JUDGMENT M.I. Chaturvedi, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of Constitution praying for the quashing of an order passed by the 1st Respondent granting temporary permits to the 2nd Respondent, and also for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the 1st Respondent to proceed in accordance with law. 2. The Petitioners are the operators of passenger buses in the district of Gorakhpur. They have been running their buses on the whole or part of the route Pharenda-Brijman Ganj-Nautanwa and Sonahuli. On the 1st and 5th Dec. 1955, the 1st Respondent granted two stage carriages. The permits were granted for a period of three months, and the 2nd Respondent was to run the two carriages on a part of the above route namely, Nautanwa to Sonahuli. The Petitioners had also applied for the grant of these temporary permits, but the order of the 1st Respondent was against them and hence they filed the present petition on 2-3-1956 with the prayers mentioned above. 3. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners had urged two submissions in support of the petition. His first, submission is that the temporary permits are invalid because they have not been granted for any of the purposes mentioned in Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The second submission is that, even after the expiry of the three months' period, the 2nd Respondent has continued running the buses on temporary permits, and this was against the provisions of Section 62, inasmuch as the period for which a temporary permit can be granted is limited to four months in that section. The learned Counsel for the Respondents have controverted both the above propositions and they have further alleged that the two permits were granted only for a period of three months in December 1955, and the subsequent renewal was after the writ petition had been filed and the Petitioners therefore, in this case cannot make any complaint of events that happened after the petition had been filed in this Court. Another objection has been taken to the effect that the order passed by the 1st Respondent was appealable u/s 64(f) of the Act, and the Petitioners having failed to avail themselves of this remedy, it is not open to them to claim the reliefs sought for by them. Another objection has been taken to the effect that the order passed by the 1st Respondent was appealable u/s 64(f) of the Act, and the Petitioners having failed to avail themselves of this remedy, it is not open to them to claim the reliefs sought for by them. I propose to consider the preliminary objection first and then the other points. 4. Temporary permits were granted u/s 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Section 64(f) provides that any person, who has been providing transport facilities, will have a right to go up in appeal against an order granting a permit provided he opposes the grant of the permit before the Transport Authority. In the present case it does appear that the Petitioners or at least some of them had opposed the grant of the two temporary permits before the Authority concerned. That being the position, they could have gone up in appeal against the impugned order. There was another remedy open to them. But I do not think that the existence of another remedy is an absolute bar to entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. All the circumstances and the facts of the case have to be taken into consideration and, if as a result of the consideration, the Court thinks that the justice of the case requires interference, it is open to the Court to interfere with the order, even though the other remedy was not availed of by the Petitioner. In this case if the Petitioners had filed an appeal, the appeal, may not have come up for hearing for months and the entire purpose of filing the appeal would have been frustrated because the period of temporary permits would have expired after the lapse of three months. There is the further fact that, according to the admissions contained in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State, a clear illegality is being committed by the department and I do not think I should shut my eyes to the illegality because the Petitioners committed the mistake of not filing an appeal against the order. After a consideration of all the circumstances and facts of this case, I have come to the conclusion that the preliminary objection should not be given effect to. 5. After a consideration of all the circumstances and facts of this case, I have come to the conclusion that the preliminary objection should not be given effect to. 5. I now come to the first point raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, namely that the purposes for which a temporary permit could be granted have not been made out in this case. Section 62 mentions the purposes for which a temporary permit can be granted and these purposes are: (1) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions, (2) conveyance of passengers for purposes of seasonal business, and (3) to meet a particular, temporary need. I understand that a fourth purpose has also been added recently and that is that a temporary permit can be granted for the period during which proceedings for the grant of a regular permit are being taken. 6. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner says that, in the instant case, there is no question of conveying any passenger on special occasions, nor is there any seasonal business or temporary need. I do not agree with this contention of the learned Counsel. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State two purposes have been disclosed for the grant of temporary permits. One purpose is for providing transport to passengers because out of 7 buses that were running on the route, three were out of service for a long time. In order to replace those buses, temporary permits were granted. The second need is disclosed in Para No. 9 of the counter affidavit. It is stated there that between November and April there is a heavier traffic because a large number of Gurkha pensioners come to Gorakhpur during that period for drawing their pensions, and the traffic on this route increased temporarily during that period. I think the facts disclosed in the counter affidavit concerning the above two matters should be accepted as correct. 7. The next question is whether the needs disclosed in the counter affidavit make out any of the purposes mentioned in Section 62 of the Act. In my opinion the the breaking down of three buses did create a temporary need for which temporary permits could be granted u/s 62(c). The other ground is a ground covered by Clause (b), being the ground of seasonal business. In my opinion the the breaking down of three buses did create a temporary need for which temporary permits could be granted u/s 62(c). The other ground is a ground covered by Clause (b), being the ground of seasonal business. It is well known that a large number of inhabitants of Nepal were employed in the Indian army, and many of them are still in such employment. The persons who have been discharged come to India for drawing their pensions, and they, it appears, choose to do so during the winter months, November to April It may be due to the fact that the conditions in India in those winter months are better than the conditions in Nepal. The traffic increases particularly during that period and it can, therefore, be said that it is seasonal business for which temporary permits can be granted. I, therefore, do not agree with the first contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners. But the second contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners appears to have force. The opening words of Section 62 are as follows: A Regional Transport Authority may at its discretion, and without following the procedure laid down in Section 57, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily... 8. The argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is that there is a clear limitation as to time for which a temporary permit can be granted, and this limitation is a limitation of four months. A reading of the quoted portion of the section fully bears out the contention of the learned Counsel. The Legislature has taken care to say that the temporary permits can be effective for a limited period not, in any case, exceeding four months. The language is quite definite and clear. The learned Counsel for the Respondents, however, argued that the limitation that has been imposed is on the period of the permit and not on the power of the authority. The argument proceeds that the section prohibits the issuing of a temporary permit for a period exceeding four months; but if after expiry of four months the temporary need continues, another temporary permit can be granted for another period of four months closely following the first period. After giving due considerations to the argument. The argument proceeds that the section prohibits the issuing of a temporary permit for a period exceeding four months; but if after expiry of four months the temporary need continues, another temporary permit can be granted for another period of four months closely following the first period. After giving due considerations to the argument. I find myself unable to agree with it. In my opinion, the entire purpose of the limitation of the period laid down by the statute would be frustrated if this interpretation is put upon the section. There would be no point in the Legislature limiting the period of a particular permit leaving it open to the same authority to issue another paper of like nature extending the period by another four months. The limitation that has been imposed is on the power of the Regional Transport Authority to grant a temporary permit for a period of more than four months. The section confers a power on the authority concerned to grant a temporary permit without following the procedure laid down in Section 57. At the same time it imposes a limitation that such permit will not be effective for a period exceeding four months. The power is to issue a permit and the permit is to be for a particular period. The limitation thus is on the power and not merely on the permit. Cases may arise where it may be possible for the department to argued that the need for a temporary permit may arise on two occasions in the same year. That question I do not propose to consider in this case because what I find from the admitted facts is that the temporary permits were, in the first instance given for three months and those very permits were renewed, one for the period of two months and another for the period of three months. It is really the same permit which has been made effective for a period of more than four months. 9. If the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents is accepted, I think it will render nugatory the portion of Section 62 of the Act, which places a limit of four months on the period for which a temporary permit can be issued. In the case before me the temporary permits were renewed. 9. If the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents is accepted, I think it will render nugatory the portion of Section 62 of the Act, which places a limit of four months on the period for which a temporary permit can be issued. In the case before me the temporary permits were renewed. But there may be cases where a second temporary permit may be granted, which has to take effect immediately after the expiry of the period mentioned in the first temporary permit. Even in those cases 1 think the action of the Regional Transport Authority would be in contravention of the provisions of Section 62. For the same purpose, it is not legally possible to grant one or more temporary permits prolonging in total the period of four months. 10. The other point urged by the learned Counsel for the Respondents is that, when the writ petition was filed the temporary permits issued for three months were still in force, and, on the date of the filing of the writ petition, the temporary permits, being only for periods of three months, were valid and the Court should not look into the events which subsequently happened, namely, the event of renewing those permits. This argument does not appear to be quite correct, even so far as the facts are concerned. One of the temporary permits was granted for three months on 1-12-1955. The period of three months expired on 1-3-1956 and this permit was immediately renewed. The exact date of renewal has not been given, but a reading led to continuous running of the bus under the temporary permit. The petition was filed on 2-3-1956, namely, one day after the expiry of three months' period and was, therefore, on the date that Respondent No. 2 started running one of the buses under the renewed permit. The renewal of one of the temporary permits had taken place before the writ petition was filed and of the other after it had been filed. 11. Apart from this, I do not think that it would be a proper exercise of the discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution to dismiss a writ petition on a technical ground like this when it is quite apparent that the department had been illegally renewing temporary permits. 11. Apart from this, I do not think that it would be a proper exercise of the discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution to dismiss a writ petition on a technical ground like this when it is quite apparent that the department had been illegally renewing temporary permits. It is admitted in the counter-affidavit, filed on behalf of the 1st Respondent himself, which has been subsequently amended, that previously the two temporary permits were for three months and subsequently one of them was renewed for a period of two months and another for three months. It is thus admitted that one of the temporary permits has been allowed to be in force for a period of five months and another for a period of six months, when the purpose for which the permits were granted and renewed was exactly the same. I think it is open to this Court to see the position as it is not only on the date when the writ petition was filed but also on the date when the matter comes up before Court for decision. 12. The next question is what relief should be granted to the Petitioners in this case. I am inclined to believe the averments made in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State that the Petitioners had been unduly harassing the Gurkha pensioners who came from Nepal to draw their pensions. The department has acted in the interest of those workers and for best of motives, but the department also has to keep in view the law, which is supreme in a democratic country, and the law cannot be circumvented or disobeyed on considerations of equity. Considering all the circumstances of the case, I think the proper order to pass in this case would be to issue a writ of mandamus to the Respondents, the effect of which would be stopping of the running of buses on temporary permits for a period exceeding four months. I do not express any opinion on the point whether or not it would be open to the 1st Respondent to grant fresh permits to the 2nd Respondent for a period of four months beginning from November next. If a question ever arises, it would then be considered whether it is possible to grant a temporary permit for the purpose of a temporary recurring annual need. 13. If a question ever arises, it would then be considered whether it is possible to grant a temporary permit for the purpose of a temporary recurring annual need. 13. For the reasons given above, I allow this writ petition and order the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the 2nd Respondent to stop the running of its buses on Nautanwa Sonahuli part of the route, so far as it lies within the Indian territory, under the temporary permits which have already been granted or renewed in favour of the 2nd Respondent. A writ of mandamus shall issue to the 1st Respondent also directing the 1st Respondent to cancel the temporary permits already issued and renewed in favour of 2nd Respondent. 14. The Petitioners will have their costs of this petition from the Respondents.