JUDGMENT A.P. Srivastava, J. - This is a Defendant's application in revision. 2. The Plaintiff filed a suit against the applicant and certain other persons. The reliefs claimed were specific performance of a contract, recovery of damages and the issue of an injunction. The suit was valued at Rs. 5,39,500. After issues had been framed and the issues of valuation and court-fee had been decided 18-9-1952 was fixed as the date of final hearing. On 14-8-1952, the applicant made an application (No. 137/C) praying that a copy of interrogatories filed along with the application be served on the Plaintiff and he be ordered to answer the same within 10 days time. The Court ordered on the application "Let talbana be filed. Ask the Plaintiff's counsel to file replies in ten days." Talbana was filed and on 25-8-1952 the Court ordered "Talbana filed. Issue notice to the Plaintiff's counsel who will file replies of the interrogatories in ten days." On 4-9-1952, the Plaintiff applied for extension of time for the filing of the reply and time was extended by 15 days i.e. till 19-9-52. No replies were, however, filed. On 18-9-1952 when the case came up for final hearing the Plaintiff applied for adjournment on the ground of illness. The case was adjourned to the 18th and 19th of November 1952 on payment of costs. On 23-9-1952 the Defendant, now the applicant, made an application praying that the suit be dismissed because the Plaintiff had not filed replies to the interrogatories within the time allowed by the court. The application was allowed and the suit was dismissed on that very date. The Plaintiff then applied for the restoration of the case and after hearing the parties the learned Addl. Civil Judge who was dealing with the case allowed the application, set aside the order of dismissal and restored the case to its original number. He also permitted the Defendant to reply to the interrogatories within three days. The replies were filed within the time allowed. 3. The present application in revision has been filed against the order restoring the suit and setting aside the order of dismissal. It is contended in support of the application that the suit had been dismissed under Order 11, Rule 21, Code of Civil Procedure. The order was appealable. The Plaintiff did not avail of that remedy. 3. The present application in revision has been filed against the order restoring the suit and setting aside the order of dismissal. It is contended in support of the application that the suit had been dismissed under Order 11, Rule 21, Code of Civil Procedure. The order was appealable. The Plaintiff did not avail of that remedy. He could not therefore invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court for getting the relief which was open to him but which had not been pursued by him. The court too had no jurisdiction in exercise of its inherent powers to set aside the order of dismissal and to restore the suit when a specific remedy provided by the Code was open to the Plaintiff but had not been pursued by him. Reliance is placed in support of the contention on two cases Nageshar Prasad Vs. Gudri Lal Narain Das and Another and Chander Bhan Singh v. Lallu Singh AIR 1947 All. 343. 4. On behalf of the opposite parties, the facts which led to the dismissal of the suit and to its subsequent restoration are not disputed. The Plaintiff's reply to the applicant's contention is, however, three-fold. It is urged, in the first place, that the court is not necessarily deprived of its inherent jurisdiction u/s 151, CPC simply because an alternative remedy is open but has not been pursued. The second contention is that in this case the order dismissing the suit was not a legal order. Even if it be conceded that the subsequent order restoring the suit was equally illegal, on the principle laid down in the case of Chandra Bhan singh v. Lallu singh AIR 1947 All. 343 this Court should not by setting aside the subsequent illegal order restore the former illegal order. The last contention is that in the circumstances of the case the order restering the suit was a just and proper order which the learned Civil Judge had passed keeping in view of the fact that the Plaintiff had omitted to file the replies to the interrogatories served upon him within the time fixed by the court under a misapprehension of facts. This Court's powers of revision are discretionary and the applicant has not made out any case for the exercise of those powers in his favour in the circumstances of the present case. This Court's powers of revision are discretionary and the applicant has not made out any case for the exercise of those powers in his favour in the circumstances of the present case. The question whether the court has jurisdiction in the exercise of its inherent powers to grant a relief for which an alternative remedy existed but had not been pursued has been the subject matter of consideration in a number of cases and judicial opinion on the point cannot be easily reconciled. There can be no doubt that in Nageshar Prasad Vs. Gudri Lal Narain Das and Another it was laid down: 5. "Where a party considers a decree or order of the Court unjust and has neglected to avail himself of the remedy provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, e.g., his right of appeal or of application in revision it is not open to him subsequently to invite the Court by virtue of its inherent jurisdiction reserved by Section 151 to disturb that decree or order which he has failed to challenge in the statutory manner and within the statutory period." Following these observation Mootham, J. laid down in Chander Bhan singh's AIR 1947 All. 343 case. An order u/s 51 cannot be made where there is a specific remedy provided by the Code applicable to the circumstances of the case. Subsequently in Raj Kumar v. Ved Roop Narain 1950 AWR (H.C.) 35, Agarwala J. Was of opinion that, The Court's jurisdiction to grant relief under its inherent powers may be exercised even though there may be another remedy open to the aggrieved party. This power will be readily exercised where the mistake is of the Court itself; it Would not be so readily exercised where the other party was negligent in the prosecution of his case or did not avail himself of another remedy which was easily available and did not involve greater expense or delay. He referred in support of this opinion to the cases of Sri Rajah Ravu Venkata Mahipathi Suryarao Bahadur Garu of of Pithapuram Vs. Mattapalli Chalamayya and Others, AIR 1947 Mad 339 , Badri Pd. v. Ambika Pd. 1940 AWR (C.C.) 457 and Chandar Sekhar v. Shankar 1942 AWR (C.C.) 137. He also referred to an earlier case of this Court in Kallan Vs. Nanhe, AIR 1930 All 701 . Mattapalli Chalamayya and Others, AIR 1947 Mad 339 , Badri Pd. v. Ambika Pd. 1940 AWR (C.C.) 457 and Chandar Sekhar v. Shankar 1942 AWR (C.C.) 137. He also referred to an earlier case of this Court in Kallan Vs. Nanhe, AIR 1930 All 701 . In that case the defence of the Defendant had been struck off for noncompliance with an order of the Court and the suit had been decreed ex parte. The order striking off the defence was appealable under Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, but that remedy had not been pursued. Instead the Defendant applied to the Court for the setting aside of the ex parte decree and the decree was set aside. The Plaintiff went up in revision and it was held. The Court has an inherent jurisdiction to over set the former order, striking out the defence and passing an ex parte decree against the Defendant. The mere fact that the Defendant had a right of appeal under Code of Civil Procedure, Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (f), from the order striking off his defence does not preclude the Court below from exercising jurisdiction in setting aside ex parte decree which has been wrongly and illegally passed. 6. The true principle in my opinion appears to be that the mere existence of an alternative remedy is not necessarily a bar to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of a court reserved by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such an inherent power can be exercised only in the interest of justice to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. Whether the jurisdiction is to be exercised in a particular case or not must depend necessarily on the facts and circumstances of the case. The facts that an alternative remedy existed and had not been pursued are important considerations which the court must keep in view while deciding whether to exercise its inherent powers in the particular case or not. 7. In the present case the suit of the Plaintiff had been dismissed on the ground that he had not complied with the order of the court directing him to file replies of the interogatories within a fixed time. That time expired on 19-9-52. 7. In the present case the suit of the Plaintiff had been dismissed on the ground that he had not complied with the order of the court directing him to file replies of the interogatories within a fixed time. That time expired on 19-9-52. One day earlier, i.e. on 18-9-1952 which was the date fixed for the final hearing, the Plaintiff had applied for adjournment. As has been pointed out by the learned Civil Judge, his application for adjournment contained a prayer for extension of time for filing replies to the interrogatories also. When the application was put up before the learned Civil Judge his attention was apparently not drawn to this prayer. The result was that the learned Judge did not pass any specific order granting or refusing to grant extension of time for the filing of the interrogatories. He only adjourned the case to another date on payment of costs. This naturally led the Plaintiff to think that his prayer for extension of time for filing replies had also been tacitly granted. The Plaintiff, therefore, thought that time had been granted to him to file his replies by the date to which the case had been adjourned for final hearing. No replies were, therefore, filed by 19-9-1952 and on the 23rd of September the Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the suit. In these circumstances the learned Civil Judge felt that the dismissal was not justified and that it was necessary in the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court that the inherent powers should be exercised and the case restored to its original number. 8. Considering the case purely from the technical point of view also the order dismissing the suit could not be upheld as a valid order. A perusal of the provisions of Order 11 of the CPC will show that three distinct stages are contemplated. Under Rule 1 of that Order it is open to a party to deliver interrogatories for the examination of the opposite party. Before such interrogatories can be delivered, however, leave of the court has to be obtained. The interrogatories may be delivered outside the court or through the court. In case they are delivered through the court the necessary process fee and copies have to be filed so that they may be served on the party who is to reply. Before such interrogatories can be delivered, however, leave of the court has to be obtained. The interrogatories may be delivered outside the court or through the court. In case they are delivered through the court the necessary process fee and copies have to be filed so that they may be served on the party who is to reply. Leave of the Court is, however, a necessary condition and without that leave no proceedings in connection with the interrogatories can be started. After the leave has been obtained and the interrogatories have been delivered it is open to the person required to reply to make replies or to raise objections. If no objections are raised and replies are not made, or if made are insufficient, Rule 11 becomes applicable, and the party interrogating can apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to answer, or answer further as the case may be. The application under Rule 11 presupposes that the necessary procedure contemplated by Rule 1 has already been followed. If an order under Rule 11 has been made requiring the party concerned to answer or to further answer interrogatories and that order has not been complied with, Rule 21 comes into play and for failure to comply with the order made under Rule 11, a penalty can be imposed on the party in default. If he is the Plaintiff, the suit can be dismissed for want of prosecution, and if he is Defendant, his defence can be struck out. These three stages have been clearly pointed out in Ramapat Saran and Another Vs. Habib Ullah Khan and Another, AIR 1926 All 553 where it was laid down: An order under that rule (that is to say Order 11, Rule 21) can be passed only, when there is a previous order under Rule 11, requiring a party to answer interrogatories. There are two stages in which the application proceeds. The first is indicated in Rule 1. Under that Rule a party simply delivers certain interrogatories to be answered by the other party. The other party may or may not comply with the request. When the party to be questioned fails to answer the interrogatories, the party interrogating has a right to come before the Court and to obtain an order under Rule 11 for an answer. Under that Rule a party simply delivers certain interrogatories to be answered by the other party. The other party may or may not comply with the request. When the party to be questioned fails to answer the interrogatories, the party interrogating has a right to come before the Court and to obtain an order under Rule 11 for an answer. It is then that the Court decides whether the party "interrogated must answer or not. It is when the court has ordered certain interrogatories to be answered and there is a failure that the question arises whether the failure should be punished and the order enforced by the provision of Rule 21. 9. In the present case the record shows that the procedure required by Order 11, Rule 1 was never followed. No leave of the court was ever applied for by the Defendant for delivering interrogatories to the Plaintiff. The application which was made in that connection is 137/C. It does not contain any prayer that leave be granted to the Respondent for delivering interrogatories to the Plaintiff. The only thing prayed for was that the Plaintiff be required to reply to the interrogatories within the time fixed. The court never applied its mind to the question whether any case has been made out for the grant of leave and it never purported to grant any leave either expressly or by implication. It only directed that the interrogatories be delivered through the court and that replies be filed. No leave having been granted the interrogatories cannot be held to have been properly delivered and in that case the Plaintiff was not bound to reply to them. The Plaintiff could not therefore be compelled under Rule 11 to reply to them. Rule 1 not having been complied with, the direction given to the Plaintiff to reply to the interrogatories within time fixed cannot technically be held to have been made under Rule 11 and if no order under Rule 11 was passed the penalty contemplated by Rule 21 could not be imposed. The learned Civil Judge has taken the view that Rule 1 was complied with as the leave could be held to have been granted by implication. It is difficult to agree with this view. When the court never considered the question how could it be held to have granted the leave by implication. The learned Civil Judge has taken the view that Rule 1 was complied with as the leave could be held to have been granted by implication. It is difficult to agree with this view. When the court never considered the question how could it be held to have granted the leave by implication. Strictly speaking, therefore, the order dismissing the suit was not a legal order and when it was brought to the notice of the court that it had somehow passed an illegal order, the court must be held to have inherent jurisdiction to correct its own mistake and to set aside that order. 10. Taking all the above mentioned aspects and circumstances in view the order of the learned Civil Judge setting aside the dismissal of the suit appears to be a just and fair order and I think no case has been made out for interference with it. 11. The application is therefore dismissed with costs. The stay order is discharged. The record will be sent back at an early date to the court below so that it may proceed with the trial.