DEKA J.: These are three connected applications made un­der Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for appropriate writs. All these cases practically arise from the same set of facts and the points involved are almost identical and that is why they are treated as analogous matters. The State Government of Assam passed an Act in 1954 The Assam State Road Trans­port Act, 1954' (Assam Act XXX of 1954) which came into force with effect from the 20th October, 1954. Three of its sections are relevant for the purpose of these cases and they are Ss. 3, 4 and 5 which are reproduced below for the purpose of easy reference: "3. Power of the State Government to run Road Transport Services.-Where the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary in the interest of general public and for sub serving the common good so to direct, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that the road transport services in general or any particular class of such service on any route or portion thereof, as may be specified, shall be run and operated by the State Government exclusively or by the State Government in conjunction with Rail­way, or partly by the State Government and partly by others in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 4. Scheme of State Road Transport Services.-(1) As soon as may be after the publication of the noti­fication under S. 3, the State Government or if the State Government so directs, the Transport Commis­sioner shall publish, in such manner as may be speci­fied, a scheme as to the State Road Transport Service framed in pursuance of the declaration under S. 3. Scheme of State Road Transport Services.-(1) As soon as may be after the publication of the noti­fication under S. 3, the State Government or if the State Government so directs, the Transport Commis­sioner shall publish, in such manner as may be speci­fied, a scheme as to the State Road Transport Service framed in pursuance of the declaration under S. 3. (2) The scheme under sub-s. (1) shall provide for all or any of the following matters, that is to say- (a) die date on which the State Road Transport Service shall commence to operate; (b) the route or any portion thereof on which the State Road Transport Service shall be provided; (c) the State Road Transport Services which are to be provided on the route or any portion thereof and for prohibiting or restricting the provision on the route or its portion of transport services otherwise than under the scheme; (d) the extent to which persons other than the State Government will be permitted to provide road transport services on the route or any portion thereof specified in clause (b); (e) the road transport services which will be provided by the State Government exclusively or by the State Government in conjunction with Railway; (f) the type and carrying capacity of transport vehicles to be used in such services; (g) the cancellation or the modification of the existing permits granted under Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939); (h) the reduction in the number of transport vehicles plying on the route; (1) the curtailment of the route covered by the existing permits or transfer of the permits to any other route or routes; and (j) the convenience of the ordinary class of passengers; (k) such other consequential or incidental mat­ters as may appear necessary or expedient for the purposes of the scheme. (5) Objections to the Schema. 1. Any person whose interests are affected may, within thirty days from the publication of the scheme, file objections to the same before the Transport Com­missioner. 2. The State Government or if the State Gov­ernment so directs, the prescribed authority, as the case may be, shall after having considered the ob­jections either confirm, modify or alter the scheme. 3. 1. Any person whose interests are affected may, within thirty days from the publication of the scheme, file objections to the same before the Transport Com­missioner. 2. The State Government or if the State Gov­ernment so directs, the prescribed authority, as the case may be, shall after having considered the ob­jections either confirm, modify or alter the scheme. 3. The scheme as confirmed, modified or altered under sub-s. (2) shall then be published in the Gazette, and the same shall thereupon become final and the route to which it relates shall be called the notified route.'' (2) In pursuance of S. 3, the State Government published a notification, a copy whereof is marked 'Annexure-F whereby they indicated that they were going to declare that the road transport service in the routes mentioned in schedule attached thereto would be run and operated exclusively by the State Government. Item 3 of that notification refers to Tezpur-North Lakhimpur including Tezpur-Ranga-para route via Balipara and also via Binduguri and fair weather Tezpur-Jamuguri route via crossings of Jia Bharali. The present petitioners in the three connected cases are Bhiman Singh Chetri (Civil Rule No. 6/57), Bhupendra Nath Sarma (Civil Rule 7/57) and Montosh Kumar Sarkar (Civil Rule No. 22/57), who held valid permits for running Stage carriages in parts of this route. Bhiman Singh Chetri and Bhupendra Nath Sarma held licenses from the Regional Trans­port concerned valid upto 28th February, 1958 and that of Montosh Kumar Sarkar was only upto 31st December, 1956. (3) In pursuance of S. 4 of the Assam Act 30 of 1954 the Government published a scheme over the signature of the Transport Commissioner, Assam, whereby they set out the scheme specifying the routes on which the State Transport Services would be provided by the State Government exclusively or on monopolistic basis for different kinds of services mentioned in column 4 (vide Annexure II to the petition) and the dates on which the State Transport Services would commence operation were also indi­cated therein. In the particular route in which these petitioners were interested, namely the Tezpur-North Lakhim­pur route, the Government proposed to run their carriages with effect from 1st January, 1957, which they subsequently did. After hearing objections as provided under S. 5 of the Act a notice as provided thereunder was also published on 20th December 1956, a copy whereof has been made Annexure III to the petition. After hearing objections as provided under S. 5 of the Act a notice as provided thereunder was also published on 20th December 1956, a copy whereof has been made Annexure III to the petition. The relevant paragraph of the notice runs as follows : "Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers con­ferred by sub-s. (3) of S. 5 of the Assam State Road Transport Act, 1954 (Assam Act 30 of 1954) read with sub-r. (d) of the Assam State Road Transport Rules, 1956, the Governor of Assam is pleased to declare the routes specified in the Schedule as noti­fied routes where the State Road Transport Services will be provided by the State Government exclusively with effect from 1st January, 1957." We need not refer to other notifications, though there has been some reference in the course of argument to a part of Annexure III (marked as p. 2) where there is mention of the licenses in the aforesaid routes that stood cancelled with effect from 1st January, 1957. This is the background from which the pro­ceedings have started. The petitioners challenge the validity of these notifications and the steps taken by the State Government or the Transport Commis­sioner purporting to act under the provisions of the Assam State Road Transport Act. (4) The stand taken by the learned counsel ap­pearing in all these consolidated Rules for the peti­tions is almost identical and the points taken by him are -• 1. that the Assam Act 30 of 1954 (which we shall call the Act, hereafter for the sake of brevity) is ultra vires the Constitution of India, 2. that the notifications under Ss. 3, 4 and 5 as issued by or on behalf of the State Government are not in accordance with the provisions of the Act it­self, and 3. that the orders of cancellation of the licenses in question were in derogation of the provisions of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act which the State Gov­ernment could not have passed. (5) The first point taken by Mr. Ghose for the petitioners is sought to be substantiated on two grounds, first that the Act is in violation of Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India and secondly that the Act is in violation of Art. 301 of the Consti­tution of India. (5) The first point taken by Mr. Ghose for the petitioners is sought to be substantiated on two grounds, first that the Act is in violation of Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India and secondly that the Act is in violation of Art. 301 of the Consti­tution of India. We need not refer to the provisions of the Articles of the Constitution since they are quite familiar except that I should say that Art. 19 (1) (g) refers to the right of the citizens of India to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business and Art. 301 refers to freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India. Mr. Ghose in support of his contention has placed much reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Saghir Ahmad v. State of U. P., AIR 1954 SC 728 (A). There has really been considerable change of circumstances and in the Constitution of India itself on the point under consideration after decision of the Supreme Court in Saghir Ahmad's case (A). The latest position has been considered by the Supreme Court in the Motor Transport case from Orissa, Ram Chandra Palai v. State of Orissa, (S) AIR 1956 SC 298 (B). There also the identical points came up for con­sideration, namely the validity of a legislation where­by the State Government wanted to exercise mono­polistic rights in respect of transport traffic within the territory of the State and the cancellation of licen­ces issued under the Motor Vehicles Act. The case under reference relates to the validity of the two Acts passed by the Orissa Legislature, they being the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Regulation of Stage Car­riage and Public Carrier's Services) Act (36 of 1947) and the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act (1 of 1949). By these legislations the Orissa State Gov­ernment sought to monopolies the transport traffic in certain routes and the licence-holders of motor vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act objected to the validity of those legislations and notifications issued thereunder cancelling the licences of the private stage carriage-holders. By these legislations the Orissa State Gov­ernment sought to monopolies the transport traffic in certain routes and the licence-holders of motor vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act objected to the validity of those legislations and notifications issued thereunder cancelling the licences of the private stage carriage-holders. In the words of Bhagawati, J., "One thing, how­ever, is common between all these petitioners that their permits under which they have been operating their buses upon those routes for the last several years are liable to be either terminated or cancelled or are not to be renewed under the scheme of Na­tionalised Road Transport Services and either the State Government or the Transport Authorities will grant the permits on those routes only to the Orissa Road Transport Co., Ltd., or the State Transport Ser­vice as the case may be.'' The later concerns were organised or financed by the State Government. (6) In the case of Saghir Ahmad (A), the First Amendment to the Constitution of India which af­fected cl. (6) of Art. 19, was considered not appli­cable to U. P. State Road Transport Act (Act 2 of 1951) which came into force on 10th February 1951, and therefore it was held that the Uttar Pradesh legislation was hit by the Indian Constitution as it stood at the time of the passing of the impugned Act. By the First Amendment to the Constitution sub-cl. (ii) was added to cl. (6) of that Article which provided that "nothing in the said sub-cl. (g) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to or prevents the State from making any law relat­ing to............. the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or other­wise." This amendment to the Constitution made it possible for the State or any corporation owned or controlled by the State to carry on any trade, busi­ness, industry or service even on a monopolistic basis. The Assam Act in question being passed in 1954, there could be no objection to its validity on the ground of being monopolistic or for running the busi­ness by the State Government to the exclusion of the licence-holders for stage carriages. This disposes of the first branch of the argument of Mr. The Assam Act in question being passed in 1954, there could be no objection to its validity on the ground of being monopolistic or for running the busi­ness by the State Government to the exclusion of the licence-holders for stage carriages. This disposes of the first branch of the argument of Mr. Ghose on the first point taken by him. (7) Though Mr. Ghose for the petitioners took sufficient pains to show that the impugned legislation is in violation of Art. 301 relating to free trade, com­merce and intercourse, there is a fitting reply in re­ference thereto by the Advocate-General that the position has altogether been altered by virtue of the passing of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitu­tion of India which affected Art. 301 and practically a new provision was inserted in place thereof which runs as follows:- "305. Nothing in Arts. 301 and 303 shall affect the provisions of any existing law except in so far as the President may by order otherwise direct; and no­thing in Art. 301 shall affect the operation of any law made before the commencement of the Consti­tution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, in so far as it relates to, or prevent Parliament or the Legislature of a State from making any law relating to any such matter as is referred to in sub-cl. (ii) of cl. (6) of Art. 19." It says specifically that nothing in Arts. 301 and 303 shall affect the provisions of the existing law except so far as the President may by order or otherwise direct and that the provision has retrospective opera­tion. Therefore this argument relating to restriction under Art. 301 as it originally stood has no substance. (8) While dealing with the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned Acts vio­lated the guarantee of freedom of inter-State and intra-State trade or business embodied in Art. 301 of the Constitution, Bhagawati, J., in (S) AIR 1956 SC 298 (B), observed as follows:- "Art. 305 as it stood before the amendment and the amended Art. 305 which came into effect after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, afford a complete answer to this contention of the petitioners", thereby rejecting the contention. This observation of his Lordship applies with equal force to the contention placed before us on this point by the learned counsel for the petitioners. This observation of his Lordship applies with equal force to the contention placed before us on this point by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The case of Saghir Ahmad (A) had been considered by the Constitution Bench in connection with Ram Chandra Palai's case (B) and their Lordships have held relying on the earlier deci­sion of the Supreme Court in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (S) AIR 1955 SC 781 (C), that the State Government could run trans­port services on a monopolistic basis and it would not militate against any of the provisions of the Con­stitution. (9) Mr. Ghose's further contention is that the notifications as issued by the State Government really militate against the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act which provided that the licences of the stage carriage owners could be cancelled only under S. 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act. This point has been consider­ed by their Lordships in Ram Chandra Palai's case (B) and there what was observed by Bhagawati, J., was that "in the granting or refusing to grant such permits the Provincial Government was not bound to take into consideration the matters specified in S. 47 or 55, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Provincial Government was also authorised by notification to cancel any permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, without following the provisions of S. 60 ol that Act. The only provision which was made in S. 6, Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 in this behalf was that when a permit became inoperative under S. 4 (2) or was cancelled under S. 5 of that Act, compensation as therein prescribed was payable to such permit-holder." (10) Mr. Ghose argued that Ss. 13 and 14 of the Assam State Road Transport Act, 1954 - which deal with certain powers under this Act "notwithstanding any provision in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, or any other law" are repugnant to the Motor Vehicles Act which was an Act of the Central Legislature and drew our attention to the provisions of Arts. 13 and 14 of the Assam State Road Transport Act, 1954 - which deal with certain powers under this Act "notwithstanding any provision in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, or any other law" are repugnant to the Motor Vehicles Act which was an Act of the Central Legislature and drew our attention to the provisions of Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution, - but the learned Advocate-General argued that the relevant provision applying to the circumstances is Art. 254 (2) of the Constitution which runs as follows:- ''Where a law made by the Legislature of a State specified in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State, shall if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State: Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.'' (11) It is admitted that the sanction of the Pre­sident had been obtained in regard to the impugned Act on 5th October 1954 - that is before the Act was put into operation, - and therefore no objection can be taken as to the validity of its provisions within the State, as contended by the learned Advocate-General, - in spite of the Motor Vehicles Act. (12) In this case also Mr. Ghose feebly agitated his contention under Art. 31 of the Constitution. But the relevant provision has been made for payment of compensation for persons whose licences had been cancelled by the Assam State Road Transport (Amend­ment) Act, 1955 (Assam Act XVIII of 1955) by S. 7-A thereof. (13) Dealing with the point as to whether a hold­er of a stage carriage licence has the automatic right of renewal as contended by Mr. (13) Dealing with the point as to whether a hold­er of a stage carriage licence has the automatic right of renewal as contended by Mr. Ghose their Lord­ships of the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Palai's case (B) observed to the effect that "if there was no renewal of their permits on the expiration thereof after they had run for their normal period by virtue or the provisions of Orissa Act 1 of 1949, no claim could be made by them on the score of such non-renewal because renewal was not a matter of right." (14) The aforesaid observation applies with equal force in the circumstances of this case and Mr. Ghose's contention that petitioner Montosh Kumar Sarkar whose licence expired cu 31-12-56 was neither given nor offered any compensation by virtue of the Assam Act XXX of 1954 has therefore no substance. His licence on his own admission expired before the State took up the transport business in the route concerned. It is further in evidence that the other two persons Bhiman Singh Chetri and Bhupendra Nath Sarma had been permitted by tile State Government to run their buses in some other routes and they have suffer­ed no other injury except that they will not be per­mitted to run their buses in the original route for which they obtained the licences which were in force till 28th February 1958. They accepted the offer and have been so ope­rating their buses. On the facts therefore these two petitioners can have no grievance and the term of the licence of Montosh Sarkar had already expired. From the above discussions it will appear that the conten­tions of Mr. Ghose as to the validity of the Assam State Road Transport Act, 1954 (Assam Act XXX of 1954) and the orders of the State Government being in violation of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, have no force. (15) The other contention of Mr. Ghose, as I have already indicated, is that the notifications under Ss. 3, 4 and 5 were not in accordance with law. His first ground on this point relates to the fact that the two notifications under Ss. 3 and 4 were simultaneous and published in the same issue of the Assam Ga­zette and they also bore the same date. Ghose, as I have already indicated, is that the notifications under Ss. 3, 4 and 5 were not in accordance with law. His first ground on this point relates to the fact that the two notifications under Ss. 3 and 4 were simultaneous and published in the same issue of the Assam Ga­zette and they also bore the same date. He draws our attention to S. 4 of the Assam State Road Trans­port Act, 1954, which provides that "as soon as may be after the publication of the notification under S. 3, the State Government or if tile State Government so directs, the Transport Commissioner shall publish, in such manner as may be specified, a scheme as to the State Road Transport Service framed in pursu­ance of the declaration under S. 3''. He argued that as the words occurring in the sections are ''as soon as may be after'', - the notifi­cations could not have been simultaneous. We do not think that this contention merits any serious con­sideration as there must have been some consultation of the State authorities with the State Transport Com­missioner after the Government had made a declara­tion of their intention and the Transport Commission­er might have framed the scheme under S. 4 after such intention was known and then the notifications under Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act were published in the same Gazette rather than wait for some time to pub­lish the scheme under S. 4 of the Act. The peti­tioners in no sense were prejudiced by this simulta­neous publication. (16) The other contention was that the name of the petitioner Bhupendra Nath Sarma did not find a place in the notification published under S. 5. It is not denied that Bhupendra Nath Sarma had notice personally and therefore even if his name was omit­ted either by mistake or otherwise, it did not pre­judice him in any way or at least it is not a matter which we should take note of under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The result is that all the con­tentions raised by Mr. Ghose are considered not to be of much substance and v/e reject the petitions accord­ingly. All the three Rules are discharged and each of the petitioners is directed to pay Rs. 100 as hear­ing fee. The same judgment will cover all the three Rules. SARJOO PROSAD, C. J.: (16a) I agree. Ghose are considered not to be of much substance and v/e reject the petitions accord­ingly. All the three Rules are discharged and each of the petitioners is directed to pay Rs. 100 as hear­ing fee. The same judgment will cover all the three Rules. SARJOO PROSAD, C. J.: (16a) I agree. Most of the attractive and plausi­ble submissions of Mr. Ghose based on the interpre­tation of the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 728 (A), appear to have been adequately ans­wered by the later decision of the same Court in (S) AIR 1956 SC 298 (B); and even if on some points it might be legitimately urged that the later decision is not sufficiently discursive so as to displace all the reasonings in the earlier case, we are at any rate bound by the categorical decision actually given in the latter case by that Court. (17) I may further refer to a contention of Mr. Ghose wherein he urged that the Act as it was ori­ginally passed did not provide for any compensation for those whose licences were to be terminated be­fore the expiry of the due date, with a view to na­tionalise road transport on a particular route. He contends that inasmuch as such a termination of li­cence before the due date operated to deprive a per­son of his right to property, a provision for compen­sation was necessary and in the absence thereof, the Act is constitutionally invalid. The argument, how­ever, ignores the provisions of the amending Act, the Assam State Road Transport (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Act XVIII of 1955), which came into operation on the same day as the Act itself. The original Act, though passed in 1954, had been kept in abeyance until notified to be in force by the State Government with effect from 10th Au­gust 1956. Therefore, read with the amended provi­sion, the Act could not be constitutionally impugned on that ground. The contention that it should have further provided for compensation for persons whose licences to operate state carriages had already expir­ed before the date on which the State commenced operations on that route is futile, as such persons have no property right in getting renewal of their li­cences as a matter of course; and after the decision of the Supreme Court in Rama Chandra v. State of Orissa (B), the point cannot be legitimately agitated any longer. SARJOO PROSAD, C. J. AND DEKA, J.: (18) Leave is prayed for under Art. 132 of the Constitution, but in view of the decision of the Sup­reme Court in (S) AIR 1956 SC 298 (B), we refuse to grant the same. V. R. B. Rules discharged.