Judgment :- 1. This is a revision by the City Corporation, Trivandrum, against the order of the learned Corporation 1st Class Magistrate acquitting the respondent under S.245 (1) of the Criminal P. C. 2. The respondent-accused was charged by the Revenue Inspector of the City Corporation, Trivandrum, under S.409 of the Trivandrum City Municipal Act (Act IV of 1116), read with R.31(2) of Part VI, Schedule II of the said Act. 3. According to the prosecution, the respondent was the highest bidder at the auction held for the right to run the cantonment Connemara Market for the period 1-4-1952 to 31-3-1953. The respondent is stated to have entered into an agreement with the Corporation, agreeing to pay the bid amount in certain instalments stated therein. He is stated also to have agreed that in case of default, the corporation could re-auction the right and collect from him any fine imposed by the Corporation together with other losses incurred by the corporation by such re-auction. It is the case of the corporation that the accused failed to remit the amounts as agreed to by him, and in consequence, the right to collect the market dues was put up in re-auction and the corporation sustained loss thereby. As distraint of his property was found impracticable, the present charge was laid and the subject matter of the charge was to prosecute him for failure to pay the sum of Rs. 915-4-0 being the loss, including fines, due to the corporation from the accused. 4. Before the learned Magistrate, the accused raised no other plea excepting that of pleading "not guilty". But during the later stages of the proceedings before the court the accused appears to have raised two specific contentions stating: (a) that the charge is barred by limitation under S.415 of Act IV of 1116; and (b) that the prosecution is not maintainable, as the amount due from the accused is on account of arrears of money due to the corporation on account of market dues defaulted by him as per terms of the agreement, and as such, the claim is of a civil nature to be agitated in a civil court. The trial court held against the accused on point (a) on the view that the section that is applicable is S.413 and not S.415. 5. The trial court held against the accused on point (a) on the view that the section that is applicable is S.413 and not S.415. 5. On point (b), the Magistrate held, following the ruling of the Travancore-Cochin High Court reported in Ahemad Hydros v. Alwaye Municipality (1950 KLT 345) that the amount due under a contract for the collection of market cess will not come under the dues mentioned in S.409 of Act IV of 1116. In view of his finding on point (b), he held that the prosecution started against the accused is incompetent and as such, acquitted the accused under S.245(1) of Crl. P. C. 6. The City Corporation, Trivandrum, has filed this revision against the said order of the lower court. It appears to have come before a single judge of the Travancore-Cochin High Court, who referred the matter to a Bench of two Judges. The learned counsel for the respondent-accused filed an application dated 27-1-1956 being Crl. M. P. 174/1956, for permitting him to raise the contention about the validity of S.409 of Act IV/1116 in view of Art.14 of the Constitution. His contention is found in Para.2 of the petition which runs as follows: "In so far as S.409 empowers the corporation to start prosecution for realising dues or damages in respect of breach of contract committed by a person the section is discriminatory and offends Art.14 of the Constitution of India". 6. On 20-3-1956, my Lord the Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Joseph, sitting in a Bench, ordered this application, as there was no opposition to the same. Further, the same learned judges, by order dated 29th August 1956, referred the Crl. R. P. for decision by a Full Bench 7. Though the Corporation was the petitioner, we permitted the respondent to first argue the case about the constitutional validity of S.409 of the Act; because if that contention was accepted, the whole prosecution itself will fall to the ground and it may not be necessary for us to canvass the reasons given by the trial court for acquitting the accused. 8. The sole contention of Mr. Easwara Iyer, learned counsel for the accused respondent, was that S.409 of Act IV of 1116 is discriminatory and void as offending Art.14 of the Constitution. S.409 of the Act runs as follows: "Payment of compensation etc. by and to the Corporation Recovery of 409. 8. The sole contention of Mr. Easwara Iyer, learned counsel for the accused respondent, was that S.409 of Act IV of 1116 is discriminatory and void as offending Art.14 of the Constitution. S.409 of the Act runs as follows: "Payment of compensation etc. by and to the Corporation Recovery of 409. All costs, damages, penalties, compensation, charges, sums due as fees, rents, expenses, contributions and other sums which taxes under this Act or any rule, byelaw or regulation made thereunder or any other law or under any contract, including a contract in respect of water-supply or drainage made in accordance with this Act, and the rules, bye-laws and regulations shall, if there is no special provision in this Act for their recovery, be demanded by bill containing particulars of the demand and notice of the liability incurred in default of payment and may be recovered in the manner provided by R.31 and 37 of the rules contained in Part VI of Schedule II unless within fifteen days from the date of service of the bill, such person shall have applied to the District Court of Trivandrum under S.410". Mr. Easwara Iyer contended that the relevant portion in S.409:- "and may be recovered in the manner provided by R.31 and 37 of the rules-" eaves some discretion without any guidance, in an Executive authority to exercise, the powers given under this section. R.31(2) in part VI of schedule II of the rules framed under the Act runs as follows: "If for any reason the distraint, or a sufficient distraint of the defaulter's property is impracticable, the commissioner may prosecute the defaulter before a Magistrate". According to Mr. Easwara Iyer, this sub-rule makes the commissioner the sole judge for taking action under this sub-clause without giving or indicating any guiding rule or principles as to how the commissioner is to act. 9. Art.14 of the Constitution on which the contention regarding discrimination is based states: "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or, the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India". We may state that Mr. Easwara Iyer did not attack the validity of this S.409 apart from Art.14 of the Constitution. 9. Art.14 of the Constitution on which the contention regarding discrimination is based states: "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or, the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India". We may state that Mr. Easwara Iyer did not attack the validity of this S.409 apart from Art.14 of the Constitution. He relied upon the well known cases of the Supreme Court reported in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali (AIR 1952 SC 75), Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1953 SC 404) and the decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court reported in P. J. Joseph v. Assistant Excise Commissioner (AIR 1953 T-C 146). He also relied upon the decision in Bahadur Singh v. Jaswant Raj (AIR.1953 Rajasthan 158). In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali (AIR 1952 SC 75), their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the validity of the provisions contained in the West Bengal Special Courts Act X of 1950. The particular section which came in for severe attack was S.5 of the said Act which provides: "The special courts shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases as the State Government may, by general or special order in writing direct". The point of attack was that the said section gave a naked and arbitrary power to the executive without laying down any standard or rules of guidance to make use of the procedure laid down by it. Dealing with this attack on the said clause, their Lordships observe: "The selection is left to the absolute and unfettered discretion of the Executive Government with nothing in the law to guide or control its action. This is not a reasonable classification at all but an arbitrary selection". The Supreme Court, by a majority held, that the provisions of S.5(1) of the said Act are ultra vires of the Constitution by reason of their being in conflict with Art.14. This is not a reasonable classification at all but an arbitrary selection". The Supreme Court, by a majority held, that the provisions of S.5(1) of the said Act are ultra vires of the Constitution by reason of their being in conflict with Art.14. In the next case reported in Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1953 SC 404) their Lordships of the Supreme Court considering the provisions of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Codes) Act XXI of 1949 observed, at page 406 as follows: "Now it is well settled that the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art.14 of the Constitution does not mean that all laws must be general in character and universal in application and that the State is no longer to have the power of distinguishing and classifying persons or things for the purposes of legislation. To put it simply, all that is required in class or special legislation is that the legislative classification must not be arbitrary but should be based on an intelligible principle having a reasonable relation to the object which the legislature seeks to attain. To put it simply, all that is required in class or special legislation is that the legislative classification must not be arbitrary but should be based on an intelligible principle having a reasonable relation to the object which the legislature seeks to attain. If the classification on which the legislation is founded fulfils, this requirement, then the differentiation which the legislation makes between the class of persons or things to which it applies and other persons or things left outside the purview of the legislation cannot be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the law Dealing with the argument that the vice of discrimination consisted in the unguided and unrestricted power of singling out for different treatment, one among a class of persons, all of whom are similarly situated and circumstanced their Lordships observed at p. 407 as follows: "The argument overlooks the distinction between those cases where the legislature itself makes a complete classification of persons or things and applies to them the law which it enacts and others where the Legislature merely lays down the law to be applied to persons or things answering to a given description or exhibiting certain common characteristics; but being unable to make a precise and complete classification, leaves it to an administrative authority to make a selective application of the law to persons or things within the defined group, while laying down the standards or at least indicate in clear terms the underlying policy and purpose in accordance with and in fulfilment of, which the administrative authority is expected to select the persons or things to be brought under the operation of law". Finally their Lordships concluded: "Whether an enactment providing for special procedure for the trial of certain offences is or is riot discriminatory and violative of Art.14 must be determined in each case as it arises, for, no general rule applicable to all cases can safely be laid down". Ultimately their Lordships held that S.4 of the Act, challenged before them, was constitutionally valid. In P.J. Joseph v. Assistant Excise Commissioner, (AIR 1953 T-C 146) Sankaran and Subramonia Ayyar, JJ. had to deal with R.7 framed under the Cochin Abkari Act, I of 1077. R.7 was as follows: "Licenses for the sale of foreign liquor Indian made foreign spirits, etc. etc. shall be in the forms appended hereto. In P.J. Joseph v. Assistant Excise Commissioner, (AIR 1953 T-C 146) Sankaran and Subramonia Ayyar, JJ. had to deal with R.7 framed under the Cochin Abkari Act, I of 1077. R.7 was as follows: "Licenses for the sale of foreign liquor Indian made foreign spirits, etc. etc. shall be in the forms appended hereto. This will be issued at the discretion of the commissioner for an annual fee of Rs. 1,000/-. Under this license, the sale of foreign liquor to any person other than a retail or tavern licensee is prohibited except in sealed bottles to 'such extent' and in such manner as may be permitted by the Commissioner. It This rule was challenged before the learned judges on the ground that power has been given to an officer to fix the quantity in a naked and arbitrary manner and has a potency of being exercised with unjust discrimination as there are no principles or standards prescribed to guide or regulate the exercise of power. The learned judges observed at p. 151 of the report. "Whatever might have been the validity of such an authority before 26-1-50, when the Constitution of India came into force, every citizen of India being thereunder and thereafter entitled to "equality before the law" or "the equal protection of laws", under Art.14, such power which is capable of being used with discrimination in favour or against particular individuals would be void and inoperative". The last case relied upon by Mr. Easwara Iyer is in Bahadur Singh v. Jaswant Raj (AIR 1953 Rajasthan 158. The learned judges there had to deal with S.48 of the Matsya Customs Ordinance 1943. S.48 left it to the discretion of the Superintendent of Customs either to prosecute an offender under the Ordinance in a court of law or to deal with him departmentally and impose penalties prescribed thereunder. Following the decision of the Supreme Court: in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali (AIR 1952 SC 75) and other cases, the learned judges held, that the officer therein has been given an unrestricted power to send any cases he likes to a court of law and retain any case of the same type to be dealt with departmentally at his discretion by his own self and that there was no reasonable classification. The learned judges observed at p. 162: "The provision of law, which gives such an unbridled and arbitrary power to an Executive officer to make distinction between one man and another similarly situated cannot but be termed a discriminatory and hostile provision, and is clearly hit by the provision of Art.14 of the Constitution. In my opinion, S.48 of the Ordinance offends against the fundamental rights of equal protection of laws and equality before the laws enshrined in Art 14 of the Constitution, and is, therefore, void under Art.13". Based upon the principles laid down in the above rulings, Mr. Easwara Iyer contended that S.409 of the Act is void as it offends the prohibition against discrimination embodied in Art.14 of the Constitution. He contends that there is nothing in the Statute to indicate in what manner the discretion is to be exercised under S.409 or under R.31(2) of the Taxation Rules. He says that such a power is likely to be abused and exercised arbitrarily by the commissioner who has been vested with such a power. 10. In this particular case it must be stated that the accused does not contend that that power has been exercised in any way arbitrarily or malafide by the commissioner in deciding to prosecute him under R.31(2). Mr. Easwara Ayyar's further contention is that there is an objectionable discrimination shown in favour of the corporation under S.409 read with R.31(2). While the corporation can enforce its rights in the manner provided therein, the party in the same position, is left to work out his right under the ordinary law. 11. Mr. Govindan Nair, learned counsel for the petitioner corporation contends that the provisions contained in S.409 or R.31(2) do not in any way infringe upon the equal protection guaranteed under Art.14. His contention is that the section and the rules are only in the interests of securing the finances of a public body which itself exists in the interests of the general public. He says that the special rights given to the corporation is amply justified and those provisions have been made to enable the public body, like the corporation, to collect its dues and other amounts as expeditiously as possible It does not require any argument that a Municipal body cannot effectively discharge the various duties imposed upon it to the public unless its financial position is sound. With this object the Act and the rules have made some special provisions for a speedier collection of the amounts due to the corporation. 12. Even apart from this, the learned counsel argues that a party who enters into a contract with the Municipality must be deemed to be aware of the several provisions of the City Municipal Act which give special rights to the public body in the matter of the realisation of its dues. Further, S.409 itself contemplates the issue of a bill containing the claim of the Municipal council being served on the party charged with a liability and also further intimating him by notice of the liability incurred in default of payment. The said section further gives a right to a party to apply, within 15 days of the receipt of such demand from the Municipal council, to the District Court of Trivandrum under S.410 of the Act. It is only after default is committed in payment after the service of the bill, the Municipality is authorised to recover the amount in the manner provided by R.31 and 37 of the rules contained in part VI of schedule II. R.31(1) provides for giving an opportunity to the party of showing cause against the demand made by the Municipal Council. If the party has not shown cause to the contrary to the Commissioner, the Commissioner is authorised to recover the amount by distraint and sale of the movable property of the defaulter. If the default is in respect of any building or land, the commissioner is also given powers to enforce by distraint and sale of any movable property found on such building or land and collect the amount. The proviso to S.31(1) exempts from distress the items of movable property described in the proviso to sub-section (1) of S.52 C. P. C. Clause.2 of R.31 states, that if for any reason, the distraint or a sufficient distraint of the defaulter's property is impracticable, the commissioner may prosecute the defaulter before a magistrate. We are in entire agreement with the contentions of Mr. Govindan Nair. 13. Mr. Govindan Nair further argues that the commissioner being the chief Executive Officer of the Municipal Council, ran be trusted to exercise his discretion in an honest and bonafide manner. We are in entire agreement with the contentions of Mr. Govindan Nair. 13. Mr. Govindan Nair further argues that the commissioner being the chief Executive Officer of the Municipal Council, ran be trusted to exercise his discretion in an honest and bonafide manner. Further S.9 of the Act itself says that the commissioner is to perform all the duties and exercise all the powers specifically imposed or conferred on him, subject to all the other restrictions and limitations and conditions provided in the Act. In our opinion, R.31(2) itself provides a restriction on the powers of the commissioner or in any event, it gives a legislative guidance indicating under what circumstances the commissioner may prosecute the defaulter. It is very clear from R.31(1) that the commissioner has first to issue a notice of demand and then wait for the party to show cause against the demand. It is only through that he is given the power to distrain the movable property of the defaulter. R.37 provides an additional power to the commissioner to distrain the movable property of a defaulter, wherever it may be found within Travancore and clauses (b) to (g) of R.37 provide the procedure to be followed in that respect. 14. R.31(2) makes it a condition precedent for prosecution, the impracticability of the commissioner being able to effect a distraint. Even in respect of such a prosecution it will be seen that he can be convicted under R.40(1) only when the magistrate is satisfied that the omission to pay the amount was wilful and not otherwise. Therefore, the commissioner before he proceeds to exercise his powers under R.31(2) will have to be satisfied about the impracticability of a distraint and also prima facie about the wilful nature of the default. If he does not exercise his mind and satisfies himself about these points, a prosecution under R.31(2) is bound to fail. 15. Mr. Govindan Nair has relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in Kuppuswamy Gramani v. State of Madras (1956-II MLJ 185) where Mr. Justice Subba Rao of the Madras High Court, in considering the special powers given to the Government under the Madras Revenue Recovery Act has held that those provisions do not infringe Art.14 of the Constitution. Mr. Govindan Nair has relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in Kuppuswamy Gramani v. State of Madras (1956-II MLJ 185) where Mr. Justice Subba Rao of the Madras High Court, in considering the special powers given to the Government under the Madras Revenue Recovery Act has held that those provisions do not infringe Art.14 of the Constitution. S.52 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, (Act II of 1864) provided among other things for the recovery of "All sums due to the State Government including compensation for any loss or damage sustained by them in consequence of a breach of contract in the same manner as arrears of land revenue under the provisions of this Act." The clause that was impugned in S.52 was: "And all sums due to the Provincial Government including compensation for any loss or damage sustained by them in consequence of a breach of contract." This was attacked as infringing Art.14 of the Constitution. It was contended that the said clause makes unreasonable discrimination between the Government and a person other than the Government. It was also argued that in the case of the Government, they can recover the amount by resorting to coercive process under the Revenue Recovery Act, whereas a party in the same circumstances, has to file a suit for the ascertainment of the amount due, get a decree and execute the same against the Government through Court. The learned judge observed at page 187 as follows: "There cannot be any doubt that the impugned clause discriminates the State from any other person in the matter of realising a debt. But the question is whether the said act of discrimination can be justified on the basis of a reasonable classification The purpose of the classification is apparent. It is equally its duty, if it should function effectively to realise the amounts spent on such activities as early as possible. "Public interest demand that such dues should be collected expeditiously. The classification, therefore, is not arbitrary. There is reasonable basis for the classification, having regard to the obvious differences between the State and the private individual in their relation to the object underlying the impugned legislation." With respect, we agree with these forceful observations of the learned Judge. "Public interest demand that such dues should be collected expeditiously. The classification, therefore, is not arbitrary. There is reasonable basis for the classification, having regard to the obvious differences between the State and the private individual in their relation to the object underlying the impugned legislation." With respect, we agree with these forceful observations of the learned Judge. This is a case of a public body and all the observations of the learned judge apply with equal force to the case that we have now on hand. In our opinion, the powers given under S.409 to the Municipal Council, has really to be read in the context of the various duties imposed on the Municipal Council under the Act, and considered from this point of view, we do not see anything wrong in S.409 as infringing Art.14 of the Constitution. 16. In our view, R.31(2) is also not hit in any way by Art.14. As indicated earlier, there is no such naked and arbitrary power vested in the Commissioner. 17. In Globe Theatres Ltd., v. State of Madras (AIR 1954 Mad. 690), a Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar, Chief Justice and Panchapakesa Ayyar, Justice, in considering the powers given to the Government under S.13 of Madras (Buildings Lease and Rent Control) Act XXV of 1949 to exempt buildings from the operation of the Act held that it does not in any way offend Art.14. S.13 of that Act runs as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act the State Government may, by notification in the Fort St. George Gazette exempt any buildings or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of this Act." The learned Chief Justice considered the scope of the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali (AIR 1952 SC 75) and Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1953 SC 404) referred to above and summarised the effect of these decisions as follows at p, 698: "The net result of these decisions of the Supreme court appears to me, to be this. If the policy and object of the Act can be discovered within the four corners of that Act including the preamble, and discretion is vested in the Government to make a selection in furtherance of that policy and object for the application of the Act, then the provision conferring such power is not void as offending Art.14 of the Constitution. If such power is improperly exercised in any particular case, that is, not in furtherance of the policy and the object of the Act, but arbitrarily then the court can strike down the exercise of such power on every such occasion." Applying this test the learned judges came to the conclusion that S.13 that was challenged before them, cannot be struck down. The learned judges further observed at p. 698: "But if it be shown in any given case that the discretion has been exercised in disregard of the standard or contrary to the declared policy and object of the legislation or arbitrarily or malafide, then such exercise can be challenged and declared void under Art.14 " We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning of the learned judges in the above mentioned decision. 18. That the conferring of a discretion in an officer, by itself, will not bring it within the mischief of Art.14 of the Constitution, has also been held in a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in M/s. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India (AIR 1957 SC 397). 18. That the conferring of a discretion in an officer, by itself, will not bring it within the mischief of Art.14 of the Constitution, has also been held in a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in M/s. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India (AIR 1957 SC 397). Their Lordships had to consider the scope of S.5(7A) of the Income Tax Act which runs as follows: "The commissioner of Incometax may transfer any case from one Income Tax Officer subordinate to him to another, and the Central Board of Revenue may transfer any case from any one Income Tax Officer to another Such transfer may be made at any stage of the proceedings, and shall not render necessary the re-issue of any notice already issued by the Incometax Officer from whom the case is transferred." In considering the attack on the said section with reference to Art.14, their Lordships observe at page 408 as follows: "Nevertheless this power which is given to the Commissioner of Income tax and the Central Board of Revenue has to be exercised in a manner which is not discriminatory No rules or directions having been laid down in regard to the exercise of that power in particular cases, the appropriate authority has to determine what are the proper cases in which such power should be exercised having regard to the object of the Act and the ends to be achieved Such discretion would necessarily have to be vested in the authority concerned and merely because the case of a particular assessee is transferred from the Income Tax officer of an area within which he resides or carries on business to another incometax officer whether within or without the State will not by itself be sufficient to characterise the exercise of the discretion as discriminatory Even if there is a possibility of discriminatory treatment of persons falling within the same group or category, such possibility cannot necessarily invalidate the piece of legislation." After stating that the power in that case is vested not in minor officials but in top ranking authorities in the Income Tax Department, their Lordships observed: "This power is discretionary and not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power cannot be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in such high officials". Their Lordships further observed at p. 409: "There may be cases where improper execution of power will result in injustice to the parties. As has been observed, however, the possibility of such discriminatory treatment cannot necessarily invalidate the legislation and where there are abuse of such power, the parties aggrieved are not without ample remedies under the law. What will be struck down in such cases will riot be the provisions which invest the authorities with such power but the abuse of the power itself". Their Lordships have reviewed all the previous decisions of the Supreme Court concerning this matter including their decisions in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali (AIR 1952 SC 75) and Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1953 SC 404), already referred to earlier in this judgment. 19. Following the decision of the Madras High Court in Globe Theatres Ltd. v. State of Madras (AIR 1954 Mad. 690) and the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India (AIR 1957 SC 397), we hold that neither S.409 of Act IV/1116 nor R.31(2) in part VI of schedule II of the said Act is void or repugnant to the provisions of Art.14 of the Constitution. In this view, the main contention urged by Mr. Easwara Iyer fails. During the hearing of this revision, we entertained a doubt as to whether a prosecution under R.31(2) will be a manner of recovery of the dues as contemplated under S.409 of the Act. As the assistance of the counsel who was appearing for the respondent - accused was not available to us during the further hearing of the case we requested Mr. K. K. Mathew, Advocate to assist us on this matter and he appeared and argued the case on this point in response to our request. 20. As the counsel for the accused-respondent himself did not seriously argue this point, we do not think it necessary to very elaborately consider this aspect. But after hearing Mr. Govindan Nair, learned counsel for the city corporation and the learned Public Prosecutor who supported the stand taken by Mr. Govindan Nair for the complainant and Mr. K. K. Mathew as Amicus Curiae, we are of opinion, that prosecution under R.31(2) is a manner of recovery for the amounts mentioned in S.409 of the Act. 21. But after hearing Mr. Govindan Nair, learned counsel for the city corporation and the learned Public Prosecutor who supported the stand taken by Mr. Govindan Nair for the complainant and Mr. K. K. Mathew as Amicus Curiae, we are of opinion, that prosecution under R.31(2) is a manner of recovery for the amounts mentioned in S.409 of the Act. 21. S.409 enables the corporation to recover the several amounts, including amounts due under any contract, in the manner provided by R.31 & 37 of the rules contained in part VI of Schedule II. 22. We may also state that no contentions were urged that S.409 does not embrace amounts due under any contract. In fact, it could not be argued because the section is very clear and takes in all sums due under any contract also. S.375 provides several penalties for several acts mentioned therein. Non-payment of a tax as such, has not been made an "offence" under any provision of the Act. That there could be a prosecution under the Act under two different circumstances is well brought out by the provisions of S.413 and 415 of the Act. S.413 states that no distraint shall be made, no suit shall be instituted and no prosecution shall be commenced in respect of any sum due to the corporation under this Act after the expiration of a period of three years from the date, on which distraint might first have been made, a suit might first have been instituted or prosecution might first have been commenced as the case may be, in respect of such sum. This section, in our opinion, contemplates a prosecution for something other than an offence under the Act. Prosecution for any offence under any of the provisions of the Act rule, or bye-law etc. is provided under S.415 and the period of limitation is fixed as six months from the commission of the offence. Therefore, S.413 and 415 deal with two different types of prosecution. 23. The rules relating to the manner of collection of taxes is embodied in part VI of Schedule II of the Act It is common ground that but for the provision made in S.409, the several amounts mentioned therein cannot be collected by the procedure applicable to taxes alone. The provisions made applicable under S.409 are R.31 and 37. 23. The rules relating to the manner of collection of taxes is embodied in part VI of Schedule II of the Act It is common ground that but for the provision made in S.409, the several amounts mentioned therein cannot be collected by the procedure applicable to taxes alone. The provisions made applicable under S.409 are R.31 and 37. R.31(1) provides for distress proceedings being taken by the commissioner regarding the movables of the defaulter. It says: "The commissioner may recover etc. etc.". Again Clause.3 of S.31 speaks of recovery of tax, duty or other amount by resorting to a Civil court. R.31(2) states that if distraint or a sufficient distraint is impracticable, the commissioner may prosecute the defaulter before a magistrate. That this is a manner of recovery will also be clear for two reasons. One is, S.409 itself says that the amount may be recovered in the manner provided by R.31 etc. R.31 has got three clauses. Clause.2 providing for prosecution being in R.31 must have been considered by the Legislature also as a manner of recovery. The second reason is that R.31(2) will have to be read along with R.40 of the Taxation Rules. R.40(1) states that every person who is prosecuted under sub-rule 2 of R.31, shall be liable, on proof to the satisfaction of the magistrate that he wilfully omitted to pay the amount due by him, to pay a fine not exceeding twice the amount which may be due by him on account of the tax etc. and the expenses for distress. Clause.2 of R.40 enjoins upon the magistrate to recover summarily from the accused, apart from fine, the amount of tax etc. mentioned in Clause.1 of R.40. This itself clearly shows that when a prosecution is made under Clause.2 of R.31, the other provisions of R.40 will also follow. That is, by resorting to prosecution under R.31(2) the corporation will be enabled to collect the amount due to them through the Magistrate. R.31, Clause.3, also gives a clear indication that prosecution under Clause.2 is a manner of recovery. 24. In this connection, we may also have regard to the marginal note to S.409 which is: "Recovery of sums due as taxes." In Bengal Immunity Co. R.31, Clause.3, also gives a clear indication that prosecution under Clause.2 is a manner of recovery. 24. In this connection, we may also have regard to the marginal note to S.409 which is: "Recovery of sums due as taxes." In Bengal Immunity Co. v State of Bihar (AIR 1955 SC 661 at 676) their Lordships held that prima facie the marginal note furnishes a clue as to the meaning and purpose of the Article. Therefore, even on this basis S.409 must be considered to make available all the provisions for recovery of taxes pure and simple. 25. Mr. K. K. Mathew, who has appeared at our request, as Amicus Curiae, contended that prosecution is not a mode of recovery. He also contended that it could not have been in the contemplation of the legislature that parties who enter into a contract with a Municipal Body should be liable to be prosecuted under that Act. He also placed great reliance upon the non-mentioning in S.409 that the various amounts are to be considered as taxes or deemed to be considered as taxes. Therefore, according to him, even such a legal fiction has not been incorporated in the section. He also contended that breach of contract is not a public wrong and referred to certain American decisions on this point. He also placed very strong reliance on the wording in Clause.2 of R.40. Clause.2 of R.40 starts by saying: "Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under sub-rule 1 the magistrate shall in addition to any fine etc. etc." Mr. Mathew contended that the conviction under R.40(1) is for an offence and non-payment of amounts due under a contract will certainly not be an offence. Though we do see very great force in his argument based upon clause (2) of R.40, we have also to consider that there is no provision in the Statute making even the non-payment of a tax an offence. Therefore, the expression "offence" under clause (2) of R.40 is used in a very loose sense. But when we take the whole of R.31 and R.40 together, we do not see any reason against holding that these are modes of recovery 26. In fact, we put it directly to Mr. Mathew about the application of clause (1) and clause (3) of R.31 regarding the amounts mentioned under S.409. But when we take the whole of R.31 and R.40 together, we do not see any reason against holding that these are modes of recovery 26. In fact, we put it directly to Mr. Mathew about the application of clause (1) and clause (3) of R.31 regarding the amounts mentioned under S.409. He readily agreed that those two clauses will be 'a manner of recovery' contemplated by S.409. If so, we are not able to see how Clause.2 which finds a place in R.31 can be taken to be something other than a manner of recovery. In fact, Mr. Mathew found it very difficult also to explain the prosecution contemplated under S.413 and the prosecution contemplated under S.419. We have indicated earlier our views about the two different prosecutions contemplated under the two different sections. 27. Mr. Mathew further contended that it is very unconscionable for a Municipal council to collect nearly double the amount by virtue of a prosecution under R.31(2) read with R.40. When the section itself is not challenged on any other ground, the clear wording of the section brings within its ambit also amounts due under a contract. It is not as if that a party is not without a remedy, because the remedy is provided under S.410 onwards. Further, it is not as if that the Municipality is entitled to get double the amount when there is a conviction under Clause.1 of R.40. The said rule only gives power to the magistrate to levy a fine not exceeding twice the amount due mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) therein. Further, the corporation can succeed in a prosecution only when the magistrate is satisfied that the omission to pay the amount was wilful. The corporation will get only the amounts as provided in Clause.2 of R.40. 28. Mr. Mathew next contended that R.40 will not apply because it deals only with taxes. The short answer is that Part VI of schedule II itself deals only with collection of taxes and but for the special provision made under S.409, R.31 and 37 will not at all apply to the amounts mentioned in the said section. The object of the section is to enable the council to recover those amounts as if they were taxes by adopting the manner indicated in R.31 and 37. The object of the section is to enable the council to recover those amounts as if they were taxes by adopting the manner indicated in R.31 and 37. When Clause.2 of R.31 is invoked, R.40 also necessarily operates as it has to be read along with R.31(2). 29. After considering the arguments of Mr. Mathew and Mr. Govindan Nair on this point, we are satisfied that prosecution is a manner of recovery contemplated under S.409 of the Act. 30. Before concluding, we must express our grateful thanks for the valuable assistance given to us by Mr. K. K. Mathew as Amicus Curiae, in response to our request. 31. Coming to the actual merits of the case, we must state that Mr. Easwara Ayyar did not argue any point other than the validity of S.409 as being hit by Art.14. 32. Mr. Govindan Nair, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contends that the actual decision of the lower court based on the decision in Ahemad Hydros v. Alwaye Municipality (1950 KLT 345) is not correct. The decision in Ahemad Hydros v. Alwaye Municipality (1950 KLT 345) related to a question arising under S.365 of the Travancore District Municipalities Act, the wording of which is quite different from the section before us namely, S.409 of the Trivandrum City Municipal Act IV/1116. S.409, as discussed above, specially takes in all sums due "under any contract including etc. etc.". Therefore, the trial court was not correct in applying the decision in, Ahemad Hydros v. Alwaye Municipality (1950 KLT 345) and acquitting the accused. 33. In the result, the order of the lower court is set aside and the case remanded to that court for fresh disposal on the merits according to law and in the light of the observations contained in the judgment.