Judgment :- 1. This civil miscellaneous appeal relates to a matter in execution. The decree schedule properties, 18 in number, belong to the illom of the decree-holders. Items 1 to 10 were mortgaged by the illom to defendant 4, and by successive assignments defendant 7 obtained the mortgage interest. Items 11 to 18 were outstanding on a lease granted by the illom arid, on the date of suit, the lease-hold interest was vested in defendants 10 and 17. Defendant 1 is the karnavan of the illom and defendant 2, Padmanabhan Nambudiripad, the senior anandiravan. The equity of redemption of items 1 to 10 was sold in execution of a decree obtained against the karnavan of the illom by defendant 4, a joint stock bank, and purchased by the bank itself. Defendant 7 subsequently obtained an assignment of the auction-purchaser's right. After this, six junior members of the illom - three of whom were adult females, one a minor female named Sreedevi, and two who were minor boys - brought the suit for cancellation of the above mortgage and lease and the decree and execution proceedings, and for a declaration that they were entitled to recover possession of the properties on behalf of their illom, and also for recovery of possession of the same. The trial court set aside the decree and execution proceedings but held that the mortgage and the lease were valid and gave a decree to the plaintiff in the following terms: "That the plaintiffs be entitled to recover possession of such of the lands as was taken possession of by the fourth defendant in execution of the above decree-That the above declaration be subject to the mortgage rights of the 4th defendant over items 1 to 10 under Exts. B2 and B4 and also subject to the tenancy rights of defendants 10 & 17 for items 11 & 18 under the terms of Ex. A3". In the plaint there was an alternative prayer that, if the mortgage was found to be valid and binding on the plaintiff's illom, plaintiffs should be given a decree for redemption of the same and recovery of possession of the mortgaged properties. This prayer was not allowed by the trial court and so the plaintiffs filed an appeal from the trial court's decree. This prayer was not allowed by the trial court and so the plaintiffs filed an appeal from the trial court's decree. The appellate court allowed the plaintiffs to redeem the mortgage and recover possession of the mortgaged properties and also directed in its decree that, if the plaintiffs failed to redeem the mortgage within the time specified by it defendant 7 could apply to the court for a final decree for sale of the mortgaged properties and realisation of the mortgage amount due to him. The present civil miscellaneous appeal relates only to decree schedule items 1 to 10 2. In accordance with the appellate decree the plaintiffs deposited the mortgage amount in court and filed E. P. No. 27 of 1952 for execution praying for recovery of possession of the mortgaged properties. By the time this petition was filed plaintiff 1 had died and the application was therefore made only by the remaining five plaintiffs, two of whom (the boys) were still minors. This execution petition was dated 10-2-1952, and shortly after it was filed in court defendants 1 and 2 and plaintiffs 3 and 4 executed a lease deed, Ex. BI, in favour of one Madhavan who is the younger brother of defendant 7 for items 1 to 10. This lease deed was executed on 19-4-1952 and provided that the lessee should get himself impleaded in execution as an additional decree-holder and should recover possession of the mortgaged properties and that he was to hold the properties for a period of ten years thereafter paying an annual rent of 100 paras of paddy. A sum of Rs. 750/- was also taken from him as security for due payment of the rent. Defendant 1, the karnavan, joined in the execution of the document not only in his own capacity but also as guardian of the minors. On the strength of Ex. BI Madhavan applied by E. A. No. 497 of 1952 on 19-11-1952 for getting himself impleaded as additional decree-holder. Defendant 7 was employed in Colombo at this time. On 23-1-1953 he filed a counter to E P. No. 27 of 1952 filed by the plaintiffs and another counter to E. A. No. 497 of 1952 filed by Madhavan. Both these counters were signed by defendant 7 at Colombo on 10-1-1953 and they were filed in court on 23-1-1953. Defendant 7 was employed in Colombo at this time. On 23-1-1953 he filed a counter to E P. No. 27 of 1952 filed by the plaintiffs and another counter to E. A. No. 497 of 1952 filed by Madhavan. Both these counters were signed by defendant 7 at Colombo on 10-1-1953 and they were filed in court on 23-1-1953. In the counter to E.P. No. 27 it was stated that Ex. BI was taken by defendant 7 benami in the name of his younger brother, Madhavan, and for settling the decree and that as the decree has been adjusted it could not be executed. In the counter to E.A. No. 497 also the same statement was repeated and delivery to Madhavan also was objected to. It was stated in both these counters that Ext. BI was taken benami in the name of Madhavan because defendant 7 was employed and was living at Colombo. The plaintiffs also filed an objection to Madhavan's application stating interalia that Sreedevi had not joined in the execution of Ext. BI and it was therefore "an incomplete document since it was intended to be executed by all but was not executed by all the members of the mana. It is also learnt that the persons who have executed it did so in the name of the applicant benami for his brother, Krishnan, who was away in Ceylon at the time. The rights, if any, created in favour of the petitioner have to be worked out and can be worked out after delivery of the properties to the decree-holders". On 2-12-53 defendant 7 filed another petition to record satisfaction of the decree on the strength of the adjustment said to have been effected in pursuance of Ext. BI taken by him benami in the name of his younger brother. This application also was opposed by the plaintiffs on the ground that Sreedevi had not joined in the execution of Ex. BI and that plaintiffs 2 and 3 were caused to execute it by the fraud and undue influence of the karnavan (defendant 1). After defendant 7 filed his petitions, Madhavan himself filed another petition dated 30-12-1953 stating that he had taken Ext. BI for and on behalf of defendant 7 and benami for him and that he had no objection to defendant 7's applications being allowed. After defendant 7 filed his petitions, Madhavan himself filed another petition dated 30-12-1953 stating that he had taken Ext. BI for and on behalf of defendant 7 and benami for him and that he had no objection to defendant 7's applications being allowed. On 8-11-1954 the execution court recorded satisfaction of the decree on the strength of Ext. BI and dismissed E. P. 27 and E. A. No. 497 of 1952 holding that Ext. BI was taken benami by defendant 7 in the name of his brother and rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that Ext. BI was invalid. Plaintiffs have, therefore, filed this appeal against the order of 8-11-1954. 3. Mr. Sundara Iyer, the learned advocate for the appellants, urged in this court that Ext. BI is invalid and cannot be acted upon for the reasons (1) that Sreedevi, one of the plaintiffs, had not joined in executing it, (2) that plaintiffs 2 and 3 were caused to join in its execution by the fraud and misrepresentation practised on them by the male members of the illom, and (3) that the execution of Ext. BI was beyond the powers of the karnavan and other adult members of the illom who had joined in its execution. He also urged that the adjustment cannot be accepted and acted upon as the same had not been certified to the execution court or an application for recording it made to the execution court under 0.21 R.2, Code of Civil Procedure, within the time required by law and no leave also had been obtained from the court under 0.32 R.7 for effecting a compromise on behalf of the minor plaintiffs. 4. We may say at once that the objections based on 0.21 R.2 and 0.32 R.7, Code of Civil Procedure, were not taken by the appellants in the court below, and we therefore consider that, in the circumstances of this case, they cannot be allowed to raise those objections for the first time in this court. The adjustment of the decree pleaded by defendant 7 is not an adjustment by the mere execution of Ext. BI but an adjustment as per an agreement in pursuance of which Ext. BI was executed. The execution of Ext. BI, according to him, was not the final carrying out of the agreement and there were other things also to be done after the execution of Ext. BI but an adjustment as per an agreement in pursuance of which Ext. BI was executed. The execution of Ext. BI, according to him, was not the final carrying out of the agreement and there were other things also to be done after the execution of Ext. BI before the decree could be adjusted. His case is that after the agreement was finally carried out he filed the objection petitions to E. P. No. 27 of 1952 and E. A. No. 497 of 1952 intimating to the court about the adjustment. In these circumstances, the question of the starting point of limitation for an application under 0.21 R.2 is dependent upon the decision of a question of fact, and so, we consider that defendant 7 would be prejudiced if the appellants are allowed to raise the question of limitation for the first time in this court. So far as the objection under 0.32 R.7, Code of Civil Procedure, is concerned, it is significant that the appellants did not raise this objection in the court below, which was the court which should have granted the necessary leave and which was therefore the best authority to say whether leave was, as a matter of fact, granted or not. From the records sent up for the appeal it is not possible to ascertain whether leave has been granted or not. Further, a compromise effected on behalf of a minor by his guardian without the leave of the court is not void ab initio and is only voidable at the instance of the minor. If leave has not really been granted and if the minors do not choose to accept the compromise it will be open to them, when they become majors, to have the compromise avoided in other appropriate proceedings. Having regard to all these facts, we do not think it proper to allow the appellants to raise this objection also for the first time in this court. 5. So far as the contention that plaintiffs 2 and 3 were caused to join in the execution of Ext. BI by the fraud and misrepresentation of the male members of the illom is concerned, the appellants have no evidence barring the interested statements of plaintiffs 2 and 3 themselves. The attestors to the document have not been called as witnesses. The ladies themselves were not illiterate and were adults. BI by the fraud and misrepresentation of the male members of the illom is concerned, the appellants have no evidence barring the interested statements of plaintiffs 2 and 3 themselves. The attestors to the document have not been called as witnesses. The ladies themselves were not illiterate and were adults. Plaintiffs had filed two objection petitions in the lower court against accepting Ext. Bl. In the first objection, dated 19-1-1953, printed at page 15 of the paper book containing the pleadings, their only objection to Ext. BI was that it was an incomplete document in as much as all the adult plaintiffs had not joined in executing it even though it was intended to be executed by all of them. There was not a whisper in it of plaintiffs 2 and 3 having been made to join in the execution of the document by fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation. The objection to Ext. BI was stated in Para.3 of the counter of 19-1-1953 and that paragraph reads: "3. The lease deed, dated 19th April 1952 referred to in the affidavit is not a deed executed by all the petitioners and as such is not binding on them. It is also an incomplete document since it was intended to be executed by all but was not executed by all the members of the mana. It is also learnt that the persons who have executed it did so in the name of the appellant benami for his brother, Krishnan, who was away in Ceylon at the time. The rights, if any, created in favour of the petitioner has to be worked out and can be worked out after delivery of the properties to the decree-holders." Another counter was filed on 12-12-1953. In that counter plaintiffs charged only defendant 1, the karnavan of the illom, with having practised fraud and undue influence on plaintiffs 2 and 3. In Para.4 of that counter it is said: "Petitioners 2 and 3 became parties to the said kaichit document because the first defendant never informed them that the kaichit was in respect of the properties items Nos.1 to 10 and because they were completely misguided". There was no case in that counter also that any male member other than defendant 1 had practised any fraud or undue influence. Defendant 2, Padmanabhan Nambudiripad, the senior anandiravan of the Illom, is one of the executants of Ext. There was no case in that counter also that any male member other than defendant 1 had practised any fraud or undue influence. Defendant 2, Padmanabhan Nambudiripad, the senior anandiravan of the Illom, is one of the executants of Ext. BI and he is the husband of plaintiff 3. The minor plaintiffs are the children of Padmanabhan Nambudiripad and plaintiff 3. Besides Padmanabhan Numbudiripad and plaintiff 3 and the minor plaintiffs the only other members of the illom are defendant 1 and plaintiff 2 who is the widow of Padmanabhan Nambudiripad's elder brother. Padmanabhan Nambudiripad would not have joined in the execution of Ext. BI if that document was caused to be executed by defendant to defraud the illom and advance his own interests; and it is also unlikely that his wife and sister-in-law would have joined in the execution of Ext. BI without obtaining his advice or against his interests. In the circumstances, we do not believe the case that plaintiffs 2 and 3 were caused to join in the execution of Ext. BI on account of fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence. We have absolutely no doubt that they executed it of their own free will, after getting advice from Padmanabhan Nambudiripad; and we find accordingly. 6. At the time of the institution of the suit three of the plaintiffs were minors, as has been stated already. The eldest of the minors was Sreedevi who was then 15 years old as per her age given in the plaint. Ext. BI was executed by defendants 1 and 2 and plaintiffs 2 and 3, and defendant 1 has executed the document both in his personal capacity and in his capacity as guardian of the minor plaintiffs. Under the law governing the parties defendant 1, the karnavan of the illom, was undoubtedly the guardian of the minor members of the illom. But, Sreedevi had become a major by the time of the execution of Ext. BI, and in the preamble of that document wherein the names of the executants are given Sreedevi also figures as an executant without it being stated whether she was a minor or a major. But, she has not actually executed the document, and the persons who have signed it are only defendants 1 and 2 and plaintiffs 2 and 3. It was not disputed before us that Sreedevi was a major on the date of Ext. Bl. But, she has not actually executed the document, and the persons who have signed it are only defendants 1 and 2 and plaintiffs 2 and 3. It was not disputed before us that Sreedevi was a major on the date of Ext. Bl. The appellants urged that, as the document was intended to be executed by Sreedevi also and as she has not actually joined in its execution, it is an incomplete document and effect cannot therefore be given to it. Reliance was placed in support of this contention of Kanniah Gupta v. Subbarami Reddy (1949 (II) M.L.J. 390). The dictum in that case is: If a document is drawn up in the name of several persons and it is the intention of the parties that all should execute it, it will become incomplete and inoperative till all have done so; but it is a question of fact in each case as to what was the intention of the parties". We are in perfect agreement with this decision, but we consider that there are ample materials in this case to show that it was not the intention of the parties that Sreedevi also should join in the execution of the document. S.32 (2) of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, XXII of 1933, which governs Nambudiris also, provides: ' "No lease of an immovable property of a tarwad in cases not referred to in subsection (1) shall be valid unless it is executed by the karnavan, and where the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, confers fixity of tenure on the lessee, unless also the written consent of the majority of the major members of the tarwad has been obtained to the lease". Leases referred to in sub-section (1) are leases for periods exceeding twelve years and leases with premium. Being a lease for ten years Ext. BI could be executed by the karnavan of the illom, namely, defendant 1, with the written consent of the majority of the major members. Besides the karnavan there were only four adult members in the illom at the time of the execution of Ext. B1, and out of those four, three including Sreedevi's parents have joined in its execution. There can, therefore, be no doubt of the fact that if Sreedevi's name did not happen to be mentioned in the preamble as one of the executants of the document Ext. BI would have been perfectly valid. B1, and out of those four, three including Sreedevi's parents have joined in its execution. There can, therefore, be no doubt of the fact that if Sreedevi's name did not happen to be mentioned in the preamble as one of the executants of the document Ext. BI would have been perfectly valid. Although Sreedevi has not signed Ext. B1 it was presented for registration by the remaining parties, and execution of it was admitted by all of them. If it was the intention of the parties that Sreedevi also was to join in the execution of Ext. B1 it is absolutely certain that defendant 2 and plaintiff 3 would not have joined in presenting it for registration when she had not signed it. The presentation of the document for registration, without Sreedevi having signed in it, by the remaining parties is one important circumstance which shows that there was no intention that Sreedevi was also to join in its execution. Sreedevi had become a major only about two years before the execution of Ext. Bl. She was unmarried on the date of that document, for it is expressly stated therein that she was kanyaka. The names all the other minors are also recited in the preamble in Ext. BI among the names of the executants. From the mere recital of the names in the preamble it cannot be inferred that the intention was that all of them should join in the actual execution of the document. Sreedevi's name was mentioned in the preamble just like the names of the minors and since the document would be valid even without her joining in its execution the parties did not consider it necessary to take the signature of the young unmarried antherjanam in it and cause her to be taken before the Sub-Registrar for admitting execution. In the circumstances, we do not consider that Sreedevi's failure to join in the execution of Ext. BI renders that document invalid as against the illom. Ext. B1 having been executed by the karnavan and three out of the four other adult members in the illom it has to be treated as valid document under the provision of S.32 (2) of the Malabar Marumakkathayam Act. 7. In the result, the order of the court below is confirmed and this civil miscellaneous appeal is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.