeem the whole of the nine fields, or only the field conveyed to them subject to the mortgage over the whole. According to English law the respondents would have been entitled to redeem the mortgage in its entirety, subject only to the safeguarding of the equal title to redeem of any other person who had a right of redemption, a point which has not arisen so far in the present case. The respondents, being transferees of part of the security by English law, if it applied, would on the one hand be entitled to redeem the entire mortgage on the properties generally, and correlatively could not compel the mortgagee to allow them to redeem their part by itself. This would be so as the result of principle unless something had happened which extinguished the mortgage in whole or in part, such as an exercise of a power of sale originally conferred on the mortgagee by his security, or such conduct on the part of the transferees as would estop them from asserting what normally would have been their right. Nothing of this kind is alleged in the case before their Lordships." 4. Thus the question which their Lordships had to decide was whether the owner of part of the mortgaged properties could redeem the whole in a case in which the integrity of the mortgage was not broken up. It is therefore clear that the question which has decided in Azimut Ali's case did not arise in the later case and there is no justification for holding that their Lordships impliedly overruled the earlier decision, the correctness of which did not arise for consideration on the facts of the liter case. It has been held in Kallan Khan and others v. Mardan Khan and others (I.L.R 28 All. 155); Ahamed Hussain and others v. Muhammad Qasin Khan and others (A I. R.1926 All. It has been held in Kallan Khan and others v. Mardan Khan and others (I.L.R 28 All. 155); Ahamed Hussain and others v. Muhammad Qasin Khan and others (A I. R.1926 All. 46); Mr. Jagannath Kunwar v. Jaipal and others (A. I. R.1933 All. 257 F.B. ) Durga Prasad and another v. Chunni and others (A. I. R.1940 All. 528) and Abdul Wahab v. Raghunandan Lal (A.I. R.1945 All. 388) that when the integrity of mortgage is broken up it is not open to the plaintiff who owns only a share in the equity of redemption to redeem more than his share. This view is in consonance with the decision of the Privy Council in Azimut Ali's case. There is an observation in Govinda Pillai and others v. Ahmed Moosa and others (A.I.R.1954 T.C. 251) which supports the appellant but this question did not arise for decision in that case. Following the decision in Azimut Ali's case and the decisions of the Allahabad High Court referred to above I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to redeem only his share. This is the view taken by the lower appellate court and I confirm the same. In the result, the Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.